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ABSTRACT
In January 1839, the British occupied Aden for a number of 
reasons# These reasons and the early British contacts with the 
peninsula are discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis*
During the period under study, Aden developed from a small 
poor village into a sizable town, a prosperous trading port, an 
important military and naval base and a vital communications 
centre* The factors and policies responsible for this development 
and the problems which had to be faced are dealt with in 
Chapters III-V*
The British had no desire to use Aden as a base for expansion 
and wanted to keep contact with the interior to a minimum* However, 
for geographical, economic and political reasons, they could not 
avoid becoming involved with the neighbouring tribes* The last 
three chapters trace the course of Arab-British relations and 
analyse the factors which governed them*
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ARABIC NAMES*
Many Arabic names in the sources are spelt in a number of ways, and 
sometimes even the same name appears in more than one form in the 
same source* In fact, certain names have been completely altered, 
e.g* "West1* for "Ways", "Aloose” for ,,,AlawiM and "Urgl!" for 
M,Awlaqin, In this work the author has tried his best to see that 
all names have been correctly given and transliterated*
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INTRODUCTION.
The peninsula of Aden, on the south-west coast of Arabia, lies 
100 miles east of the straits of Bab al-Handab at the entrance to the 
Red Sea. It has an area of 21 square miles, the greater part of 
which is uninhabitable, being covered by precipitous hills, the high­
est of which is Mount Sharasan, 1775 feet. These hills slope towards 
the sea, forming many spurs and valleys.
Aden is surrounded by the Arabian Sea on the east, west and 
south. To the north it is connected with the mainland by an isthmus, 
one and a half miles long and 1350 yards broad. It has been suggested 
that the peninsula was once an island, for until the British era the 
Isthmus was at one place almost covered by the sea at spring-tides.
In 1868, the British built a causeway to carry the Bhaykh 1Uthman
aqueduct and to facilitate trade with the interior.
The peninsula has two large bays, one on the eastern, and one on
the western, side. Before the British occupation, the harbour was in
Eastern or Front Bay. The British, however, built their harbour in 
Western or Back Bay, it being deeper, more extensive and well-sheltered. 
The new harbour lies between the peninsulas of Aden and Jabal Ihsan 
(Little Aden). It measures about seven miles east to west and four 
miles north to south. Eastern Bay had been silting up long before the 
British came, and in the l860#s the old harbour was abandoned.
On the eastern side of the peninsula, and open to the sea, is a 
plain, the crater of an extinct volcano. It is three miles in circum­
ference and on it stands the town of Aden, or Crater, as it is often 
called. From the western side of the peninsula and from the interior 
there was until the 1950*6 only one way into the town except for 
r gged mountain paths. This road lies to the north of the town, and 
the British called it the Main Pass. The Little Pass (Ras Hujayf) 
is to the west of the peninsula and leads to Tawahi (Steamer Point).
The dry b>d of a water-course runs down to the sea from the Tawilah 
Valley, dividing the town into two nearly equal parts*
Opposite to, and commanding, the town is Sirah Island, a 
triangular rock, 1200 yards long by 7CO yards wide and kOO feet high*
At low water it is connected to the peninsula. Two miles to the 
north-west of the town, and about half a mile to the north of the 
Main Pass, lies Mu'alia, in 1839 a fishing hamlet, but now a 
flourishing township. Here the coasting craft still anchor as in the 
past*
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During the north-east monsoon or the trading season (from 
October to April), the temperature rarely rises above 30 degrees F*
For the rest of the year, i.e. during the south-west monsoon, hot 
sandy winds coming, strangely enough, from the north prevail, and 
the temperature can exceed 100 degrees F. May and .September are 
particularly unpleasant, being the months of the change of monsoon, 
when there is practically no wind and the air is oppressive.
Aden has no mineral wealth and produces nothing worthy of mention. 
Even for its water it is dependent on outside sources. Yet its 
strategic and commercial position made it a highly desirable possession* 
In August 1538, the Ottomans, under Admiral Sulayman Pasha, seized it 
with the intention of using it as a base for their operations against 
the Portuguese settlements on the west coast of India. Leaving a 
garrison behind them, the Ottomans proceeded to attack Diu. VJhen 
they were repulsed, they returned to Aden, landed 100 pieces of 
artillery and strengthened the garrison* Then from Aden Sulayman 
went to Kukha and spread Ottoman authority along the coast of the 
Yemen. He eventually captured San'a and subjected the whole country*
In 1540, the Portuguese attacked Suez in retaliation, but were 
driven back. Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Aden rose against the 
Ottomans, slaughtered the entire garrison and invited the Portuguese 
to take over. The Portuguese remained in control of the town until 
1551, when an Ottoman fleet under Peri Pasha recovered it.
VJhen Murad IV succeeded to the sultanate in 1623, the Ottoman 
Empire appeared to be on the point of collapse. In the Yemen, in 
1595* the new imam, al-Qasim Ibn Muhammad, had rebelled against the 
Sunni Ottomans, he being a Shi1! and head of the Zaydi sect. Al-Qasim 
fought successfully until his death in 1620, and his son Muhamjaad 
continued the struggle unabated* Faced with this situation and with 
other difficulties in the Empire, Murad withdrew from the Yemen in 
1635.
After the departure of the Ottomans, South Yemen, which was 
Sunni, asserted its independence. Aden, together with Lahj to the 
north and Abyan to the east, was seized by Husayn Ibn *Abd al-Qadir, 
the Yafi’i* In 1644, the Imam Muhammad died and was succeeded by 
his brother Isma’il who, in the same year, annexed Aden and the two 
neighbouring districts. Before his death in 16?6, Isma*il had 
subjected the rest of South Yemen except Hadramawt which fell to his
9.
uncle and successor, Ahmad Ibn Husayn, in 1631*
The imams, however, could not control the couth for long, and 
the term 11 Yemen” was soon to mean only the northern part of the 
country* In the south, the tribes, one by one, revolted and freed 
themselves from imaaic rule* Thoir chiefs assumed different titles, 
the most common being that of "Sultan”*
Fadl Ibn *Ali, the chief of the ’Abdali tribe which inhabited 
Lahj, wanted to gain independence and annex Aden* For this purpose, 
he sought the assistance of Sayf Ibn Qahtan, the Sultan of Lower Yafi* 
and promised him in return half the revenues of the port; Sayf agreed 
In 1723, Fadl declared his independence, and in 1735, the confederates 
captured Aden; but before six months had elapsed, Fadl broke his 
promise and expelled the Yafi*ie from the town*
The Fadlis, the neighbours of the 'Abdalis to the cast, invaded 
Aden in 1835 and 1836* In the latter year, they carried off property 
amounting to #50*000 and demanded, for the future, one dollar per day* 
In the following year, the "Darya Dawlat” incident occurred and 
resulted in the occupation of Aden by the British*
30,
CHAPTER I.
3JKITI.SH C.,NJACTS ’ ITU A DSN PRIOR TO 1837*
The first visit by an English ship to Aden was that of the 
“Ascension** commanded by Captain Alexander Sharpeigh of the East 
India Company* The "Ascension" anchored off the town on 
7th April, 1609* and the Captain landed only to be detained*
Rajab Agha, the Governor, promised to release him if he unloaded 
the vessel or paid the customs dues* Sharpeigh agreed to pay dues, 
not only for the goods on shore, but also for those on board® There­
upon he was freed, and two of his men were sent to the Pasha at 
San'a. The Pasha told them that if the Company desired to trade in 
the Red Sea, they should first get permission from the Ottoman Sultan* 
He added that trade sijould be carried on at Kukha, as Aden was a 
garrison town, a sta Moment confirmed by Sharpeigh*
Contrary to expectation, the vessels of the E*I*C* visited Aden 
again. Sir Henry Middleton arrived there on 7th November, 1610, in 
command of three ships: the "Trades Increase" which was his own,
the "Peppercorn" under Captain Nicholas Downton, .and the "barling"*
The merchants brought with them a email present and a letter of 
recommendation from King Janes I to the new Governor, Rajab Agha 
having been transferred to Kukha. In addition, they had a safe
conduct from the Ottoman Sultan, as required by the Pasha of oan*a,
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for trade in the Red Sea. The safe conduct may have been obtained 
through the Lovant Company*
The Ottomans did not permit the merchants to enter the town nor 
did they mention trade, but x^retended that they were expecting daily
3
a force of 30,000 men "which statement was plainly suggested by fear"* 
Middleton then asked for a pilot to take the fleet to Kukhaj but when 
none was supplied, he decided to depart. The Governor, however, 
requested that at least one ship be left behind to carry on trade*
He went on to say that Aden had lost all its commerce owing to bad 
government and that he was anxious to restore it. If the three ships 
left without trading, the Pasha at San’a would put the blame on him* 
Middleton was deceived and resolved to leave the "Peppercorn" 
behind* However, before he sailed for Ilukha, he instructed her 
captain not to trust the natives by landing any cargo; business was 
to be transacted on board* If the people suspected his intentions, 
he was to exchange hostages with them; if they objected, he was to
11.
follow him.
No sooner had Middleton left (13th November) than the Governor 
sent for the merchants of the "Peppercorn"• When he learnt about 
their instructions, he grew furious and detained them, ostensibly 
for anchorage dues which he claimed to be 1500 golden Venetians# 
Downton did not have this sum without which he could not secure the 
release of his colleagues} and if he made no sale, he could not 
raise the money# Every two or three days he sent to enquire about 
the prisoners* The Ottomans treated his messengers with courtesy so 
as to create in them a feeling of confidence of which advantage might 
be taken later. However, only those chosen by the Governor were 
permitted to have any communication with the "Peppercorn" lest too 
much information be divulged to the strangers. Despite this 
restriction, Downton learnt that no trading vessels worthy of note 
called at Aden and no merchants of any importance were to be found 
there. The scarcity of money was particularly noticeable, a bad sign 
in a place where one hoped to trade.
More than once the Governor expressed his disappointment that no 
part of the cargo had been landed, and he often praised Sharpeigh for 
landing his goods. Downton was not influenced by these tactics and 
wrote to Middleton about the imprisonment of the merchants, hoping 
that he had made enough money to pay for their release. No answer 
was received, and for the "Peppercorn" the situation was to get still 
worse. On 12th December, the Governor gave permission for some of 
the crew to come ashore to make cordage. When they arrived, they 
were arrested and put in the stocks* In all, there were now twenty 
prisoners.
lx
Having lost all hope of freeing the captives, and being worried 
about Middleton, Downton sailed for Mukha on 16th December. He 
arrived there five days later only to find that his commander had not 
been more fortunate than his men. Middleton had been attacked and 
made prisoner on 28th November. He remained in prison until 15th May, 
1611, when he ©scaped with fifteen of his companions#^
The fact that Aden was a garrison, and not a commercial, town, 
together with the treatment experienced there by the English traders, 
caused the E.I.C# to leave it out of their sphere of interest*
However, this did not mean that they left the Red Sea area. In 1612, 
Captain John Saris visited Hukha at the head of an exjjedition
12.
consisting of three vessels. Saris was well received by Azhar Agha,
the Governor of the town, who asked him to forget the cruelty suffered
by Middleton at the hands of his predecessor, Rajab Agha* The
Governor added that he had instructions from the Pasha of San’a to
allow the Englishmen full freedom of trade at Mukha*
In l6l8f at the request of Sir Thomas Roe, tho British Ambassador
at the Moghul Court, Captain Shilling went to Mukha and succeeded in
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obtaining permission to establish there a factory for the E.I.C*
The Dutch and French established their factories in 1620 and 1709
respectively. However, they abandoned them at the end of the
Seven Years* War (1756-63), anci t*10 British were left alone in control
of the Red Sea trade. In 1785, the Americans began to compete with
them; and by 1800 they were the main exporters of the Yemen*s most
important product, coffee.
The decisive result cf the Seven Years* War between Britain and
France was that France lost her Indian possessions* The French could
not forget their loss and were bent on revenge* For this purpose,
they thought of occupying Egypt, not only to maintain their interests
0
in the Near East, but also to threaten Britain’s position in India*
In April 179$, Napoleon Bonaparte was appointed Commander of 
the Army of the East* He was to secure Malta and Egypt, cut a channel 
through the Isthmus of Suez and obtain for his country full control 
of the Red Sea. Hov/ever, the ultimate object of expelling the British 
from India was not to be forgotten* Napoleon took Malta in June and 
Egypt in July, but Nelson was in his wake. On 1st August, Nelson 
found the French fleet lying in Abu Qir Bay, and completely destroyed 
it*
Encouraged by the British victory, the Ottoman Sultan, Salim III, 
declared war on France (1st September) and prepared to reconquer his 
lost province* Napoleon then attacked Syria# He captured Gaza and 
Jaffa, but was repulsed at Acre and had to retreat to Egypt* The 
Ottomans sent an expedition to drive him out, but he defeated it on 
25th July, 1799, and thus firmly established his control over Egypt* 
These events in the Mediterranean directed British attention to 
Aden, now ruled by an Arab sultan, Ahm?.d Ibn *Abd al-ICarin. The first 
contact with him was not for commercial* but for diplomatic, reasons*
In November 1798, Captain Samuel Wilson, British Resident at Mukha 
and Political Commissioner for the Red Sea, asked him to prevent the
13.
French from being supplied in hie territory and to pass on any infor-
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nation which he might have about their movements* In reply, the
Sultan assured him of hie full co-operation*^
Early in 1799i a naval force from England arrived in the Red Sea*
It was commanded by Admiral John Blankett, and its duty was to prevent
any communication between Mapoleon in Egypt and Tippoo Sultan, his
potential ally in India* Meanwhile, the Bombay Government received
11orders from the Secret Committee in London to occupy the island of 
Perim in the straits of Bab al-Handab* The island, strongly fortified, 
with one or more vessels of war in the straits, would enable the 
British to command the Red Sea route to India, thus making it imposs­
ible for the French to reach that country from Egypt* In its turn, 
the Government of Bombay sent letters to the Imam, his governor at 
Mukha, the Sharif of Mecca and the Ottoman Governor of Jaddah, asking
for their collaboration in supplying the detachment, which was about
12to be sent, with water and wood* Similar letters were sent by the 
Porte*
The detachment of 300 European and Indian troops, under
Lieut.-Col* John Murray, occupied Perim on 3rd May* The British
remained on the island until 1st September, when they went temporarily
to Aden. Perim was evacuated for three reasons* The v/ater supply
provided by the chiefs in the area had been discontinued; the water
on the island was not fit for drinking; and the straits could not be
commanded by batteries on the island* The British did not go to Mukha,
which was nearer than Aden and where ".hey had a Residency, because
Murray considered its people "insolent"*
In Aden, the British were treated with extreme kindness and
courtesy* They had v/ater in their camp, and for their supplies they
were not dependent on the inhabitants* The port was practically theirs
an the only thing needed to make it actually so was the hoisting of 
l*fthe flag*
Sultan Ahmad, who had received a request from the Porte to assist 
the British force in the Red Sea, claimed no credit for his hospitality, 
and wrote to the Bombay Governments "The port of Aden belongs to 
Sultan Salim *«* and I am his servant performing my duty*”^  As will 
be seen, these words, which were only a flowery Arab compliment, made 
the British take the Porte into their calculations when considering 
the Sultan’s offer*
lJf.
In his conversation with Hurray, the Sultan expressed his wish 
to hold his country under British protection in the same way that the 
Kawwab of Arcot held the Carnatic. Here, he was referring to the 
"Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Alliance and Security" signed with 
Muhammad ’Ali, the Hawwab of Arcot, in 1787* If the British 
agreed, the Sultan would provide them with as many men as they 
desired to fight on their side "in any part of the world". Murray 
told him that he had no authority to enter into such an important 
engagement * ^
Then the Sultan sent to the Government of Bombay a draft treaty
embodying his proposals# The British were to regard his enemies as
theirs, and vice versa* The armies of the two parties were to be one
and their ports were to be open to each other* The British were to
have a settlement in Aden*
The motive behind the proposed treaty was frankly stated# "I *«*
have a great number of enemies, and many are envious# •*• when you
18will be at my back, I shall be without dread." Significantly, in
proposing this treaty, Ahmad made no mention of the Forte, underlining
his actual independence#
The Sultan was also anxious to restore the commerce oF Aden and
asked that the British use their influence with the Indian merchants
to this end* Murray favoured the idea and discussed it with two of
them# The merchants shared the Sultan’s aspirations and undertook to
buy goods from India as soon as they arrived. The Colonel wrote
confidently that trade, particularly with the East African coast,
19would grow rapidly* As regards the products of the country round 
Aden, he wrongly stated that the main ones were cotton and coffee, 
and that the coffee which was exported from Mukha was grown here* 
Murray was greatly impressed by Aden# He wrote that it was 
nearly impregnable both from the land and sea. The roadstead (in 
Eastern Bay) was in every respect preferable to that at Mukha, and 
Western Bay was still better than Eastern Bay. It was almost enclosed 
by land, and ships could safely anchor there in either monsoon* There 
were wells only one and a half miles away (probably from Mu’alla) in 
which the water v/as "excellent and in profusion"# The British fleet 
in the Red Sea area could be supplied at Aden with every necessary 
article. Admittedly the supply facilities were poor due to lack of 
demand, but this could be remedied.
15*
While the French remained in Egypt, Aden could serve as a base 
for the British Navy* Its occupation would make the British 
independent of the other powers on the Arabian coast* Therefore,
Murray recommended acceptance of the Sultan’s offer and the station­
ing of the garrison at Aden. Perim, he asserted, would never be of
20
any advantage, and only a email detachment should be kept there*
When Blankett arrived in Bombay (December 1799)f the Governor,
Jonathan Duncan, asked him to comment on the letters from Aden,
emphasising that acceptance or rejection of the Sultan’s offer must
depend on the usefulness of the place as a permanent naval base
commanding the route between Egypt and India, should the French
21remain in Egypt after peace had been concluded* Blankett agreed with 
Murray about the unsuitability of Perim as a naval base, but contra­
dicted his evaluation of Aden point by point*
Western Bay Blankett simply dismissed as being "of little 
importance"* Eastern Bay he described as "very bad"* It was exposed 
to the wind from the south and subject to a very heavy swell* The 
shore was shallow and always covered with surf, which made landing 
always difficult and often impossible* Ships anchored four or five 
miles out# When the wind was blowing from the south, they ight see 
the enemy in the offing and not be able to leave the anchorage to 
follow him* In brief, "no officer of common prudence would consider
it as a proper station for a cruising squadron"*
Blankett reported that the water was "brackish" and implied that 
Aden could not be a supply base; it .ad no trade or vessels attached 
to it* Commercially, it was "not calculated to be of any consequence 
to us"#
Contrary to Hurray, Blankett had nothing but praise for Mukha 
an.: its people* The roadstead was good, supplies were abundant and 
the inhabitants were peaceful and co-operative* Sometimes, up to 
three hundred of his men were on shore and no complaint was heard from 
them or from the natives* Every facility that the town could offer 
was as rauch at the disposal of the British as if they had been its 
actual masters* The commerce of Mukha was at the mercy of the British, 
and this could serve as security for the continued friendship of its 
people* In short, Blankett*s argument was that the British had no need 
of Aden while Mukha met all their requirements#
Blankett thought that if the Sultan made public his "nominal
dependence" on the Porte, he would incur the anger of his neighbours
and of the Imam of Ban’a, all of whom suspected the Ottomans and
considered the British too closely connected with them# Furthermore,
he rightly doubted the Sultan’s power to dispose of Aden# As an
illustration of his limited authority, Blankett mentioned the occasion
when he set out for Aden to meet a British captain, but his people,
who were opposed to the meeting, forced him to turn back#
Commenting on the treaty proposed by Sultan Ahmad, Blankett
wrote that most of, if not all, the Arab chieftains in the vicinity
of Aden might be persuaded to enter into a temporary alliance with
the British merely because such friendship would give them power#
rever, the British themselves would derive no benefit from such
connections, and must trust to naval superiority for their security
in the Red Sea# If the Government wanted to withdraw the troops from
Aden, they could do so without embarrassment and, at the same time,
22keep the Sultan’s friendship as long as it suited them#
The great difference between Plankett’s report and that of 
Hurray may have been clue to several reasons# Blankett spent only 
three days in Aden, and could not have made a detailed study of 
Western Bay, hence his inability to appreciate it# Eastern Bay was 
not as bad as his description suggests# It v/as opon all the year 
round, and chips anchored only a fow hundred yards from the shore as 
the British force which occupied Aden in 1839 was to do. During 
Blankett’s visit tnc* weather must have been especially unfavourable, 
and ho took the particular for the general* It is true that Aden was 
commercially unimportant, but its future was not as hopeless as he 
imagined# The town had once been a great commercial centre, and could 
and did become so again# The quality of v/ater v/as not the same in all 
the wells, and this explains the different judgments passed on it by 
Blankett and Hurray; the two men could not have drunk from the same 
source* The difference in the accounts about the inhabitants of 
Mukha and Aden can be attributed only to personal experience#
For the reason given by Blankett, any ruler in the area would 
have welcomed a permanent, and not only a temporary, alliance with 
the British# Blankett v/as also right in thinking that the British 
had to depond on their naval power in the Red Sea and that alliances 
with the chiefs were of no value*
17.
Duncan, alive to the French danger from Egypt, was not influenced
by Blankett*s arguments* On 1st January, l8C0, he wrote to
Lord cellesley, the Governor**General of India, that the occupation of 
Aden and its re-establishment as "the grand mart between India and 
Arabia" would greatly harm the trade of Egypt, thus weakening the 
l^ower of tho French should they continue rulers of that country* The 
"Gulf of Arabia" (the Fed bea), and its eastern coast in particular, 
was completely dependent on Egypt for its annual supply of grain* 
Arabia exchanged the Egyptian grain partly for its own x>roducts and 
partly for those of India* From Egypt both Arabian and Indian goods 
were channelled to Europe and West Africa*
Tho interruption of this traffic would be a blow to the French, 
arid it could be achieved by preventing Indian products from passing
by sea beyond the port of Aden* The Governor, however, was not
oblivious to the hazards of such a measure. If the plan were carried 
out, it would be mainly at the expense of the Company's subjects* The 
Company itself would lose financially, especially from customs dues 
at the port of Curat# The Imam of Gan'a and the Sharif of Mecca would 
immediately protest, as the restriction of trade to Aden would inevit­
ably ruin their ports of Mukha and Jaddah* It would also have its 
effect on the pilgrims who went to Jaddah by merchant vessels, and 
from there to Mecca and Medina* For all these reasons, Duncan did 
not recommend the restricting of the Indian trade to Aden, but thought 
that the Company night do so should it finally become necessary to 
stop trade between India and Europe via Egypt*
Afraid that the Forte might resent the presence of British troops 
in Aden, Duncan, on 20th December, 1799, had asked Lord Elgin, the 
British Ambassador at Istanbul, to inform the Ottoman Government that 
th ^ E*I*C# had availed itself of Sultan Ahmad's hospitality* This 
move on Duncan's part was precautionary, but not necessary* He wrote 
to Wellesley that the Porte was not aware of any allegiance due to it 
by the Gultan of Aden, although Ahmad had on one occasion avowed a 
dependence on it* However, even if the Sultan were truly subject to 
the Porte, the latter had ordered its dependants to assist any British 
force which might be sent to the Red Sea*2^
Wellesley accepted, unquestioningly, Blankett's evaluation of 
Aden and advanced arguments of his own against acceptance of the
18.
Sultan's offer. Militarily, the importance of the place depended on 
the means which it could afford to bar the French from establishing 
themselves in Arabia should they entertain such an idea. However, 
it was doubtful whether tho resources of Aden (should they be at the 
disposal of the British) would be of any advantage in this respect. 
Besides, the occupation of the place by a British force, instead of 
uniting the neighbouring tribes against the French, might create 
jealousy and alarm among them, in which case they would .^ ight on the 
side of the enemy*
Politically, the British did not know enough about the Sultan's 
views or the nature of his government to enable thorn to form a correct 
judgment about how long their connection with him might last. At 
that time he wanted tuem to have an establishment in his country.
However, since, in ftellesley'e opinion, his reasons for giving them 
this concession were not clearly stated (which they were), they might 
be temporary. After the Sultan had accomplished his object, or 
discovered that the British could not or would not assist him in 
attaining it, his favourable disposition towards them might cease*
Other political objections to the occupation of Aden were the 
effect of such a measure on the Ottoman Government which might regard 
it as an encroachment on its territorial rights and the possible 
involvement of the British in disputes and hostilities with the neigh­
bours of Sultan Ahmad. However, the strongest argument against the 
proposed occupation was its repercussions on the annual pilgrimage 
from India to Lhe iiijaz. If the direct route to that country was 
closed, it was doubtful whether Aden could replace it. The additional 
expenses and other inconveniences which might attend the new route 
would prevent many Indian Muslims from performing their religious 
duty. The blame would fall on the British, and the Muslims would be 
convinced of the truth of Tippoo Sultan's accusation that the British 
wanted to eradicate Islam*
On Duncan's idea of restricting the Indian trade to Aden with 
a view to harming the French in Egypt, the Governor^-General thought 
that such a step should be taken only after tho British Government 
had been convinced that the enemy would be permanently established in 
that country* The time had not come for the Company to make great 
sacrifices in order to harm the French. For all the reasons given above, 
Wellesley directed Duncan to decline the Sultan's offer in concil-
pL
xatory terms and to issue orders for immediate withdrawal from Aden.
19.
The Governor-General gave his orders on 4th February, 1800, and
the Governor of Bombay issued similar orders on the 7th of the same
month, before Wellesley's letter reached him. The previous day,
Blankett, who was still in Bombay, informed Duncan that he had received
intelligence to the effect that about the middle of October an affray
had occurred at Aden in which a British soldier was wounded. There
had also been an attack on 'Abdali territory by a chieftain subject
to the Imam because the Sultan had given hospitality to foreign troops.
Blankett recommended withdrawal from Aden as being "indispensably
necessary to prevent any disagreeable altercations with the Arab 
25
governments". Duncan agreed, and the British withdrew in March.
In Egypt, Napoleon's victory over the Ottoman expedition on 
25th July, 1799* complete as it wa3 militarily, had no political 
significance. News from France convinced the General that his presence 
was needed there, and a month later he left Egypt, having appointed 
General Kleber to the command of the army.
In September 1800, Britain seized Malta. Then she threw into 
Egypt a large army including 10,000 sepoys from India. The French 
lost Alexandria in March 1801, and Cairo in June. Three months later, 
they agreed to evacuate Egypt which was restored to the Sultan. Thus 
the French threat to Arabia and, concomitantly, to India was removed.
As part of the operations in Egypt, Sir Home Popham was sent
from England to the Red Sea in command of the "Romney", R.N. His
mission, which was at the request of the Court of Directors of the
E.I.C., had a twofold object 1 to help in transporting sepoys to
26Egypt and to revive the British trade in coffee, now dominated by 
the Americans. In 1802, Wellesley appointed Popham envoy to "the 
states of Arabia" with full authority to conclude commercial treaties.
Naturally, Popham wanted to have his first treaty with the Imam 
of San'a who controlled the coffee lands, but in this he failed. He 
then turned to the Sultan of Lahj who again proposed an alliance with 
the British. His proposal was again refused, but Popham promised him 
help if the I^ench attacked. The Sultan had no cause to fear the 
French} what he wanted was help against his neighbours. However, a 
treaty of friendship and commerce was made between the two parties.
The treaty, which was dated 6th September, 1802, stipulated that 
the port of Aden was to be open to British ships and that no port 
fees were to be charged. For the first ten years a duty of 107? was
to be levied on all goods exported from Aden* Thereafter, the duty
was to be fixed forever at 3/j« The raising of duty or the levying
of anchorage or other fees would mean the loss of British friendship
and commerce* Two pieces of land in Aden were given to the E.I*C*,
one for a factory, and the other for a cemetery*
Under the treaty, British subjects might claim the protection
of the British flag* Disputes among them were to be referred to the
British Resident, while disputes involving British and 'Abdali
subjects were to be decided by the laws of the country* The British
27were not to be subjected to any indignities and could ride horses*
This concession was important? in Arabia, the riding of horses was 
a privilege reserved for Muslims#
The treaty between Popham and Sultan Ahmad remained ink on 
paper, which is not strange* Aden had no commerce to speak of, and 
in 1800 it had been dismissed as unpromising* The treaty may have 
been a courteous gesture or a precautionary measure should the French 
re-occupy Egypt# Sultan Ahmad, however, did not change his favour­
able attitude towards the British*
The next British visitor to Aden was Lord Valentia who called 
there twice in l8o4 during his travels in the Red Sea area* During
his first visit, in April, he had nothing good to cry about Aden
28
except that it had a fine back bay* In July, during his second
visit, he radically changed his opinion of the town. He wrote: "It
is the only good sea-port in Arabia Felix, and has the great advantage
over every harbour, within the straits, that it can be quitted at all
seasons, while it is almost impossible to repass 3ab-el-Mandeb during
29the S.VJ. monsoon*"
Valentia found that the little trade Aden had was carried on 
by Banyans from Mukha and was mainly with Berbera on the Somali coast* 
The Somalis took their products of myrrh and gum to Aden where the 
Banyans bought them. The Sultan received a duty of 3'L'. In addition, 
he had a monopoly of the trade in bullocks*
In I808, two years after his return to England, Valentia wrote
in a report to George Canning, the Foreign Secretary, that Aden was 
"the Gibraltar of the East ••• that at a trifling expense nay be made 
impregnable"* He recommended the building of a factory in the town,
the repair of the old fortifications, and the garrisoning of
Sirah Island by troops from India#
21.
In Valentia*s opinion, n strong British presence in Aden and an 
alliance with the Wahhabis and Abyssinians would be the best means of 
closing the Fed Sea to any hostile power from the West* An alliance 
with Abyssinia would, moreover, increase trade between India and that 
country# Valentia wrote that the Sultan was willing to deny the use 
of his port "to all other powers” (France and the United States)# This, 
Valentia mistakenly believed, would give the British a monopoly of 
the Fed Sea trade# Valentia was afraid of a Wahhabi attack on Aden# 
Therefore, he advised his Government to send Sultan Ahmad ammunition
31and also money to help him increase his army by the purchase of slaves# 
The Foreign Office did not act on Valentia*s recommendations, 
but in 1809 it sent to Abyssinia Henry Salt, his secretary and drafts­
man during the long voyage (1802-6), to report on the state of that 
country and cultivate friendly relations with the tribes on the Fed 
Sea coast# Salt arrived at Aden on 3rd October, where ho was hospit­
ably received by the Banyans. The wretchedness of the town and its 
people was as obvious to him as to others, but he wrote favourably 
about its commerce# "Aden as a place of trade is still of some 
consequence# It is the chief mart for the gum3 ••• and coffee of the 
best quality may be procured in considerable quantities, though not
32as expeditiously as at Hocha, owing to the want of a regular demand#"
Salt reported that the anchorage in Western Bay was exposed and
lacked the necessary protection# Any vessel at anchor might be
attacked and denied aid from the shore# His fear that a British ship
might experience such a danger at the hands of "a French privateer or
33pirate" or a United States vessel prompted him to think of remedying 
the situation#
Salt privately suggested to Duncan that two pieces of cannon be 
sent as a present to the Sultan on the understanding that they should 
be placed near the tomb of Shaykh Ahmad where they would completely 
protect the anchorage# The plan, which was to be financed by the 
E#1#C#, would not only benefit the British, but also "prove a just 
return for the alliance (friendship) of a chief who has, by repeated 
and substantial acts of kindness* evinced his attachment to the British
34-interests"# Duncan did not act on this recommendation#
Salt visited Aden again in 1810, and on that occasion Sultan Ahmad 
suggested that the British should establish a factory there*^ However, 
his suggestion was not considered, and Aden was forgotten until
22.
circumstances forced the British to think of moving their factory 
from Mukha.
In 1317, after a quarrel between Lieut. Domincetti, the British 
Resident at Mukha, and the captain of a vessel under charter to the 
E.I.C., an Arab was detained at the factory. The Arab was soon 
released at the request of the town’s governor, but hardly had he 
left the factory when it was stormed by three or four hundred soldiers 
and looted in the process. The sepoys and the captain of a British 
vessel who happened to be in the factory wore severely beaten. The 
Resident, in addition, was dragged naked to the governor’s house and
35
imprisoned. Afterwards he was set free and returned to India.
The Government of Bombay demanded an apology and reparation from
the Imam. Two years want by without a satisfactory answerj and
finally, towards the end of November 1819, the Government sent the
Imam an ultimatum* He was required to punish the former governor of
Mukha before the Company’s broker, to pay adequate compensation and
to give up deserters from British ships.
The Governor-General, Lord Hastings, who regretted that the
Bombay Government had not taken any action until then, authorised
them to send a squadron to Mukha to enforce their demands. Besides,
he directed that measures should be adopted to guarantee the necessary
respect for the British Resident in the future* The terms under 
which the British factory could continue should be made clear to the
37Imam and embodied in a treaty.
Before carrying out these instructions, Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
the Governor of Bombay, wanted to know what reaction such a procedure 
might provoke from Muhammad ’Ali, the Pasha of Egypt since I805. In 
l8ll, Muhammad ’Ali was ordered by Sultan Mahmud II to suppress the 
Wahhabi movement in Arabiq. The Wahhabis, a puritannical Muslim 
sect, came on the scene in the middle cf the l8th century, and by 
1810 they had subjected Najd, the Hijaz, the coast of the Yemen and 
even raided up to the suburbs of Damascus. After three expeditions 
from Bgypt, they were crushed in l8l9| and for this service, the 
Porte regarded Muhammad ’Ali by investing him with possession of the
Hijaz. In San’a, the Imam, al-IIahdi ’Abd Allah, agreed to pay the
38Egyptian Pasha an annual tribute of 0X00,000 for restoring to him
the coast and other areas in the interior which his predecessors had 
lost to the Wahhabis.
23.
This connection between the Imam and the Pacha made Elphinstone
write to Henry Salt, now British Consul-General in Egypt, informing
him that if the Imam rejected the ultimatum, the Bombay Government
would blockade his port# If necessary, Salt wa3 to obtain
Muhammad ’Ali*s permission for the blockade, and to assure him that
39no conquest of the Yemen was contemplated#
Salt answered that the Bombay Government need not fear the Pasha
and that the intended blockade "cannot fail to produce the desired
effect where the Country in any way depends upon commerce - and it is
this which makes the Pasha himself sensible that he lies perfee"Ay
at our mercy as well as on the Indian side, as on that of the 
40
Mediterranean*’* Yet Elphinstone's letter had special significance
in that it was the first recognition by the Bombay Government of
Egyptian interests in the Red Sea area and their first diplomatic
41
contact with Muhammad ’All*
YJhen a whole year had elapsed without any response from the Imam,
the British bombarded Kukha on 2nd December, 1820# On 6th January,
1821, the town authorities agreed to new demands made in the spirit
of the Governor-General'o instructions* These demands were incorpor-
42ated in a treaty which the Imam ratified on 13th January#
The treaty guaranteed the desired respect for the British Resident
and abolished tho anchorage duty on British ships# It also fixed the
import and export duty at 2j$* 3y it, moreover, all British subjects
trading at Mukha were to be under British protection#
Article 6 stated: "All the dependants of the factory of every
denomination from broker downwards shall be wholly under the
protection of the British flag and control of the Resident who shall
alone possess the power of punishing them and redressing all complaints 
43against them#"
Early in 1822, the British discovered that the paragraph quoted 
above had been omitted in the Arabic translation# The Imam's 
attention was drawn to this omission, but he refused to listen# In 
its attempt to have the paragraph added, the Bombay Government 
suggested giving up its claims "to exemption from high duties in 
favour of its native subjects"# Captain G# Hutchinson, the new 
Resident, was directed to inform the Imam that the Company would rather 
remove the factory from Mukha than see its dependants under the 
jurisdiction of his officers^ The Imam persisted in his refusal, and
24*
Hutchinson went to Aden in March 1822 to discuss with the friendly
sultan the possibility of transferring the factory to his port*
During Hutchinson's meeting with the Sultan, the latter disclosed
that he had agreed to allow a "Turkish" (Egyptian) garrison of 200
men to build a small fort on Eastern Bay, provided it helped him
against his er.omies and rebellious subjects* Therefore, he could not
give a definite answer until the stipulated period of five months
had elapsed without the arrival of the "Turkish" garrison* The reason
for this was his conviction that the English and the "Turks" coi d
not live together, even though his troops were to control the gates,
and he himself was to exercise civil and military authority# If,
however, the "Turks" did not fulfil their part of the bargain, he
proposed that the British should erect the fort and join forces with
him# Hutchinson refused the offer and told the Sultan that his
instructions were to enter into commercial, and not political, relations
45with the Arab chiefs#
On receipt of Hutchinson's report, the Bombay Government decided
that the removal of the factory was inexpedient and expressed their
hope that the Governor-General would ratify the treaty with the Imam 
46as it stood# Eastings did not ratify it, and the factory was not
removed# The Zgyjitians did not send a force to Aden, and Muhammad 'Ali
47"missed his chance of obtaining full control of the Red Sea"#
The Pasha himself revealed to Salt that tho Ottoman Government
had frequently asked him to occupy the Red Sea ports as far as Aden
and that finally he might be forced to comply* Salt's comment was that
it would be better for the Indian Government if tho Arabian ports were
under Ottoman control rather than under the control of the "barbarians"
who possessed them# However, he thought that the British would object
to seeing the Ottomans in possession of Aden because of its strength
and proximity to Bombay# It would be dangerous to leave the peninsula
in the hands of any first-rate power which might become Britain's
enemy in the future# "The Indian Government has certainly in some
48late proceedings in the Persian Gulph as also in the affair of 
Mocha made war out of its limits, and the same motives (the protection 
of British interests) may induce them, perhaps, to hazard as much 
for Aden, rather than see it in the hands of the Turks,###"^
Balt's words came true, but not only for the reason he gave# In 
1807, Robert Fulton built the first practical steam vessel on the
25.
Hudson, The Bombay Government realised the value of this invention,
and with a view to shortening the distance between India and England,
directed the Bombay Marine (the Indian Navy from April 1830) to
study the possibility of opening a communication through Egypt by
50means of steam navigation. The Court, with the came object in view,
encouraged the establishment of navigation by steam round the Cape of
Good Hope* Lord Ellenborough, President of the India Board and later
Governor-General of India, favoured the Red Sea route and wrote to
the Court that such a communication, besides bringing them nearer to
Inuia, would eliminate or diminish many problems resulting from the
51dependence of that country upon the supreme authority in England*
Steam navigation had other advantages for the E*I*C. The problems
of monsoons, currents and calms were now overcome. The navigation of
the Ned Sea, with its many coral reefs and small islands, and the
Persian Gulf, with the channels through the various straits in the
passages to China, were made much safer and easier. The introduction
of cteam facilitated trade and gave security from pirates to vessels
carrying merchandise* It halved the sailing time, which meant that
troops and artillery could be rapidly transported to any place where
52rebellion broke out*
However, before the lied Sea line of communication with Europe
could be considered established, a safe and convenient station was
necessary between Bombay and Suez where steam vessels might refuel
and carry out minor repairs* Col* Michael Bagnold, the British
Resident. at Mukha, recommended that Aden should be that station, as
"it was the only port fit by nature for a depot (on the Red Sea 
53route),..*" Bagnold made his recommendation after a coreful survey
of Aden which he visited in August 182? on his way to Bombay*
Bagnold’s visit was at the invitation of the new Sultan of Lahj,
Muhsin Ibn Fadl. : u.hsin wanted the British to help him revive the
trade of Aden, an aim which his predecessor had also hoped to achieve
with their assistance* The geographical position of the port, the
anarchy in the Yemen and "the illiberal treatment" of British merchants
at Mukha the Gultan put forward as factors in his favour. If the
J3ritich desired to establish a residency in Aden, they would be 
5h
welcome* The Government thought that it rested with the merchants 
themselves to choose their ports* If more preferred Aden to Mukha, 
the factory would be moved there,^
26,
Without mentioning the current rates at Mukha or Aden, Bagnold 
wrote that the Sultan had offered to reduce the duty for British 
Indian subjects to 3/y for the first two years, and after that not 
more than 5>u, British-born subjects were to pay a duty of 2-J%, as 
at Mukha
Kuhsin sent with Bagnold a letter to Elphinstone asking for two
guns, two howitzers and ammunition. The Sultan wanted the arn3 to
57put down his neighbours, the *Aqrabis, end was ready to pay.
However, he was told that British policy was against giving military
58aid to any chief in Arabia, Sultan Muhsin did not accept this
answer and repeated his request to tho new Governor of Bombay,
59Maj,-Gen, Sir John Malcolm# Malcolm discussed the subject with
Bagnold who advised him to send the arms, as this would aid future
communication with the Bed Sea, Malcolm accejjted his advice and
in December 1828 the guns were shipped to tho Sultan, as a gift.
The folloxving year it was decided to inaugurate the Bed Sea line.
Coal was deposited at Sirah Island for the use of the ’’Hugh Lindsay”
(4-11 tons), the first steamship made in India and the first to
navigate the Med Sea, The "Hugh Lindsay”, which was built to carry
five and a half days* fuel, left Bombay with coal for eleven days.
Yet when she reached Aden, she had only six hours* fuel left. This
showed that for a vessel of her kind tho distance (I'^l miles) was
too great without an intermediate station, Besides, it was so hard
to obtain labour at Aden that six and a half days were needed to tako
62on only 180 tons of coal. Shortage of labour and distance from 
Bombay made the British abandon Aden in favour of Mukalla, on the 
Hadrami coast, 250 miles nearer to Bombay,
Mukalla in turn did not prove as satisfactory as had been hoped}
steamers returning from Suez during the south-west monsoon could not 
touch there for coal. Moreover, the British were not satisfied with 
the co-operation which they received from the local chiefs. Now the 
island of Socotra, off the Horn of Africa, seemed to meet the require­
ments for a British depot. It was 20G miles learer to Bombay than 
Mukalla; and if steamers were to run from Calcutta to Suez it would 
be essential,^
Socotra belonged to the Mahara tribe whose capital was at Qishn 
to the east of Mukalla. In 183^, Captain Daniel Ross, Karine Surveyor 
at Calcutta, was sent to Qishn to negotiate an agreement by which the
27,
British would be permitted to land coal on the island. After much
haggling, the agreement was made, but the Bombay Government now wanted
to buy the island, as this would give them full control over the depot
and the inhabitants,
Ross, asked for his opinion, stated that the Kaharas were poor
and would be glad to sell. However, difficulties would have to be
faced on account of the many chiefs who had to be consulted, as in the
case of the agreement} but the chiefs feared the British, and it would
be better to take advantage of this feeling than to negotiate with
’’many scarcely civilized persons, jealous of each other and often at
Variance”. In other words, the British would pay for the island what
they wanted, and the chiefs would have to accept or else face British
power, Tho sum Ross suggested as a price for the island was between
Rs. 15,000 and Rs* 20,000*
The Government of Bombay was encouraged by Ross*a opinion and
recommended the purchase to the Governor-General, Lord Bentinck,
Bentinck approved, but emphasised that the island should not be occupied
until it had been ceded through negotiation. The man chosen to
negotiate the deal was Lieut, Stafford Bettesworth Haines of the Indian
Navy, and he was chosen because he knew the chiefs very well} he had
been cruising in the Arabian and Red Seas since 1820* Haines was
authorised to pay a maximum of #10,000 for Socotra, and the Governor-
65General expressed the hope that he would be able to get it for less.
Shortly after Haines left for C^ishn, the Bombay Government,
anticipating no difficulties, sent a detachment to take ^ssession of
Socotra, However, contrary to expectations, Haines* mission was a
failure* 'Umar Ibn Tawari, the old blind sultan, while welcoming a
66British coal depot on the island, steadfastly refused to sell.
When the troops arrived at Socotra (5th January 1835)* they 
landed because bad weather made it impossible for them to return to 
Bombay. In Calcutta, when the Governor-General laarnt of the Sultan*s 
refusal to sell, ho proposed that negotiations for a lease for part 
or all of the island should start, and repeated that no force should 
be used, ”••• we should not be justified in retaining possession of 
the Island for a day longer than can be avoided in opposition to the 
will of those to whom it belongs,”^
Commander William Rose, I.N,, was deputed to conduct the new 
negotiations, but he too did not succeed. Then he asked if the
28,
British would bo allowed two small depots, but the Sultan would give
68
them only one which Rose considered useless in view of tho monsoons.
Meanwhile, the British found that the water on Socotra was bad, and
the troops, whose camp was near a swamp, were dying of fever. These
facts, coupled with the Sultan*s unwillingness to co-operate, made
the British abandon the island on 2Ath October, 1835,^
When it became certain that the British were to leave Socotra,
Haines visited Sultan Muhsin and conveyed to him a request from the
Bombay Government to establish a trading ost at Aden, The Sultan
agreed, provided the Government gave him come ammunition and cent two 
70vessels of war to assist him in his attack on Shunrah, the Fadli
seaport and capital. The Government did not accept these conditions,
71their policy being one of non-interference in the affairs of Arabia,
However, beforo his letter arrived in Bombay, the Sultan cent a
special messenger with a present and another letter to the new Governor,
Sir Robert Grant, repeating his request and adding that he would be
willing to pay for the ammunition whatever it might cost* Ho asserted
that ’’one of tho conditions of the agreement entered into between me
and the British Government is that we are mutually to assist each 
72
other,,,,” This was in reference to an agreement which seems to
73have been concluded between Bagnold and the Sultan in 1827, but
there is no evidence that it was discussed at Bombay, Nevertheless,
Ikthe Government sent Muhsin the ammunition.
The British had no further contact with Aden until 1837. In that
year, the ’’Darya Dawlat” incident provided them with a good excuse 
for occupying it.
The British first went to Aden for trade, but the town had no 
trade to offer, and they lost interest in it. However, interest in 
Aden was revived after the French invasion of Hgypt, and that was 
mainly due to its strategic value. This value was enhanced in British 
eyes by the advent of steam navigation.
The British wanted a base in Aden, but on terms which precluded
intervention in the affairs of Arabia, The ’Abdalis wanted an
offensive-defensive alliance with the British, which necessarily 
required intervention in the interior. The result was that neither 
party achieved its aims.
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CHAPTER II*
BACKGROUND TO THE OCCUPATION,
After hie victory over the Wahhabis, Muhammad *Ali directed hie 
attention to more important projects# In 1820, he entrusted the 
conquest of the Sudan to his third son, Isma’il, who accomplished the 
task three years later* From 182^ * to 1829* the Pasha concentrated 
his energies on Europe* Then, in November 1831, he sent his first 
eon, Ibrahim Pasha, to conquer Syria, which he did before the end of 
June 1832*
The Egyptian victories greatly alarmed Sultan Mahmud II, and he
decided to crush his rebellious vassal* In May 1332, he dispatched
a large force against Ibrahim, but it was heavily defeated on
29th July in the Baylan Pass to the north of Aleppo# The Sultan then
sent a second army, but it was no more fortunate than the first; it
was routed at Konya on 21st December* From Konya, Ibrahim advanced
to Mutahya, threatening the existence of the Ottoman Empire*
After his first defeat, the Sultan appealed to the European powers
for help, but only Russia was quick to respond# Austria and Prussia
were anxious to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but
neither could be of any assistance* France had a traditional interest
in Egypt and sympathised with the aims of Muhammad *Ali# Britain was
in toe midst of a domestic crisis over parliamentary reform* Her
Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, was still occupied with the
Portuguese and Belgian questions* In 1831-2, he paid little attention
to Egypt. Neither in official nor in private correspondence did he
give sufficient instructions to his subordinates with regard to 
1
Muhammad *Ali# Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador at 
Istanbul, strongly urged his government to support the Buitan by send­
ing a naval expedition to the Syrian const# Palmerston, however, 
was not ready to risk a breach with Russia and France which might 
follow from unilateral action in the Levant#
Sultan Mahmud made effort after effort to get Britain’s assist­
ance; but when he failed, he accepted Russia’s aid most reluctantly*
A powerful Russian s y adron anchored off Istanbul on 20th February, 1833* 
Britain and France were alarmed and put pressure on the Sultan to ask 
for its withdrawal# However, Tsar Nicholas I refused to withdraw it 
until the Egyptian army had rccrossed the Taurus mountains#
Muhammad ’Ali countered by demanding the cession of .Syria and the 
district of Adana, and he would not instruct his son to retreat until
30.
these demands had been met# In March, the Sultan agreed to the
cession of Syria only, but the Pasha insisted on Adana as well#
The fears of Britain and France were to grow still greater when
a second Russian squadron arrived in the Bosphorus and landed troops
at Scutari* The arrival of this force may also have increased the
Sultan’s anxiety# A long conflict with Muhammad ’Ali seemed likely
to result in a continued Russian presence in Turkey* Britain and
France, therefore, urged the Pasha and the Sultan to come to an agree-*
ment# Finally, the Sultan gave way; and on 8th April, the
Convention of .hitahya was concluded# By it, both demands of
2
Muhammad ’Ali were conceded#
The Sultan bitterly resented his humiliation at the hands of 
his vassal; and after April 1833, the expulsion of Muhammad ’Ali 
from Syria became his earnest desire# lie threatened to attack by 
himself if Britain did not help him# Palmerston, however, repeatedly 
instructed Ponsonby, the new British Ambassador at Istanbul, to warn 
him against carrying out his threat* Ponsonby was to indicate to 
the Sultan that if he attacked, he would be repulsed; and that if he 
depended on Russia alone, he might lose his empire* He was advised 
to improve his army and wait* This advice was accepted, and tho 
situation in the Levant remained quiet until the middle of 1839*^
In the Hijaz, while Ibrahim was preparing to invade Syria, four 
officers rebelled against his father’s rule and imprisoned his 
governor, Khurshid Bey# Khurshid was replaced by one of the four 
officers, Muhammad Agha, surnamed Turkchi Bilmas# Sultan Mahmud 
welcomed the revolt, confirmed Turkchi in his position and promised 
him support* Turkchi was encouraged and captured the Tihama (the 
coast of the Yemen) in the name of the Porte#
Muhammad ’Ali, in turn, sent Ahmad Pasha, his nephew and a former 
governor of the Hijaz, to quell the rebellion# Ahmad recovered the 
Iiija?- and occupied the Tihama in l833» His brother, Ibrahim Pasha, 
who accompanied him was left as Governor-General of Egyptian-occupied 
Yemen, with headquarters at lludaydah*
The Imam al-Kahdi *Abd Allah, who had been paying tribute to 
Muhammad ’Ali since 1819, died in 183^, and v;as succeeded by his 
con ’Ali under the title of al-Mansur* Al-Mansur suspected his uncle, 
Sidi Muhammad, of conspiracy and imprisoned him# However, he escaped 
and took refuge at Ta’iz where he assumed the title of al-Hadi#
Having no confidence in his ability to retain his position, he sold
31.
the city to the Egyptians in 1837*
Soon afterwards, ’Ali al-Mansur was overthrown by ’Abd Allah
Ibn Muhammad who proclaimed himself Imam under the name of al-Nasir
and imprisoned his predecessor together with Sidi Muhammad# In
November 1837, Muhammad ’Ali sent an embassy to the new Imam to
negotiate the cession of San’a, and thus gain control over all the
Yemen# The mission was received with great ceremony, but the Pasha’s
A
proposals were rejected#
Muhammad ’Ali’s successes in the Levant and Arabia were not 
viewed with indifference by Palmerston# After the attack on Konya, 
he became anxious to help the Sultan, but foreign involvements and 
the domestic situation did not allow him* The aim of Muhammad ’Ali, 
Palmerston wrote, "is to establish an Arabian kingdom including all 
the countries in which Arabic is the language# There might be no 
harm in such a thing in itself; but as it would necessarily imply 
the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it* Besides,
Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active
5
Arabian sovereign would be#"
Palmerston could not allow Turkey to be crushed between two
empires, the Russian advancing from the north and the Egyptian from
the south# It was easier to fight the Pasha than the Tsar# ,rBut
Mehemet Ali should still be left in possession of Egypt and if he
6wants to extend himself let him go up the Nile#1*
Although Palmerston had, since the beginning of 1833, believed
that the Pasha might be contemplating the control of the Persian Gulf
and Red Sea routes to India through possession of Syria, Iraq and
Arabia, it seems he did not think it necessary to check him then# All
that Palmerston did was to warn him against declaring his independence
of the Porte# The warning came in October 183^, after the Pasha had
in the previous month confided that intention to the European consuls 
7
m  Egypt# Besides, Palmerston did not think that Muhammad ’Ali, 
then probably 65, was likely to be of danger very much longer, for 
in the same year he wrote to Ponsonby, "Mehemet is an old man and 
what remains to him of life is nothing when set against the duration 
of an Empire"#^
However, after 183^ -, Palmerston’s hostility to Muhammad ’Ali 
grew steadily and he came to regard him as the major obstacle to the 
solution of the Eastern Question* Therefore, he made it his policy
32*
to break down tho power of the Pacha and. to keep hid in subordination
to the Bui tan#'* On 4th August, 1837, he wrote to Patrick Campbell,
the British Consul-General in Egyptt "Reports having reached
iler iiajesty’s Government that the Pasha of Egypt is about to send a
force to take possession of the shores at the entrance and on the
outeiue of the Red Boa I have to instruct you to take an early
opportunity to mention the subject to the Pasha of Egypt, and to
intimate to him, that such a movement of bin forces would not be well
looked upon in England or in India and right give rise to discussions
10between hin end the British Government#"
The "reports" referred to by Pnlnerston originated with
Captain Janes Mackenzie of the Bengal Light Infantry# Mackenzie,
who was on leave during 1836-7# visited the Yemen, the Ilij&z and
Egypt while travelling to England* Fron hio conversations with
Egyptian officers in tho throe countries, ho understood that after
11conquering or bribing the ’Aoiric, Muhammad *Ali intended to
advance on Aden and from there extend his power to Iladranawt, # Hsian
^  12ana j-xtsqat#
On receipt of i. aimers ton’s dispatch, dated 4th August, 1337,
Campbell addressed a note on the subject to Boghoa Bey, Muhammad #Ali#«
vizier, requesting him to transit it to the Pasha who was then in
Crete# L'uhorjir.ad *A.li replied that he had never contemplated such an
ix
exposition, and Campbell believed hid#
However, report© about Egyptian military activity continued to 
alarm Palmerston# In December 1837# he instructed Campbell to inforn 
the Pasha that "•#* report© have reached II.M#1© Government of move­
ments of hie troops in Hyria and Arabia which seen to indicate 
intentions on his part to extend his authority towards the Persian Gulf 
and tho i'ushalic of Baghdad; and you will state frankly to tho Pasha
that the British Government could not nee with indifference tho
* 14execution of such intentions#" Campbell delivered this warning
early in February 1838, but F.'uhsnmad ’Ali denied that ho had onter-
15tainod such thought©# However, subsequent event© indicated the 
contrary#
While Palmerston*© antagonist! to Fuhazmad *Ali had been growing 
since 1834, the Bombay Government was careful to maintain good 
relation© with him# The Pacha controlled the Red Tea route, and the 
Government could not afford to loss his goodwill* The abandonment of
33.
Socotra did not mean that a coaling station on the Red Sea was no 
longer necessary* A substitute was found in the island of Kamaran, 
to the north-west of Hudaydah#
This island was under Egyptian rule, and Grant wrote to the
16
Pasha asking for permission to establish a coal depot there*
17Muhammad *Ali agreed without hesitation, and this brought him the
18
gratitude of the foreign Office in London# However, the island 
was never used by the British* The day before Muhammad *Ali wrote 
to Grant, there occurred an incident which was to be the direct 
cause of the British occupation of Aden#
The "Darya Dawlat", a Madras barque sailing under British 
colours, was freighted from Calcutta for Jaddah and back by an Arab 
merchant, Hajj Insaf# The ship had on board 30 crew, 27 pilgrims 
and a cargo valued at Rs* 200,000* At 3.00 a*m* on l8th February, 1837, 
she ran aground four miles from Aden* At daybreak, the supercargo,
Bu Khaydar, made off to the town in the jolly-boat and sent men to 
clear the wrecked vessel of her cargo only# In the town, the cargo 
was divided into three shares, the Sultan taking two, and Bu Khaydar 
one*
The barque's cajjtain followed the supercargo in another boat with 
ten of his crew, but they were drowned# Three others were also 
drowned attempting to save their lives# The rest reached the shore 
either on rafts or in a boat provided by Sayyid Zayn al-*Aydarus, 
the chief custodian of the 'Aydarus Mosque and the leading man in 
Aden* Once on land, they were stripped naked, male and female alike*
The women were insulted in the most disgusting manner and underwent 
a revolting search for gold and money#
The 'Abdalis then dismissed their victims who began their weary 
march towards the town* Fortunately, Gayyid Zayn took pity on them, 
gave them food and supplied them with cloth to cover their nakedness# 
From Aden the survivors of the wreck sailed to Mukha in a boat belong­
ing to a Muslim from Bombay, Shaykh 'Abd Allah Sufi, and there they 
related the story to Haines who was on a survey mission in the 
Rod Sea*19
Haines went to Aden and found that the cargo of the "Darya Dawlat" 
was being sold at one third of its real value* He told the Sultan 
that the ship and her cargo were British and asked him to protect the 
recovered goods until a decision regarding them had been taken by the
competent authorities in India* He also informed him that the British
Government would require an explanation for the plunder of the barque
20
and the maltreatment of her passengers and crew*
The Sultan denied these accusations, and later wrote to the
Governor of Bombay that normally whenever a vessel was wrecked on
the Indian or Arabian coast, her cargo and the lives of the people
on board were lost and nothing was recovered from the local chief#
However, when he h'd heard of the wreck of the "Darya Dawlat", he had
sent his son to Aden an 1 ordered a boat to help the- victims in landing*
By 1837, the Bombay Government had obviously decided that Aden
would be better than Kamaran as a coal depot# In 1829, the place had
been abandoned because the distance from Bombay was too great for a
small vessel like the "Hugh Lindsay" and because labour was scarce,
but these problems were not insurmountable. The first had been solved
by the building of larger steamers, and the second could be overcome
by -British occupation# However, it was not only as a coal depot that
the British now wanted Aden; the other reasons will become clear as
the chapter progresses*
The Bombay Government welcomed the "Darya Dawlat" incident as an
excuse for acquiring Aden* On 17th August, Grant wrote in a private
letter to Sir James Rivett-Carnnc, Chairman of the Secret Committee
and later Governor of Bombay, "••* if we do not make ourselves masters
and possessors of Aden, we ought at least not to lose the present
opportunity, •*« of humbling that robber (the Sultan) and compelling
him to submit to the establishment of a convenient coal depot on
22advantageous terras at his port#"
The same day Grant wrote another private letter to 
Sir John riobhouse, President of the Board of Control, in which he 
asserted that the British would be "fully justified in taking
px
possession of the town and harbour of Aden"* Next to British 
possession of Aden, Grant would have liked to see it in the hands of 
the friendly ruler of Masqat whom he had heard was anxious to annex 
it*
Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India, was officially
addressed on the subject of the "Darya Dawlat" in September: "••• the
shameful outrage ••• calls for prompt notice and effectual redress#
*•• should a^ iple satisfaction so not obtained from the Sultan of Aden,
oLl
this Government be authorised to enforce a demand for redress#"
35.
Then, on 23rd September, Grant outlined the advantages which 
Aden offered and the reasons which made its occupation imperative#
The harbour of Aden he described as "excellent'*; and with the past 
greatness of the town in mind, wrote: "It might again, under good
management, be made the port of export for coffee, gums, and spices 
of Arabia, and the channel through which the produce of England and 
India might be spread through the provinces of Yemen and Hadhar-el-Mout 
(Hadramawt)# The trade of tho African coast would also be thrown 
into the Aden market*"
To the Governor, there was no place on the Arabian coast which 
could compete with Aden as a coal depot# "It divides the distance 
between Bombay and Suez, and steamers may run into Back Bay during 
the night, and load and unload at all seasons in perfect security#"
The strength of Aden and the ease with which it could be defended, 
the reportedly good quality of its water and the salubrity of its 
climate were other advantages which presented themselves readily to 
his mind#
In Grant's opinion, the British had to occupy Aden for four
reasons* The establishment of a monthly steamship service with Suez
and the building of armed steamers demanded that the British should
have a station of their own on the Arabian coast as they had in the
Persian Gulf (at Ras al-Khaymah)# The Americans were trying to
acquire a place in or near Bab al-Mandab, and Grant was afraid that
they might choose Aden# American merchants had already introduced
their cotton goods into the Mukha market at 3% duty, while British
25merchants were charged 7% on similar goods# The other two reasons
were the possibility that Iluhammad 'Ali might annex it, and the need
2£
to punish Sultan Muhsin#
James Farish, a member of the Bombay Council, supported the 
Governor, but expressed his fear of a collision with the Egyptian 
forces in the Yemen, since he, too, thought that Muhammad 'Ali had 
designs on Aden# Farish was afraid that the occupation of the place 
by the British might cause Muhammad 'Ali to deprive them of the 
facilities they had at Suez and Alexandria**^
Grant replied that if the British did not take Aden soon, it would 
be too late to do so after Ibrahim iasha had taken San'a# "Now he 
has no right to object to us punishing the Sultan of Aden, but if we 
do it later, he will interfere to protect him#" This "interference",
36.
28the Governor explained, would result in the dreaded "collision"#
The opinions of Grant and Farish were forwarded to Auckland#
The Governor-General did not feel that the "Darya Dawlat" incident
provided a sufficient pretext for the occupation of Aden# He
answered "that satisfaction, in the first instance, be demanded of
the Sultan of Aden for this outrage# If it be granted, some amicable
arrangement may be made with him for the occupation of this port as
a depot for coals and a harbour for shelter# If it be refused, the
further measures may be considered; and in the meantime information
may be collected of the political state of Aden and the neighbouring 
29countries#"
On receipt of this letter, Grant ordered that Haines, who was in
Bombay, should proceed to Aden and demand redress from the Sultan for
the outrage committed and the restoration of the "Darya Dawlat"1s cargo
or the remittance of its value# The Governor also directed that he
should keep in mind during the negotiations "the desirable object of
30obtaining consent to our establishing a coal depot at Aden",
The Bombay Government, however, also gave Haines instructions 
which went beyond those of the Governor-General# In a minute dated 
2bth March, 1838, Grant wrote: "On its being brought to our know­
ledge ••# by the Superintendent of the Indian Navy, that, in the 
opinion of Captain Haines, the Sultan would willingly, and on very
favourable terms, make over to us ••• Aden, we conceived that the
instructions of the Supreme Government would bear us out in obtaining
such transfer# We therefore directed Captain Haines to enter into
31terms with the Sultan for that purpose,###" As in the case of 
Socotra, the Bombay Government felt it necessary to have complete 
control of the place where their depot was located#
Haines arrived off Aden on board the sloop-of-war "Coote" on 
2bth December, 1837, and had his first meeting with Sultan Muhsin on 
4th January, 1838# At that meeting, he demanded the cargo of the 
"Darya Dawlat" or the sum of $L2,0G0# The Sultan considered this 
demand unreasonable, since he claimed that what he had of the cargo
was given him voluntarily# However, Haines told him that the sum was
to be recovered from him "either by pacific or coercive measures"#
On hearing this, the Sultan returned what he had, amounting to #7809, 
and signed a bill for the remainder to be paid within one year*^
37.
Then Haines gave presents to the Sultan and his sons, which they
33returned in the form of bullocks and sheep* The Sultan also sent
Haines a friendly letter in which he wrotes "You have ai-serted we
are old friends? ... I wish to see it is truth?*.* If God pleases,
3b
my friendship shall be the same as my father’s (predecessor*s),
3 5
and a treaty shall be witness* •••• He and the English are one»H
Encouraged by this letter* Haines answered? "••* I am empowered
by Government to form a treaty with you for the purchase of Aden
and sent the Sultan a draft treaty for his perusal and comment* The
draft protected the Sultan’s religion? guaranteed him independence
"though in alliance" with the British? gave him the right to reside
in Aden and to continue in possession of his two houses* His trading
vessels were to be protected and allowed to fly the British flag* The
Sultan had only to name his prico, and Haines expressed his confidence
36that he would not let such an opportunity pass*
However, Haines was not completely frank in his proposals. To
Charles lialcolm, the Superintendent of the Indian ITavy, he wrote?
"All articles that would be necessary are not therein written? what
I now forward being merely hastily written to give them satisfaction,
37from my knowledge of their character and wishes*"
Ileanwhile, he urged the Sultan to accept the draft treaty,
pointing out the advantages which would accrue to him and to his
country from it* The British would protect his territory by sea, and
this would lead to commercial prosperity* "Some minor power" might
soon try to take Aden, in which case it would become a source of
38trouble instead of an external defence*
At 9*00 p.m. on 13th January, the Sultan visited Haines on board 
the "Coote" to discuss matters relating to the transfer of Aden* With 
him he had his eons and Rashid Ibn ’Abd Allah, the chief merchant 
in the town. At first, Kaine3 reported, the men were afraid of being 
disgraced in the eyes of their people if they sold the town, but this 
fear he soon dismissed, probably by restating the advantages which
the 'Abdali tribe would derive from British occupation*
Haines* explanation for the Sultan’s readiness to sell Aden to 
the British was his fear that the Egyptians might take it by force and 
pay him nothing. In return for the town, Euhsin asked that he be 
treated as an Indian nawwab and that his country bo placed under British 
protection* Ee also made the familiar request for ammunition, this
38.
time to be supplied from the ”Coote”; the urgency was due to a 
truce vath the Fadlis having come to an end, Haines* answer was 
that he had no authority to grant either request, but he undertook 
to write to the Government on the first, and advised the Sultan to 
address them personally on the second,
Tho Sultan promised to do so, and also to inform the Governor
39of the sum of money for which he would cede Aden. He added that 
he would go back immediately to Lahj to consult with his chiefs and 
that all should be ready by 1.3th March, when the Government could 
send troops and guns to take possession of Aden. However, Haines told 
him that they would not do so until the final arrangements had been 
completed.
Before the Sultan left the ”Coote”, he had promised Haines all
that he wished, and this Haines took to mean that all had ended well
for the British. "The subject of our conversation that evening was
conclusive,...” he wrote, and he even chose a spot for the coal depot.
Earlier, he had drawn the line of British ground as far north as
ZfO
Khur Maksar, a creek at the head of the Isthmus.
The Sultan*s promises, however, were not more sincere than Haines*
41treaty proposals* To Shaykh Tayyib Ibramji, the agent at Mukha,
he explained! when I saw his (Haines*) face so determined (on
acquiring Aden), I endeavoured to escape him, and put it (the transfer
42question) off for two months while each held council.”
In his letter to the Governor of Bombay, instead of naming his
price for Aden, the Sultan firmly objected to selling it. ”Let it be
known ... that it is an Arabian adage, that *Let the body be burnt,
43
but do not let the wuttum be pierced through*.** Muhsin reminded 
Grant of the treaty uhich Ahmad *Abd al-Karira had proposed to Duncan, 
and which he considered valid. Such a treaty, he added, would be 
acceptable to him* **If your Excellency have any business in Aden, 
whether for a long or short time, your ports and our ports are the 
same* Our and your friends and foes are the same. You should
live under your own flag, and we under our own* Guch an arrangement 
may be entered into.
-‘ise any aggression, v;h ether by sea or land, be attempted 
upon us by our enemies, we shall trust in the Almighty and you;
44oecause tho enmity of the tribes surrounding us will be increased;
whom we will not dread if you maintain a union with us, and act in
45conjunction with us.”
39.
On l8th January, the Sultan complained to Haines that the English
had been seen on Mount Shamsan, and the people appeared "a little
angry”* They said that the land had been transferred without their 
46knowledge* llainea replied that it would be better if the people
knew about the transfer negotiations* Should the land be ceded, they
47would not be surprised*
Having failed to get any ammunition from Haines, the Sultan asked
48him to prevent his enemy, the Fadli chief, from raiding his country*
Haines* answer was: "Promise me the transfer under your seal for any
sum you may think requisite, and I can then prevent the encroachment
49of others by writing to them*”
To speed up negotiations, Haines sent his Arabic interpreter, a
Persian named Ilulla Ja*far, to the Sultan to press him for a decision
on the transfer and its price* The interpreter returned with two
letters bearing the same date, 22nd January, 1838* In the first,
which was sealed, the Sultan reminded ..aines that he depended on Aden
for his own support and for the stipends which he paid to neighbouring 
50chiefs* Then he renewed his promise to transfer the town after two
months, i*e* in March* In the interim, Haines was to go to Bombay
while the Sultan conferred with his elders* On Ilaines* return, in
iiarch, the iiritish could start building forts or houses, or do what
they wished; the town would then be theirs* The Sultan was not to
be held responsible if they were attacked by sea or land*
Muhsin asked for half the customs dues; and if that would not
be possible, then a monthly or annual stipend* He stipulated that
his name be respected, and warned* **If you do not come between these
months, and the Turks (the Egyptians in the Yemen) come and take the
whole country by strength from me, or any other oeople, you must not 
51blame me*’1
The second letter, which was unsealed and which the Sultan 
dictated to Haines* interpreter, was more official, and Haines was 
supposed to return it with his seal affixed* This letter also gave 
Aden to the British; but required that the houses and guns of the 
Sultan should remain his, and that his control should continue over 
the town’s population, Arabs and Jews*^
Tho interpreter could not persuade the Sultan to put in writing 
the sum he wanted for Aden, the latter preferring the Government of 
Bombay to decide it, probably believing that they would pay more than
40.
ho would ask. However, under much insistence on the part of 
Mulla Ja*far, the Sultan suggested $50,QGQ annually, claiming that 
that was what he received as customs dues from Aden.
This claim Haines described as "ridiculous", since according to 
him, the Sultan*s revenue from the port amounted only to six or seven 
thousand dollars per annum, but he thought that the Government might 
pay him a little more.^ Commenting on the two letters, he wrote to 
the Sultan* "... the sealed one was clear enough, but the other 
destroyed its decision. .... They (tho Government) must first have 
(before building houses, forts, etc.) the transfer, and money for 
the same arranged, and concluded, under your seal."
The equal division of the customs dues was unacceptable to Haines 
on the grounds that though they were insignificant at that time, they 
might well increase after the British took over. Haines agreed that 
the Sultan should continue in possession of his personal property in 
Aden, and that he and his children should still enjoy princely status* 
However, ho described as "ridiculous" his condition that the Arabs 
and Jews must continue to obey him after the transfer, as indeed it 
would have been if he had meant what he said.
Haines made it clear to the Sultan that if Aden were attacked, 
the British would undertake its defence, and pointed out that if the 
agreement had to wait until March, the transfer would be considerably 
delayed. During the south-west monsoon (May to September), the 
voyage from Bombay to Aden would take as long as two months. There­
fore, he urged immediate transfer, advising in a threatening tone*
54"... give, while you have an opportunity, a decided answer."
The Sultan’s reaction was an angry one. "I have given my seal
that Aden is yours, and you must now give me yours as a security to
me. .... if my letter with the seal does not please you, give it me
back, and what I dictated to Jaffer give it to Reshid, who will give
55it my man and he will bring it to me."
Haines returned the unsealed, and not tho sealed, letter for 
which the Sultan had asked. "I return the letter ... merely 
objecting to the part ... regarding the Jews, Banians and Arabs in 
the town." To lialcolm he wrote: "The letter confirming Aden to
the British I herewith enclose, with the translation of it,.**"^
This letter, however, was not sufficient to make the transfer legal.
It was not countersigned, and the price, without which no transfer 
could have been made, was not rentioned. Besides, Haines himself
41*
admitted that the unsealed letter had rendered null and void the 
sealed one*
Cn receipt of the unsealed letter, the Sultan, who was ill,
dictated an answer to his eldest son Ahmad and sent it to Haines with
Rashid Ibn *Abd Allah* He wrote* "If God pleases, all on our side
58will be properly arranged*" By this he may have meant the conspiracy 
to which reference will soon be made* Rashid, besides, told Haines 
that "all was concluded", and the price for Aden was to be 08700 
annually* He also informed him that the Cultan*s son, hie son-in-law, 
Gayyid Muhsin Ways, and Ha j j Muhsin, a rich Hadrami merchant of long 
residence in Lahj, were coming to Aden as witnesses to the transfer 
agreement*
Accordingly, Haines left in the Coote *s pinnace, accompanied 
by two of the ship's officers as witnesses on the British side*
However, no sooner had they landed than Haines was told by his 
interpreter, who was on shore, that there was a conspiracy to seize 
him and his papers, and, probably, to murder him* Whereupon the 
British immediately returned to their boat*
Haines had no doubt that the chief man behind the conspiracy was 
Sayyid Muhsin Ways whom he described as "a cunning crafty being, 
devoid of honour, honesty or integrity,**." The conspirators* aim, 
Haines thought, was to seize the promissory note in the belief that 
by the time it fell due, the old Sultan (then about 70) would have 
died and they would be required to pay* For his escape, Haines was
grateful to Hajj Muhsin (who had been excluded from the delegation),
50
Rashid and Kulla Ja'far.
Anxious to settle the transfer question before his return to 
Bombay, llaines ignored the conspiracy and asked Ahmad to state In
60writing the sum for which, his father was ready to sell Aden* Not
knowing that the plot had been discovered, the young chief answered
that he had come on his father*s behalf to arrange matters, and
requested Haines to come to the town alone because of the Sultan*s
61desire that all should be secret*
liaines replied that if Ahmad wanted secrecy, the "Coote" would
62be a better place, although t :ere was no need for secrecy* In 
response, Ahmad wrote a strange letter which was a imixture of 
arrogance, insult and friendliness* In it he saidi "If you wish to 
have Aden, the people of Aden are not willing to have you* ••*« No
42*
one will go out of their houses until their deaths#’1
At this point, Haines revealed to Ahmad that he knew everything
about the conspiracy and told hims "I have the bond for the transfer
of the land and harbours we required, under your father's signature
and seal; and what bond have you now from me? Had you acted
honourably you would have received papers from me equally binding as
the seal of your father for the transfer, and it is now not too late
if you send me the sum you arranged for Haines also advised
Ahmad to apologise for his attempt to obtain by violence the documents
64
given "in friendship" by his father#
Then, prior to his departure for Mukha, on 30th January, 1838,
65
he sent a reproachful letter to the Sultan and gave Damji, the 
agent in charge of the cargo recovered from the "Darya Dawlat", 
instructions regarding any coal that might arrive before he heard 
from the Government * ^
Thus Haines failed to buy Aden as he had failed to buy Socotra, 
but this tine he would not admit failure# From Kukha he wrote to 
Ibrahim Pacha that Aden had been transferred to the British; ^  and 
although this was not the case, it was accepted as such#
Grant, who was determined to take A •■■'on, wrote privately to 
Hobhouso on 20th March, 1838: "Perhaps we went too far in initiating
... the occupation* If so, blame, but confirm what we have cP: no,. .*" 
The Governor of Bombay accused the British Government of not being 
fully alive to the dangers threatening* India from Russia and France, 
and added: "I am tempted to address a stimulant to Palmerston; but
what fruit will there be from my efforts, unless seconded by the 
Minister of India?"^
On 2oth March, Grant recorded a second minute advocating the 
occupation of Aden* This was longer and more strongly-worded than 
his first minute of 23rd September, 1837# In it, he explained in 
detail why the British must take Aden, stressing the dangers from 
Muhammad ’Ali, France and Russia* £y so doing, he undoubtedly hoped 
to administer "a stimulant" to Kobhouse and Palmerston, an effort 
which was hardly necessary#
Tho Governor wrote that Muhammad 'Ali's aim was to build Egypt, 
Syria an^ Arabia into an independent kingdom, a belief expressed by 
Palmerston in 1833* France or Russia might help him achieve this goal, 
and then join him against Britain* "The establishment of a potentate
thus vigorous and violent at the head of a hundred thousand men, on 
a coast within easy sail of our shores, forms no very bright 
anticipation for the auture fortunes of India*"
Grant was certain that Muhammad 'Ali had for years been contem­
plating the annexation of Aden, and therefore he would not be pleased 
if the British forestalled him* However, if they did, he would have 
no reason to accuse them of hostility towards him, since they would 
be seizing it from an independent chief who owed him no allegiance*
On the other hand, if he took it first, his would be the prior claim, 
and the British could have no coal depot at any station on the
Red Sea which was not under his control*
In 1838, Grant could see "no great evil" in British dependence 
on Muhammad 'Ali's goodwill for coaling facilities in tho Red Sea; 
steamers were few, and it was in the Pasha's interest to maintain a 
friendly attitude* However, the Governor of Bombay could foresee 
significant changes which required the occupation of Aden* In a few 
years, Muhammad 'Ali would be the ruler of a vast independent kingdom, 
and "certain European powers" would form alliances with him* Moreover, 
the ships of the Indian Navy would all be propelled by steam* Under 
these circumstances, the last thing the British would want was to 
see "the key of our strength •*• in the keeping of an Egyptian despot; 
devoid of feeling or principle and allied only to the impulse of a 
restless daring and insatiable ambition*"
Grant had no fear that if the British took Aden, Muhammad 'Ali 
would cut off their communication with Europe via Egypt; the Pasha 
appreciated the benefits which his country derived from its geograph­
ical position between India and Europq* He was particularly mindful 
of the revenue which steam navigation indirectly brought to his 
treasury*
In Grant's opinion, there were other reasons for occupying Aden* 
France, who was extending her rule along the coast of North Africa 
(having captured Algeria in I832) and building up her naval force in 
the Mediterranean, would naturally be tempted to retake Egypt and 
then attempt to recover her former possessions in India*
As long as Muhammad 'Ali lived, he would maintain his control 
over Egypt; but after his death, confusion would set in and power 
would be contested by opposing factions* At that point, France 
would intervene* Whether the British joined in the struggle for
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Egypt or saw it turned into a French colony, the possession of Aden
would be indispensable* “For the purpose of watching the progress
of affairs it would be a secure observatory; if we found it necessary
to collect a force it would afford a highly commodious station, and
if the shores of the Red Sea were to pass under a French yoke it
would become the Gibraltar of India*"
If France occupied Egypt, she might agree with Russia to launch
a joint attack on India, she by way of Egypt, and Russia by way of
Persia. A more immediate apprehension was that Sultan Muhsin might
cede Aden to France* At the time Grant wrote his minute, the French
frigate "L'Artemise", commanded by "a most intelligent officer", was
on her way to that port after a visit to Masqat*
Grant described the advantages which Aden offered as "greater
than the sacrifice", meaning perhaps that it was worth fighting for*
Of all the reasons which he put forward for its occupation, the need
for a coal depot was foremost in his mind* "The advantage of
occupying Aden as a station convenient for the steam navigation
entered largely into the views of the Bombay Government,••*" Grant
expressed his hope that the competent authorities would ratify the
measures which his government had taken and emphasised: "Aden is
actually in our hands, and the question respecting it is one purely
69of retention not of acquirement*"
In reply, Hobhouse wrote that some members of the India Board
were against choosing Aden as a coal depot, but "now that Aden has
70been actually ceded to you they may sanction the measure"* The
opposition at India House was won over, and on 30th May, 1838, the
Secret Committee formally authorised the occupation in letters sent
71both to Grant and Auckland*
News of the "transfer" reached Muhammad 'Ali in March, and on
the 27th, Campbell wrote to Palmerston that the Pasha was greatly
disturbed by it, not wanting the British too close to Mukha. He
asserted that Aden was a dependency of the Yemen, and that he had
undertaken his expedition to that country (1832-3) with the knowledge
72and consent of the British Government, implying that they recognised 
his jurisdiction over Aden* Yet Boghos Bey, who conveyed this message 
to Campbell, assured him verbally "that if it should be the desire 
of the British Government that Mehemet Ali should evacuate Yemen he 
would do so; and further that if it appeared that Aden did not
45.
depend on the Imam of Sennaar (San'a) the Pasha himself would be
happy to contribute all in his power to facilitating the cession of
Aden to the Bombay Government*"
Campbell described the Pasha's claim to Aden as "invalid” and
added that the Bombay Government had a right to take possession of it
without reference to hira*^ Later, in his dispatch of 17th April, he
reported that he had told Boghos Bey that Aden was independent* Had
this not been the case, its ruler could not have made the treaty of 
741802 with Popham* Campbell also reminded Muhammad 'Ali that in
1822 the British Resident at Mukha discussed with the Sultan of Aden
the possibility of transferring the Residency to his port* In
neither caso had the Imam protested* Moreover, tho succession to the
Lahj sultanate was hereditary, and the Sultan did not acknowledge
75the overlordship of the Imam, nor did he even pay him tribute*
Afraid that the Eritish might use Aden as an advance post against 
his forces in the Yemen, Muhammad 'Ali proposed, on 28th March, that 
the chain of mountains running parallel to the coast should be the 
boundary between the Egyptian and British spheres of influence*
However, if the British wanted Aden only as a coaling station, it 
would be better for them if ho occupied it* An Arab government could 
not render the services which they would require, while he would give 
them the same facilities which they had in other places under his 
control*^
To Campbell's dispatch of 27th March, Palmerston answered on
12th May that Auckland had not informed the British Government of the
occupation of Aden and added: "••• as Her Majesty's Government
cannot doubt that if this has been done, it will have been done upon
sufficient reasons, it is in that case also likely that the conduct
of the Indian Government in that matter will be approved. As for the
effect which the possession of Aden would have on the occupation of
the Yemen by the Egyptians, it wa3 up to the Pasha* But the British
Government is not aware that any interest of Great Britain is promoted
by the continuance of that occupation*"
Regarding the Pasha's claim that he had British consent for hie
expedition to the Yemen, Palmerston wrote that the India Board did
not think that such an expedition would harm British interests* He
further pointed out that since Muhammad 'Ali had acted before receiving
77this consent, clearly it could not have influenced his plans*
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Palmerston advised the Pasha to "respect the independence of the 
native chiefs in the vicinity of Aden,**#" and threatened "that any
attempt on his part to subvert their authority would not be viewed
78with indifference by the British Government"*
Then, on 24th Kay, Palmerston replied to Campbell's dispatch of 
17th April* This letter was very important because it defined the
area on which Britain would permit no encroachment by any power in
79the north, be it Egyptian, Ottoman or native* Campbell was 
instructed "to remind Boghos Bey *•* that Great Britain could not 
see with indifference any attempt made by Mehemet Ali to invade or 
conquer the coimtry lying at, and beyond the mouth of the Red Sea*
"with respect to the occupation of the Yemen by the Egyptian 
troops, you will say that the Eritish Government has no desire that 
such occupation should continue; but, on the contrary, would be 
better pleased by any overt act which should show that the Pasha is 
engaged in improving the administration of the provinces confided to 
his govt, instead of employing the energies of his mind, and the 
resources of tho countries he governs in aggressive expeditions
Soagainst neighbouring districts*"
Palmerston received the news of the alleged cession of Aden in
June, whereupon he instructed Campbell to tell Muhammad 'Ali that it
had been ceded to the British and would be occupied immediately*
"••• therefore any hostile attempt of the troops of Mehemet Ali against
Aden will be an attack upon a British possession and will be dealt
8lwith accordingly*" In July, Palmerston instructed Campbell to tell
82Muhammad 'Ali not to occupy Aden; and if he had done so, to withdraw.
In May I838, Muhammad 'Ali informed the European consuls in
Egypt, for the second time, that he was about to declare independence 
83
from the Porte* This news was received in England after the Pasha 
84had subdued Najd and at a time when Palmerston was occupied with a 
growing crisis in Persia.
In the late summer of 1837* Muhammad Bhah of Persia advanced on 
Herat, the westernmost of the three main Afghan states, thus threatening 
the routes to Kabul, Qandahar and the Indian frontier* British 
officials at home and in India believed that the Persian conquest 
of this principality would give Russia an outpost for intrigues 
among the tribes and states bordering on India* Here it is to be 
remembered that the treaty of Gulistan (IS13) gave Russia the right,
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confirmed in 1823 by the treaty of Turkmanchai, to have consuls or
commercial agents in any part of the Persian dominions where commerce
made it necessary* Therefore, if the Persians took Herat, Russia's
right would be extended to it* Britain had no such concession#
In March, John McNeill, the British Minister at the Persian
Court, tried to persuade the Shah to give up the siege of Herat.
Earlier, he had written to Palmerston and Auckland recommending the
occupation of the island of Kharg off Bushehr, the principal port
85
on the Persian side of the Gulf.
The intention of Muhammad 'Ali to declare his independence 
brought a strong reaction from Ilobhouse, one of Palmerston's closest 
colleagues in the Cabinet* On 9th June, he wrote to Auckland: "We
must take part with the Sultan, and assuredly have the power of doing 
so with more effect than any of the great Continental sovereigns.
Not only the shores of the Red Sea, but the Pachalic of Baghdad is 
within reach of your Indian forces, and I think it by no means 
improbable that you will have to send troops both to one and the other. 
At any rate, you will, of course, occupy Aden at once* You have 
bargained for it, and it does not belong to Mahomet Ali, and, even 
before this letter reaches you, I trust either you or Sir Robert Grant 
will have taken measures to accomplish that object* I cannot help 
thinking that the necessity which this contemplated declaration of 
independence by Mahomet Ali might create, would justify also the 
occupation of Karrack (Kharg). The Viceroy of Egypt will, doubtless, 
follow up his declaration by on attack on the Pachalic of Baghdad; 
and we shall want a position for British troops in the Gulph of Persia, 
which may be found conveniently at Karrack*"^
With regard to Kharg, Auckland had acted forty days before 
Hobhouse sent him his instructions* On 1st May, he directed Grant 
to send a joint naval and military force to the Persian Gulf to be 
at McNeill's disposal* The expedition anchored off Bushehr Roads on 
13th June# When the Shah refused to lift the siege of Herat, as 
requested by McNeill, the expedition landed on Kharg two days later* 
However, a number of factors finally forced the Shah to raise 
the siege on 9th September* These were pressure from Palmerston, 
representations made to the Shah through the British mission in 
Teheran, the insinuation that Britain would not allow Persia to occupy 
Afghanistan, rumours that an army from India was already in Afghanistan
48.
37on its way to Herat and the repulse of the Persians in late June*
In caking known his intention to declare independence,
Muhammad 'Ali relied on the disunity of the European Powers to
prevent any action against him. However, Palmerston reacted immed-
iately because such a declaration might have resulted in war and
brought the Russian fleet back to the Bosphorus. He wrote to
Muhammad 'Ali that he was mistaken if he thought that differences
among the Powers would "protect him from Britain's wrath". The
88Pasha was impressed and gave up the idea.
In June, Campbell received a letter from Bombay, asking him to 
tell Muhammad 'Ali that no further steps would be taken in the 
negotiations for Aden without the instructions of the superior 
authorities. Campbell did so, and reported that the Pasha hoped 
"that the Indian Government would be persuaded that Aden formed a 
part of the Yemen, and, it was notorious, had formerly been part of 
the Turkish Empire}..." Muhammad 'Ali repeated that if he took 
Aden, the British could be sure of having a coal depot there without 
the expense of garrisoning it. Tho Pasha trusted that the Bombay 
Government would appreciate this and refrain from occupying the 
place.89
Campbell replied that the British would not authorise him to 
take Aden simply to obtain a coal depot free of expense. Great Britain 
was strong enough to take it at any moment if she so wished. However, 
she had made "an equitable agreement" with its ruler and would permit 
no interference from Muhammad 'Ali*
The Pasha then explained that his reason for wanting to be in
Aden was not the possession of the place, but his fear that disputes
might arise between his subjects in the Yemen and the people of Aden 
after they had become British subjects. He also asked Campbell to 
assure the British Government that he would not stand in the way of 
their occupying Aden, and added that it would probably be better if 
he withdrew from the Yemen.
The Consul's comment was: "... the dislike of the Pacha arises
not from any collision between our subjects at Aden and the neigh­
bouring people of the Yemen, but from his apprehension that from the 
equity and mildness of British rule the whole of the coffee trade of 
the Yemen would probably be diverted to Aden, and thus the monopoly 
which he now exercises in that article would be entirely destroyed*"9^
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Campbell's argument would have been stronger if he had mentioned
that there would be no likelihood of a collision between Egyptian
and British subjects because Aden had no common border with Egyptian-
occupied Yemen. The Consul, however, could not have referred to this
fact due to lack of knowledge, as he himself later admitted.
To Palmerston's dispatches of June and July warning him not to
occupy Aden, Muhammad 'Ali replied, through Campbell, that he had
never entertained such an idea and that he now regarded Aden as a
British possession. The mutual boundary, he repeated, was to be the
chain of mountains running parallel to the coast* Campbell told him
that he did not know what the boundaries of Aden were, but that he
had simply to state "that the whole territory under the rule of the
Sultan or Governor of Aden must in future be considered as a Eritish
91territory and be respected as such." liarston suggests that
Muhammad 'Ali chose the mountain chain as a boundary in order to
ensure his continued control over the coffee-growing area in case the
92British had plans for expansion#
When the two months went by and Auckland did not comment on
Grant's minute of 26th March, 1838, the Government of Bombay wrote
to him again requesting instructions. The Governor-General replied
that the establishment of a coal depot at Aden was necessary for steam
navigation, but he felt that occupation was a matter to be decided
93by the Home Government.
Auckland's reply was dated 2nd July, and Grant died a week later#
James Farish, his successor as Acting Governor, was not less
enthusiastic about annexing Aden. On 25th August, he wrote to Auckland
asking for permission to occupy it; and two days later, he wrote in
answer to the Secret Committee's letter of 30th May* "It appears to
be the wish of the Home Authorities that the port of Aden should be
occupied by this Government without delay; indeed It seems to be
their expectation that measures are already in progress to secure this
94important object; which, however, we beg to state is not the case."
Then, in a minute dated 1st September, Farish directed that 
Haines, who was in Bombay, should be sent immediately to Aden to 
conclude "the treaty". "This proceeding will have on the face of It 
an amicable character, and as he (Baines) should take 30 Europeans as 
an escort, their presence and the knowledge that a sufficient force 
is on its way to Aden to occupy it as a possession ceded to us will,
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I have no doubt, prevent any shuffling on the part of the Sultan,.*.”
The reasons which Farish gave for his decision were firstly,
his fear that if Kuhaxnnad *Ali took Aden, the blane would fall on him
as Governor* Secondly, he felt that time should not be allowed to
elapse ’’without taking some measures to keep alive the claim we have
established...”^  Thirdly, the monthly steamer was scheduled to leave 
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for Suez on oth September, and on her way back she would be able to
bring news from Haines in Aden.
Before Haines left Bombay, the Government supplied him with a
revised version of the draft treaty (which was not fundamentally
97different from the original), a copy of Palmerston’s letter to 
Campbell of 2^ +th May, I838, the promissory note and ’’the original 
deed of transfer”. Besides his escort of 30 European soldiers, Haines 
was to take with him his interpreter and Sbaykh Tayyib Ibraraji, the 
former agent at Kukha, who was a close friend of the Sultan and whose 
influence with him, it was hoped, would be of benefit. Lieut. J. life stern 
of tho Engineers was also to go with Haines to report on the fort­
ifications and on what would be necessary for tho defence of the place 
after its occupation*
Tho Government instructed Iiaines that if he found Ibrahim Pasha 
in possession of Aden, he was to inform him officially that he had 
Violated British territory and should evacuate. If Ibrahim refused, 
Haines was to write to Campbell that he might protest to Muhammad *Ali 
and urge him to order his nephew to withdraw. Meanwhile, Haines was 
not to communicate with the Egyptian force, but to warn its commander 
“that all plunder or contributions levied on the town will be 
considered acts of aggression and redress demanded.”
Iiaines was to assure the tribes in the vicinity of Aden that the 
British were their friends as long as they continued to be theirs. 
However, he was not to discuss commerce, as this would arouse the 
jealousy of Muhammad 'Ali and lead to unnecessary complications. Haines 
was empowered to bribe influential people in Aden and, if necessary, 
to increase the annual sum of #8700 rather than resort to force. If
the Sultan refused to pay the promissory note but agreed to the transfer,
98
the Government would pay the bill. The Sultan was to be guaranteed 
protection under the terms of the proposed treaty, and told that as 
long as British rights and interests were respected, the British would 
not interfere in tribal quarrels unless their mediation was sought by 
both parties*
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If the Sultan refused to cede Aden, Haines was to tell him that 
the reparation for the "Darya Dawlat" (#12,000) was not sufficient 
and would not have been accepted had he not promised to transfer 
Adexu*^ If he still persisted in his refusal, Haines was to remind 
him that the price for Aden (#8700 annually) had been agreed on and 
that tho transfer had been actually made, but the agreement could 
not be formally ratified because of the conspiracy. If the Sultan 
now fulfilled "his engagement", the Government would be satisfied 
that no conspiracy was contemplated* If he broke "hie pledged word", 
he would be considered guilty of the intended plot, and in the likely 
event of a force being sent to occupy Aden, he would get nothing from 
the Government*^00
Haines arrived off Aden on board the sloop-of-war "Coote" on
2^th October, I838* From the ship he wrote to the Sultan that he
had returned to complete the arrangements for the transfer and
invited him on board for discussions; but if he could not come in
person, he could send whom he chose on his b e h a l f T h e  Sultan
answered that ho could not come on account of pain in his legs and
that he had entrusted the task of negotiation to his son Ahmad* He
also expressed his hope that the affair would be settled to the mutual
102benefit of the two parties.
Ahmad did not go to meet Iiaines, but sent a man to get from him 
the letter which authorised him to conduct negotiations in the name 
of the Bombay Government*^0^ Instead, Haines sent him the revised
treaty and advised him to study it and see that he would get not only
IOA 105#8000 per annum but other advantages as well*
Ahmad did not take Haines’ advice, and on 31st October, his
father decreed that the "Coote" should not be supplied from Aden*
At the same time, he sent his boat, the "Choki", to the opposite
Somali coast to prevent supplies reaching the British from that
quarter* The British retaliated by blockading Aden and capturing 
I06
the "Choki". Their requirements of wood, water and other provisions 
were now met by Sultan Ahmad of the Fadlis, Huhsin’s neighbour and 
enemy.
Haines urged the Sultan’s son to fulfil the transfer agreement, 
and threatened that if the question of money was not settled before 
the troops arrived, the ’Abdalis would not get anything*^0^ Then he 
advised his government to dispatch seven or eight hundred troops and
some vessels for the capture of Aden# The chiefs, he wrote, were
using dilatory tactics "until Government may give up all idea of the
109place, similar to Socotra which they know and speak of". There­
fore, he recommended that a letter be sent from the Governor of 
Bombay to the Sultan, telling him that the blockade would be strictly 
observed# Such a display of strength would prevent the actual use of 
force; if no supplies reached the town, the people would give in#^*^
On 20th November, the Arabs fired at the Coote *o pinnace, but 
no one was hurt# Haines regarded this act as the beginning of 
hostilities and directed Commander W# Denton of the "Coote" to
capture boats belonging to the Sultan or to any of the town’s merchants
111without regard for life or property# As a result, a number of
skirmishes took place in the following fortnight#
Then the Sultan’s son sent Rashid Ibn *Abd Allah to enquire
whether Haines was still willing to pay the #8000; Haines answered
that the demand v/as not reasonable, because the ’Abdalis had attacked
the British# The Sultan then requested a ten day truce, but Iiaines
would agree only to a permanent peace preceded by the transfer#
Iiaines attributed the Sultan’s desire for a truce to the severity 
11?
of the blockade# His obstinate resistance to the transfer, he 
thought, wa3 due to his conviction that the British could not spare
men for Aden owing to the unsettled state of the countries bordering
113on India, namely Persia, Afghanistan and Burma*
Later the Sultan applied for two days’ ceasefire, and Haines 
agreed, adding; "#•• but your answer must be decisive; and the only
one I can receive to give a permanent peace is, that you immediately
114
deliver up the land of Aden to the British,##*" The Sultan
115answered that he was coming to Aden in a week’s time* However, 
pain in his legs prevented him from fulfilling his promise#^*
In Bombay, on 29th November, the Government acted on Haines’ 
advice and decided to support his negotiations by a show of force#
Such a decision v/as possible because the retreat of the Persians from 
Herat in September had eased the military situation for the Bombay 
Government* Besides, Madras had strengthened the Bombay Army by two 
regiments, one of infantry and one of cavalry*11^
Farish wrote to the Sultan that troops were to be sent immediately 
to exact redress for the "Darya Bawlat" incident and to enforce the 
fulfilment of the transfer agreement# He advised him to consider the
53.
consequences and to avoid them "by conceding immediately to the just
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demands of the British Government"* Haines was instructed "to
obtain hostages* should circumstances render such a measure practic- 
119able"* After the arrival of the troops* Haines was to renew
negotiations for the cession of Aden* If he failed* measures were
120to be taken for its occupation*
On 18th December* the coal vessel "Ann Crichton" anchored off 
Aden, a strong hint to the Sultan that the British were determined to 
take tho peninsula whether he agreed or not* The Sultan ignored the 
hint* and Haines wrote to him* on 24th December, demanding the cession 
of Aden and an abject apology for past behaviour* Ho even sent him 
an example of the apology he v/as to make: "••• I solicit forgiveness
from the British Government, for the past conduct of myself and tribe* 
and throw myself on their mercy and forgiveness* **• for any remun­
eration tho generosity of the British Government may be pleased to 
give, for the annual support of myself, family and tribe, X shall be 
thankful*"121
The Sultan did not accede to either demand* Instead* ho went to
Aden and from there wrote to Haines that if he wished to see him* he
v/as available* He challenged him to bring with him the letter which
transferred Aden to the British# "If you have my letter (the sealed
122one) show it me; I shall then know it*"
Haines, who had reason to fear going on shore* replied: "••• I
will not answer any letter you may send until I receive your applic-
123ation for forgiveness*" The Sultan then offered him half the town} 
and this having been refused* he suggested $12*0:0 for the whole* the 
same sum Haines had demanded for the "Darya Dawlat", but Iiaines 
insisted that he should apologise prior to any friendly communication 
between them*
The Sultan disregarded Iiaines* letter and decided to enlist the
support of his Fadli neighbour* On 1st January, 1S39* a meeting was
held between the two* but ended in failure* Then Muhsin enquired of
Haines whether he would £>rgive him if he apologised* Haines* answer
124being in the affirmative, the Sultan sent him with Sayyid 'Alawi 
Ibn Zayn al-*Aydarus what he considered a sufficient apology: "I
give you to understand that I came from Lahedge to meet you* after 
Keshid Ben Abdulla had told me that my con Hamed (Ahmad) and Bedouins 
had done wrong, and that the English were very angry* They have done
wrong* and I am not willing for this* and never could be, for it is
bad, their acting so towards Government or yourself* On this account*
I send Syod Zain, Syed Alooso (•Alawi), and Eeshid to you, to solicit
pardon on my account and on account of my son and Bedouins* I shall
be glad to be friends with you* and our hearts to be one* I wish it
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on account of old friendship - friendship of a very old date*"
This was not the apology which Haines wanted, and he therefore
returned it to Sayyid *Alawi* declaring that "it is by war alone that
126the resjject due to the British can be enforced"* To the Bombay 
Government he wrote: "**• the Sultan appears determined not to
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deliver up Aden *•« the sight of troops will bring him to his senses*"
The troops arrived on 16 th January, in two transports, accompanied
by W o  ships of the Royal Navy, the "Volage" (28 guns) and the brig
"Cruizer" (16 guns)* The force* which was commanded by
Major T*M* Bailie of the 24th Regiment* Native Infantry, consisted
of 350 men of that regiment* 300 of the First Bombay European Regiment,
12840 European and 60 Indian artillery men* together with pioneers*
The same day the force arrived, Haines addressed a letter to 
Bultan Kuhsin and all the principal men of his tribe,, requesting them 
to transfer Aden peacefully to the British before sunset and assuring 
them that resistance would be futile* Haines also asked the Sultan
for three chiefs as hostages* and once more repeated his demand for
> T1 
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129an apology* he Sultan replied that he needed six. days to deliberate
on the matter*'
Iiaines did not return an answer* but directed Major Bailie* 
commanding the troops, and Captain II* Smith, commanding the naval 
force, to plan the attack* The plan completed, the British launched 
their attack on the corning of 19th January* 1839* and in less than 
three hours were in possession of Aden*
The British captured Aden when they did because Haines had received 
a secret message from Rashid Ibn *Abd Allah to the effect that the 
inhabitants were preparing the guns for service and they needed only
time to get more men* Besides, there v/as water enough only for a few
. 131days*
The Bombay Government occupied Aden without permission from the
Governor-General, and they could do so because they had the support
of the Home Authorities* However* it must be added that under pressure
from these authorities, Auckland sanctioned the occupation two days
132after the actual event#
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The occupation of Aden was overshadowed by the Afghan War and 
hence it did not receive much publicity* It was not discussed in 
the House of Commons, and in the House of Lords there was only one 
question about it# The question was put by Lord Lyndhurst, formerly 
Lord Chancellor, to the Prime Minister, Viscount Melbourne* In reply, 
the Prime Minister laid before the House the correspondence relating 
to Aden*1^
By 1837 the Bombay Government had decided that possession of 
Aden was essential* They were afraid that a hostile power might 
seize it and use it as a forward base against India* The Government 
also thought that the peninsula would be a good observation post 
should tho French re-occupy Egypt and a centre of operations against 
that country should the British decide to attack it. Another reason 
for taking Aden was its commercial potential, but the overriding 
factor was its value as a coal depot on t',2 Red Sea route*
The British were determined to acquire Aden, and the "Darya 
Dawlat" incident was welcomed as a means of putting pressure on the 
Sultan to cede it to them on their own terms* Kuhsin would have 
gladly given them a depot in return for an offensive-defensive 
alliance, but at no time v/as ho ready to part with Aden* Even his 
sealed letter did not constitute a legal transfer, although the 
British chose to regard it as such# In the face of Iiaines1 determin­
ation, the Sultan used dilatory tactics and laid down impossible 
conditions# The Bombay Government did their best to take Aden by 
diplomacy} but when they failed, they took it by force*
CHAPTER III*
THE GROWTH OF THE SETTLEMENT*
Before the 16th century, Aden was a prominent commercial centre 
due to its strategic position between India and Egypt, its harbour 
which provided good anchorage, and its natural strength manifest in 
the surrounding hills* Indian and other Eastern products bound for 
Europe were brought to Aden and then chipped to Egypt where they 
were channelled through Alexandria to the West* The town was also 
the entrepot for the trade of the East African coast and the southern 
Red Sea and the southern terminus of all caravan routes through 
Arabia* The Romans called Aden "Honanum Emporium"*
The same factors which contributed to Aden’s commercial 
importance also combined to render it an important military post, 
hence its fortification by the different rulers* The ruins which 
were still visible at the time of the British occupation showed how 
strong and extensive its defences had been* All the mountain passes 
had been fortified, and at every commanding point there v/as a fort, 
a tower or 0 turret# On the Shamsan range, overlooking the town, 
had been a wall four miles long, and other walls had been built on 
both the northern and the southern sides of the I'ain Pass* At 
Darb al-Hawsh, a gap on the northern side, there had been a gateway 
and breastwork* Sirah Island had been strongly defended with numerous 
works*
On the Mansuri range of hills which separated the town from the
Isthmus was a ruined wall flanked at intervals by irregular bastions*
Across the Isthmus itself, from shore to shore, was a wall which the
Arabs called "Barb sl-’Arabi" (the Arab Wall), and which the British,
starting with Haines, called "the Turkish Wall" (believing it to have
been built by the Turks), and they continued to refer to it as such
even after they had replaced it with a new one* The ruins of the sea
defences attested to their former strength*
The prosperity of Aden suggest* that it had a sizable population*
Ltffgren writes that in 1276, the year of Marco Polo’s visit, it had
2
80,000 inhabitants, but he does not quote the source of his infor­
mation* Marco Polo himself gives no figure, and there is nothing to 
suggest that he visited Aden. In any event, it is certain that he 
did not visit it in 1276 *"'’ Whatever the population nay have been, 
it is unlikely that it amounted to 80,000# The town was in the Crater,
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which has an area of only three square miles, not all of it fit for 
building.
For water, the inhabitants depended in the first instance on 
wells, When a more reliable source became necessary, because of 
drought or heavy consumption, tanks for collecting rainwater were cut 
in tiers in the solid rock* V/hen the uppermost was full, it over­
flowed into the next, and so on until they were all full.
It is not known when or by whom these tanks were built. Some
attribute their construction to the Himyarites, and date them back
to 1500 B.C. Others believe that they were built by the Persians 
during their second invasion of the Yemen about 600 A.B* Still others 
maintain that they were constructed by the Turks after their occup­
ation of the Yemen in 1538. The first two theories are worth 
investigating, but the third is to be discarded. Ibn Battutah, the 
great Iloroccan traveller who visited Aden in the ihth century, 
mentioned its tanks.
The number of the tanks at the end of the 15th century is nowhere
given, nor is there any indication as to their capacity and condition,
but it is clear that there was not enough water in the town. To
relieve this shortage, the sovereign of the Yemen, Taj al-Din
*Abd al-Wahhab Ibn Tahir, built an aqueduct to bring water from
Bir Hamid, a village eight miles away in what was later Fadli territory.
In addition, water was brought from the interior in groat quantities 
5
on camels.
In 1^98, the discovery of the sea route to India via the Cape of 
Good Hope enabled European merchants to trade with that country direct^ 
and Aden ceased to be an important entrepot between the East and the 
West. The Ottoman occupation in 1538 contributed still further to 
its decline; Aden became a garrison town, and ITukha soon replaced 
it as the centre of trade for the Yemen. Without giving a reference, 
Playfair writes that Aden*s population in the 17th century was 
30,000,^ implying that although it had greatly declined, it was still 
an important city. However, the accounts given by the merchants of 
the East India Company early in that century cast doubt on this 
figure.
Uhat cannot bo doubted is that in 1839, the year of tho British 
occupation, Aden was but a small village. Lieut. J.B. Wellsted, I.N., 
who visited Aden with Iiaines in 1835* mentions in his book
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"Travels in Arabia”* published in 1838* that the inhabitants were 
not more than 800. Of these* a few were Banyans, between 230 and 
300 were Jews and the rest were "descendants of Arabs, Somalis and 
offspring of slaves”.^ Iiaines, who revisited Aden in 1837 and 1838* 
writes in his memoir, submitted to the Bombay Government in the 
latter year, that tho population numbered 6OO1 300 Arabs* 230 Jews 
and 30 Banyans* Captain F.M. Hunter, Assistant Resident at Aden 
(1871-88), gives the population at the time of the occupation as
o
6000, which clearly could not have been the case. The mistake may
have been due to a printing error or to the inadvertant addition of
a nought by the writer himself.
Most of the Arab3 gained their livelihood by fishing and
supplying the pilgrim boats with water and firewood. Some Jews
earned their living by distilling from raisins an intoxicating drink
which they sold to the /Tabs in great quantities* Some used their
houses as shops where they sold grain and other articles of small
value, while a number caught fish with nets along the beach. The
Jews were also the porters, bricklayers and artisans of Aden and Lahj.
The Jianyans were Hindu merchants who came from the Gujerat area,
and for centuries had traded with Aden as well as with other Arabian
ports. They monopolised almost the whole of the Red Sea trade in
myrrh and gum. Aden’s commerce, little as it was, was nearly all in
their hands, and because of this monopoly they wielded great 
9
influence.
The people lived in about 100 houses built mainly of baked mud.
The largest and best was the one occupied by Sultan Kuhsin when he
was in Aden. Later, this house v/as acquired by Haines and remained
his official residence until 184-2.
There were several mosques in Aden, the oldest of which was the
ono where, it is said, the Fourth Orthodox Caliph* ’Ali, prayed.
However, the only mosque kept in good repair was the one which
contained the tomb of Shaykh ’Aydarus, the Kali (patron saint) of
Aden. The shrine was supported by visitors to tho town, and the
descendants of the Shaykh, who were the custodians of hie tomb,
benefited greatly from the gifts,10
The tanks were all in disrepair, and some had even been concealed
by sand and debris. The aqueduct was in ruins. The wells, estimated 
11at 300, were in a state of neglect. The streets were choked with
the rubble of fallen dwellings. Tombs, mounds and heaps of rubbish 
formed the landscape# The fortifications had all crumbled; drift 
sand had filled the breaches and covered the whole. Such was Aden 
when the British seized it from Sultan Muhsin, and the purpose of 
this chapter is to trace its growth under their rule in the light of 
the value set upon it*
Security against tribal attacks v/as the first concern of the 
new conquerors, and therefore Lieut* Western, now Executive Engineer, 
urged the temporary repair of the Turkish Wall* As a site for the 
military camp, he proposed the whole seafront in Eastern Bay where 
the occupying force had pitched its tents. One line of barracks 
was to be built at the northern end, and another at the southern, 
with quarters for the officers in the middle. The space behind the 
camp, in the direction of the *Aydarus Valley, v/as to be a parade 
ground*
Western further suggested that the fishermen be moved to Bandar 
Huqqat outside the Southern Gate where they would not interfere with 
the camp* The rest of the inhabitants were to bo settled in the 
Tawilah and *Ayuarus Valleys south of the town. The bazaar was to be 
near tho i-:am Pass.
The Bombay Government, who were more interested in the connercidL, 
than the military, aspect of the town, did not sanction Western^ 
plan for the camp because the site which he had chosen was the most 
convenient for trade. "The commercial advantages of Aden being of 
the highest importance with regard to that place, these must have 
primary consideration in the arrangement of the town and public 
buildings, and the Governor in Council (Farish) therefore requests 
that in planning out the town, and selecting sites for public build­
ings, this object be kept distinctly in view and strictly attended 
to."1*5
To draw up a now plan, the Government sent to Aden Captain R. Foster, 
Superintendent of Roads and Tanks, Xonkan. He was to plan the defences 
of the Settlement against an Arab or European attack and "to lay out 
the town v/ith reference to its becoming a place for great commercial 
resort"*
Foster arrived in Aden early in 1’arch 1839, and submitted his 
first report at the end of that month# By then, work on the 
Turkish Wall had started, and Foster agreed with Western that as a
6o.
temporary defence this was necessary* Furthermore, he recommended 
the repair of the old gateway and breastwork at Darb-al-Hawsh and 
the building, in the Crater, of a fort to command the approaches to 
the Tain Pass, having a gun battery at either end and in front an 
open space of about 200 yards, i*e* out of matchlock range* Thus if 
any body of men succeeded in scrambling over the hills and descending
into the Crater, it would be exposed to the fire; and if the guns
were mounted on swivels, they could be brought to bear in any 
direction required*
For permanent fortifications against an Arab attack, the gateway 
and breastwork at Darb al-Hawsh in the Kansuri range were to be 
replaced by new ones, and the hills were to be scarped from that point
tb the sea. The fort was to be strengthened, and more guns were to
be mounted* At night, the open space in front would be patrolled by 
a body of horse which would give warning of Arabs attempting to pass 
over the hills* By this plan, the Turkish Wall would be unnecessary* 
However, extensive fieldworks along its line would be necessary 
against a regular land siege by a large European force, for heavy 
artillery could fire shells into the town from the foot of the hills* 
The land fortifications, with the addition of batteries on Sirah 
and along the seafront, would enable the garrison, then numbering 
929, to defend Aden against a European naval force of from two to 
three thousand men* Against a larger naval force, heavy batteries on 
Ras Ma'ashiq would be required as well* In the first case, the cost 
would be #200,000, and in the second, #^00,000*
Tawahi, where the coal depot was situated and the new harbour 
was being developed, was four and a half miles from the Isthmus and 
six miles from the Crater, too far for its defences to be connected 
with theirs* Therefore, Foster proposed that it should be protected 
by a blockship capable of holding 600 tons of coal and armed with guns 
covering the land and sea. As a precaution against an attack by a 
large European fleet, batteries on Ras Tarashan and Ras Marbat would 
also be necessary*
Foster*s plan for the camp did not differ greatly from \vestern*s* 
However, Foster thought that if the town were to become a great 
commercial port, the garrison could be concentrated in the centre of 
Eastern Bay, and the space on either side could be occupied by 
merchants* If the merchants required still more room,they could build
61.
within the military limits, but this was a consideration for the 
future. At present there was sufficient space between the proposed 
military lines and the *Aydarus Valley to the south and the Khusaf 
Valley to the north#
Western had intended to take a count of the wells and tanks which 
could be cleared out, but the rejection of his plan and the appoint­
ment of Foster to draw up a new one made his efforts unnecessary*
Foster gave no number of wells or tanks, but reported that Aden 
appeared to have enough drinking water in the four wells then in use* 
The depth of water in these wells in the evening varied according to 
the demand during the day, but they generally recovered during the 
night. In addition, there were several other wells which contained 
sweet water, but were seldom used*
However, the great number of wells which were choked up, the 
many ruined tanks and the traces of the aqueduct which had once 
brought water from the interior all rightly suggested to him that Aden 
had suffered in the past from severe drought. Therefore, he felt 
that the British should guard against such a contingency by cleaning
out and repairing all the promising wells and tanks, and by boring
15for more water in Uestern Bay# ^
The Bombay Government approved of the defences proposed by Foster, 
but directed that only such works as were essential for the immediate 
safety of the town were to be carried out. The inner defences were 
not to be commenced until "higher authority" had been consulted, and 
no native was to build within their limits until the question regard­
ing them had been settled. Wherever the town was built, it should be 
laid out to a regular plan.
Foster's plan for the camp was not sanctioned. Like that of
Western, it allocated too much space to the garrison at the expense
16of a population which the Government believed would grow rapidly*
The setting up of the camp meant initially the removal of
several huts from Eastern Bay. Haines, who immediately after the
occuf/ation followed a friendly and conciliatory policy, deemed it
correct to compensate the owners of these dwellings, although he
17acknowledged that the town was now British property* If Foster*s 
plan was to be carried out, further expense would be incurred in 
paying compensation for the other houses to be demolished. Moreover, 
the Commander of the Garrison himself was of the opinion that the
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military lines could be narrowed and still leave the troops with
ample room. The Government marked the line within v/hich the camp
l8was to be confined; but in the ahsence of Foster's plan, it is
not possible to tell what limits they set.
"Higher authority" (Lord Auckland) considered it sufficient for
tho time being to secure Aden against Arab attacks. Plans for
defending it against a European enemy by land, valuable as they were,
could be deferred* However, they should be kept on record and all
improvements made with reference to them. The Governor-General did
19not think that an attack by sea was likely. The Secret Committee
also agreed that for the present it v/ould be sufficient to fortify
20Aden against Arab attacks only.
In L'£ly, a few weeks after his return to Bombay, Foster submitted
another plan for the defence of Aden against a small European force,
and its cost he estimated at #100,000, only half of that of the first
plan. He recommended that if Western Bay was healthy and water could
be found there, it should be the site for the camp and for a new
town* The defences which ha thought would be necessary here wero a
murtello tower and battery on both Ras Tarashan and Ras Marbat, a
strong gateway at Ras Hujayf and g fieldwork running from the western
end of the Mansuri range down to the sea.
In addition, the scarping of the range and the fortification of
Darb al-Hawsh, Sirah and Ras Ma'ashiq would still be necessary. From
the latter two positions, the British could command the old town;
and if an enemy succeeded in storming it, he would not be able to
hold it. In any event, the wealth would be in the new town where the
21merchants and other immigrants would have settled*
In August Foster strengthened his argument in favour of abandon­
ing the old town. During the north-east monsoon, the easterly winds 
22"often" rendered Eastern Bay unsafe, while Western Bay was always 
calm* The coal depot was in Western Bay, and here all naval and 
merchant vessels would eventually come. Here too, therefore, the 
defences and garrison would be required*
If the camp were moved to Western Bay between the headlands of 
Tarashan and ISarbat where the main batteries would be, the merchants 
would follow, not only for protection, but also for commercial reasons; 
they would be nearer the shipping, and thus be saved porterage expenses 
to and from the Crater* Then the old town would no longer be the
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chief target for an attack. Therefore, nothing more should be done 
in the Crater other than strengthening the South Gate and connecting 
it with a battery for the protection of Huqqat and Duras Bays and 
for subduing the townspeople in the event of a rebellion*
Like Auckland, Foster did not think that Aden would be attacked 
by a large fleet. He argued that no European power would send its 
fleet to assault a settlement which had nothing but "a valuable 
harbour", passing by many rich colonies on the way. In any case, no 
large fleet could sail from Europe all the way to Aden without being 
detected. A surprise att.ck might be tried by a frigate or two based 
at a nearby station, but this could be repulsed without extensive 
fortifications. Foster considered that a garrison of eight or nine 
hundred would be sufficient if supported by a body of from 73 to
24100 horse.
Lieut. Western died of sunstroke on 4th June, 1S40, and was 
succeeded by Lieut. J*A. Curtis. Curtis disagreed with Foster as to 
the wisdom of abandoning the Turkish Wall under any circumstances*
He argued that it would be easier to defend the Wall than the Haneuri 
range since it v/as shorter and allowed better use of artillery. He 
also objected to cantoning the garrison in Eastern Bay for three 
reasons
1. Space was limited and the garrison had increased. In April 
1S39, it was 929* and on 1st October, l84o, it was 1890.
2. The town separated the camp from the sweet water wells in the 
Khusaf Valley. In case of hostilities by the inhabitants, the garrison 
might be cut off from the wells, if only temporarily*
3. Compensation would have to be paid for the rest of the build­
ings to be removed.
Curtis suggested that the garrison should be moved to the Khusaf
Valley and be separated from the town by a palisade. The civil
population would thus have the entire seafront, while the troops would
have ample space and a never-failing supply of water. If the
Turkish Wall was retained, there would be no people between it and
the camp, and the garrison would be nearer the outv^orks, in a good
25position to quell any disturbance in the town*
By June lS4o, only the defences most essential to repel an Arab 
attack had been temporarily repaired and their strength tested*
These were the Turkish Wall, the Main Pass Gate and the wall on the
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Mansuri range. Work on scarping the range had been started, and 
the blockship "Charger" had been positioned off the coal depot where 
she remained until 1847, when she was broken up.
The British presence in Aden v/as quick to attract immigrants 
and change the character of the town. People came from the interior 
of Arabia, the East African coast, India and other places. The 
peninsula had to be fortified, the town rebuilt, the harbour In 
Western Bay developed, the steamers coaled, the garrison fed and 
many other new requirements met. The British wanted workers, and 
many wanted work.
26About six weeks after the occupation, the population had 
risen to 1295, as shown belowi
Males Females
Arabs 283 341
Jews 267 301
Somalis 26 37
Banyans 35 - -
Egyptians 4 - - 27
The Arabs and Jews came from the interior* The Somalis had for 
centuries traded with Aden, but now some started to bring their 
families and settle there. The Banyans, hov/ever, continued without 
families, and their houses, the only stone ones before the occupation, 
were mainly for business purposes. The Egyptians were deserters from 
Muhammad 'Ali's army in the Yemen.
At the beginning of a period of rapid immigration, one would 
expect the figures for men to be higher than those for women, but 
here, strangely enough, the reverse is the case* An explanation may 
be that the Arabs, Jews and Somalis all came from a short distance, 
and the company of their wives and daughters was not a great 
inconvenience. If necessary, a family, or part of it, could go back 
as easily as they came.
The population figures quoted in this v/ork cannot be considered
accurate* Tho Muslims did not give the right number of females in 
28their households, which served to decrease the actual figures.
Other factors tended to increase them. Many Somalis and Arabs who 
went to Aden were not married or did not have their families with 
them. They lived in tribal groups, talcing their rneals in the eating- 
house and sleeping where they happened to be when night foil, in
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coffee-shops or even in the open* Such itinerants, the idlers
waiting to be hired, and the labourers who were continuously-coming
29in and going out - all these could be counted more than once*
Thus the figures give only a general picture of the growth of the 
Settlement*
There is no mention in the sources as to the method used for 
taking a census, but it seems that at the time announced for one, 
efforts were made to count everybody who happened to be within 
British limits, residents and visitors alike. Race, religion, 
country of origin and occupation were all used for purposes of 
enumeration, with inevitable overlapping*
By September 18391 t*16 population had increased by 1613, and the 
increase was as followss
Males Females
Arabs 711 3^3
Somalis 27^ 203
Jews ^6 6 __
Banyans 25 - - -
The increase in the civil and military population made
necessary the drawing of new lines for the camp, and this task was
entrusted to a coim.ittee from the Aden garrison headed by
Captain E# Hallara* In carrying out their duty, the committee were
to bear in mind the mercantile interest of the new Settlement* They,
however, with the interest of the garrison paramount in their minds,
proposed that the whole seafront in Eastern Eay be reserved for the
European troops, and the space in the direction of the Main Pass for
the sepoys, thus establishing in effect two separate camps* The
inhabitants, they claimed, would still have ample space towards the
'Ayuarus Valley*
For the reasons given by Foster, the committee believed that
Western Bay, and not the Crater, would become the centre of trade
once it had been made secure* The place v/as healthy and had such
gooa sites for building that it would attract even Europeans* Water
was the only problem; but if a good road were made from the Khueaf
and conveyances provided, it could be transported very cheaply*
Boring for water in Western Bay had started, and the committee
”51recommended that it should continue*
Iiaines, with commerce as his priority, objected to the 
committee's plan and made his views known to them and to the Govern­
ment* To Kalian he wrote that under the proposed arrangement, half
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the building ground in the Crater, the half which happened to be 
more convenient for trade, would be appropriated by the military*
The area of the camp would be 114 acres, and the space separating 
the European troops from the sepoys would nearly double it* No 
civilian would build between the military lines, and the space would 
thus be wasted* Tho military would also want roads through the town 
to the wells in the Khusaf, and the civil population would require 
roads through the European camp to the beach, which would in both
32cases mean less space for building and more opportunity for friction*
In his letter to the Government, Haines pointed out the necessity
of not building roads through the European camp and suggested that it
should not extend southward further than the customs-house which was
opposite Sirah mole* He wanted the space between the customs-house
nd the South Gate for the merchants and others* This arrangement
would provent any conflict between the military and civil populations
and any interference with trade* Haines reminded the Government that
the committee's plan was not different from that of Western which they
33nad rejected for commercial reasons*"^
The Governor, Sir James Carnac, felt that if the military had
their ivay, the commerce of Aden would suffer, and thus one of the
obj ects of acquiring the peninsula would be thwarted* He therefore
34ruled that the Camp should not occupy the whole seafront, and
Lieut*-Gen* T* McMahon, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army,
33agreed* ^ Thus Haines had his way*
In the first two years of the occupation, the town succeeded 
mainly in attracting labourers, and its failure to attract merchants 
was due to insecurity and lack of opportunity to build substantial 
houses* The tribes made three attacks and others were threatened*
The authorities had, so far, failed to agree on a plan for the town, 
a plan which would unavoidably be connected with the defences* Under 
these circumstances, a settler was afraid to build lest the land 
might be required later for military purposes* Such cases were not 
unknown*
To remedy this situation, Haines recommended in 1840 that no
36ground rent should be levied before 1842, and in 1842 he recommended
that permanent fortifications should be erected to satisfy the merchants
37that tiieir property was protected* The second recommendation needed 
a long time to be carried out, but the first was acted on immediately*
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The Government wrote that every inducement should be offered to 
people to reside permanently in Aden, and expressed their hope that 
the events at Mukha would foster immigration, as they actually did.
In 1840, the people of Mukha, and the merchants in particular, were 
fleeing from the oppressive rule of Sharif Rusayn of Abu 'Arish. who 
succeeded to the government of the Tihama after the Egyptian with­
drawal In April 1840,
The Government authorised Haines to assign sites for building, 
but cautioned him that the town should not encroach upon the military 
limits or interfere with the defences. As regards the levy of ground 
rent, they agreed to its postponement and left Haines to fix the rate, 
but thought that it should be moderate to encourage hew settlers.
In 1£42, no ground rent was levied; and in the following year, 
at the suggestion of Haines, the Government decided that initially 
the rate should be one pie per square yard per annum. However, pay­
ment was continually postponed until 1853, and in i860 the rate was
doubled, Haines* argument for postponing the payment was always the
39same, it would encourage building.
This policy and the British success in repelling the tribes had
the desired effect; merchants now? settled in Aden in the knowledge
that the British could protect them and their property. On 13th May,
1842, Haines reported that he had allocated ground for several large
houses and 153 shops of stone, and many other shops of mat and 
40bamboo. The settler was to build within a given period, otherwise 
the land was to be taken from him and given to somebody else. If at 
a future date the Government found it necessary to demolish a certain 
building, it v/as to pay the owner a fair compensation and grant him 
another site*^
As a precaution against fire, Haines ruled that all houses built 
in the new town should be of stone. He allowed each a frontage of 
75 feet and stipulated that it should be two storeys high and chunamed, 
When it was completed, the chunam (prepared lime) on the outside was 
to be coloured t minimise the glare of the sun. To ensure that 
regularity and level were attended to, the Executive Engineer himself
was to mark out the lines of streets, houses, etc,, and the actual
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building was to be supervised by a few of his overseers. The sites
were granted to the applicants on condition that they should pay
43grounu rent when called upon*
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The people of Aden were mainly poor and could not afford to build
stone houses* Therefore, the Khusaf was set apart for those who
could only build dwellings of inflammable materials such as mat and
reed* Here, there was no danger that a fire might spread to the
other parts of the town because the wind blew up this valley# The
♦Aydarus Valley was reserved for the wealthy inhabitants* The bazaar
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was placed in a central position at the town end of the Main Pass*
In the l86o*s, there is mention of another bazaar to the south*
The population continued to grow rapidly until, in November 1842, 
it reached 16,58?, as shown below:
Males Females
Arabs 8960 327 0
Somalis 1430 620
Jews 590 480
Afghans 180 100
Egyptians 146 50
Portuguese 136 - - -
Sidie 45 180
Banyans 196 - - -
Borahs 46 111
Indian Shopkeepers 100 - - -
Parsis 38 -----
By contrast with the census of March 1839, the males here heavily
outnumbered the females, a pattern usually associated with a rapidly
growing town* The new census also shows that the population not only
increased in number, but also became greatly diversified*
In 1342, the Somali men worked chiefly as horsekeepers to the
European officers, while the young women sold mats v/oven by their
elder relatives and carried water from the wells for sale in the town*
Parsis and Muslims from Bombay were selling in their shops goods of
the latest fashion* The peasants from Lahj were the poorest of the
48inhabitants* They sought employment as weekly or day labourers*
The ratio of females to males among the Egyptians (one to three) 
suggests that when Muhammad ,Ali*s army withdrew from the Yemen, some 
deserters went to Aden with their families, or married there and for 
census purposes their wives were counted as Egyptian* The Afghans 
may have been pilgrims on their way to or from the Ilijaz. The 
Portuguese, too, were only passing through*
The plans submitted by Western, Foster and Curtis do not seem to 
have helped the Bombay Government in adopting a comprehensive system 
of defence for Aden# Now that tho population had considerably
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increased, it became necessary to devise ’’one complete and definite 
plan for the defences of the peninsula”* This duty was entrusted 
to a special committee made up of Majors VJ* Jacob (Brigade of Artillery) 
and C*W. Grant (Corps of Engineers)* The Committee were to keep in 
mind the plans drawn by Foster and Curtis and draw up one of their 
own by which Aden was to be made defensible against an Arab attack 
and a siege by a large European force# They were also to study 
Aden*s sufficiency as "a civil depot” and the means of securing a
49supply of good water for the garrison, town and shipping*
Jacob and Grant arrived in Aden on 11th December, 1842, and were 
there for four months* Their survey made them reject Foster*s plans* 
They objected to moving the town and garrison to Eastern Bay because 
no water had been found there, and they were against contact between 
the military and civil populations* Under their plan, the inhabitants 
were to remain in the Crater, and the main body of troops was to be 
moved to the Isthmus which would then become the key point of the land 
defences* Thus the garrison could be kept small and effective*
Tho Committee saw the need for a line of defence across the 
Isthmus and for the garrison to be stationed between it and the 
Mansuris* The slope of the hills facing the Isthmus was easy to 
scale, while that facing the town was precipitous* Therefore, Jacob 
and Grant had no fear of an attack on the garrison by the inhabitants 
and a revolt could be easily quelled by batteries on the heights#
For communication with the town, the Committee proposed a ramp road 
from tho Main Pass by the gap at Darb al-Hawsh, and this road was to 
be reserved for the military*
There were no wells at the Isthmus, but the Committee were 
confident that water could be found; the soil there was exactly like 
that at the nearby village of Shaykh ’Uthman where water was abundant# 
However, even if boring proved unsuccessful, water could be piped 
from the Khusaf* The upper part of this valley, where the wells were 
situated, was from 40 to 54 feet higher than the Main Pass, and there 
would be no difficulty in pumping water to the Isthmus* Iron pipes 
could run from a reservoir at the wells along the Main Pass and 
through the gap at Darb al-Hai^sh to two reservoirs in the camp, one 
for the European troops and one for the sepoys# A third reservoir 
could be built on the shore to supply the shipping* The three 
reservoirs would have a total capacity of 7020 cubic feet*
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Jacob and Grant believed that Aden would never experience a 
shortage of water# According to them there were in the Settlement, 
in 184-3# 107 wells of potable water. Of these, 27 were in the 
Khusaf Valley, but only six were in working order# The water in them 
v/as generally better than that at Bombay, and their source appeared 
to be independent of local climatic conditions# They never failed,
and the supply of water could be increased if more wells were cleared
4. 50 out.
In this, the Committee were not only confirming Foster*© 
observations, but those of Haines as well# Answering a letter from 
them about Aden’s water requirements, Haines wrote on 12th December, 
1842s "Even with the increased expenditure of water consequent upon 
the rapidly increasing population, no diminution or want has taken 
place#" Some wells had six or seven inches less water in them in
51thi evening, but the supply v/as always replenished during the night*
The Committee were against further attempts to find water in
Western Bay, as they did not think it desirable that merchants should
be encouraged to settle there# If a large town vzerc to spring up
next to the Isthmus, this would limit the recreational facilities of
the troops; and if the troops were to mix with the inhabitants, they
would have more opportunity to drink, and this would ruin their
health# In other words, the benefits sought from separating the Camp
from the town would be negated# However, they asserted that from a
military point of view, & new town in Western Bay would not pose a
threat to the Settlement while the garrison held the Isthmus position*
From the sea, the town would be protected by batteries on Has Marbat
and Jazirat Shaykh Ahmad (Flint Island)#
Majors Jacob and Grant stated that in peacetime A*den needed a
garrison of 1186 men (1140 artillery and infantry and 46 cavalry)#
Their estimate of the force required to resist a regular European
siege was 3593 ^en (3501 artillery and infantry and 92 cavalry)* As
for the cost of the land defences necessary to withstand European and
52Arab attacks, they calculated it to be Rs. 662,039*
It is clear from the records that on 11th June, 1844, the 
Committee submitted a report on the sea defences, but this cannot 
be traced and, as will be seen, it did not receive much consideration# 
Their report on the land defences quoted above was forwarded to 
Lord Ellenborough for his decision# The Governor-General expressed 
no opinion and sent it to the Court of Directors# "The question of
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what fortifications there shall be at that place (.Aden) can be
disposed of as v/ell in England as in India, and His Lordship suggests
that the whole correspondence on the subject be referred to the Home
53Authorities for orders.11 Lord Ellenborough himself, it must be
noted, did not set a high value on Aden. He did not see in it more
than a coal depot which could be protected at a small expense. If
5k
that was not possible, it might be better to abandon it.
In London, the Court approved of the Committee’s plan. However,
they ashed Lieut .-Gen. Sir Henry Ilardinge (later Lord Ilardinge), the
incoming Governor-General, to inspect the defences of Aden on his
way to India and give his opinion on the recommendations of the
Special Committee. Ilardinge agreed with the Committee in principle,
but thought that the defences had been planned on an unnecessarily
large scale. Like Foster and Auckland, he saw no probability of
Aden’s being besieged by a large European force and asked where such
a force was to come from. In his view, the distance involved and
the lack of food resources in the surrounding country would make a
siege impossible. His orders were therefore that the garrison and
fortifications should be sufficient only to keep tho population in
check and to resist an attack by Arabs or by a small European force.
In Uardinge’s cj)inion, Aden could be made secure against a land
or sea attack by fortifying a distance of luO'J yards across the
Isthmus and scarping another l800 yards from Mount iiadid to the
Main Pass. If a French danger threatened again from Egypt, or were
55to threaten from the Comoro Islands (in the Mozambique Channel), 
additional works could be constructed. However, tho British, in 
possession of Aden and with naval supremacy in the Led Sea, would 
h'-'.vo nothing to fear.
ilardinge did not share the general confidence as to the abundance 
of water in Aden, and recommended that more boring experiments should 
bo made at the Isthmus and at Western Bay. He wanted the Isthmus 
reservoirs to contain 150,000 cubic feet (approximately 934,500 
gallons), and not 7020 cubic feet (approximately 43,735 gallons).
If a sufficient supply of water could not be provided, the troops 
should be located to the north of the Crater, between the town and 
the iiain Pass, roughly as suggested by Curtis.
If water could be found in 'Western Bay, Kardinge, for the same 
reasons given by Foster, was certain that merchants would be attracted
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to it and a new town would spring up. New settlers would be welcome 
as a counterbalance to the local Arabs who might rebel, and the 
customs dues from the increase in trade would partly re-imburse the 
Government for its expenditure on defences# However, the water 
situation might make necessary some restriction on immigration.
Ilardinge asked the Committee to revise their plan in accordance
with his observations* This they did, effecting a saving of
Rs* 14-6,133» only about a fifth of the original figure. The garrison
was cut down to 1212 men in peace, and 1696 in war, with 23 horse
57to patrol always outside the Turkish Wall.
While making these reductions, the Committee still urged the 
adoption of their original plan, stressing that the works they had 
proposed were not larger or stronger than necessary, and that in the 
long run they would prove more economical. If Aden were strong, 
enemies would be discouraged from attacking it, while if it were weak, 
it would invite aggression# The defences should be strongly built 
from the beginning* If they were to be strengthened when the occasion 
demanded, it would be too late; workers, artificers and troops would 
all have to be rushed from Bombay.
In answer to Ilardinge*s question, as to where a large force would 
come from to besiege Aden, the Committee replied that it could come 
from as far as Egypt, and gave as examples the ligyptian expeditions 
to Arabia in 1818 and 1835* On both occasions, a large army equipped 
with heavy artillery had covered as great a distance as it would have 
done if it had come to Aden# If the Egyptians in the Yemen had wanted 
to march on Aden, there was nothing to stop them.
Nov/ a siege could be laid to Aden by a force sent direct from 
-ATpt* an Ottoman force from the Hijaz, by tho Imam of £an*a, 
or by the chiefs of the great Yemeni tribes, such as the •Asiris.
In addition, the Committee claimed that French emissaries, dressed 
and living as Arabs, were active among the tribes, and it was 
possible for France to take Aden through Arab agency. They also 
reported a rumour current in Mukha that in the event of a European 
war, France would attack Aden by sea, and Sharif Ifusayn of 
Abu *Arish v/ith the •Asiris would attack by land#
The Committee re-iterated that the wells had enough water, and 
all that was required was the building of larger reservoirs at the 
Isthmus holding a month*s supply# A town on Western Bay would have
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many advantages from a commercial point of view over one in the 
Crater, and it would also be easy to pipe water to it# However, 
there would be serious disadvantages# For their water, the inhabit­
ants would be entirely dependent on the troops who would have control 
of the pipeline, and this dependence might arouse their suspicions* 
The town would separate the Isthmus Position from Tawahi, the troops
would be deprived of space for recreation and it would be impossible
58
to prevent them from mixing with the population*
Hardinge was not convinced by the Committee's reasoning* In
March 18^5* he wrote that the sea defences of Aden were of secondary
59importance, and in May, he emphasised that Aden did not deserve 
special treatment* It was not more important than Singapore,
Hong Kong or the island of Labuan at the mouth of the Borneo Kiver* 
These places had the same function as Aden, being links along the 
sea route through Egypt to China* Singapore v/as practically defence­
less, and Hong Kong and Labuan were to have only a fo': sea batteries* 
Aden v/as less exposed to an attack by sea than any of these 
stations; and if in time of war an enemy wanted to interrupt 
Britain's steam navigation by seizing one of her naval bases, Aden 
would be the last choice* The enemy would not attack it, knowing 
that tho British had large powerful steamers capable of carrying 
heavy guns and of transporting from Bombay 1000 soldiers at a time# 
The Governor-General asserted that in view of the distance to be 
covered, a siege by a force from Egypt was as improbable as one by a 
force from Europe# A long voyage or a long march by a large army 
with heavy ordnance could not be concealed# In seven days, the naval 
and military resources of India would be brought to bear upon Aden 
quickly and effectively*
Hardinge'a argument had a number of weak points# By virtue of 
its position, half way between Bombay and Suez, Aden v/as more 
important than the other places he mentioned and also more exposed 
to an attack by sea. If the French had thought of attacking any 
British naval base outside Europe, it would have been Aden, and not 
distant Singapore, Hong Kong or Labuan* Judging by the slow admin­
istrative machinery of the E*I#C#, Hardinge was unduly optimistic 
to think that a force from India could reach Aden in seven days# 
lie also failed to comment on a possible attack from the Hijaz or the 
Yemen#
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However, the Governor-General laid it down as a final and binding 
decision that the fortifications should be built on a reduced scale*
As for the amount of water to be stored in the reservoirs at the 
Isthmus, he adhered to his instruction that it should always be 
150,000 cubic feet to ensure the independence of the garrison# The 
supply to the town and the restriction on its population were questions
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to bo decided when the results of boring were known*
The results proved negative, and Lord Hardinge ordered that the 
population should be limited to the available supply of water* He 
also recommended that the Bombay Government should request the Colonial 
Office, through the Court of Directors, for full information on the law 
by which the number of inhabitants of Gibraltar was regulated and on 
every other point which might be applied "to so important a station as 
Aden"*^
The Governor-General did not feel that there was sufficient 
restriction on the building of houses, and he was afraid that private 
dwellings might interfere with the plans for fortifying the Settle­
ment* lor military reasons, he decided that no houses should be 
built too close to the Khusaf Valley and the Iain Pass, and until the 
fortifications were completed, no building whatsoever should be 
allowed on Postern Bay*
...ov/ that Aden was "to be converted into a fortified place of some 
importance", Hardinge thought that the advantages and disadvantages 
of allowing a new town on Western Bay should be weighed# He himself 
argued that the commercial advantages would be very small compared with 
the military disadvantages, a change to thi Special Committee's opinion# 
A large suburb on Pester:'; Bay would make difficult the defence of the 
Settlement in general and the harbour in particular; the troops would 
not be able to pass through it with ease and speed*
If Western Bay were to be inhabited by a multi-racial population 
as the Crater was, the British would have to face the same problems 
they were facing there* In an emergency, the loyalty of a mixed 
population could not be guaranteed; and in support of his argument, 
ilardinge reminded the Government of Bombay of how, in August 1846, 
when Sayyid Icma'il threatened to attack, many people had fled the
62town believing that he would succeed# Since the British must be 
prepared always "to a certain extent" for internal insurrection as well 
as external aggression, the copulation should be confined to the town in
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its existing dimensions; this would facilitate the detection and 
suppression of any trouble*
Hardinge’s argument against a town on Western Bay similar to 
that in the Crater was not without flaws* A multi-racial population 
in a colony is generally a safeguard against an uprising because the 
diverse elements composing it can hardly be expected to unite in a 
common cause* When Sayyid Isma’il attacked, the superstitious among 
the Arabs fled the Settlement , but no Arabs or non-Arabs seized the 
opportunity to rise against the British* The same was true at the 
time of the Mutiny in India. Yet this fear made the British develop 
Tawahi as a European township*
The Governor-General directed that houses already built outside 
the ilain Pass should be valued* Improvements and additions made to 
them later were not to be taken into account if compensation was paid 
in the future* lie therefore recommended that no building sites be 
granted outside the Main Pass without the express permission of the 
Bombay Government and that the power of resumption be clearly under­
stood in each case* MIn all probability, these matters have already
been provided for, and I am not aware that any imprudent grants have
63been made or houses built (on Western Bay)*1*
The fact was that grants had been made and houses built. To 
encourage building outside the Main Pass and along Western Bay,
Haines had suggested, and the Bombay Government had agreed in 1843, 
that the ground rent in these areas should be only half of that
64levied in the Crater.
In the mean time, the fortifications temporarily erected in the
first seven years were gradually replaced by permanent ones on the
principles laid down by Hardings. The land defences formed a triangle*
The first side was the line of fortification built in place of the old
Turkish Wall} the second was the line of hills from Mount Iladid on
the western shore to the Main Pass; and the third was the line of
hills from the Main Pass to the eastern shore. The sea defences
consisted of batteries on Sirah Island and Pas Ma’ashiq on the east,
and on Ras Marbat and Jazirat Shaykh Ahmad on the west* When Hardinge
inspected the defences on his way home in February 1848, he expressed
general satisfaction, but thought that some works were larger than 
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necessary* Iiardinge's recommendation that the garrison should 
always have in store 130,000 cubic feet of water was not put into 
effect until 1857, when three reservoirs were built at the Isthmus, 
each holding 50,000 cubic feet*
In contrast with the defences, no plan was ever drawn up for the
town. In 1845, Haines was asked to submit one, but he answered that
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he could not do so until the position of the Camp had been decided*
The decision was not taken until 1853* and in the mean time the town 
continued to grow without a plan#
As years went by, the military and civil lines expanded and 
contracted with inevitable overlapping and conflict between the two 
authorities. Half the ground designated in 1841 as '’military” was in 
1853 occupied by public civil buildings, and half the ground designated 
as ’’civil" was occupied by troops* The result was that the array could 
not take any administrative decision in this latter military area 
except, as they said, "by sufferance or concession”*
The reason for this situation was the uncertainty about the final 
location of the Camp* Officers complained, but nothing was done until 
185 ,^ when it was decided that the Camp should continue in the Crater 
and that new barracks should be built* Haines and the Commander of 
the Garrison, Brigadier T*R* Green, were asked to co-operate in 
redefining the civil and military limits* However, with Haines 
stressing the commercial aspect of Aden, and Green, the military, 
agreement was impossible*
The Commander-in-Chief of the Eonaby Army, Liout*-Gen*
Lord F* FitzClarence, considered further discussion between the two 
men useless and asked the Government to intervene by laying down 
general principles for the guidance of the Political Agent* He 
himself suggested two!
1. The Settlement was held ’’solely in consequence of its military 
importance”, and therefore "every measure concerning Aden should 
mainly be considered with reference to the perfect efficiency of the 
troops”*
2* The Commander of the Garrison should have full control over 
the ground required for troops and followers and all military purposes* 
In fact, FitzClarence would have had the whole peninsula of Aden, 
like Gibraltar, under one authority, military of course* However, 
since there were two authorities at Aden, all that he could do was to 
specify the parts which should be "under the sole and entire control 
of the military commandant *•*« Aden being held as a military post, 
when at any time the commanding officer may be called on to resist an 
European enemy, it is important that he should have entire, unquestioned
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and habitual control over every portion open to attack, or required
..67for the use of the troops,• *•"
The Government, under Lord Falkland, answered that Aden was not 
held "only” as a military post and that it was too late, after 
fifteen years, to ask whether the policy of encouraging its trade 
had been right or wrong. The fact was that there was now a flourishing 
town with a population of about 20,000 who looked to the British for 
protection. Therefore, the Government could not agree that "every 
measure concerning Aden should mainly be considered with reference 
to the perfect efficiency of the troops”. The garrison and civil 
population were not opposed to each other, and consequently, the 
Government could not say that the interest of one party was more 
important than that of the other* The expediency of placing the 
civil and military authority at Aden in the hands of one nan had been 
considered in 1847, but the Home Authorities had objected to the plan 
and it had been dropped.^
FitzClarence agreed that the civil population was entitled to 
due consideration, but he was convinced that it was a mistake to have 
made Aden a commercial centre* This mistake should be corrected, 
and the Commander-in-Chief gave threo reasons in support of his 
argument.
Had it not been for the townspeople, the troops would havo had 
enough drinking water locallyi but as it was, water for them had to 
be imported at a heavy cost to the Government. A further increase in 
the population could only be achieved by crowding the troops into a 
small space, and this increase necessarily demanded a proportionate 
increase in the garrison to keep the increased population in check* 
Therefore, owing to the shortage of space and water at Aden and ”to 
the dangerous and treacherous character of its Arab population”, the 
Commander-in-Chief thought that Aden could not be at one and the same 
time ”a flourishing commercial and ... a strong military post”.
If the Government decided to keep Aden as a military post, its 
commercial development should be secondary to its military security*
For the troops to function properly, they should bo healthy, and to 
be healthy they should have "good water and pure air"* FitzClarence 
made a strong attack on Haines for encouraging the commerce of Aden, 
and expressed his opinion that unless he was clearly instructed that 
the needs of the garrison were to be considered more important than
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commerce, and that the views of the Commandant, as the interpreter
of these needs, were to be listened to with respect, no co-operation
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could be expected between the civil and military authorities*
The Government of Bombay gave way before these overstated
arguments and wrote to Haines that the military importance of Aden
70should come before its commercial development* Then a committee 
made up of officers from the Aden garrison, headed by the Commandant, 
Brigadier A. Clarke, assembled to draw up new lines which would give 
the troops more space and put an end to civil authority within the 
Camp*
This committee, like that of l8*f0, recommended that the military
should have the whole seafront in Hr stern lay, and in addition
71Huqqat Bay, Siruh Island and Ras ma’ashiq* Haines protested
strongly against these plans, using arguments reminiscent of those
which he had used in 18^ -0* He warned that if no consideration was
given to the health and comfort of the merchants, they would not be
induced to stay, and the troops themselves would be affected by
72shortages of supplies*
The Committee answered that the proposed military lines would
not affect the merchants and traders who would still be able to sell
their merchandise and would have no reason to leave* The level of
supplies was sufficient to meet the demands of the garrison and of
"the limited foreign trade which Aden has hitherto enjoyed", a
statement not in keeping with the facts* The officers strongly
urged that the military authorities be given control over all the
wells in Aden and echoed the doubts of FitzClarence sbout the policy
of expanding the town and increasing its population which, they said,
73the garrison had always been taught to suspect* This time the
Bombay Government did not support Haines who was soon to be dismissed
on a charge of peculation* The arguments of the military committee
7kwere accepted .md their proposed limits sanctioned*
The civil-military conflict settled, the question now became 
the distribution of the troops* In 1855* the new Resident, 
Lieut*-Col. W*M* Goghlan, suggested that only the sepoys should 
remain in the Crater* The European troops should be three quarters 
at Tawahi and one quarter at the Isthmus*^ After a long discussion
%
involving all levels of authority, it was decided to keep the sepoys
in the Crater and to have the European force equally distributed
76among the three positions*
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Until then, detachments from the Crater, relieved periodically,
manned the Isthmus defences. After the break-up of the blockship
"Charger” in 1847, the defence of the harbour and coal depot was
left mainly to the occasional presence of a vessel of war* The shore
batteries were not manned except for the one at Ras Marbat. Haines
and his successors persistently asked for a vessel of war to be
stationed at Aden, but this was not to be*
Luring the first nine years, work on the fortifications went
slowly* In Aden, the Arab attacks kept the British occupied in
erecting temporary defences and the military and civil authorities
were often at variance* Due to Crab hostility, the Bombay Government
were at first not certain whether they wanted to keep Aden* They
also took a long time to decide on a comprehensive plan for its
defence, and were not forthcoming with money. Bureaucracy and the
slow mail service were two other delaying factors*
In August 1846, the Arabs made their last attack, and in November
of trie folic /ing year Lieut*-Col* C« V/addington, the highest ranking
officer to be given charge of the defences, arrived in Aden
simultaneously with a letter from Bombay to Haines instructing him
"that there should be no interference with the proceedings of the
77Superintending Engineer in the execution of his office"*
These two factors accelerated the ivork on the fortifications*
Goon the new Turkish Wall across the Isthmus was completed, and a
tunnel cut through the hill which divided it. A lino of scarp,
defended by batteries and towers, was made along the Mansuri range
to connect the two ends of the Isthmus defences, and thus enclose
this military position. In the enclosure were the arsenal, magazine,
barracks, reservoirs and condensers* In 1859, Playfair wrote that
the Isthmus was "guarded by massive lines of defences, strengthened
by a broad, deep ditch, bastions, demi-bastions, redans and casements,
armed with heavy ordnance;••*”
The sea defences comprised "strong, heavily armed martello
towers, casemcnted and open batteries on the hills and a fleur d*eau
as well as on the adjacent islands, together with piers of obstruction
78anu other subservient works*" Later, to protect tho harbour, 
heavy batteries were added at Tawahi, on Ras Tarashan and Ras Harbat.^
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3oThe Abyssinian Campaign of 1867-8, for which Aden was a 
supply base, led Sir Robert Napier, the commander of the expedition, 
to give thought to tho defence of the Settlement* The garrison was 
stationed at three points; and if Aden were attacked at a time when 
no outside help was available, it would be difficult to move troops 
quickly to the point attacked* The difficulty would not only be one 
of distance, but the hilly nature of the ground and the intense -oat 
of the climate would be two other disadvantages.
In 1868, Napier recommended that as a precaution, a railway
system should form part of the defences of Aden, and suggested that
a lino be laid from Tawahi to the Isthmus Position* The railway
plont which v/as used during the Abyssinian Campaign and was now at
Nula, could be shipped to Aden for the purpose* Napier thought that,
resides its military function, the railway might be of commercial
value* All ships loaded and unloaded at Tawahi; and if the line
wore used for goods and passenger traffic, it would bo a source of 
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revenue*
The Resident, Maj*-Gen* Sir N*L# Russell, agreed with Napier 
as to the military importance of the railway, but thought that 
civilian traffic could not maintain a train service for more than 
one hour a day, which did not justify the expense. Yet, he did not 
doubt that when the Suez Canal was opened, Aden's mercantile community 
would rapidly increase and the railway would become a necessity* 82 
The project wan under discussion for three more years, but was finally 
dropped.
As for the strength of Aden's defences at the end of the period 
under study, it was not sufficient* Lord kayo, who visited the 
Settlement on his way to India in 1869* wrote that it was defenceless 
against armed vessels; it was a fortress only against the Arabs of 
the interior and others who might attack it without the aid of siege 
artillery*0'"’
The apparent contradiction between .'ayo'e statePSht and the
impression of great strength conveyed by Playfair's description in
1899 can be explained by tho developments in artillery following the 
8*f
Crimean kar* That was considered heavy ordnance in the l850's was 
not so a decade later. It should also be remembered that the sea 
defences never received the same attention as the land defences because 
the British, from the time of Blankett, trusted to naval power to keep 
control of the seas#
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The defence picture completed, it is now necessary to go back 
and trace the physical development of the town from 184-2, the growth 
of the population from 184-6, and the efforts made from 1854- to solve 
the water problem#
The Town.
The toi\rn developed as slowly as the defences, but not only for
the same reasons; water and fire were two additional ones. In
Aden, years went by without any rain, but sometimes the fall was so
heavy that it destroyed life and property# The water streamed down
with great violence from the steep hills surrounding the Crater and
on its way to the sea carried everything before it.
Such devastating rains visited Aden on 2.8th December, 184-2# All
roads were destroyed except the military one which ran from the town
to Tawahi; this was damaged. The Political Agent's office was
flooded and made insecure. The commissariat depots collapsed and so
did houses and shops which had recently been built# Nine people and
about 200 donkeys were swept into the sea#
Haines was glad that the Special Committee were In Aden to judge
for themselves what was needed to prevent the recurrence of such a 
85catastrophe. They, however, did not give the subj ct any attention,
and in 184-5 Haines' fear that the town might again fc damaged by
floods made him recommend the embanking of the water-course which ran
86through its centre, to channel the flood water into the sea# The 
Government agreed, and the work proceeded at the usual slow rate#
Before it had been completed, another deluge swept through Aden 
on 2nd Hay, 184-6. The water poured into the centre of the new town, 
flooding the buildings, in some cases to a 'lepth of five feet. 
Twenty-seven houses, most of which had been built within the previous 
two years, were destroyed and nearly as many became insecure. The 
main sufferers were the rice and grain merchants whose supplies for 
the hot season had just been put in store# The- financial loss was 
estimated at Rs# 120,000#
Haines impressed upon the Government that the merchants should 
not be allowed to suffer such calamities as would tend to discourage 
their enterprising spirit which was vital for the development of the 
Settlement, and he again urged the building of embankments to take 
the flood water to the sea# Better still, he thought, was to store 
it in reservoirs on the mountains and in the ancient tanks in the
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valleys after they had been cleaned out and repaired. High embank­
ments along the water-course were built before long, but no tanks 
were restored until the following decade, and these were in the 
Tawilah Valley*
In the floods of Kay 1846 no lives were lost. However, cholera
followed in spite of the preventive measures which the authorities
took to light fires and clear away the great accumulation of filth
87deposited by the waters. The victims of the disease were about
88$00, 20 of whom were European.
The next disaster befell Aden on 6th September, 1854, and it
was caused by fire* The fire started in the quarter chiefly inhabited
by Indian pilgrims. It claimed nine lives and destroyed nearly 400
89huts, several stone houses and the entire lines of the sebundis.
The blaze spread because of a high wind; and the Resident,
Lieut.-Col. James Outram, wrote that had the wind not changed direction,
90the whole town would have been in ashes.
The Resident recommended that houses of inflammable materials
cleared by the fire should not be rebuilt. Moreover, the town police
should live together in one place so as to be readily available in
91cases of emergency; nothing came of this recommendation.
In August 1856, Coghlan reported yet another major fire which 
brought about the total destruction of the bazaar, the quarters of 
seven companies of the 18th Regiment, N.I., and several of the 
officers* houses* The jail escaped damage through the exertions of 
tho jailer, police and prisoners*
Coghlan repeated his predecessor's recommendation that no
92buildings of combustible material should be allowed in the town, 
and his Assistant, Lieut* R.L. Playfair, took two steps in this 
direction. In 1856, there were in the toira 2600 Somalis living in 
huts, and they were moved to Mu'alla. The same year, the Khusaf 
Valley, Aden's chief source of water, was crowded with the huts of 
Indian workers and their families. For safety, as well as for health 
reasons, Playfair moved a portion of them to two sites outside the 
Crater, one at the Isthmus and the other just outside the Main Pass.^
In the town, reed and mat huts were tolerated only in the quarter 
inhabited by fishermen and sweepers, whose occupations made their 
removal impracticable.
To encourage the building of stone houses in the town and in
83.
Ku'alla, the authorities ruled that no repairs were to be carried out
on the huts; when one collapsed, it was not to be rebuilt# This
rule could not be enforced; the occupants, while not daring to carry
out too obvious repairs, could easily, for instance, substitute a
new post for a decaying one. Thus the huts remained in a bad state,
but did not fall*
With the passage of time, they came to be surrounded by heaps
of rubbish and filth, with the inevitable danger to public health#
The authorities admitted defeat and offered the occupants small plots
on which to build new huts, free from any restriction on repairs#
The people welcomed the offer and agreed to pay the annual ground 
94-rent.
The destruction caused by the fires of 1834- and 1856 was limited
and in a way beneficial. The case was very different when the town
was visited by heavy rain on 30th April, 1859, and on 25th October,
i860. On the first occasion, the whole town was several feet under
water and appeared almost a ruin. Several hundred houses either fell
or were badly damaged. Tons of rocks and soil were washed down into
the tanks, causing great harm. Nearly 30 men, women and children
95were reported drowned.
In October i860, the high embankments of the water-course gave
way under pressure at two points, and more than half the houses were
partially or totally destroyed. The jail, the Native General Hospital,
the Residency and the customs-house were considerably damaged. Five 
9 6lives were lost.
After every heavy fall of rain, barriers were erected here and
there without an overall plan. In 1864, the Resident,
Lieut.-Col. Vi.M. Merewether, proposed a drainage system for Aden, but
the Government replied that they had no funds and suggested that the
money needed might be made available from local sources. "••• as
Aden is now a very considerable place, it may be practicable to
provide for such works as that under reference from some sources of
local income*H They also asked what benefits were expected from the 
97project.
Merewether replied that the drainage system would have great 
advantages. Wherever the torrents ran, they left loose stones and 
enormous holes, making the land unfit for building. People used the 
holes as latrines, and they could do so with impunity due to the small
84#
police force in the Settlement. When the holes were filled in and 
waste ground levelled, good sites for building houses would be made 
available, and their occupants could be forced to observe standards 
of hygiene#
In 1865 when two and a half inches of rain fell one morning, not 
only did all the Tawilah Tanks overflow, but also they could have 
been filled once or twice again# The surplus water streamed uncontrolled 
into the sea, causing great damage on its way. The incident showed 
of what little value the tanks were in preventing floods. Large sums 
were spent on repairing roads and public buildings and in compensating 
individuals for flood losses. The money thus spent would have been 
enough to build the proposed drainage system#
In 1864, there was before the Government a project for storing 
more water in another ravine, the Khusaf, and Merewether wrote that 
even when that was carried out, there would still be an overflow to 
be channelled safely to the sea.
Commenting on the Government's suggestion that the drainage 
system might be built with money raised locally, Merewether wrote:
'***. Aden is only becoming a considerable place". Although it had a 
large population, the wealthy among them were few. Most of the 
inhabitants were Arabs who, he claimed, had been induced to settle in 
Aden with great difficulty, and care had to be taken not to drive them 
away by introducing a new tax, the purpose of which would be the build­
ing of a drainage system.
The Resident stressed that the money collected locally was hardly 
sufficient to meet the daily expenses of the town. Many vital 
projects, such as street lighting, could not be carried out due to
98a lack of funds. Merewether's letter remained unanswered, and the 
drainage system is not mentioned again. However, there is mention of 
a destructive rainfall in 1870, which suggests that even then it was 
not in existence.
Two projects which were less costly than a drainage system, but
also had sanitation as their object, were carried out in 1864. Until
then, there were a number of small furnaces for burning rubbish.
However, owing to the growth of the town, they became too central, and
it was necessary to have them replaced by one largo furnace outside
the town. The second project was the building of three public 
99privies; others were added later.
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Street lighting was introduced in 1870-71. On dark nights, the 
road from the town to Tawahi, a distance of six miles, was dangerous 
to travel onj there were many bends and highway robbers. With such 
hazards in mind, 27 iron lamp poets were erected in the town and 
along the road. Apart from their obvious usefulness,
Captain Vi.F. Prideaux, the Assistant Resident, thought that they 
were "ornamental to a certain extent"
The British did what they could to make Aden a less sombre place.
In 1845, "the only minaret and the last relic of ancient Aden" seemed 
on the point of collapse* Haines thought that it was worth preserving, 
and a private subscription was started for the purpose* The public 
donated Rs. 6l8, but the cost of repairs was estimated at Rs. 902.
The Political Agent asked the Government for the balance, emphasising
101that "The minaret will ho a most handsome ornament to the new town...”
The Government responded, and the restoration work was completed in 
1846*
Another project which the British carried out with a view to
giving Aden a more pleasant aspect was a garden at the Tawilah Tanks.
Flowers, vegetables and trees were planted in the garden, and the
trees were reported to be "growing famously" as early as 1864, making
102it a good resort in the evening after the scorching heat of the sun.
The vegetables, which were for sale, brought in little money, only
three or four rupees per month during 1871. Nevertheless, Prideaux
thought that the garden should be maintained, even at a loss, because
103"it is so great an ornament to Aden".
In Aden, easy communication vms a prime necessity for both
military and commercial reasons. Good carriage roads were built to
link the different parts of the town with one another as well as to
connect the town itself with the other two parts of the Settlement.
More important than these roads was the digging, in 1859, of a tunnel
under the Mansuri range of hills. Until then, to reach the Isthmus
from the town, one had to go through the Kain Pass and foliow the
road north along the seashore, a journey of about one mile. The
104tunnel reduced this distance to a mere 350 yards, which speeded 
the movement of traffic, civil and military.
At the end of the period under study, the important parts of 
the town were:
Bazaar No. 1. Here nearly all the daily buying and selling was
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carried on. Hero, too, were all the eating-houses, food shops and 
general retailers.
Bazaar No. 2. This quarter was 600 yards long by 500 yards 
broad, and had seven streets, each more than 500 yards in length.
Here all the Jews and almost all the rich non-European inhabitants 
lived - money-lenders, contractors, Parsi and Borah shopkeepers and 
Banyan and Arab wholesalers trading in precious stones,coffee, spices, 
gums, etc.
The Tawilah district. This was the vice area of Aden.
The fishermen’s village. This consisted of about 200 houses.
Chukla. This adjoined the Tawilah and was the quarter of the 
washermen*
The main buildings in the town were the Residency, the Court- 
House and Treasury Office. Two other buildings worthy of mention were 
a Catholic chapel (built in 1852) and a Protestant church (built in 
1871).
Outside the Crater, the other portions of the Settlement were 
the village of Ilu’alla and the township of Tawahi, both of which were 
fishing hamlets before the British occupation. Mu’alla was inhabited 
mainly by Somalis, and in 1872 most of the houses were still of reed 
and mat. Here a customs-house was built for the registration of 
trade and a landing pier constructed for the use of country craft.
The township of Tawahi grew up around the new harbour, and its 
growth was helped by the fact that it was cooler than the Crater. At 
first, only part of the garrison and those connected with the port 
and Government coal depot resided there. Then gradually private 
houses were built. The houses were all substantial stone buildings, 
most with two storeys and some with three, and were occupied almost 
exclusively by Europeans.
Shortly after the occupation, Haines built, at his own expense,
a house on Has Marbat where he lived away from the heat of the Crater.
After his departure in 1854, the need for an official Residency at
Tawahi was realised and eventually one was built on Ras Tarashan. In
1872, this Residency was the main building at Tawahi. At Tawahi also
were the foreign consulates and the offices and houses of the agents
of steam navigation companies. There were in addition two hotels,
a post office, a hospital, a police court, a Protestant church and a 
1
Catholic Chapel.
The Settlement in
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Population.
In 1846, the Bombay Government asked the Court of Directors to 
obtain for them the rules and regulations which were in force at 
Gibraltar, that they might select those which could advantageously 
be applied at Aden* The Secret Committee sent them a paper entitled 
"Heads of Instructions for the Police Magistrate at..". The Bombay 
Government, in turn, sent a copy of this paper to Hardinge and asked
him whether the instructions could be transmitted to Haines as they
107stood. 'The Governor-General replied that only their substance should 
be communicated, whereupon the Bombay Government formulated what they 
termed "A Proposed Draft of Instructions for the Guidance of the 
Folitical Agent at Aden", and sent it to Haines.
The document laid down a number of principles for the adminis­
tration of the Settlemeiit, but here only two are relevant. Firstly, 
the Political Agent was to devise means by which he could obtain an 
accurate census of the population, showing the nationalities and the 
individuals composing it, the length of their residence and their 
occupation or mode of living. The census was to bo forwarded annually 
to Bombay together with a return of births, marriages and deaths* 
.Secondly, persons who were not citizens of Britain or subjects of the 
E.I.C. should not be allowed to enter or live in the peninsula
without the permission of the Folitical Agent or his Assistant, and
those who broke the law were to be expelled*
As regards the first rule, Haines wrote that no matter what he
did, the constant changes in the population made any census 
necessarily imperfect* With respect to the second, he explained how 
difficult it was to put into practice. Arab traders, fishermen and 
labourers went in and out daily. During the trading season, Somalis 
visited Aden in large numbers. Vessels engaged in transporting 
Indian pilgrims to the Hijaz and back often anchored to the west of 
the harbour at an isolated point. Then, having landed hundreds of 
poor pilgrims, the captain surreptitiously sailed away with the passage 
money* Stranded, the pilgrims made their way into the town where 
they mingled with its people without attracting any attention, they 
being no different from the Indians there.
The Arabs and Somalis do not seem to have presented Haines with 
any problem. The Arabs were checked at three points:
1. The Barrier Gate in the Turkish Wall where they came in from 
the interior.
89.
2. The customs-house just within tho Main Pass, a little further
south of the Barrier Gate* There, all men were searched for arms,
and from 1845 a record was kept of all goods brought in by land*
3* The bazaar at the town end of the Main Fass* The Bazaar
Inspector was present at the arrival of all caravans, and he reported
any trouble to the Political Agent or his Assistant* In addition,
the names of all entrants were kept here in a special register, and
thus in times of trouble the Political Agent could expel members of
any tribe which was hostile to the British*
Haines was satisfied with the system of checking land traffic and
argued that new restrictions would discourage commercial activity*
The Political Agent made no mention of the Somalis, most of whom
went back at the end of the trading season*
The Indian pilgrims were the real problem. For them, Haines
built huts which he did not make too comfortable "else the Settlement
would be inundated with beggars". If employment was available, it
was offered; and for as many as possible a free passage to India
was arranged* To combat the pilgrim problem,Haines suggested
109strengthening the harbour administration* The Bombay Government
agreed, and in May 1847 decided that as soon as this was done, the
culprit shipmasters should, in the likely event of their return,
re-imburse the authorities for the money spent on accommodating the 
110pilgrims. For many years to come, the harbour administration was
not as strong as had been envisaged, and the evil practice continued.
The annual return of births, marriages and deaths asked for was
never supplied. The Assistant Civil Burgeon was appointed Registrar
of Marriages under Section 18 of India Act V, 1852, but no additional
salary followed the appointment because the Bombay Government thought
111that it would be "a sinecure", and so it would have been*
In September 1854, Gutram reported that "following an increase
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of deaths from sickness", he had started a register of deaths,
but this register was never mentioned again. All Residents, including
Gutram, did not send in returns of deaths as such, but when they
recorded floods, fires or epidemics, and when they reported on the
hospital and prison, they gave figures of the dead. A population
such as Aden's, changing and primitive In the main, was not the right
one to provide the desired returns. In fact, the records do not even
give annual figures for the population.
90.
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Consequent on the attempted murder of Delisser in March lo51,
Haines issued a series of emergency regulations, only two of which 
are relevant here, and they concerned the Interpreter at the Barrier 
Gate*
1« Every Arab coming to Aden should be thoroughly searched, he
and his baggage. If he had no weapons or prohibited merchandise,
the Interpreter would give him a tin ticket of admission into the
town which he should produce at the Main Pass where he would undergo
another search* If the result was satisfactory, the Arab (man, woman
or child) might proceed, merely showing the ticket to the clerk at
the customs-house on the inner side of the J-iain Pass,
2* Every Arab who entered Aden in the morning had to leave by
3.00 p.m. of the same day, and he had to return his admission ticket
to the Interpreter, In case of any deficiency, the Interpreter was
to report the came to the police in order to ensure the expulsion of
the person or persons concerned. Ho one was allowed to remain in
the Settlement after the fixed t.i/.o without the express permission of
115
the Political Agent.
In 1834, 1.utraa reverted to these regulations to check the entry
of Arabs, many of whom could find no work in the Settlement. Besides,
the space available for occupation was limited, and sweet water was
116becoming a problem. These reasons for controlling immigration 
undoubtedly arose from tho new official emphasis on Auen's military 
importance*
Under Coghlan, Outram's successor, efforts i^ rere made to restrict 
Somali immigration by sea, but not only for the reasons given above.
Many Somalis who went to Aden with their families returned alone, 
having abandoned their wives and children in the Settlement* 
Consequently, the women had to support themselves and their children 
as best they could by taking service or by collecting firewood from 
the interior for sale in the town. Under economic pressure, they 
frequently rid themselves of their sons as soon as they could walk.
Other Somalia took their wives and daughters back with them, but left 
their sons behind. The aba:; oned children, with no one to care for
117the 1, turned to thieving, and some of them became hardened criminals.
In 1855, Playfair decided to register all Somalis in Aden, and 
not to allow in anyone who had no means of earning a living.*^^ The 
following year, the Bombay Government decreed that the commanders of
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vessels carrying pilgrims or Somalis should report to the police office 
within six hours of their arrival. They were to declare the correct 
number of their passengers and if necessary obtain permission to land 
them. Any captain who landed or allowed such passengers to land 
without permission was to be fined up to ten rupees for every 
individual. Captains were also prohibited from taking any Somalis 
on board without a pass from the police, and failure to comply with 
this law entailed a similar fine.^*^ The purpose of this prohibition 
was to ensure that no Somali left behind him divorced women or 
unwanted children who would become a burden on the Settlement and a 
source of trouble to tho authorities.
The regulation forbidding people with no work to reside in Aden
was cancelled by Coghlan in 1862. His reason for so doing was the
needs of trade and labour. The result was that by January 1863
hundreds of Somali idlers had flocked into the Settlement with the
120inevitable increase in theft. In June, the Government wrote to 
the Resident asking for an explanation.
Merewether, who was Resident by then, defended the cancellation
of the regulation and described it as "a wise measure". Aden, he
wrote, was in need of labourers and would continue to be so for some
ti me to come. He found it only logical that an increase in theft
should follow a great influx of people into a place which previously
had been closed to them. However, he added that as the Somalis and
others found that they could be regularly engaged, they would give
121up thieving for honest work.
This pious hope was not justified; the Somalis continued to 
steal. In addition, they still deserted women and children. In 
1865, when the Bombay Government suggested that the latter practice 
might be checked by the re-imposition of stringent police controls, 
Merewether explained how difficult and unwise it would be to restrict 
the movement of inhabitants and visitors.
Tho police force at Aden (125 men) was inadequate to control 
the traffic. Those who wished to leave secretly could do so by 
taking a boat from any part of the peninsula and then joining a sea­
going vessel outside the harbour. They might also proceed first into 
the interior and then journey home from any place on the coast.
However, even if there were more policemen, the enforcement of 
stringent traffic regulations might only partially solve the problem,
122but v/ould certainly harm the trade of a rising settlement like Aden* 
Eighteen years earlier, Haines had expressed the same opinion, and 
four years later Bussell echoed it* ”To prevent the Somalis from
*123entering Aden would be to check trade and the import of supplies*”*^
In Aden, Haines outlawed slavery immediately after the occupation,
but the Settlement did not become a centre for the suppression of the
slave trade until the l860*s* Officers of the Indian Navy had no
authority to seise vessels belonging to subjects of powers (chiefs
or states) not bound by treaty with the British to ban the slave
trade* Haines was directed in 184? that if a slave vessel was
brought to Aden, he should send the slaves to Bombay or elsewhere
’’according to their wishes”* The vessel was at first made over to
the chief, or the agent of the chief, whose subject the master was*
If neither was possible, Haines was to take security from the master
124who was to report himself to his chief*
This procedure was suggested because there were no tribunals in
Bombay competent to adjudicate in cases involving slave vessels.
After these were set up, in 1849, captured ships were sent to Bombay*
However, this arrangement was not satisfactory* Host of the slave
trade in the vicinity of Aden was carried on by small craft which
could reach Bombay only if towed by large vessels, and this could not
always be done as and when required* The witnesses wero always the
naval officers x*ho made the arrest, and they could not be spared from 
125thoir duties* In addition, the officers were disheartened at the
idea of their prizes being sent to Bombay where they could not be 
sure of a conviction* They themselves admitted that, but for this,
126they would be more energetic in the suppression of the slave trade*
In I856, Coghlan signed treaties prohibiting this traffic with
the sultan of the Lower *Awlaqi tribe and with the chiefs on the
Somali coast* For dealing promptly with cases of slave trading, he
asked in 1858 that the Kesident and ids First Assistant be made judges
127of a Vice-Admiralty Court* The Government of Bombay, who saw an 
economy measure in this proposal, recommended it to the higher 
authorities, but it was not until 1861 that a Vice-Admiralty Court 
was instituted at Aden* By way of encouraging the officers of the 
Indian Navy to be more active in the suppression of the slave trade, 
a reward of Ks* 50 was paid for every slave freed*
In 1869, Captain G*H. Goodfellow, Acting Resident, complained
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of the increasing numbers of slaves brought to the Settlement and 
urged that it should oq limited* The magnitude of the roblea 
becomes clear with tho help of the table below:
Year Freed & landed at Aden i>ont to Bombay
1865 2k9 57
1866 9^9 k8
1867 231 221
1868 32k 92
1869 (first h&lf ) 1044 106
During the four and a half years referred to above, 1046 liberated 
claves returned to their country or died in Aden, and only 684 of 
those remaining in the Settlement found work* Some took service with
wealthy Indian families, soma were employed by the Harbour Depart­
ment or at tha depot of the Peninsular & riental Com any, and others 
became sailors on aoard the uaany ves-rels which fro uented the port*
The rest (743) could find no •’'obc and had t be kept at rest ex ^nee
ipO
to the authorities*
The population of Aden grew slowly after 1842. According to 
jlayfair, it was on 1st January, 1856, 20,733, including the 
military (troops and cam? followers) whose number norjnally fluctuated 
between fskQQ and 360O1 
Muslims:
Arabs 4812 (the original inhabitants
being only 965)
Africans 3627
Inaians 2557
Others 58 11,05**
Hindus 5*611
Jews 1,22**
Christians 1*129
Parsis 61 m
Miscellaneous 1,659
In li?2, the population was 19*289* excluding the military who
were 5433*
Arabs 8241
Africans 5346
Indians:
fSKiir
Parsis 121 3589
Jews 1435
Furopeans 208 (only 26 of whoa
were not ritish) 
Miscellaneous 277 2,30
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The occupations followed by the different elements of the 
population were as follows:
X. Arabs* The second and third class merchants of Aden were 
generally Arabs. The former imported coffee from the interior and 
sold it to the first class merchants who were chiefly Europeans and 
Americans, with a few Indians. The third class merchants or petty 
traders went to the Somali ports during the trading seasfan and from 
there sent back to Aden small shipments of merchandise and livestock 
in exchange for piece goods, rice, dates and other commodities.
Camel and donkey-drivers were all Arabs, and many came from the 
once great city of Mukha. Camels and donkeys were employed in 
conveying water. Besides, asses carried building materials and were 
hired out for riding. From Mukha, Aden also inherited its boat- 
builders.
The Arabs had a monopoly of dyeing, and their work consisted 
only in giving piece goods a blue colour. They formed the majority 
of butchers who, for religious reasons, were invariably Muslins.
They were also shopkeepers, coal-coolies, day-labourers, sailors 
and fir omen aboard steamers. The lower classes provided domestic 
servants.
Other occupations with which the Arabs were identified were 
water-carrying, porterage, fishing, building, lime-burning and 
brokerage. Brokers or middlemen acted in almost every transaction, 
however insignificant. They got from both purchaser and seller a 
certain percentage which depended on the value of the purchase.
II. Africans, The great majority of the Africans were Somalis, 
Host Somalis stayed in Aden only for a short time; when they had 
made some money, they went back to their country. Their traders who 
dealt in sheep, cattle, ponies, ghee, guns, hides, etc. crossed over 
to Aden during the north-east monsoon when it was safe for their 
small craft.
Of the Somalis who settled in Aden, many were engaged as coal 
and cargo-coolies. They were also petty traders, boatmen, bumboat- 
mcn, domestic servants and shoemakers* Low-born Somalis and 
Jabortis (Ethiopian Muslims) together with the Akhdam, of whom 
mention will be made later, worked as sweepers.
The occupation of carriage-driver was most desirable to the 
Somalis, and Hunter attributes this to the great opportunity which
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it afforded for dishonest dealing, since the owner had no check on 
his driver. In 1872, the trade was monopolised by members of the 
•Iyal Ahmad tribe who succeeded in ousting all other drivers, be they 
Somali or not.
The Somali women went about selling bread, sweetmeats and 
buttermilk by the cup. They cleaned and sifted coffee like Sidi 
and Indian woman# In 1872, as in 184-0, they wero still weaving 
excellent mats.
Ill# Indians, The Indians formed the majority of blacksmiths, 
carpenters, shoemakers and sweepers, Tho mechanics, few as they 
were, were generally Indians. The Indians were also shopkeepers, 
bricklayers, humboatmen and merchants of the three classes. Some 
were jewellers.
Most of the Indian Muslims came to be in Aden by force of
circumstance, as has been explained. Some found employment with the
police force, and many engaged themselves as masons. The poor 
worked as tailors or domestic servants. In 1872, many of the Borahs 
worked in tin, and the need for gallon measures was enough to keep 
them busy, since water was given or sold by the gallon.
The Banyans, who were the wealthiest among the Hindus, had in
their hands the wholesale trade of Aden as well as the banking and 
exchange business. At the other end of the scale, most of the menial 
servants were Hindus. In contrast with the Banyans, the Parsis were 
mainly retail merchants,
IV. Jews. The Jews were chiefly artisans. Most of the jewellers 
and all the silversmiths were of their number. Silver ornaments were 
worn extensively by men, women and children of all communities. When 
it is also remembered that the Arabs had a great fondness for weapons 
richly decorated with silver, it becomes obvious how large a market 
there was for the silversmith’s trade. The Jews did not only decorate 
weapons, but many of them were also engaged in their manufacture. 
Besides the Banyans, they were the only other people who changed and 
lent money, although on a small scale. The few bookbinders tended to 
be Jews.
The Jews were also spinners, weavers and masons. Mat and reed 
work, which had been one of their principal trades, was dying out 
towards the end of the period under study due to the discouragement 
by the authorities of the building of temporary huts of inflammable 
materials.
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V* Europeans. Apart from the soldiers and government officials,
the Europeans consisted of agents, managers and employees of
mercantile firms and steamship companies* Some were mechanics*
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VI. The Akhdam* In Playfair’s table, the Akhdam are 
included under the head "Miscellaneous”, which suggests that they 
did not belong to any of the religions mentioned, while the fact is 
that they were Muslins. The Akhdam occupied in South Arabia a position 
similar to that of the pariahs in India. They worked as roadsweepers, 
musicians in low coffee shops and followed other menial occupations.
In Aden, as in other South Arabian towns, they had a quarter to 
themselves*
The origin of the Akhdam is obscure. According to local
tradition, they were the descendents of the Abyssinians who ruled the
Yemen from 525 to 575 A.D* In the latter year, tho Arabs, with the
help of the Persians, defeated the Abyssinians, and in their desire
to perpetuate the memory of their victory, they condemned the remnant
132of the enemy to a life of servitude.
With the exception of the Government officials, there wore no
professional people in Aden. Gome educated Eurasians, Parsis,
Indians and Arabs were employed as accountants and clerks with
133commercial firms and in Government offices*
The Water Problem.
The increase in Aden’s population and trade showed that the
"never-failing" wells referred to by Haines, Foster and the Special
Committee had but a limited yield of sweet water. More wells were
dug or cleared out in the Crater with varying degrees of success.
However, as in tho past, the wells proved unrex.iaole and ultimately
well water had to be supplemented by water from the interior which
wa3 brought in on camels, sometimes up to 3000 gallons a day, and
134sold in the town at six to ten pice per five gallons.
The nearest place from which Aden imported water was called 
al-Hiswah. Al-Hiswah was a piece of ground situated on the northern 
or opposite side of the harbour in Western Bay. It was four miles 
long by one and a quarter miles broad. When heavy rain fell on the 
mountains inland, al-Wadi al-Kabir (the Great Valley), a branch of 
the Tiban River, flowed through tho Lahj plain and into the sea at 
Aden Harbour, luring the wet season the river irrigated the land 
around al-IIawtah and Sir Ahmad. Al-Hiswah itself became saturated,
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and water was easily procured by digging to a depth of from six to 
sixteen feet. Here four wells were dug, and water was brought into 
the Settlement either in boats to the southern side of the harbour or 
on camels across the Isthmus. The shipping, naval and merchant, was 
supplied from the Khusaf wells until 1849* In 1850, the year Aden 
became a free port, it was decided that the shipping should be 
supplied from al-Hiswah, a more convenient arrangement now that an 
increase in trade was expected.
In 1854, the old fear of a long siege was intensified by the 
outbreak of the Crimean War, and a review of the water situation was 
considered necessary* The review was carried out by a committee from 
the Aden garrison presided over by Col* G# Hutton, of the 
16th Madras regiment, N.I*f and this is a summary of their report*
The water in the Crater was of four kinds, and it improved the 
further one weni from the sea* The wells on the beach and in the 
town were affected by the tide, and the water in them was not fit for 
drinking by man or beast* It was r,ood only for spraying the streets, 
bathing, washing clothes and other domestic purposes. Such walls 
could be dug cheaply and to any number, the sea level being near the 
surface. The committee showed no interest in them*
Next came 95 wells which contained bitter water; the cattle 
drank from them, and so did men under pressure of need. Some were 
in house enclosures, some were attached to mosques, and the rest were 
privately or publicly owned* Due to the bad quality of their water, 
the committee confined themselves to enumerating then*
Then came the wells in the *Aydarus and Tawilah Valleys, the 
water in which was only slightly brackish. They were fourteen in 
number, seven private, yielding 13,712 gallons a day, and seven 
municipal, yielding 9132* The yield of some of these wells was 
reported to bo limited only by the method of drawing water*
Finally, there were the sweet water wells in the Khusaf Valley, 
3C in number. Their users and daily yield were as follows 1
User No. of Wells Yield
Municipality 
Danyan community 
rivate individuals 
Jewish community 
Military
1
2
6
1
15
2
3
11,276 "
Being sunk 
6398 gallons
4435 gallons 
246 ”
Dry, being deepened
it Being cleared out
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The number of wells in Aden, excluding the salty ones, had then 
increased from 107 in 184-3 to 139 in 1834-, those in the Khusaf from 
27 to 30. The committee did not quote a price for water from the 
municipal wells, but reported that water from the private wells was 
sold at a price ranging from ten to twelve annas per 100 gallons.
The private wells in the three valleys were all held under grant 
from Ilaines, but in no case was the term of tenure specified* The 
committee recommended that the owners of the seven wells in the 
'Aydarus and Tawilah Valleys be given new grants for three years, 
after which period the wells would lapse to the Municipality. Grants 
for new wells were to be for a fixed period, the Government reserving 
the right to appropriate them at any time. In both cases, compensation 
was to be paid.
Tho Jewish and Banyan communities, too, were to have the leases 
of their wells extended by three years, after which the wells were to 
be appropriated by the military. The same was to apply to two of the 
other Khusaf wells in private hands* The reason for the extension 
in those cases wmr? that the people concerned had not had time to cover 
the expenses of sin*d.ng their wells.
The other four private wells and the one used by the Kuniciparity
were to be transferred immediately to the troops, giving them an
additional 13,544- gallons a day. The total would then be 20,142
gallons, while the committee’s estimate of the garrison’s daily
requirements was 16,858. The committee did not give the number of
the garrison in that year, but fixed allowances for the members of
each class composing it, with and without families, from officer
downwards. The daily needs of the Indian Navy and merchant shipping
the committee estimated at 2400 gallons and recommended that they
135should continue to be supplied from al-Hiswah* Their plan gave 
the military all the good vrater in Aden; the civil population was 
to be content with water of inferior quality,
Outran agreed with the committee’s recommendations, but thought 
that the municipal well in the Khusaf should not be taken by the 
military. This was the only civil well of really sweet water, and 
the Resident argued that the Government employees and townspeople 
were entitled to a ration of good x^rater.^^
The Government did not comment on the committee’s report, and 
in March 1856, Coghlan asked them to take a decision on it* He
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himself shared Gutrara*s views and strongly recommended the adoption
of the committee's proposals* The water in Aden, he wrote, was
sufficient if properly distributed, and justice would be done when
137all the wells came under Government control# The Government
authorised Coghlan to appropriate such wells as he wanted, paying a
133fair compensation# However, he encountered difficulties in his
139attempt at appropriation, and for reasons which will shortly
become clear he may not have persevered*
Appropriation of the private wells would have ensured a more
equitable distribution, but would not have solved the water problem*
The wells did not have a constant yield and when drought lasted long,
most of them dried up completely* When insufficient rain fell in the
interior, the water did not reach as far as al-Hiswah, and thus the
wells there proved as unreliable as those in Aden#
The realisation that the wells could not be depended on had in
fact forced the authorities to look for other sources of water as
early as 185^* In that year Captain VJ.C* Suart, the Executive
Engineer, suggested the restoration of the old aqueduct, but relatione
1^0with the tribes did not allow the execution of such a plan* The
authorities then directed their attention to the old tanks on the
hills and in the Tawilah Valley#
Playfair mentions that all the tanks in Aden were about 50 in
li+1
number and had an aggregate capacity of 30 million gallons* In
185^-5, three tanks high up in the hills were experimentally repaired 
by the Engineer Department* In restoring them, convict labour was 
used, and money to pay free labourers was obtained from ground rent
l*f2
and. other local funds. Then the restoration work was entrusted to 
Ilayfair, the Assistant Resident, who tackled the Tawilah Tanks in 
l853* The Tawilah Tanks were far larger than, and superior to, the 
Hill or Hanging Tanks. They were thirteen in number, running from 
the top of tho valley to the bottom#
At first, Mayfair thought that he could restore them without 
any expense to the Government, as had been the case with the Hanging 
Tanks# However, as work progressed, it became clear that this could 
not be done, and the Government agreed to finance the project#^*^
From a letter to Lord Elphinstone dated 27th July, 1856, and 
writt ®n from Aden by one Mr. Adam who was en route to England, it is 
known that six tanks had been cleared out by then# Adam was confident
that when the other seven tanks were repaired, the Settlement would
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not need to import water from the interior# Elphinstone welcomed 
the news and wrote to Coghlan: ”1 cannot congratulate you too warmly
upon the success which has attended your exertions to place the water 
supply of Aden upon an efficient footing* Not the least gratifying 
part of it is the little expense (roughly Rs* 6000) which has been 
incurred* It would have been well worth while in my opinion to have 
expended lakhs of rupees upon what has been accomplished, or at least 
will shortly be accomplished, for a few thousands, for until Aden has 
an independent supply of water within its own limits, we must be in 
a great measure at the mercy of the neighbouring tribes and in the 
event of a siege we might be obliged to give in from this cause, 
notwithstanding the many lakhs that have been sunk upon fortifications# 
In 1857* the number of tanks cleared out was twelve, and they
had a capacity of 3*538,715 gallons# They were filled for the first
146time on 23rd October of that year# However, their restoration
was not completed until 1361, by which time the cost had amounted to 
three and a half lakhs of rupees, and the financial return to only 
Rs# 62,381, less than one-fifth of the outlay# The Government was 
disappointed at this result and decided to spend no more on the tanks 
despite assurances from Playfair that when the system was finished,
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it would bring in a great revenue* ' This decision meant that the
148last and best tank in the Tawilah chain would not be restored#
The tank in question, called ”Playfair”, had a capacity of 
4,179*915 gallons, i.e# larger than the other twelve tanks combined, 
and was in a better state of preservation* Coghlan was anxious to 
have it repaired, but he could not ask the Government for money# 
However, in 1863* three leading merchants, an Arab, Ilasan 'Ali, and 
two Parsis, Kowasji Dinshaw and Edulji Manekji, offered to restore
l4q
this tank and six of the Hill Tanks# Coghlan welcomed their offer, 
and his successor, Kerowcther, gave them a contract for ten year3#
3y this contract, which was signed on 29th June, 1863* the 
”co-partnery" was to complete the restoration work 1Vithin tv/o years, 
provided that no unforeseen circumstances prevent the completion 
within that time”# At the expiration of the ten years, ’’Government, 
represented by the Political Resident, shall have the option of 
resuming possession of these works, or of renewing the lease for a 
limited period or in perpetuity as may seem expedient, but in case 
of talcing possession Government shall pay a fair valuation of the 
outlay made by the co-p>artnery in the restoration herein promised#
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In 1873* the lease was renewed for a further period of 30 years,
..hen the tanks were full, the Commissariat water bills were
reduced by importing less water from the interior, and the authorities
could realise some money from the sale of water. The rate charged
was one rupee per 100 gallons. However, the tanks were more often
empty than full. It did not rain annually in Aden, and much of the
ivater collected was lost through evaporation. The thirteen tanks
151could hold 7|7l8f630 gallons. If it had rained annually, they,
with the wells, might have been sufficient, under wise management, to
meet the demand for drinking water, and there would have been no need
to go on importing this vital commodity. Yet the situation being 
what it was, other means of increasing the water supply were necessary. 
In 1858, Coghlan asked for several condensers, but the Government
sent him only two old ones, and they were installed at the Isthmus,
Four more arrived in the following ten years, and they were placed, 
two at Tawahi and two at the Camp in the Crater* The six condensers 
distilled 12,000 gallons a day, which was considered sufficient for 
the needs of the garrison, estimated in 1868 at 2000 men*
The condensers supplied all the drinking water to the garrison 
except when there was water in the tanks. Then, the troops at the 
Camp and the Isthmus were given half condensed and half tank water.
The troops at Tawahi had only condensed water, since the cost of 
carriage from the Tawilah Valley would have made tank water as 
expensive as condensed.
In addition to the six military condensers, there were nine 
private ones owned by the Peninsular « Oriental Company, the European 
mercantile firm of Luke Thomas & Co,, Edulji Ilanekji and 
kowasji Dinshaw, The Peninsular & Oriental Company supplied their
vessels only, while the others supplied the European civil population
152and the wealthy among the non-Europeans, In 1863, condensed water
v/as sold at seven rupees per 100 gallons, and in 1870, from three to 
five rupees per 100 gallons.
Compared with the water in the wells and tanks, condensed water 
had the obvious advantage that its supply could be relied on. The 
element of failure was under human control, and with proper foresight 
and knowledge could be prevented. The only objection to the general 
use of condensed water was the cost involved.
To ensure a cheap and regular supply of ’.rater, Captain II, Pyn,
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the Executive Engineer* proposed to Kerewether in IS63 the rebuilding
153of the old aqueduct as far as Shaykh *Uthman* The Resident agreed
and recommended the scheme together with the damming of the
Khusaf Valley* The area drained by this ravine was not as extensive
as that drained by the Tawilah, but still it was considerable. As
was the case with the Tawilah before the tanks were restored and the
embankments of the water-course built, the water which rushed down
from Shamsan into the Khusaf was not only lost* but also caused great
damage on its way to the sea*
In support of the Khusaf project, Ilerewethor argued that even
if the Government derived no immediate profit* it would be repaid by
the gratitude of the people who would be able to buy water at a low 
154price* The Government, who were unwilling to sanction both 
projects, asked kerewether which in his opinion would bo the more 
useful. The Resident replied, in Ray 1864, that both were equally 
necessary*
In favour of the Khusaf project, he repeated that it would prevent
damage and added that part of the 'water collected in the valley
would percolate to the wells* The Aden rock was porous and covered
only with a thin layer of soil. By means of the aqueduct, a large
amount of water could be stored in the Isthmus reservoirs, and th©
garrison would not suffer if supplies were cut off from the interior
during a siege* The Shaykh •Uthman water could bo sold at the same
price as tank water, and thus Government would derive a steady income
155from the aqueduct* The revenue which the 'Abdalis were to get
156would encourage them to identify themselves with the British*
Kerewether examined the old aqueduct and found it useless
except as a foundation. In some places, it was broken up for several
157feet, and in others covered with drift sand* The water at 
Shaykh * Uthman, Kerewether wrote, was ”very good” and ’•inexhaustible”*’^ ^  
For bringing it to Aden, he proposed that an agreement should be made
with the Sultan of Lahj in whose territory the village was. The
agreement should state that:
1* When the aqueduct was completed, its maintenance was to be 
the responsibility of the Sultan*
2* The Sultan was to protect the wells and the aqueduct*
3# In return for the water and all that the Sultan had to do,
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he was to receive half the amount realised from the sale of water
4 159in Aden.
The Bombay Government did not authorise the two water projects,
as Kerewether had hoped, and it was not until 1866 that they gave
their decision in favour of the Shaykh •Uthman scheme. The following
year, while work on the aqueduct was in progress, Kerewether wrote
that its value could not be exaggerated. Aden would not only have a
cure and plentiful supply of water, but the project would also prove
to everybody that the British "would no longer consent to be
deficient in the use of the natural resources of the country (the
3»60
mainland), which are needed for the Settlement”. The "natural
resources” were the sources of water in the interior beyond
Shaykh •Uthman*
The agreement which Kerewether had recommended in 1864 was,
three years later, incorporated in a convention signed by him and
Sultan i’adl on 15th karch, 1867* This convention fixed the price of
water at one rupee per 100 gallons and laid down that the Sultan
should build out of his profits a wide road to run from Shaykh •Uthman
to Xhur Kaksar alongside the aqueduct. The British, in turn, were
to extend the road from their side of the border to the Isthmus
l6lreservoirs into which the aqueduct was to pour its water* The 
convention was ratified by the Government of India on 30th April, 1867, 
and the road was built two years later.
The aqueduct, which cost Rs. 296,933 to construct and could 
discharge 30 to 40 thousand gallons per day, wa3 completed in 
December 1868* Its construction was a tacit acknowledgment on the 
part of the British authorities in Aden, Bombay and Calcutta that a 
cheap and continuous supply of water could not be obtained in the 
Settlement itself, and that they must go for it to the mainland# 
Russell, Kerewether*s successor, also considered tho Shaykh •Uthman 
water "very good” and decided that the Commissariat should be supplied 
with it. An Assistant Resident was to supervise its sale to the
I T  162public.
The restoration of the tanks, the rebuilding of the aqueduct and 
the installation of condensers all made little difference to the 
general public* The cost of carriage and the price at which water 
from the aqueduct and the other two sources was sold, did not encourage 
the poor majority to buy it in any appreciable quantity, and the rich
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minority did not need it. The result was that the sales of water
from the new sources were not as great as had been anticipated by
the authorities in Aden and Bombay*
Tic, Arabs and Somalis who came to Aden only for work would
drink from brackish wells rather than spend the little money which
they had saved on buying expensive water* The Banyans and most other
townspeople bought their water mainly from the Banyan and Tawilah
wells owned by the Municipality* In 1870, the price of water from
the former was eight and a half annas per 100 gallons, and from the
latter two and a half annas per 100 gallons* After rain, the Parsis
drew first on their Hanging Tanks, and then on the water stored in
tho Playfair Tank* Furthermore, Edulji Kanelcji had a very good well
in the Khusaf Valley*
Attached to the Parsis was a large number of followers and
servants who shared their water supply* The Parsis also competed
with the Government in the sale of tank water* Although they
charged the same price, purchasers were attracted to their tank at
the mouth of the valley, nearer the town* Hasan *Ali had a well of
good water in the *Aydarus Valley, and his acquaintances, including
the Arab merchants, had the free run of the well* Also,
163Sayyid #Alawi al-’Aydarus had two good wells*
Moreover, water continued to be brought in from the interior on 
the backs of camels, averaging in 1072 6500 gallons a day*
Captain W*M* Ducat, the Executive Engineer, wrote that this water, 
although not much better than the aqueduct water, had to the towns­
people the advantage that it was brought to their doors* The price 
varied with the demand, generally two rupees per 100 gallons, and in 
the hot season three rupees* According to Ducat, this price was
equal to that of the Shaykh ’Uthman water, if not cheaper when the
164cost of carriage was taken into consideration* This statement is 
inexplicable, for surely the Isthmus was nearer to the town than 
any point outside the Settlement, and consequently the cost of carriage 
from the Isthmus should have been less*
Uater stored in the Isthmus reservoirs was also of small benefit 
to the other two military positions* The charge for carrying it to 
the troops at Tawahi and at the Camp in the Crater was in 1070 
Rs. 3681 per month^^ considerable sum* To overcome this problem, 
it was suggested that the Isthmus and Tawahi be connected by a pipeline 
or a tram road; that the Harbour Department’s steam barge be used
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for conveying water from the Isthmus to Tawahij or that two traction
engines, each drawing a wagon, should daily take water to Tawahi, the
Camp and the town*
All these suggestions were discussed at length, and faults were
found in each of them. Finally, Tremenheere concluded, "The system
l66
of transport by means of donkeys and camels has to go on", and it
did go on for a long time to come* In 1875-6, 17,910 camel loads
of water, i.e. three and a half million gallons, passed through the 
167Barrier Gate.
After 1863, the garrison had no reason to complain of a shortage 
of water} but the fear that the Shaykh ’Uthman supply might be cut 
off for a long period made the authorities think of storing as much 
water as possible within British limits* To this end, in 1869, the 
Government of Bombay recommended to that of India the damming of the 
Khusaf Valley in addition to extending the Shaykh ’Uthman aqueduct 
to the village of laydah on the ’Abdali-Haivshabi border, where the 
River Tiban branched out* The duct was also to be enlarged so as to 
deliver 120,000 gallons per day instead of only a maximum of 40,000# 
Captain A.T* Hander, the Executive Engineer, estimated the cost 
of the new work at seven lakhs of rupees* On the basis of past 
experience, he argued that for a definite income, the ’Abdali and 
Hawshabi sultans would be glad to forego the water which irrigated 
their land. As with the Shaykh ’Uthman water, the new "mixture” was 
to be sold at one rupee per 100 gallons, and the two sultans were to 
receive half the proceeds of the sale after the deduction of running 
expenses* The water was tested in England n d  found fit for drinking 
and cooking*
Russell was opposed to the Zaydah scheme on a number of grounds* 
He could not countenance the idea that the land through which the 
river passed should cease to be cultivated, and if cultivation was 
to continue, the water supply to Aden would be scanty and irregular* 
Water from the mainland was always liable to be cut off by the Arabs 
or by a European enemy* The cost of the project Russell estimated 
at ten lakhs of rupees, and he predicted that the Government would 
get very little by way of revenue, only eight per cent*^^ The 
civil population would continue to use water from the wells and tanks 
nearer home* For all these reasons, he recommended the Khusaf scheme 
as being cheaper and more practicable*
The Bombay Government accepted Russell’s arguments,^^ but in
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the light of the experience with the Tav/ilah Tanks, the Supreme 
Government supported the Zaydah scheme and expressed their pious hope 
that the supply from the new source would be found sufficient for 
all purposes without affecting the land under cultivation* The 
Government of India added that if two years* supply of water were 
stored v/ithin British limits, the garrison would not suffer a short­
age should the supply be cut off by the Arabs or any other besieging
force* Yet they asked the Government of Bombay to reconsider the
170two schemes and submit plans for both or either of them*
The Zaydah scheme is not mentioned again until 1873t when there
was a new Government in Bombay under Sir P*E. YJodehouse* This
Government, for the reasons given by Russell, opposed the Zaydah
project and a similar one by Ducat which envisaged a pipeline to
Aden from a spring near al-Iiasna'a* a Sayyid villago *t3 miles away in
Lower Yafi1* The Government, who do not seen to have acquainted
themselves with the history of the water problem in Aden, considered
the two plans ,f .ndesirable, until it has been proved that an adequate
171supply cannot be obtained within the limits of our own occupation1’* 1
The Khusaf project was carried out, but was doomed to failure*
In September 1877, when the dam was almost full, a pipe burst and
much water was lost in a few hours* The rest seeped through the
172rocL'.: in 2k hours* Even if the dam had been watertight, it would 
have een, like the Tawilah Tanks, more often empty than full, a fact 
which Russell and the authorities in Bombay failed to take into 
account*
The Shaykh 'Uthman aqueduct was the only water project which 
proved efficient and reliable* It continued to be the chief source 
of supply for many years to come, and even today Aden's water is 
piped from artesian wells in and around Shaykh 'Uthman* The use of 
the tanks, condensers and wells was gradually discontinued*
The Bombay Government attached great importance to Aden's 
military and naval value, hence their plans for fortifying it against 
every possible danger by land or sea* The Supreme Government 
admitted the importance of the Settlement but did not consider it 
more valuable than other stations on the route between Egypt and
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China. Consequently, they saw no justification for giving it 
special treatment. The Government ox India thought it unlikely that 
the Settlement would face a major attack by sea. In any event, 
they were certain that if such an attack were attempted, the Navy 
would pre-empt it# This conviction and a reluctance to spend money 
resulted in the sea defences being built on a scale much smaller than 
Bombay had wished#
Nor obvious reasons, the land fortifications received greater 
attention, but even they, due to lack of money, were constructed 
with the modest objects of keeping the population in check and repell­
ing an Arab attack or one by a small European force# At the end of 
the period, the defences were too strong for Arabs and too weak for 
Europeans.
The town was completely ignored by the military engineers and 
had little attention from the Government# As a result, it grew 
haphazardly, care being taken only that the streets should be properly 
laid out and the buildings should not encroach on the military limits# 
Tor its growth, Aden had to depend mainly on private enterprise and 
money raised from local taxes#
The development of the new possession required labourers, artisans, 
traders and others# Immigration was encouraged, and immigrants came 
from far and near. In l8*f6, Lord Hardinge expressed fears that a 
large population might endanger the security of the Settlement and 
exhaust the water supply# He therefore recommended restriction on 
immigration, but his recommendation was not acted upon*
In the first eight years, equal strops was laid on the military 
and commercial value of Aden. However, after two years in office, 
Hardinge started to put more emphasis on the military importance, but 
thi s did not affect the growth of trade# In 1853, the Bombay Govern­
ment officially declared that the military value of the Settlement 
came before its commercial development, but no measures were taken 
to curb commerce# Haines* successors continued to encourage trade, 
and their superiors did not check them#
Cne result of the new emphasis was that restrictions were placed 
on immigration, but these were lifted when it was found that they 
adversely affected Aden’s trade and labour supply# However, regard­
less of freedom or control of immigration, the population seems to 
have stabilised after 18^2# In Aden, space was limited and water was
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a problem, two factors which discouraged permanent settlement.
With regard to the water supply, the British faced the same old
pro Li I •-■ms and for the most part tried the same old solutions with
similar results. Desalination was the only new method which they used
to increase the amount of sweet water in the Settlement. The
%
authorities did not do anything to make drinking water cheaply avail­
able to the inhabitants although they expressed concern on this subject# 
Thoy left resources which should have been used for the general good 
in the hands of wealthy private individuals who could easily have 
bought all that they required. The result was that the poor could not 
afford good drinking water, and the authorities did not derive from 
the water projects the profits which they had Loped for*
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CHAPTER IV*
TRADE*
Customs Dues and Establishment*
At the time the British occupied Aden, its trade had dwindled
into insignificance* Indeed, what commercial activity there was
depended on boats which dropped anchor on their way to Mukha. Thus
the ’Abdalis were able to buy certain commodities which they badly
needed* From Indian traders they bought spices, cotton cloths and
small quantities of iron, lead and rice* Boats from the Persian Gulf
landed dates, and others from the Somali country brought sheep* In
return, the ’Abdalis exported wheat, .jowari (Indian millet), coffee
and small amounts of copper*^*
As regards customs dues, Wellsted mentioned that on all imports
and exports a duty of only v/as demanded* In addition, a small
harbour due was required, and the Dawlah (governor) expected a
2
trifling present from all boats touching at Aden* For Aden’s
poverty, Wellsted put the blame on Sultan Muhsin who, by his extortion,
3
forced certain men to flee his territory, and one can assume that 
these were wealthy merchants whose departure deprived the country of 
their capital*
Haines, who visited Aden with Wellsted in 1835, gave a completely
different picture of what went on at the harbour* He wrote that a
heavy duty was levied on each article of import and export regardless
of its value* The Sultan charged one dollar for every bag of rice
or dates, the original price being between two and three dollars*
Without mentioning the price of a bag of coffee, Haines recorded that
the Sultan levied a duty of between sixteen and eighteen dollars*
The reason for the difference between the two accounts given by
Wellsted and Haines may have been a deliberate attempt on the part of
the latter to discredit the Sultan* When Haines wrote his account in
1838, he was negotiating the transfer of Aden* As the negotiations
dragged on, the Sultan became his enemy, and adverse reports could be
expected# This argument is borne out first by the brief statement of
customs dues levied under Sultan Muhsin, and then by comparing the
pre-occupation rates with those of the Bombay Customs Act, 1838* It
is noteworthy that the pre-occupation figures were supplied by Haines 
15
himself#
As for the income from the port, Sultan Muhsin said that it was
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050,000 annually. Haines, reporting this in February 1838, claimed
that he had in his possession the customs accounts for the previous
few years which showed that the figure was not more than 07000 per
annum.^ However, in his memoir, submitted to the Government in
August of the same year, he estimated the Sultan’s regular revenue
from customs dues at $12,000 a year* and added that the Dawlah
increased this sum greatly by additional charges ’’adapted to the
occasion”* In fact, Haines accused him of ’’constantly defrauding” 
n
travellers* Uellsted, on the other hand, described the same Dawlah 
as being ”a clever, hospitable man, and exceedingly attentive to 
Europeans”.
Besides the Dawlah, Aden had a customs master with one or two
assistants. They collected duties, but did not issue receipts or
keep regular accounts* After the occupation, Haines was directed
9
to re-appoint the customs men* However, as they did not speak
English, Haines asked for someone with a knowledge of that language
to take charge of the customs-house* The Government answered that
they could not comply with his request until the trade of Aden had
justified the employment of such a man*
Encouraged by the steady rise in the customs receipts for the
12first three official years, Haines asked again for a qualified 
customs master and explained the unsatisfactory situation in the 
customs establishment* The Arab customs master was a former governor 
of Aden, and the accountant was a Jew whose family had for many years 
been employed at the customs-house. Under the Sultan, they were 
adequate for the task; then, no receipts were issued or detailed 
accounts kept. How these were necessary, and moreover they had to be 
written in English. How also manifests arrived daily with goods} and 
as they were in English, the two men could not read them* Thus 
smuggling was made easy, and only an official with a knowledge of 
English could put an end to it* Besides the two chief employees, 
the customs establishment consisted of two writers (one at the Main 
Pass gate and one at th© Southern Pass gate), one havildar, and 
eight peons. The peonfe' duty was to guard the whole seafront, the 
two passes mentioned above and the pass leading into Bandar Duras 
(Fishermen’s Bay)*
At Aden, there were no warehouses where goods could be put into 
bond* Merchandise landed at Tawahi had to be guarded by a peon all
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the way to the customs-house in the Crater* Since there were not
enough peons for this task, smuggling could not be avoided* As a
remedy, Haines recommended the building of two warehouses, one at the
Main or Northern Pass which led into the Crater from Tawahi, and
another at the Southern Pass which led into the Crater from Huqqat Bay*
The Political Agent also recommended an increase in the salaries
of the two writers, the customs master and the accountant. The latter
two each received #30 per month, and Haines insinuated that such a
email salary might make them resort to fraudulent practices,
especially as the customs master was "a merchant of some rank11,
Lieut* C*J* Cruttenden, the Assistant Political Agent, could not
13supervise their work as he should because of his other duties#
The only time he could devote to the customs accounts was before or
after office hours, i.e. before nine o'clock in the morning or after
14four o'clock in the afternoon#
Haines' letter produced one positive result. The long-desired 
official arrived in Aden on 12th December, 1842, and he bore the title 
"Inspector of Customs”. His office at the customs-house was a room 
in a dilapidated state. The building itself was ”a mere ruin, 
neither wind-tight nor water-tight”* Packages left there were exposed 
to plunder or damage* Haines, therefore, impressed upon the Govern­
ment in July 1843 the necessity of having a proper customs-house to
enable the Inspector to work effectively. He also reminded them that
15the two warehouses were still needed#
The warehouses and the customs-house were not built, and when
Aden became a free port in 1850, the need for them ceased* However,
in 1864, a trade registration office was built at Hu'alla, da
Western Bay, and as the old harbour in Eastern Bay was still used by
a few vessels, a small office was built at the foot of Sirah,
replacing the old customs-house which was within the precincts of the 
16Camp#
As to what customs dues were levied under the British, Haines, 
on assuming control, permitted the free import and export of merchand­
ise, pending instructions from the Government.^ The Government did 
not approve and directed Haines to go on collecting dues according 
to the pre-occupation rates until a ruling on the subject was received 
from the Governor-General* With their letter they enclosed a copy of 
the Bombay Customs Act, 1838, and asked for two reports, one on the
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effect which "exemption certificates" would have at Aden, and
19another on the current import and export duties.
Lord Auckland thought that the Bombay Customs Act might be
introduced at Aden provided it would not increase the existing rates.
He continued: "It must be borne in mind that a main object of holding
Aden will probably be that it may become in our hands the emporium
of tho import and export trade of that part of Arabia and that object
will be entirely defeated unless the duties levied at Aden be more
favourable to the importing and exporting merchant than at other
20ports of the sane coast."
In a further letter, the Governor-General expressed his opinion
that, like Singapore, Aden should be a free port; and to foster
trade with the new Settlement, he suggested a light scale of tonnage
dues on all vessels using the harbour. If, in consequence, Aden
became the great emporium which it was hoped it i^ould become,
Auckland would expect a fair revenue from ground rent and from
21moderate duties on land trade.
Regarding the customs duties to be collected at Aden, Auckland
preferred not to give any instructions until ho had received a
22report on the old rates. The report was provided, but, as will be
seen, he never issued instructions on the subject; the matter was
finally settled by Bombay.
Meanwhile, in Aden, the collection of customs dues according to
the old rates started on 1st April, 1839. and Major Bailie, acting
for Haines who was on sick leave, commented on the Customs Act. Its
application, the Commander of the Garrison remarked, would raise the
23duties, "albeit slightly". ^ How "slight" this rise would have been 
is not easy to tell. Comparison between the pre-occupation rates 
and those set out in the Act is made difficult by the lank of 
uniformity in the system used for evaluation and by ignorance of 
current prices. However, it is clear that the Act generally increased 
import and export duties. This increase was obvious in the case of 
goods carried in foreign vessels. In all ports of the E.I.C. the 
duty on goods carried in foreign vessels was, in most cases, double
pL
that charged on goods carried in British vessels. Under the Sultan, 
this distinction did not apply#
Commenting on the exemption certificates, Bailie wrote that they 
would have a beneficial effect in that they would relieve the Aden
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merchants of the duty which they paid at ports within the Bombay 
Presidency* Bailie also recommended, as a measure to encourage the
25
land trade, the abolition of transit dues between Aden and the interior*
his letter was sent back to Haines who had resumed his duties*
Haines abolished the transit dues which, anyway, formed only a
very small proportion of the customs revenue for April (0^ 02^ ) and
May (£89-J)* Their abolition was intended to benefit Aden by
2S
encouraging tho tribes to bring their produce for export* Another 
benefit which Haines could have mentioned was that the flow of 
supplies for the garrison and the town would be increased*
Land Trade*
From tlie beginning, Haines1 dream for Aden was to make it again 
what it once had been, a great commercial centre* In all his engage­
ments with tho inland chiefs he stipulated that no obstacles should be 
put in the way of trade, but his most important treaty in this respect 
was the one made with Sultan Ahmad of the 'Abdalis in l8*f8* Article 7 
of this treaty dealt specifically with transit dues payable at al-IIawtah* 
these were:
Grain anu coffee 63 3
Ghee (clarified butter) 30',;'
Fish 203
Iron 103
jJnglish piece goods 103
Grass, kirbi (millet straw), 
wood and vegetables 6/3-83
Under the new treaty, the duties on the last four articles were
removed entirely, as they were grown in the 'Abdali territory* The
duties on the first five and all other articles were reduced to two 
per cent* Furthermore, the treaty gave the merchants of Aden the 
right to have a branch house at al-Hawtah, thus enabling them to 
monopolise tho trade of the interior*^
The needs of the Aden garrison and population, the cash prices 
offered for tho produce of the interior and the great variety of 
foreign goods in the Aden market - all these factors led to an 
increase in traffic between the Settlement and the hinterland* In
fact, the degree of interdependence between the two became so great
as to warrant the saying "Aden is the head, the near neighbourhood
28the body, and one cannot exist without the other”*
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further away in the Tihama, the rule of Sharif i ueayn (1331-49)
was cetriaental to Aden’s trade in coffee, tho most important product
of tne Yemen* The Sharif saw in Aden’s growing pros erity a throat
to is ort of ukha, an this made him place a ban on trade with the
ettleaent. Merchants who dared defy it did so at the risk of having
tneir roperty confiscated*
The Sharif also, to the detriment of the Settlement, gave the
Americans referential treatment* The American agent at, say, Mukha
would store up as much coffee as he could, so that when the vessels
arrived they w uld only have to load and sail away* All port and
other charges were paid by the merchant who sup lied the coffee, and
thus there was no chance of a quarrel between the American shipmasters
anc the local authorities* Other reasons which discouraged the
Yemeni merchants from taking their coffee to Aden were the proximity
of the coffee-growing districts to the ports, the dangers which besot
the overland j urney to Aden and the money required by the different
chiefs through whose territories tho caravan® passed*
Aden also failed to attract much coffee from Harar in
Abyssinia* .hen tribal feuds broke out on the Somali coast (which
was not uncommon), the coffee from arar, instea of being shipped to
Aden from i.ayla or ©rbera, was taken to Sulhar and from there ship ed
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to ukha, it being the nearest market*
Coffee from H&rar reached Aden when t ere was peace on the 
Somali coast* Coffee and ther products of the Yemen reached Aden 
mainly when the Yemen was in a disturbed state an : the people could 
not reach the ports or boycotted them as a rotest against high duties* 
In 1849* an Ottoman force from the HiJen under Tawfiq iasha 
ousted Sharif msayn and occupied the Tihama* Then the Ottomans 
became the only rivals of the ritish in South- est Arabia, with the 
coffee-, rowing districts near the ports under their control. To 
compensate for this disadvantage, Prideaux, t e Assistant esident, 
thought that the iritish chould work for the abolition of all transit 
cues on inland trade. When this was done, these districts would be 
brought "com ercialiy, if not geographically, nearer to us than to the 
ports which, notwithston inp early every conceivable drawback, 
except position still enjoy four fifths of the trade in the most 
valuable products of Arabia"
Prices of interior commodities in Aden were affected by a number
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of factors* When there were hostilities between the tribes and the
British or among the tribes themselves* the flow of supplies into
Aden was interrupted* Three days1 interruption doubled prices* five
31days* trebled them and ten days* caused panic* During disturbances,
a chief might take upon himself the responsibility of seeing the
supply caravans through, and the money he demanded for this service
32forced up the prices three times.* When the 'Abdali sultan was at
enmity with the British* and the tribes in the districts beyond Lahj
wanted to trade with Aden without going through his territory* they
made a detour which lengthened the journey by one day^ and this also
added to the price of commodities* Lack of rain in the interior led
to a shortage of supplies and a rise in prices*
Sometimes, disturbances had the opposite effect* For instance,
the •Abdalis once feared an 'Awlaqi attack* and this xAcr made them
hurry with their stores to Aden lest they would be plundered by the
enemy. The result was that the price of hay fell from two or three
rupees to eighteen or twenty annas a load* and the dollar, for which
one could normally get ceven or eight kaylahs of grain, now bought .
eleven. Two other factors which brought prices down were compet­
ition and the abundance of rain in the interior*
In the first six years of the occupation no record was kept of 
Aden's trade with the interior* From I8*f5 onwards* data for interior 
trade was compiled from a daily register kept at the Police Office*
In 1845-6 and 1846-7, the records give figures for imports only, the
35figures being in camel loads* Import figures, when given, continue 
to be in camel loads up to 1858*9, and from then on the value in 
rupees is also shown* Figures for exports to the interior are avail­
able only from 1847-8 onwards, and they show the value of the articles
exported as well as their quantity* However* since no single unit is
36used m  measuring quantity, only the monetary value is shown here*
Aden's main imports from the interior were aloes* ba.jri (millet),
beeswax, coffee, dyes, firewood, fruits, jowari, kirbi, lentils,
37potash, qat, vegetables and wheat* The chief exports were cotton
and cotton piece goods, silk and silk piece goods, dates, grains, metals,
38spices, sugar, tobacco and snuff*
The figures for land imports and exports cannot be considered 
strictly accurate. In 1850, Cruttenden wrote that piece goods and 
silk in bundles were smuggled inland to the extent of from Ks* 60,000
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to Rs. 78,000 annually. The following year, he remarked that the 
statistics were compiled from the statements of the canelmen them-
39selves, and not from any bona fide examination of the merchandise#
I Market supplies from the interior were not brought only on
camel back. In 18^4« Haines reported that every day between 60 and
4080 men and women came to Aden on foot, bringing fowls, eggs, etc. 
Merchandise was taken into the interior jjrincipally by individuals 
and in email quantities. In theory, it was obligatory on all who 
came to Aden for trade to declare at the Police Office the nature, 
quantity and value of their goods, but this rule was constantly
41evaded, and there were not enough officials to enforce it.
Attempts were made to give more accurate figures for the land
trade* In 1855, Coghlan wrote that goods were valued at the current
market price } and in the absence of such a price, by the Government
tariff* For forming an approximate idea about the quantity of
merchandise coming from the interior, Lieut* G*E. Hancock, Assistant
Resident, recommended in 1870 that a writer be stationed at the
Barrier Gate with weighing apparatus to make random checks on camel 
42
loads.
Lea Trade.
When Haines abolished transit dues with the interior, he proposed
some reduction in customs dues paid on goods imported and exported
by sea. He was confident that the reduction would have the effect of
4 3
increasing trade without diminishing the revenue. The Government 
did not comment on his suggestion, but asked him for a comparative 
statement of the rates levied at various Red Sea ports and those which
44
he intended to levy at Aden, a request with which he eventually
45 46
complied. With two minor exceptions, Haines* rates were sanctioned
47by Bombay, and the Government of India was informed accordingly.
Another step taken to encourage Aden’s trade by sea was the
48treatment of country craft as British vessels with respect to rates.
To start with, the trade of Aden was mainly carried on by such craft$
and if they had to pay the double duty imposed on foreign vessels,
49they would have been deterred from coming to Aden.
In 1848, the Government of India passed an Act abolishing
duties on goods carried from port to port in the territories of the
H.I.C. and equalising the duties on goods imported and exported in
50ioreign and British ships* This Act was of great benefit to Aden.
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The abolition of duties referred to tended to encourage trade between
it and India. The equalisation of duties on shipping had the effect
of attracting more vessels to the harbour*
Ilaines did not welcome this equalisation because it meant great
competition for the Indian merchants, especially from the Americans
51whose cotton manufactures were extremely cheap* Before the equal­
isation of duties, the Americans anchored off Aden only to make use 
of the Post Office# They avoided landing goods and consequently 
paying trans-shipment duty* Three vessels, one large and tv/o small, 
would leave the United States with cargoes of piece goods. The small 
ones would proceed first to the Red Bea where they exchanged their 
cargo for coffee, gums, hides, etc. Then they joined the large vessel 
which had anchored off Aden, and the three went to one of the ports 
on the Red Sea, say, Mukha where they paid lower duties* There
trans-shipment took place, and the large vessel returned home, while
52
the other two remained to trade with the new supply of piece goods*
The most important decision which the Government took to foster
Aden's trade was to declare the port free in 1850. Haines' dis-
53satisfaction v/ith the revenue from customs made him recommend in
1847 that the port be opened for a limited period of five or seven
years. The advantages which would follow, he argued, would outweigh 
any loss in revenuej Aden would become what its geographical position 
entitled it to be, the chief emporium for Arabian, African and Indian
54-trade* The Bombay Government agreed, but thought that there should 
be no time limit on this measure. If a tine limit were fixed, the
traders would think that after the specified period had elapsed,
heavy duties would be imposed, and this prospect would deter them
from trading with Aden or settling there.
Aden's revenue from customs duties was small. Many of the 
articles exported with a value greater than Rs. 20,000 contributed 
to the treasury of the S.I.C* since import duties were paid on them 
elsewhere, and many of those imported with a value greater than 
Rs# 20,000 were for the consumption of the garrison and no duties were 
paid on them. Tho abolition of customs dues would also reduce the 
price of goods passing through to the interior and the African coast 
which would diminish pro tanto the necessity of paying in cash for
goods imported from there. As a result, the drain on bullion would be
less*
In brief, the Government of Bombay argued that the advantages
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which would accrue from the opening of the port would outweigh the
loss of the small customs revenue, and in recommending tho measure
to the Supreme Government they asked whether there would be any
political objections.**^ Lord Hardinge, who was about to vacate his
post as Governor—General, replied that he would be making enquiries
on the subject while in Aden on his way to England and that he would
report his findings to the Home Authorities* After his visit to
Aden, he wrote privately to Sir G.R. Clerk, the Governor of Bombay,
from his ship off Qusayr that he had no objection to making Aden a
free port provided that it did not become ,fthe resort of all the
loose population of the Red Sea coast'*# In a military base such as
57Aden, the population should be strictly controlled*
Lord Dalhousie, Hardinge*s successor, saw in Aden primarily a
military base and a communications centre. He did not think it was
necessary to make Aden a free port in order to encourage its trade#
Trade could be encouraged by the levy of moderate duties, as was in
fact the case, for it was not the policy of the Government "to attract
by extraordinary advantages and indulgences, more commerce and
immigration than would naturally flow to it, or than would be quite
compatible with the defences of the place, and its occupation for the
main purpose which the British Government has in view there, namely
58the communication with Europe".
Haines himself warned that if Aden were made a free port, the
Americans, having equal rights with the British, would trade under
great advantages; they would flood the Arabian and African markets
with their goods to the detriment of British manufactures • Therefore,
the Government should decide whether the port should be free to the
59vessels of all nations or to British vessels only*
Tho Court of Directors supported the proposal to make Aden a
free port "having ourselves a strong inclination to add to the
8 0commercial importance of the place". They therefore asked the 
Government of India to reconsider their decision. The result was 
that Aden was declared a free port by Act X, 1850, according to which 
no customs duty was payable on any goods carried by sea or land to 
or from Aden. The purpose of the Act was stated in its preamble,
"... the trade between the western coast of India and the Red Sea 
and places thereunto adjacent will be improved by encouraging the 
resort of vessels of all nations to the Port of Aden..." By it,
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Aden was excluded from the provisions and privileges of Act VI, 18^8, 
and was thus treated as a foreign port*
As Haines had anticipated, when the port of Aden was opened, on 
2'/th April, 1850, foreign traders were quick to make use of it in 
preference to Kukha, Hudaydah and other ports on the Red Sea. Now 
at Aden they could buy and sell more advantageously. They could also 
receive and send letters through the Post Office, a facility not to 
be had anywhere else in the area. An American shipmaster, for 
example, could receive letters direct from home by steam in ^5 days 
and reply in the same period, speedy communication for those tines.
While the merchants were transacting their business, their vessels 
lay in a safe quiet anchorage where they could be refitted. The 
traders also avoided the wear and tear of the boisterous voyage up 
tho Red Sea.
After Aden was decJ.ared a free port, American and 19rench commercial
activity increased considerably* The Americans bartered their cotton
cloth with great profit, and the PVench vessels, after delivering
thoir coal to the French depot (established in 18^5)* returned laden
with goods bought at a cheap rate. Hardly any merchandise came to
Aden from Britain, and trade between India and Aden was still subject
to duty at the Indian ports*
In addition, the opening of the port deprived the *Aqrabis and
Fadlis of part of their income because some country craft now went
to Aden in preference to the Arab bandars (roadsteads) to avoid
customs dues. From 18^0 to 185^, as v/ill be seen, there was hostility
between the British and these two tribes for reasons not connected
with trade. However, in l8f&, the Rev. G.P. Badger, the Protestant
Chaplain to the Garrison and Outran*c close adviser, recommended the
re-imposition of customs dues at Aden. Their abolition, he claimed,
had deprived the tribes of their revenue from the bandars and made
them actively hostile to the British. The British themselves fell I
derived no benefit from the opening of the port. The restoration of
the customs dues, Badger argued, would cover the expenses of the
Customs Department and bring in a small revenue* More important still,
it would divert some trade to the Arab bandars and thus reconcile the
62 .
chiefs to the British*
The Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, did not agree to 
consider the re-imposition of dues at Aden. He argued that
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economically, such a measure would have a retrogressive effect on the 
commerce of tho place# Politically, the Arab bandars should not be 
encouraged, so that the chieftains might identify their interests with 
those of Aden. Thus Aden would be the market where they could
63exchange their produce for whatever foreign goods they needed.
The abolition of customs dues at Aden harmed not only the Arab
bandars in the vicinity, but also the Ottoman ports in the Yemen*
Aden became a free port when there were great disturbances in the Yemen
consequent on the re-occupation of the Tihaiaa by the Ottomans. As was
usually the case in times of trouble, much of the trade in Yemeni
coffee was diverted to the British Settlement. Thus the Ottomans lost
revenue from both customs and anchorage duos*
This apparent transfer of the coffee trade to Aden made
Mustafa Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of Iludaydah, request that customs
dues be levied on all merchandise entering Acen by land* Its free
passage, he claimed, was "injurious to the Gubline Porte", and in timo
64-might deprive the Yemen of all revenue. Merchandise from the Yemen
continued to pass free into Aden, but its flow was not always as great
as in the years immediately after the opening of the port, and the
Yemen did not suffer the dreaded economic collapse#
The abolition of customs dues naturally led to an increase in
trade; Aden once more became An emporium for India, East Africa and
South Arabia, as envisaged by Act X, 1850* The only other places
with w.i ich the Settlement had a two-way traffic before and after the
opening of the port were the Persian Gulf, the United States, the
6 5United Kingdom, Singapore, Hamburg and Mauritius. Prior to 1850, 
IVance only exported to Aden; but after that date, she also imported 
from it*
Holland had trade relations with Aden only in the four years 
following the opening of the port. The year 1850-51 saw an exchange 
of goods with the Seychelles. In 1851-2, merchandise came from Spainf 
and in the following year, a Belgian ship took home a cargo of goods.
In tho last fourteen years, Suez, China and Australia became good 
trade partners with Aden.
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 gave Adon its greatest 
commercial boost. The same year the Canal was opened, Trieste began 
trading with Aden, and Italy followed in 1870, the year of her 
unification. JArior to this date, Genoa was the only Italian city
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shown to have imported goods from the Settlement (1861-2).
Two places which deserve special mention in connection with 
Aden’s trade are Berbers and Bulhar* In the early years of British 
rule in Aden, the town of Berbers on the opposite Somali coast was 
of great commercial importance. It was the market where merchants 
from Africa, Arabia and India congregated during the north-east 
monsoon, i.e. from October to April. For its supplies of coffee, 
gums and resins, the Settlement was greatly dependent on Berbers*s 
trade fair. When the fair was not held. Aden’s trade suffered 
considerably*
In 18^6, Berbers*s trade began to decline owing to tribal quarrels.
The Somali warring factions were liable to plunder vessels bound for 
66
Aden and India. This state of affair© led Haines to write!
M... eventually lire may expect to draw the whole of the Berbers trade
over and make Aden the annual rendezvous for both Indian and African 
67merchants.”
By 1863, the Berbers trading season had become a thing of the 
past, but this was not to Aden*© benefit, as Kaines had hoped* The 
merchants, instead, took their goods to Bulhar, a roadstead between 
Berbers and Zayla* Bulhar had formerly been almost unused, but in 
the l860*s it started to develop rapidly as a commercial port. This
was due to the *Iyal Yunus, the tribe inhabiting the town, who were
68better disposed than the *Iyal Ahmad of Berbera* However, towards
the end of the decade, Berbera had re-established itself as a
69commercial centre, rivalling Bulhar, both trading with A-den*
There are no reports on the sea trade for the first three years
of tho occupation. Before the arrival of the Inspector of Customs,
the Arab customs master kept his accounts in Arabic, and the Jewish
accountant kept his in Hebrew, and they were afterwards translated
into English* These accounts were not detailed enough to form the
70basis of trade reports* The first official trade report, therefore, 
covered the period from 12th December, l8*f2, when tho Inspector 
arrived, to 30th April, 18^3* when the official year ended. Since the 
report in question does not cover a whole year, it has been disregarded* 
From 18^3**^ onwards there are annual trade reports. Up to 
1862-3 they give quantity and value and after that, up to 1869-70, 
value only. The report for the last year, 1871-2, cannot bo traced#
At this point, attention must be drawn to two facts. The first
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is that up to 1862-3, for purposes of trad© distribution, Suez was 
placed under the heading of "United Klngdoml’. The second is that the 
year 1865-6 had only eleven months, the official year having been 
changed from Kay-April to April-Karch.
Beacons for the fluctuation of trade are not always given; and 
when they are, they are mainly of a general nature such as supply and 
demand, stock in hand and changing market prices. The trade reports 
which attribute increase and/or decrease to specific reasons are few* 
For instance, the decrease in 18^7-8 was principally in African trade 
which did not reach Aden from Berbera until May 18^8-9, whereas in 
former years it always arrived in March and April, This decrease
7‘naturally occasioned a corresponding increase in the following year* 
Another year which deserves special mention is 1858-9, when a 
number of factors conspired against commerce in the Bed Sea area* 
Those were!
1* The Jaddah Massacre of June 1858* While in Jaddah harbour, 
the "Erunee" of Calcutta, a British-registered ship, hoisted tho 
Ottoman flag. Her action was seen by Captain Pullen, of the British 
warship "Cyclops" which happened to be in the harbour at the time. 
Pullen immediately ordered the "Eranee" to be seized, the Ottoman 
flag hauled down and the British flag hoisted in its place.
The people of Jaddah interpreted Pullen’s reaction as an insult 
to Islam. A mob attacked the British Consulate and killed the Vice- 
Consul, his interpreter and clerk. Then the mob attacked the French 
Consulate, killed the Consul, his wife and Arab servants, and wounded 
his daughter and a consular official. Twenty-two other Christians, 
mostly Greek, were murdered. The survivors of the slaughter took 
refugo on the "Cyclops".
Britain and France sent commissioners to seek redress, and this 
was finally obtained; the instigators of the trouble were executed* 
Months were required to settle the matter; and during that time, the 
trade of the Ilijaz was at a standstill, the effect of which was felt 
by all Bed Sea ports as well as Aden.
2. Trouble in the Yemen. Shortly after the Jaddah Massacre, 
there followed one of the many rebellions against the Ottomans in the 
Yemen. The uprising had the effect of cutting communication between 
the rich coffee districts and the Bed Sea ports.
3. Outbreak of cholera. Hardly had trade recovered from the
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effects of the Jaddah Massacre and the fighting in the Yemen when
cholera broke out and ravaged both shores of the Fed Gea and the
Gulf of Aden. In the Settlement, 600 people succumbed to it*
4. Famine* The last disaster, and the one which affected Aden
most directly, was a famine in the Yemen and East Africa whence much
of Aden’s merchandise was received. The ports which had sent cereals
and other provisions to Aden were now supplied from there. The effects
of the famine were felt in Aden less than in other places because its
72marlcet was better supplied, but even there prices rose sharply*
Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the trade
for 1858-9 shows a decrease of Hs. 1,863,657 in imports and exports
as compared with the previous year. However, it must be emphasised
that the year 1857-8 was the most prosperous up to that date, the
Indian Mutiny notwithstanding.
Tho five main articles of sea trade were coffee, raw cotton, piece
goods, grain and ivory. With regard to this trade, ono cannot speak
of a definite exchange of articles, as one can with the land trade*
Here Aden played the same part in the circulation of goods as the
heart does in the circulation of tho blood; goods were imported only
to be re-exported.
Up to 1862-3 the records give only tho total value of the article
imported and exported; beginning v.dth 1863-4 they also show its
movement. Tho value and movement of the five articles mentioned ;,';ove
are shown in Appendix 7E. The causes of their fluctuations in
certain years are summarised in the following notes.
Coffee. As has been shown, Aden failed not only to monopolise,
but also to attract, the coffee trade of the Yemen to any great extent.
Most of Aden’s coffee came from the hinterland and from East Africa.
In 1845-6, the decrease in the coffee trade was caused chiefly by
disturbances on the African coast. The coffee traders from Karar,
unable to sell their commodity to the regular purchasers at Berbera,
shipped off largo quantities to Mukha. Besides, that year there was
a poor crop of coffee in the Yemen, and the Americans bought most of 
73
it. The decrease in 1859-60 was attributed to the failure of the
coffee crop due to a plague which attacked the plants just as the
74Derry approached maturity*
75A careful look at the export figures for coffee will show that 
they are invariably higher than the import figures. The explanation
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for this lies in two facts# A considerable quantity of coffee was 
brought into Aden in husk; and niter it had been cleaned, it 
acquired a higher market value. The figures for the land and sea 
imports, which together formed the sea exports, were not added 
together* If they had been, the discrepancy would have been greatly 
reduced*
Ra7w Cotton, The trade reports do not give explanations for the 
fluctuations in the cotton trade until 1861-2, and then they are only 
in terns of supply and demand. Cotton v/as principally imported from 
Kutch, Veraval and Porbandar, -Small quantities were brought from 
Mukalla, Berbera and the Persian Gulf, having also come originally 
from India,
Piece Goods. Cotton piece goods came mainly from Bombay, the 
United -States and the United Kingdom, From Aden, they we re imported 
chiefly by the Yemen, the Hijaz and the East African coast. The 
American Civil Bar (1861-65) affected trade in this arti. le to a 
large degree, A bale of American cloth which normally sold at #70-75 
cost in 1862-5 #200; and in the following year, not less than #350.
Until 1865, piece goods from Bombay were conveyed in country craft 
direct to ports on the Arabian and African coasts* From then on, they 
cane regularly to Aden by the Eombay and Bengal Company steamers.
This change made the Settlement to a far greater extent the entrepot
of piece goods for the Fed Sea area*
ilk piece goods were a less important item of merchandise, due 
to a lower demand and higher prices* They came mainly from Bombay, 
Calcutta and China, and were exported chiefly to the Gulf of Aden and 
Fed Sea ports. As wilh cotton, the sales of piece goods varied with 
the demand, and the trade reports do not refer to fluctuations in this 
article until 1862-3,
Grain. The records do not remark on the increase and decrease 
in the trade in grain until 1361-2. From the remarks made it is clear 
that the trade in this article was affected by drought and famine in
Arabia, India and East Africa* In 1862-3, Aden exported large
quantities of grain to India due to the famine in Gujerat and the 
Worth-Best Provinces, In 1865-6, Aden had to import considerable 
supplies from India to meet the demands of the famine-stricken interior 
which normally supplied thu Settlement with most of its grain* In 
the previous year, when East Africa suffered from lack of rain, Aden
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imported enough grain to meet the needs of that area. The increase 
in the importation and exportation of grain in 1867-8 and 1868-9 was 
caused by the Abyssinian expedition and its aftermath.
Ivory. Ivory came mainly from Zanzibar and Kassawa and went
chiefly to Bombay and Europe* The trade in this article fluctuated
according to demand, and the records comment on it for the first time 
in 1864-5.
Coal and treasure were Aden’s chief items of import and export
by sea, but since they were in a special class, they are dealt with
76separately. The first two trade reports did not refer to either,
but after reading the second report, the Government ordered that both
77should be included in the annual trade returns. The Customs
Department at Aden gave the order a retroactive effect* For the
purpose of comparing 1343-4 with 1844-5, they added the two items to
the former year, with import and export figures, and treated them
ae ordinary market commodities*
In 1848, Cruttenden rightly remarked that the import figures for
coal were deceptive; they led one to believe that iritain had an
78extensive trade with Aden, which was not the case* He also
observed that showing as exports coal taken by steamers for their
own consumption established a fictitious trade with places which never
received it* Thus the Ited Sea ports, Bombay, Bengal and even Britain
appeared as having imported coal from Aden, simply because steamers
coaled at that place en route* To correct this false impression, he
79decided to strike out coal export figures from the trade returns* 
Accordingly, they were not shown in 1848-9 or 1849-50* and one could 
reasonably expect them not to appear again, but they did from time to 
time without any explanation*
Up to 1359-60, the occasional explanations for the fluctuations 
in coal imports and "exports'1 are given in terms of heavy demand and 
large stocks in hand. The great decrease in 1861-2 is attributed to 
the facility with which steamers could obtain a supply at Suez by the 
Egyptian railroad, thereby rendering it unnecessary to fill up at 
Aden for the double voyage to and from the Bed Sea. The railroad 
from Alexandria to Cairo was opened in 1856, and in the following year 
it was extended to Cues through the desert*
Before the establishment of this line, steamers took on little 
or no coal at Suez, but now nearly as much was loaded there as at
12 7#
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Aden. Notwithstanding, the increase in steam communication in the
1860*8 led to greater importations of coal for Aden. In 1865, the
Bombay and Bengal Steamship Company started a fortnightly line of
cargo steamers between Bombay and Suez calling at Aden. Until then,
the other companies which coaled at the port were the Peninsular and
Oriental Company, tho Messageries Naritiraes Imperiales, the Anglo-
French I-lauritius Steam Navigation Company and the European and
Australian Noyal Nail Company, The large imports in 1867-8 were due
to the Abyssinian Campaign for which the Settlement was a supply
centre. Tho increase in shipping consequent upon the opening of the
8l
Suez Canal inevitably led to an increase in coal imports.
Treasure was treated as an item of merchandise until 1847-8,
but from that year onwards it was shown separately at tho end of the
trade report, and then added to the total merchandise. In an entrepot
like Aden, it was wrong to use treasure in determining the value of
trade, since the greater part of the trade, especially in the early
years, was carried on by barter. A considerable amount of bullion
was brought from Arabian ports for the express purpose of remittance
to India. The treasure which came from Bombay was used to pay
salaries and to meet expenses; sometimes it merely passed through.
There are only three trad© reports which explain fluctuations in
treasures 1855-6, 1858-9 and 1867-8. Tho great increase in the last
year was attributed to the Abyssinian Campaign. Tho decrease in 1855-6
wac due to three general causes. The political unrest in the Yemen
prevented the circulation of goods and money between Aden and the ports
of that country. Several vessels of the Indian Navy visited the ports
on the Ned Sea and took back money to Bombay which would otherwise have
gone first to Aden. The value of Aden’s imports from tho interior was
82not less than that of the preceding year while the value of exports 
was less by Ns. 104,205* This meant that a corresponding withdrawal 
of specie must have taken place*
The treasury at Aden acted as a clearing bank; it was mainly 
supplied by money received from merchants in exchange for bills on 
Bombay, any deficiency being made up by importation* Up to 1857-8 
these bills were granted at 30 days' sight, but this did not offer 
sufficient inducement to the merchants. In 1858-9* bills were granted 
at three days* sight, with the result that during that year, only one 
lakh of rupees was imported from Bombay, The movement of treasure is 
not shown until 1863*4#^
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The figures for sea trade, like those for land trade, cannot be 
considered strictly accurate* Prior to the passing of Act X, 1850, 
the merchants valued their goods as low as possible for the obvious 
reason that they paid duty accordingly* When the customs duties 
were lifted, they up-valued their goods whenever they thought that, 
by doing so, they could facilitate their passing* Also, certain 
articles, small in bulk but great in value, now for the first time 
appeared in considerable quantities* Previously they were smuggled.
Wars (safflower), for example* was invariably exported in the middle
84
of bags of ,1 owari or flour and thus escaped detection*
After the abolition of customs dues, the harbour authorities no 
longer had the power to open, examine and appraise goads. The main 
object of the registration of imports and exports became the detection 
of fluctuations in trade* If the authorities found a decrease of 
imports from Britain or the territories of the E.I.C*, end a corres­
ponding increase in imports from foreign countries, especially the 
United States, they were to ascertain why foreign goods vrere preferred, 
and do s o m e t h i n g  to ma’ce British goods more acceptable* J Reasons 
for trade fluctuations were not always given, and tho trade reports 
never explained why foreign goods were preferred to British, but 
Haines indicated that they were cheaper*
Besides the reasons given for the unreliability of the trade 
figur 3, the changing prices and the absence of weights render them 
not a: useful as they might otherwise have been* They therefore serve 
only as a guide to Aden’s growing importance as a commercial centre.
This importance can be more fully realised when one bears in mind the 
great trans-shipment trade which was carried on in the harbour, the 
value of which is not recorded* For 1876-7, Hunter estimated it at 
two million pounds*^
Shipping.
The first two trade reports do not refer to shipping* However, 
the same Government letter of 1844, which requested Haines to include 
coal and treasure in future annual reports, also requested him to 
include a statement of the number and tonnage of vessels which called 
at the port, whether square-rigged or country craft.
Steamers were included with sailing vessels for the first time 
in 1858-9, and this explains the increase in the number of vessels which 
called at Aden in spite of the great decrease in trade that year*
The records start to show steamers separately in 1863-4, when there
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was an appreciable increase in their number due to factors already
mentioned in connection with coal.^ In 1871-72, 3^5 out of 586
vessels which carried on trade by the Suez Canal touched at Aden for
88coal, water and provisions, and this shows how great a port Aden
had become.
From the beginning the restoration of Aden*s trade was a major 
goal of .British policy* The E.I.C* which ruled the place until 
1857 was essentially a commercial firm interested in promoting 
commerce. Hardinge and Dalhousie, it is true, emphasised Adenfs 
importance as a military and communications centre, but did nothing 
to discourage its trade. Trade meant revenue which the Company 
hoped would offset its military expenses.
By a series of measures culminating in the opening of the port, 
the Settlement became what the British had intended, the emporium 
for India, Couth Arabia and East Africa* The opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1869 was still to give it its greatest commercial 
boost.
The British, and Haines in particular, had hoped to monopolise 
the coffee trade, but for geographical and political reasons they 
failed* However, if Aden did not completely fulfil the commercial 
hopes entertained for it, it went a long way towards realising them*
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CHAPTER V.
THE ADMINISTRATION,
Before discussing the administration of Aden, it is necessary 
to give an outline of the government of British India. Under the 
E.I.C*, the country was divided into three main administrative units 
called Presidencies, each headed by a Governor. The Presidencies 
were Bengal, Madras and Bombay* The Governor of Bengal, who had his 
seat at Calcutta, was also the Governor-General of all India# He 
presided over an executive council composed of the Commander-in-Chief, 
another military officer and two civilian officers# Similarly, the 
Covornors of Bombay and Madras each presided over an executive council 
or board of three members, the Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency 
and two civilians#
The Government of India was highly centralised* The Governor-* 
General in Council was the legislator for the whole country and the 
supreme authority whose sanction was required for every measure taken 
by the subordinate governments* Bombay and Madras, however, could 
correspond directly with the Home Authorities*
Above the Governor-General was the Court of Directors which 
operated from India House in London* The Court consisted of 24 
members and had the power to appoint and dismiss officials throughout 
India, including the Governor-General with the consent of the Crown*
Tho Court of Directors was in turn under the India Board, or the Board 
of Control, which was a department of the British Government* The six 
members of the Board were all Privy Councillors, and the President was 
a Cabinet Minister* In matters of high policy the Board took the final 
decision*
The Chairman and two senior members of the Court formed what was 
colled the Secret Committee# This Committee was used by the Board and 
thj Governor-General when they wished to communicate without the know­
ledge of the other Directors# Dispatches in the Secret Department 
were written by the President of the Board, and the members of the 
Secret Committee were compelled by Act of Parliament to sign and 
transmit them to India* The members could inform tho President 
privately of their disagreement with a letter which they had signed, 
but this disagreement carried no weight#
The Indian Mutiny of 1857 resulted in the dissolution of the E#I#C 
and the annexation of India to the British Croim* The India House was
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replaced by the India Office, and the last President of the Board
became the first Secretary of State for India, with a seat in the
Cabinet# In India, the Governor-General was given the additional
title of Viceroy, but otherwise the government structure was not
substantially changed# In 1861, however, the Indian Councils Act
gave the minor Presidencies legislative councils with limited powersj
for instance, they could not legislate on financial matters*
The Head of Administration*
The Bombay Government had originally intended to appoint for the
administration of Aden an array officer who would combine in his person
both civil and military authority* Therefore, when they occupied
the place, they requested Ilaines ”to assume temporary charge of the
political and civil control of Aden”, i#e# to act as Political Agent*
Major Bailie, now Commander of the Garrison, was instructed ”to attend
to his requisitions”#^ Later, however, Ilaines was confirmed in his
2
office as ”the fittest person for the duties”, end thus the division
of power was officially sanctioned* The Political Agent was directed
to refer to Bombay for instructions ’’except in a case of great 
3
emergency”*
The co-existence of two independent authorities at Aden proved
impossible, and conflict was unavoidable* Haines * vision for the
Settlement was different from that of the military* The limits of the
town and Camp expanded and contracted until 1854 as has been seen*
Many civilians were employed by the garrison; and when they committed
offences, it was not always clear whether they should be tried by
military or civil law* All these were causes of friction underlined
by the question of who was to do what*
Complaints from Ilaines and Bailie against each other reached
'ornbay in August 1839 and resulted two months later in Bailie’s 
4
oismicsal* Before his successor, Lieut*-Col* D* Capon, proceeded to 
Aden, he was announced in General Orders by Maj#-Gen# Sir John Fitzgerald, 
Commander of the Bombay Forces, as being appointed ”to lifre command at 
Aden'% x^ hile the Government intended that he should be appointed ”to
5
command the troops at Aden”* Capon himself understood the announce­
ment as placing the whole Settlement under his control#
In February 1340, the Political Agent complained that the military, 
under their new commander, wanted to proclaim martial law and prevent 
him from carrying out his governmental duties#^ Then ho reported that
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they were not confining themselves to the seafront as they were 
supposed to do, but were “daily extending their limits’1, and he 
enclosed a map (not shown) to support his claim#
Haines asked that Capon be instructed to consider the townspeople 
completely outside his jurisdiction and that the troops be kept 
within clearly defined limits# He reminded the Government that their 
order was that the military should not occupy the places most suited 
for commercial purposes and that the commercial advantages were “of 
the highest importance”• The Political Agent warned that the encroach­
ment of the army would prevent merchants from settling at Aden, and 
added that due to military interference with the civil population,
the number of complaints reaching him had increased six times since
7
Capon took office#
Before Haines* complaints had time to roach Bombay, the Govern­
ment, due to tribal hostilities, had already given Capon the power of 
assembling courts-martial and confirming the sentences passed, even
extending to death under certain circumstances# Only Haines and his
8£taff were excluded from military jurisdiction#
Capon did not enjoy his new powers for a long time# When Haines’
complaints reached Bombay, the Government reversed their decision
giving Capon absolute authority at Aden# The Governor, Carnac, wrote
that placing Aden under military law was suggested by the system
introduced at Kharg which had the sanction of the Governor-General#
Then he went on to show the inadvisability of doing so#
Kharg was an island with a small number of inhabitants, chiefly
fishermen, and had little contact with the mainland# Aden, on the
other hand, was a peninsula constantly in communication with the
interior and it had a large and growing population for whose protection
o
i” itish were responsible#7 Moreover, when the British occupied 
Aden, they assured the inhabitants that they would govern them 
according to their own laws and usages# To keep this pledge, the 
Government placed them under the Political Agent, and not under the 
military commandant*
Carnac continued by arguing that if control over the inhabitants 
were transferred from the civil to the military authority, Ilaines* 
political influence with the chiefs in the interior, which it was 
necessary to maintain, would be impaired# In the town, discontent 
and trouble would be inevitable# Therefore, the order placing the
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entire possession of Aden under military lav/ v/as cancelled, and
Capon*s powers were limited to the garrison and camp-followers only*
In no way was he to interfere with the civil population except through
10representation to the Political Agent* Tho Secret Committee
supported Carnac*s decision and expressed the opinion that the Political
Agent “should on all occasions unless especially interdicted, have
the entire control over all functionaries, military as well as others*’*^*
This opinion was not conveyed to Aden, and the military authority
remained independent#
Carnac*s decision was embodied in letters to Paines and Capon,
dated 23rd March, 184-0# However, before the letters reached Aden,
both men on the same day (31st March, 1840) made complaints to
Bombay# Haines reported that misunderstandings between the civil and
military authorities, for which the latter were to hi"me, occurred 
12daily* Capon, on the other hand, accused Ilaines of “magnifying
every trifling disagreement into matters of the highest political
importance'1, and protested that he could not carry on with him paper
warfare on an equal footing because he was “not provided with an
13establishment of writers" lime him# Therefore, Capon appealed to
14the Adjutant-Gcneral of the Army to support him#
The Adjutant-General forwarded Capon’s letter to the Governor who
warned that it was necessary for the civil and military authorities
to act in harmony, or else he would have no alternative but to appoint
one supreme authority at Aden, much as he would regret to change the 
15existing system* This warning did not produce the desired effect#
Friction, varying in degree, continued between Haines and Capon and
his successors# The result i^ as that in May 184-7, Lord Uardinge, the
Governor-General, proposed that a Governor be appointed for Aden,
combining in his person the power and authority necessary to carry
out the duties in all departments#
3ir G.R, Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, wrote that in putting
this measure into effect the opportunity should be taken to declare
Aden a British possession#^ The Governor thought that the change
would strengthen the position of the British at Aden, make it easier
for them to draw on the resources of the neighbouring lands and
17restore to the port its former trade#
L#R* Reid, a member of the Bombay Council, argued that v/hile Aden 
was an important fortress, it was also a place which the British hoped
i
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would become an emporium of trade between the Red Sea and India* If
this hope was realised, Aden would soon attract merchants from
Europe and America as well as from the East* The management of such
a heterogeneous population and the safety of the Settlement required
that the head of administration should have great power to enable him
to act without constant reference to Bombay* The powers of a Political
Agent were less extensive than those of a Governor who would, besides 
commanding the garrison, perform all Ilaines* duties#
Regarding the title of the officer who was to head the admin­
istration, Reid thought that “Governor” would not be proper unless 
that officer was immediately under the Governor-General# However, if
he were to be under the subordinate Government of Bombay, then
l8“Lieutenant-Governor” would be more appropriate*
J*P* Willoughby, another member of the Council, agreed that if
harmony were to prevail at Aden, the civil and military authority
should be united in one person* However, he objected to that person
being given the title of “Governor”, since this might lead him to
expect a higher salary than the Government ivere willing to contemplate*
Willoughby himself suggested ”Political Agent and Commandant”*
When the new officer was appointed, Willoughby wrote, it would
become necessary to define his powers and the general principles on
which the administration of the Settlement was to be based* The system
19in force at Singapore might be partially applicable here# With 
respect to the Governor*s suggestion that Aden should be declared a 
British possession on the appointment of the new officer, he thought 
that the measure should be introduced with as little publicity as
possible, as Aden was viewed by France “with the eye of jealousy and
„ 20 envy”*
Commenting on Willoughby*s remark that the change in the admin­
istration of Aden should be introduced quietly, Clerk wrote that the 
declaration and the change in the designation of the British represent­
ative need not be simultaneous# However, if Aden were not declared a 
British possession, it would sooner or later cause embarrassment# In 
any case, the final decision would be left to the Governor-General*
As for the officer to be appointed,Clerk recommended Col* Bagnold, the 
former Resident at Mukha, subject to improvement in his health#^* 
Uardinge agreed that there should be a military officer as 
Lieutenant-Governor at Aden, responsible to the Bombay Government but
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22"with ample powers"* The Governor-General, it must be noted, did
not refer to the question of declaring Aden a British possession, nor
is the subject mentioned again* In London, the Court of Directors
did not consider that the friction between the two authorities at Aden
justified a change in the administration* "The superior power rests
with the civil functionary* It is his part to order the service to
be performed* The choice of means to perform it is on the exclusive
23responsibility of the military authority#" This opinion of the 
Court ended temporarily the discussion on uniting the civil and 
military authority at Aden, but did not end the friction between the 
Political Agent and the Commandant, since it was not communicated to 
them*
When, early in I85A, the Bombay Government decided to dismiss 
Ilaines, the Governor, Lord Elphinstone, nephew of Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, thought that the opportunity should be seized to appoint 
at Aden a man who would unite in his person both civil and military 
authority* The measure, he felt, was particularly desirable in view 
of the impending Crimean War* "At such a crisis ••• all authority 
both military and political at such an important isolated point should 
be centred in able and vigorous hands^1, and the man who had these 
hands, in his opinion, was Col* James Outrain* "Not only does hie 
rank enable him to hold the military command, but his reputation as 
a soldier gives him an undoubted claim to it, while his experience
as a political officer, and the influence which he has never failed to
acquire over wild and semi-barbarous people whenever he has been
brought in contact with them, seem especially to point him out as the
very man to place our relations with the Arabs upon a satisfactory 
2kfooting*"
As for the title which Outram was to bear, Elphinstone suggested 
"Political .Resident and Commandant"# This title would confer "weight 
and dignity" on tho British representative, since "Resident" was 
superior to "Agent", and Outram already held it*^ The appointment 
of Outram and the title suggested for him were both approved by the 
Governor-General, Lord Balhousie, and from that time on the title 
was borne by the head of administration at Aden, except for four 
years when Merewether was Resident#
The "Resident" referred to Bombay for instructions as constantly 
as the "Agent"# The powers of the Resident, and the principles on
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which the administration of Aden was to be based, continued, as under 
the Political Agent, without any legal definition until 1864# The 
main advantage which followed the vesting of civil and military 
authority in the hands of one person was the end of bickering between 
the two#
Administrative Assistants#
From the beginning, the Government of India laid down that the
Assistant to the Political Agent should always be a naval officer
26
since his duties would be mainly connected with the harbour# The 
Government of Bombay stipulated that he should have a thorough know­
ledge of the tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden and should be fluent
27
in Arabic to facilitate communication with the inhabitants#
The first Assistant 3'olitical Agent was Lieut# G# Jenkins who 
took up his appointment in November 1839. In September of the follow­
ing year, he went to England on sick leave, and did not return# Ilis 
place was filled by Lieut# C#J# Cruttenden who continued in the post 
until recalled to Bombay with Haines in 1854#
The duties of Cruttenden were many# He was in charge of the 
harbour, coal stores, depot ship, customs, police, Post Office, and
he was to do any other work which the Political Agent assigned to 
2 ^
him# In December 1840, Haines complained of a staff shortage and
29asked that his Assistant be relieved of the command of the depot ship,
but his request was not granted# In Hay of the following year,
Cruttenden himself asked to be relieved of the charge of the Post Office
on account of his other duties and inability to do the work to his 
30satisfaction# His application, too, was rejected, and 
G#VJ# Anderson, the Acting Governor of Bombay, wrote: "It is necessary
that these constant applications for increased establishment at Aden 
should be checked until something like a return is obtained from that 
place,"31
Later, Haines was requested to report in detail what were his
32duties and those of his Assistant. He wrote back that besides
having the treasury account, he attended to political and civil duties
and replied to correspondence from all departments# In his own words,
he was "the point of reference for all in Aden"# Then he reminded
the Government of his Assistant’s duties quoted above, and added that
from two to five hours daily were spent by him in settling complaints;
33if the case was an important one, it was heard! before both#
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The Government saw no reason for complaint regarding the Post
Office, since they maintained that no work was involved except when
the monthly mail steamers called, one coming from Bombay, and one 
xL
from Suez* In their opinion, the duties performed by Ilaines and
his Assistant were no more onerous than those of other officers in
similar positions. The opposite, in fact, was true, since no other
agents of the E.I.C, had more onerous duties. However, the Bombay
Government did not see sufficient justification for increasing the
establishment at Adennand thereby adding to the very heavy charges
35incident to the occupation of that place”. Cruttenden was relieved 
of one duty in 1842 when the customs master was appointed, and of 
another in 1847 when the depot ship was broken up*
When the Bombay Government nominated Outram for the post of
Resident at Aden, he expressed his wish to have as his Assistant
36Lieut. R.L. Playfair of the Madras Artillery, then at Aden.
Lord Dalhousie granted him his wish, and thus departed from the policy
laid down by Auckland in 1839* that the Assistant should always be
selected from the Navy. However, this departure became the new practice,
and from 1354 onwards the Residents chose their Assistants from the
37officers of the garrison. Hormuzd Rassam was the only exception*
Up to 1857* Playfair was the only Assistant Resident. Then, 
as Aden grew in importance, another Assistant was appointed in 1858, 
and a third in 1868. The duties of the Assistants were assigned by 
tho Resident, and they were not always the same. In 1859, for example, 
the First Assistant was in charge of criminal justice, the jail and 
conservancy of the town; the Second was in charge of the police. 
Sometimes one or two Assistants would be away on political duty* The 
rank of the Assistant was determined by the length of his service at 
the Residency,
An administrative post worthy of mention is that of ”IIative 
Assistant”, although it existed only for five years* From the 
beginning Haines realised that he needed on his staff someone who was 
conversant in Arabic and English and had an intimate knowledge of the 
tribes surrounding Aden. The person who answered these requirements 
was Hulla Ja*far* Haines recom,-ended his appointment as ”Native
Assistant and Interpreter to the Political Agent”, and the Government
38
agreed. Besides his duties as Interpreter, Mulla Ja#far wrote and 
translated letters* L'hen sultans and other dignitaries visited Aden,
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he acted as "chief of protocol".
Ja’far was a man of strong personality and he used his power to 
the full. This fact, and the favour which he had with Haines, brought 
him into conflict with the military and aroused against him the hatred 
of the Arab inhabitants. Complaints about Ja*far*s conduct reached 
Haines, but he dismissed them as unjustified*
In 1843, two serious charges were brought against Ja*far by 
members of the *Aydarus family supported by Sultan Muhsin. The first 
was that he incited some *Uzaybis to fire upon Lieut. Cruttenden*s 
party on their way to or from al-Hawtah in July* The second was that 
the Native Assistant had been bribed by the Sultan to use his influence 
to reconcile him to Haines from whoa he was estranged* The bribe was 
the balance still due on account of a boat purchased by Mullah Ja*far 
from the Sultan.
Kaines investigated these charges and found them groundless. His 
conclusion was that there had been a conspiracy against Ja*far with 
the aim of discrediting him and having him removed. His accusers 
hated him because he brought to Haines* notice many matters highly 
detrimental to them, and because he was a Shi*i, while they were 
Sunnis.
The Political Agent took no action, but forwarded the case to
39the Government for their opinion. The Government, too, found no
incriminating evidence against Kulla Ja’far, but suspected his
integrity on the weak ground that he had financial dealings with the
Sultan. Their judgment was that he was **a very unfit person to be
continued in the service of Government (having served them for twenty
years) and ... his remaining at Aden must be pr e j ud ic et o  the public
interest by proving a bar to the cultivation of a good and friendly
understanding with the Sultan *•.** Therefore, they ordered that he
be discharged and sent to Bombay by the first steamer.
The post vacated by Ja*far was not to be filled, since both
Haines and his Assistant were, according to the Government, "well
40versed in Arabic". Plaines and Cruttenden could undoubtedly converse
2 * 1
in Arabic, but could not read it, let alone compose letters in it.
After Ja*far*s departure, the Arabic correspondence was handled by
clerks for nearly eleven years, and they were paid from police funds.
vihen Outram took office in 1854, he realised the need for an official
42Interpreter to the Residency, and Rassam was appointed. Rassam’s 
successor as Interpreter was Saleh, the son of Mulla Ja’far.
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Tho Administration of Justice#
It Under the Sultan*
Before the occupation, all disputes were normally referred to
the Qadi (judge), and the Dawlah carried out his sentences# U’hen the
Sultan, his heir-apparent or any other *Abdali chief was in Aden, he
if 3
superseded both the Qadi and the Dawlah# In passing judgment, the 
Qadi was guided by Muslim law and local custom#
Ivhen the Government requested Haines to furnish a report on the 
judicial system in Aden at the time of the occupation, he gave, in 
summary form, the main laws which the Qadi applied;
"Theft
Murder
The loss of the hand, flogging and 
fine#
With death, but if the individual 
was shot when committing robbery, 
it was no offence#
For not saying prayers:- Reprimanding and sometimes fine,
Breach of promise of 
marriage
Infidelity:-
Period of marriage being 
legal
Separation of man and 
wife s—
If a husband and father 
die
Parents* death without 
a will:-
For a marriage fee:-
If a female child is left 
without any relative, and 
is possessed of money:-
Debt l-
Obligation to perform, or refund 
all money received#
Both culprits punished by flogging, 
and the wife and children discarded#
If a female without parents, not 
under fourteen years of age, but 
if tho father lives, at any age he 
chooses to dispose of her#
The father can take both male and 
female children#
His son receives two-thirds of his 
property, wife one-third; two-thirds 
to the male part of the family#
Gne-third to the female; if the
children are twins, male- the
Sale of spirituous 
liquors:-
other female, the former receives 
two-thirds#
According to the free will of the 
parties*
The chief or cazee protects her 
until married, but if a male child, 
until manhood#
If the debtor has property, it was 
seized and sold, but if without the 
means of liquidating the debtor 
remained unmolested until he could 
pay, for confinement was prohibited#
k-bFlogging and fine#"
l4o.
The Government approved of these laws with the exception of 
mutilation for theft, and directed Haines to re-appoint the Qadi 
and the other public officials. As before, all civil matters were 
to be regulated by Muslim law and local custom. The Political Agent 
was not to interfere more than necessary in minor disputes, but was 
to allow the inhabitants to settle them in their own way. Instead 
of introducing British laws, he was to keep and improve on what was 
good in the local judicial system; what was bad he was to reject.
46Haines was instructed "to exercise civil and criminal authority", 
but this authority i/as not legally defined. Eis judgments and proceed­
ings were not subject to a court of justice, although no execution
47was to be carried out without the sanction of Bombay. The Acts 
and regulations of the Indian Government were not to be enforced at
48Aden, but were to be used merely as guidelines. This condition 
continued until 1864, when it was partly remedied by the Aden Act.
2. Under the British.
As before the occupation, the laws which were purely social or 
religious continued to be the concern of the Qadi. Similar laws 
among the Jews were administered by the Rabbi. Religious and caste 
j.icputes among the Hindu immigrants were referred to a punchayet 
(council) composed of their leading men. The lav/ regarding murder 
remained unchanged, while the other laws were replaced by new ones, 
as shown below.
(a) The sale of spirituous liquor. The Political Agent
discontinued flogging for this offence, but kept the fine, an
unsx^ecified amount under Rs. 50* When he found that the sum could be
paid quickly by the offender’s friends and clients, he increased the
amount to Rs* 50 and added an undefined term of i m p r i s o n m e n t T h i s
harsher penalty was also no deterrent. Distilling liquor from dates
became widespread among the Jews v/ho sold it to Europeans and others
alike. The result was an increase in drunkenness among the civil 
50
population. If they could not procure drink in the town, they 
smuggled it in from outside or bought it secretly from '.ae military 
liquor contractor.
To deal with the problem, Ilaines imposed fines for drunkenness, 
two rupees for the first offence and five rupees with "slight imprison­
ment" for the second. However, he finally realised how difficult it 
was to prohibit drinking. When a Parsi arrived from Bombay with the
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intention of opening a liquor shop in Aden, Haines asked the Govern­
ment whether he could grant him a licence. He personally favoured 
the idea and argued that if liquor were sold openly in the town under 
strict supervision, it would be easier to control drunkenness. Also, 
he insinuated that the Government would benefit from the sale of the 
civil contract as they did from the military. For the latter they
received more than Rs. 900 per month, which meant that the military
51contractor was making a large profit.
The Government were convinced by Ilaines* arguments and envisaged 
the time when there would be more than one liquor shop within the 
civil limits* Their instruction was that the contracts v/ere to be 
sold to the highest bidder as was the case in the cantonment. The 
licences were to be renewed annually and withdrawn for misconduct
or breach of contract* Their number was to be fixed periodically
52with reference to the size of the population.
(b) Debt* Imprisonment became the punishment for this offence* 
Debtors were imprisoned if they could pay and did not, or if they 
coul: not nay at all, and the gucis for which they v/ere imprisoned did
not generally exceed a few rupees* In 1871, 447 persons were
53imprisoned on decrees averaging seven rupees. However, the number
of debtors sent to prison v/as greatly reduced after the application,
in l873t of Section 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure.^ Writing
in 1877» Hunter mentions that the total number of debtors in the jail
55seldom exceeded fifteen or sixteen a year*
(c) Theft. Imprisonment, with or without flogging and hard 
labour, became the punishment for this offence.
3. The Qadi.
In June 1039, Haines complained that most of his time was
occupied in settling trivial disputes, including a daily average of
56three cases involving money. In answer, the Government advised
him that if the Qadi was a man of good character, he should employ
him in the administration of justice, especially in settling disputes
57among the Arab inhabitants, and for his services he was to get a
58monthly salary of Rs. 30* In October 1840, Haines accused the 
Qadi, *Abd al-Razzaq, of causing strife and communicating with
Sultan Muhsin, then an enemy. He recommended his removal from
59 ftO
Government service, and the Government agreed.
The following year, however, Haines requested permission to
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appoint a new Qadi at the came monthly salary of Rs. 30, arguing that
he ivould be of great help in settling minor quarrels and disputes.
The Government saw no objection to the proposed appointment, but
expressed their opinion that, as in other places, he should be
61
remunerated by fees from people who made use of his services. Thi6
meant that the Qadi was no longer to hear civil cases, and his duties
were confined to natters connected with the Muslim religion. Where
money was involved, the Qadi was replaced by a council* Half the
members were chosen by the plaintiff and half by the defendant, under
the presidency of the Assistant Political Agent. An appeal from the
decision of the council could be made to the Political Agent, as
formerly with the Qadi.
In 1854, Outram applied for the re-admission of the Qadi into
Government service, and his application was sanctioned. As before,
the qadi was to receive a monthly salary of Rs. 30 and to decide
petty civil cases. Before action could be taken on this decision,
Outram had left, and as his successor, Coghlan, had two Assistants,
the need for the Qadi’s services was not pressing.
The Government sanction remained a dead letter until i860. In
April of that year, the Resident, Coghlan, and his Second Assistant,
Rassam, left on special duty and did not return until July of the 
62following year* Thus Playfair, the First Assistant Resident, found 
himself performing the duties of their offices besides his own. V/ith 
such an increase in work, he had no time for adjudicating trivial 
disputes.
The Qadi at the time was a man of great ability, integrity and
intelligence who was respected by everybody. His name was
Ghaykh Ahmad *Ali, and he came from the Yemen. Playfair had full
confidence in him and gave him authority to judge cases involving
sums up to Rs. 200. It was not obligatory for anyone to submit his
case to the Qadi if he preferred Playfair to decide it, and an appeal
against the Qadi’s decision could be made to Playfair.
As the Qadi’s salary (Rs* 30 per month) was not commensurate with
his position, Playfair was afraid that he might resign, which would
be a loss to Aden. To guard against such a possibility, the Acting 
Resident proposed that he be given the fees chargeable on small suits,
namely four annas on every Rs. 50 or a fraction thereof awarded which
he estimated at Rs* 30 per month. This arrangement would double the
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63padi’s income with no additional expense to the Government.
The fees which Ghaykh Ahmad received fell short of Playfair’s 
estimate; they did not average Rs. 15 per month. The Qadi was 
disappointed and asked Coghlan to consider his case* Coghlan, who 
was also impressed by the qualities of Shaykh Ahmad and the general 
satisfaction he gave, recommended that his salary be doubled and that 
his fees be carried to the credit of the Government, a recommendation
64with which Bombay agreed.
Later, Russell thought it not proper that an official sitting 
as a judge and supjjosed to be in the position of "a native gentleman" 
should receive only Rs. 60, "less than the least Class 9 clerk". He 
impressed on the Government that in the year 1867-8 Shaykh Ahmad tried 
2055 cases, and recommended that his salary be increased to Rs. ICO* 
His recommendation was accepted* The business of the Qadi’s Court 
continued to increase, and in 1870-71* 4381 suits v/ere filed* Of 
these, 2399 were settled out of court* This increase bears witness
to the popularity of Shaykh Ahmad who "both in his public and private
66character is deservedly esteemed".
Shaykh Ahmad died on 20th March, 1873* and. on the same day hie
Court was closed. The Registrar of the Resident’s Court was then
invested with the powers of a judge of a Small Cause Court under
Section 40 of Act XI, 1865* to hear and determine suits not exceeding
Rs. 20* The duties of the Qadi became again the settlement only of
social and religious matters connected with the Muslim population.
4. The Aden Act*
The necessity of putting the administration of civil and criminal
justice at Aden on a constitutional basis was recognised from time to
time, but it was not until 1864 that the unsatisfactory situation was
67
rectified by the passing of the Aden Act* By this Act, the admin­
istration of civil justice was vested in the Court of the Resident 
which included the Court of any Assistant Resident* The Resident 
could hear and determine in the first instance all cases instituted 
in his Court, regardless of the nature and value of the property in 
dispute* If he desired, he could distribute these cases among his 
Assistants, which was generally the practice*
An appeal from the decision of an Assistant Resident could be 
made to the Resident in the case of a suit relating to immovable 
property or a claim exceeding Rs. 500. If the claim did not exceed
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Rs* 500, no appeal could be made. However, the Resident could call 
for any proceedings of his Assistant at any stage of the case and give 
such directions as he might deem necessary.
There was no appeal from the decision of the Resident. However, 
if in suits involving less than Rs. 1000 "any question of law, or of 
usage having the force of law, or of the construction of a document 
affecting the merits of the decision" arose, on which the Resident 
was not certain, he might of his own accord, or at the request of the 
parties to the dispute, state the case and submit it with his opinion 
for the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The 
Resident could do that also if he had doubts about a legal point 
which might arise during the hearing of a suit involving more than 
Rs. 1000, and in fact he was bound to do so if requested by any of 
the parties concerned.
Cases referred to the High Court were heard by two or more judges. 
The parties to the dispute pleaded their case in person or were 
represented by a pleader. The High Court sent its decision to the 
Resident who disposed of the case accordingly. Costs of referring a 
caso to Bombay v/ere included in tho costs of the suit.
If a suit tried in the first instance by the Resident was
68cognizable under India Act XLII of i860, the Resident was to have 
in such a suit the powers conferred on a judge of a Court of Small 
Causes within the Presidency of Bombay. The same could apj)ly to any 
Assistant Resident with the approval of the Governor of Bombay in 
Council. Decisions taken by an Assistant Resident in his capacity 
as a Court of Small Causes v/ere always open to appeal.
The proceedings in civil suits in the Resident’s Court were to 
be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and by any Act relating 
to it. However, in the administration of civil justice, the Court 
of the Resident was to be "guided by the spirit and principles of the 
laws and regulations in force at the Presidency of Bombay, and 
administered in the courts of that Presidency not established by 
Royal Charter, and in the High Court in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction as a court of appeal from those courts".
As can be seen from the position of the Qadi, Chaykh Ahmad, the 
Aden Act itself was not applied rigidly in civil matters. The power 
of the Qadi to try civil suits was abrogated by the Act which took 
no cognizance of him. Nevertheless, his court continued to function 
until his death.
14%
The low scale of fees leviable in the courts (four annas per 
Rs, 30 or a fraction thereof) encouraged litigation* hence the great 
majority of civil cases were petty actions for debt in which the 
pov/er of the law was invoked to enforce payment. In 1871, out of 
1763 suits instituted in the Court of the Resident, 464 involved sums 
below five rupees, and 882, sums below ten rupees. The same year, 
4720 suits were instituted in the Court of the Qadi, and most of them 
were for trifling amounts. However, about two-fifths of the 6351 
cases were settled out of court, the summons having had the desired 
effect,69
In 1872, to reduce litigation, Prideaux recommended the
introduction of the Court Fees Act (India Act VII, 1870) into Aden,
which meant that a written plaint should be presented before a
70summons could be issued. This question had been discussed as early
as l86l. After the passing of India Act XXXVI, i860, (an Act
consolidating and amending the lav/ relating to stamp ty in the
three Presidencies) which specified the stamp duty chargeable on law
papers, the Bombay Government asked Playfair, then Acting Resident,
whether there would be any difficulty in introducing the Act into
Aden. Playfair rejjlied that the Arabs and Somalis who formed the
majority of the civil populatioh could not read or write, nor could
they see any need for presenting a written plaint on stamped paper*
In Aden, there were no v/akils (representatives). The plaintiff and
defendent were confronted in court, each made his oral statement, and
71the case was decided in a few minutes* In short, Playfair implied 
that written plaints in Aden were unnecessary and would be difficult 
to introduce,
Written plaints were not made compulsory until the beginning of
1873, By then, there were more educated people in Aden, and it is
probable that there was a writer at the entrance of the court to
help the illiterate for a small fee. The effect of this measure was
72to reduce the number of civil suits by more than half,'
The administration of criminal justice was also vested in the
Court of the Resident, The Governor of Bombay in Council could give 
any Assistant Resident the powers of a magistrate of the first or 
second class, and the Assistant Resident was to exercise his power 
under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
If the punishment awarded by the Assistant Resident in a case
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was imprisonment for more than six months, with or without a fine, or a 
fine exceeding Rs* 500, an api^eal could lie to the Resident. However, 
if the punishment awarded was imprisonment for less than six months, 
with or without a fine, or a fine not exceeding Rs. 500, no appeal 
could be made. But as in civil cases, the Resident could call for 
any proceedings of his Assistant at any stage and give such orders 
as he might deem necessary.
The Resident was to exercise all the powers of a Court of 
Cession as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure; and except in 
cases which he had to try as a Court of Cession, he could, when he 
thought fit, exercise the powers of a magistrate* He was to hold 
p riodic sittings for the trial of all persons who might be committed 
to appear before him as a Court of Session. The Resident had no power 
to try any European British subject charged with any offoncc punish­
able with death under the Indian Penal Code. Such a person was to be 
tried by the High Court in Bombay.
In criminal trials before the Resident as a Court of Session,
a uropean (British or not), or an American, was to be tried by jury.
The Resident should be satisfied that the jurors had the educational
and moral qualifications necessary for the function, and military
persons could be called upon to serve as jurors. At least half the
jury was to consist of Buropeans or Americans, if such a jury could 
73be found. A death sentence was not to be carried out until it had 
been confirmed by the High Court of Bombay who could commute it to 
transportation for life or for any period not less than seven years.
As in civil cases, no appeal could lie from any order or sentence 
passed by the Resident in any criminal case. However, a case could 
be reviewed by the High Court of Bombay if a point of law4was referred 
to it by the Resident, or if the Advocate-General found that there 
was a legal error in the decision taken by the Resident, or that a 
point of law affecting that decision required further consideration*
The proceedings in all criminal cases were to be regulated by the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, and the High Court of Bombay had the 
power to issue general rules for regulating the practice and 
proceedings of tho Court of the Resident.
India Act II of 1864 was the only Act passed specifically for the 
administration of justice at Aden. Later, most Acts which v/ere 
applicable to all India were enforced at Aden as were also some of
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the Bombay Acts# In 1874, Aden was declared a "scheduled district” 
under the Bombay Presidency, which meant that the Government of 
Bombay could, by notification, declare what Acts should be applicable 
to Aden*
3m Police*
Pending the arrival of a regular police force from Bombay, Haines
appointed eleven men (nine Arabs and two Indians) to keep order in
the town**^ The force (twelve Muslims and eight Hindus) arrived in
Kay 1840, and it was agreed that they should have home leave every
75three or four years*
By l34l, the population of Aden had risen to 90C0, and the
twenty men v/ere clearly not sufficient to control it* Haines asked
that the police force be increased by twenty, but the Government
76sanctioned an increase of ten only* The force was now composed of
one jemadar, one duffedar (petty officer), one havildar and 27 peons*
In 1845, Ilaines asked for six more peons, and in support of
his request he wrote that more than once policemen were Injured while
on duty because of their small number* Several times the whole police
force had to turn out at night to suppress disturbances among the
Bonalie* Due to the small size of the force they could not deal
effectively with troubles caused by Europeans, and sometimes thoy were
obliged to ask the military for assistance* When refractory seamen
rioted at Tawahi, the police had to bo sent down to control them,
77leaving the town without surveillance* The Government gave Haines
tho six peons he had asked for, and in 1847, sanctioned a further
increase of one havildar and twelve peons* The highest number that
the police force attained was 160, and that was in 183b, luring the
Crimean 'War* The reason for this increase may have been the fear of
an uprising in the Settlement at a time when the British were involved
in a major war* As it happened, there was no uprising, and the police
force was reduced#
In 1847, the Government directed that no policeman should hold
an interest in any trade* Aliens were not to serve as olicemen unless
they had "peculiar qualifications, accompanied by exceptional 
78
character"* However, in 18.55 the practice of recruiting police 
from India was discontinued, probably owing to the expense involved*
The result was that the ranks had to be filled by aliens as well as 
British subjects, regardless of qualifications* The Bombay men were
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replaced by Arabs, Somalis and Indian Muslims*
The need for European policemen grew with the increase of the
shipping# When the refractory sailors found that they were face to
face with policemen not of their colour, their behaviour grew worse.
Therefore, in 1865, Merewether asked for three European constables:
one to be stationed at Tawahi where European sailors continually
caused disturbances, one in the tov/n which they sooner or later
79visited, and one for relief* The Government agreed, and three 
soldiers who were about to take their discharge were appointed 
constables*
For police purposes, the Settlement was divided in 1872 into 
two main parts, the town and Tawahi, and these were further divided 
into sections* For Tawahi, where most Europeans lived, a European 
was appointed Inspector* The official Inspector for the town was a 
Somali* However, another man, a European with the rank of Inspector, 
attended to the complaints of the Europeans residing in the town*
Lieut* F*M# Hunter, the Second Assistant-Resident who was 
responsible for these arrangements, expressed regret that the police 
in the Settlement had no legal status, since Bombay Act VII, 1867 
(the District Police Act) had not yet been extended to Aden; later 
it was* Nevertheless, he tried to model the police force at Aden on
8othe one at Bombay*
While there were always complaints about the size of the police 
force, from 1857 onwards there were also complaints about its quality*
A good summary of these complaints was given by Prideaux in 1871*
The Arabs v/ere, as a rule, "honest and trustworthy, though not very 
bright”* The Indian pilgrims looked on the employment as only 
temporary* They generally joined the police too late in life to be 
of much use, and they were addicted to gan.ja (cannabis) and opium*
The Somalis were the most intelligent members of the force and were
of great value as detectives, but they were not always to be trusted,
8l
since they were prejudiced in favour of their own tribes# The only 
factor which the men of the Aden police had in common was "complete 
ignorance of the duties into which they are at once called to enter"*
In Prideaux’s opinion, the two causes which reduced the 
efficiency of the police v/ere age and debt* The men were admitted into 
the service regardless of their age, and the majority were deeply in 
debt* On joining the force, their financial situation did not improve;
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a policeman^ salary was thirteen rupees per month, and out of it he 
had often to pay five or more for rent. To remedy this situation,
Prideaux ruled that no man should be enlisted if he was over thirty 
or if he was in debt, but it is not known how this information was to
be verified. Prideaux also implied that police quarters should be
. 82 set up*
6, Prison and Prisoners.
Under Sultan Muhsin, fines were preferred to imprisonment as a
means of punishment, and the building which had once been a jail was
at the time of the occupation in a ruinous state, surrounded by a low
decaying wall* Under the British, a jail was a necessity, and the
old compound was used again* At night, the prisoners were locked up
in a long thatched shed which was closely railed, but an active man
without irons had no difficulty in breaking loose.
In l84l, having repiorted an escape, Kaines recommended that a
g7
new prison be built, J but no permission for building it was granted 
84
until 1853 and in 1855 it was still not marked out. The reason for
this long delay was that the fortifications and other building projects
85were more urgently required.
The new jail was still under construction in IS63, and the same
year, at Coghlan*s recommendation, the Government decided to convert
86it into commissariat stores* Thus the old jail continued to exist
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and to undergo minor repairs and alterations from time to time* '
The prisoners were divided into five classess
(a) Transported felons* As early as 1842, felons were sent from
India to Aden where they were put to work on the fortifications and
other projects* ilaines recommended that a jail be built for them, but
this was not done, and in 1862 the Government ceased to transport
convicts to Aden, The cost of transporting a convict to Aden and
keeping him there had risen sharply*
Transported felons were confined in a shed by themselves. They
were locked up at sunset and a military guard was posted outside their
shed* The best conducted among then were appointed monitors to see
88
that order and silence prevailed during the night* The men who were 
sent to Aden had been convicted of various offences, of which robbery 
with violence was the most common* R'hen they had served their 
sentence, they were shipped back home. Indians convicted in Aden were 
sometimes taken to serve their term of imprisonment in their own country*
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(b) Prisoners convicted in Aden. These were treated as the 
transported felons.
(c) Prisoners awaiting trial. They were confined in a shed used
for the manufacture of carpets. The building was insecure, and
89escapes were frequent#
(d) European prisoners. These were merchant seamen who deserted 
their ship on arrival at Aden in order to join the Indian Navy which 
offered many advantages. For this, they were willing to undergo the 
prison sentence of twelve weeks prescribed by the Merchant Seaman's 
Act of 184^. The seamen knew that imprisonment in a makeshift jail, 
such as the one in Aden, could not be too harsh. In fact, they 
received better treatment than the other prisoners, and often served 
only part of their sentence.
In 1852, Haines complained that he did not know what to do with 
the seamen when they rebelled in the jail. The police peons could not 
control them, they could not be put to work on the roads in the heat 
like other prisoners, and there was no employment for them in the 
prison. In many cases, after they had served less than half their 
sentence, they were taken to rejoin their vessels, only to find that 
they had sailed or that the masters would not have them back. The
90remainder of the sentence would be remitted, and the seamen discharged.
Five years later, Playfair made it a rule to send every deserter 
back to his ship before she left the harbour. This rule, which meant
that some seamen spent only a few days in prison, was hailed as "a
91 ngreat boon” to the merchant service. After lo57, there are no 
reports of seamen deserting their ships.
(e) Debtors and female offenders. During the day they did
light work in the jail, and until 1868 they slept in the open, guarded 
92sebundis. In 1868, Russell hired a house at Rs. 25 per month
to serve as a civil jail. The house had three rooms, one for the males,
one for the females, and an upper room for the peon and constable who
guarded the prisoners. Russell impressed on the Government the need
for a proper civil jail which he hoped would be within the enclosure
93of the criminal jail when it was enlarged. The criminal jail was
q2l
not enlarged, and the same civil jail was there in 1877*
Under Haines, hard labour was mainly building, and light work 
consisted mostly of what might be termed "household duties'*. From 
18V?, the aged and infirm among the prisoners were put in charge of
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95the jail garden, a plot which supx>lied the prisoners with vegetables# 
After Haines, hard labour was of two kinds, outside and inside 
the jail# Outside, the prisoners were employed as masons, carpenters, 
water-carriers, etc. Inside, they worked as carpenters, tailors, 
painters, printers, weavers, copyists, chik and mat makers and workers 
of rattan and coir#
The proceeds from the jail manufactures in 1857 paid half the 
jail expenses, and in 1859% the whole# The printing press was found
especially useful and remunerative, and Playfair wrote proudly that it
9 6was worked "entirely by convict labour11# Samples of its work, in
English and Arabic, were sent to Bombay where they received the
commendation of the Government#
Playfair was eager to expand the jail industries as much as
possible# In i860, he introduced bookbinding and applied for a man
97skilled in paper-making to train the prisoners for a year# The
Government sent him a Malay convict# In 1861, Playfair reported that
the indoor labour was making steady progress, and that the printing
98press was yielding a large profit# After Playfair’s departure in 
January 1863, the jail manufactures declined#
The jail was at first under the direct control of the police 
jemadar who was responsible to the Assistant Political Agent# When 
Playfair was appointed Assistant-Resident, he recommended that a 
European be put in charge of the jail, and this was done# In 1866, 
the jail came under the superintendence of the Civil Surgeon, as was 
the general practice in India* The Civil Surgeon in Aden was 
responsible to the Inspector-General of Prisons in Bombay#
Municipal Services*
1* The Post Office#
At first, Aden had only one post office, in the Crater, and 
the staff officer of the garrison was put in charge of it# Then it 
became one of the duties of the Assistant Political Agent* From 1855 
to 1857, it was administered by Rassam# In the latter year, due to 
the establishment of the Indian Overland Troop Service"^ and the 
increase in the number of mail steamers calling at the port, another 
post office was opened at Tawahi as headquarters#
A postmaster for Aden was recommended as early as 1839, but this 
appointment was not made until 1857# The first two postmasters, 
Europeans from Bombay, did not stay long because of the small salary
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(Rs. 100 per month). In 1859, this salary was increased to Ks. 250* 
and the postmaster who was to receive it came from London* a 
measure which showed recognition of the growing importance of the 
Post Office*
In l839» only two mail steamers called regularly at Aden every 
month* one on its way to Suez, and the other on its way to Bombay* 
Twenty years later* the regular monthly mails numbered 22, and the 
distribution of postal packets for the second half of 1858 was as 
follows:-*
Letters
Inward
Letters
Outward
Papers
Inward
Papers
Outward
Bombay 11,877 8,974 2*844- 800
Calcutta 2,039 1,471 1,557 176
Australia 157 143 129 17
Mauritius 112 638 66 952
Europe 5,585 10*898 5,316 V t 101350Rise* 1,155 1*24-1 813
During 1867-8* due to the Abyssinian Campaign* the Post Office
did more business than ever before. It was calculated that at least
18,000 letters and papers passed through .Aden on their way from
England to Abyssinia* The number of customers who called at the Post
Office was not less than 30*000* most of whom were British servicemen*
In the same period, the office dealt with the following ocean mails;-
Europe: Received 67 Dispatched 65
Bombay: 78 76
India* China*
Australia, etc: 42 37
Mauritius: 11 11 1n0
Abyssinia: 54 68
Letters, received at Aden were sorted into three classes: one
for residents at Tawahi* one for residents in the town and one for
non-residents. The mail was conveyed between Tawahi and the town on
camels and horses. The arrival of a mail steamer was announced by a
signal during the daytime or a gun at night. For coaling, a steamer
normally required not less than six hours, and often from eight to
ten, which gave people sufficient time to post their letters before
the steamer left harbour*
The importance of Aden as a communications centre was further
increased by the opening* in 1869, of the Suez Canal* and in I87O by
the completion of the telegraphic line from Suez to Bombay* Aden then
became the station where all messages from East and West were received
and passed on.
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2. Health.
Aden was not a particularly unhealthy station, but a long stay
tended to have a debilitating effect on Europeans and sometimes even
on Indians. In 1841, Captain Mignon reported that in January of the
came year* out of 1763 European and Indian troops, only 88 were sick*
In May, out of 1932 men, only 86 were in hospital, and out of 53
officers, only one was under medical care. Commenting on these figures,
Mignon wrote that they were smaller than the monthly returns for the
103
healthiest station in the Bombay Presidency*
The two diseases most prevalent in Aden, especially during the
hot season, were ulcers and scurvy* Ulcers were caused by
malnutrition and bad water, while scurvy was caused by lack of fresh
vegetables. Of the infectious diseases, smallpox was the most common.
In the period under study, there were three outbreaks of cholera
in Aden. The first was in 1846 and was attributed to the great
accumulation of filth in the town stirred up by the heavy rain on
2nd May* For want of proper drainage, the filth was not washed away,
but settled in heaps among the houses. The disease raged for 33 days,
from 8th lay to 9th June, and it was not confined to the civil
population, but spread among the military and the shipping in the
harbour. The final death toll was 500, of whom twenty were Europeans*^
This disaster moved the Government to make the Assistant Political
Agent officially responsible for public health in Aden. He was to
isolate all people suffering from infectious diseases and to see that
the drains and streets were kept clean. Cleanliness was to be imposed
throughout the town, especially in the poorer tenements which the
Assistant himself was to inspect frequently*
For maintaining standards of hygiene, the Assistant was to
appoint men who would report to him on the sanitary conditions in the
different parts of the town. These men were not to be paid for their
services* The Government thought that the best way of ensuring that
all areas were regularly inspected was to set up a board, the members
of which were to be British-born subjects, with the Assistant as
105president, in hie capacity as magistrate*
Cholera broke out again in 1859 and 1865. On the former 
occasion 600 died, but on the latter the outbreak was not serious*
The health of the town was generally good due to the infrequency of 
rain and the porosity of the rocky subsoil through which all moisture
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percolated. The aridity and the heat of the climate were not 
conducive to the spread of germs*
For the most part, diseases were carried to Aden by the shipping 
and, sometimes, by the troops from India* To prevent, or at least to 
reduce, the chances of epidemics, the authorities maintained a small 
body called the Harbour Police* The duty of this body, one naique 
(corporal) and seven men, was to board all vessels as they approached 
the port in order to make sure that they were not admitted into the
inner harbour unless they had clean bills of health from the ports
„  ^  ^ 106 of departure*
The first hospital to be built for the townspeople was the 
Civil Hospital* The date of its building cannot be fixed, but it was
there in 1846* Its condition in i860 was described by the Civil
Surgeon, and the description could hardly be more nauseating* The 
hospital lacked proper ventilation and had no privies* It was filthy 
in the extreme due to a shortage of wardmen, washermen and sweepers*
There was not an adequate supply of clean clothing for the patients,
nor was there a mortuary* The so-called hospital was in fact a single 
ward which, when overcrowded (and this was always the case), held 
only 24. The ward had no provision for the separation of the sexes, 
which meant that women were deprived of such hospital care as was 
available*
The Civil Surgeon recommended the building of a new hospital
107with the necessary facilities and staff* Playfair, then Acting
Resident, called a public meeting at which the matter was discussed
and a committee was formed to raise subscriptions for the new hospital*
With the money donated and with a grant from the Municipal Fund, the
hospital was built in 1862* It was situated in the centre of the town
and had accommodation for 50 patients*'1'
The other hospital in the town was the Smallpox Hospital, built
in 1848 by the Government and situated in the Tawilah Valley. It
contained twelve single rooms and five wards, each holding seven 
109patients* The two hospitals were free* The Civil Hospital served 
also as a public dispensary*
The British presence in Aden cohferred medical benefits not only 
on the inhabitants of the Settlement, but on others outside it as well* 
People visited Aden for medical treatment from the coast of Africa, 
Yemen and Hadramawt* Two notable cases were Yusuf Agha, the Ottoman
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Governor of Zabid, who cane in 1856 to undergo an operation for the 
removal of a stone in the bladderf and the son of Shaykh Gasin, 
the principal chief of the Gharjabi tribe* who came for medical 
advice in 1861.111 In 184-9, Dr. Vaughan, the Assistant Civil Surgeon, 
toured the ’Abdali territory for eight days "at his own expense”, 
treating the sick and impressing on the tribesmen the value of 
vaccination.
Until 1355$ the town’s health services were the responsibility 
of a commissioned officer of the Indian Medical Department known as 
the Civil Surgeon, and this officer was subject to the Medical Super­
intendent of Bombay* In 1855$ however, a separate superintendent was 
appointed for Aden.
3« Education.
In 185^$ Sir Charles Mood, President of the India Board,
presented to the Court of Directors a document which came to be known
as "Wood’s Education Dispatch”. The document set out "a comprehensive
scheme for the diffusion of practical knowledge, through the English
112and vernacular languages” to all classes in India* The object of
the new education policy was to improve the condition of the Indians 
and to equip them for government service# The Court signed the 
document on the 19th July, with a recommendation that the principal 
officers of every district in India should use their influence in 
furthering the cause of education.
In a circular to the political officers under the Bombay Govern­
ment, Lord Elphinstone added: "•*• Government confidently trust that
every servant of the Gtate, whether European or Native, will ... 
regard the diffusion of Education as a chief part of his official 
duties, • •
When Coghlan visited Lahj in December 1856, he acquainted the 
•Abdalis with his intention of establishing a school at Aden. The 
sons and nephews of Sultan *Ali welcomed the idea and expressed their 
readiness to attend the school when it was opened. Coghlan wrote:
”If it were possible to give these boys a solid education in their own 
language and in ours, the influence for good they may exercise on the 
next generation is beyond calculation, by it we should instruct them 
in our system, and attach them by a link which would not be easily 
severed. Commerce would increase, we should hear no more of stoppage 
of the roads, and of the frequent paltry squabbles which having their
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origin in ignorance and bigotry, would cease with the spread of
Hif
knowledge amongst the people;..."
The school was started in I858, with the object of raising ”a
class of young men fitted for employment in the public service and
possibly to attach our bigotted neighbours to us by the community of
feelings and interests which must follow in the wake of a sound
education”# However, these hopes were frustrated, and the school was
115closed at the end of February i860* The townspeople, and 
especially the Arabs for whom the school was founded, did not make 
much use of it# Jtost of the pupils were .children of Indian soldiers 
and camp-followers, and these could have gone to the regimental 
schools.
At the time the Aden school closed, it had 68 pupils, 40 from
the military lines and 28 from the town, only half of whom were Arabs#
By way of encouraging the Arabs to send their children to the school,
they were charged no fees, but this exemption v/as not a sufficient
inducement. Hardly any Arab child attended for more than two weeks#
Sultan ’All’s sons and nephews did not attend.
The school did not give instruction in the Islamic faith, nor
indeed in any other faith, and Badger attributed the Arabs* lack of
interest in the school mainly to the absence of the Koran from its 
ll6curriculum. The Arabs taught (and still teach) the Koran to their
children along with the alphabet, if not before it.
In 1866, a new school was founded at the recommendation of
Merewether. Unlike the old, the new school welcomed all children,
be they from the town or the Camp, regardless of race or religion#
117The school had a headmaster and two teachers, an Arab and a Parsi# 
It was divided into two sections, elementary and secondary, and each 
had three classes*
The elementary section, like the old school, was intended 
primarily for Arab children, and to attract them, the Koran was 
taught besides Reading, Writing, Grammar and Arithmetic. Education 
was free, and the language of instruction was Arabic. The children 
admitted were aged ten and eleven. In 1866-7, the section was 
reported to be "well attended”. In 1870-71, the highest monthly 
attendance was 186 and the lowest 150* Girls are mentioned for the 
first time in this year.
In the secondary section, the subjects taught were English,
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Mathematics and Geography* The language of instruction was English, 
and boys promoted to this section were given an intensive course in 
that language before they started regular lessons. The ages of the 
pupils ranged from twelve to eixteen, and the fees were one and a half 
rupees per month. Pupils who came from regimental schools did not 
pay, and to encourage the Arab boys to further their education, those 
who moved up from the elementary section were charged only four annas 
per month. In 1866-7, the average daily number of boys who attended 
this section was 50, of whom five were Arabs. In l8?0-71, the 
monthly attendance was never below 40, and once it rose as high as 
75. There were six Arab pupils in this year.
The failure of the secondary section to attract many Arabs was 
due to several reasons. It was not free, It did not teach the Koran, 
and the subjects it taught were considered profane. Moreover, the 
language of instruction itself was regarded with "sacred horror".
One of the aims of the first school was realised by the second.
In 1870-71, five boys found employment in the Government service: 
three in the Cantonment Magistrate Office, one in the Commissariat 
Office and one in the Engineer Office. It is not known to which races 
these boys belonged.
The main drawback from which the secondary section suffered was
that members of the garrison, whether European or not, did not remain
in Aden for more than two years. When they left, they took their
children with them. The Abyssinian Campaign of 1867-8 also affected
this section. Many of the traders who had children at the school
went 'with merchandise to Annesley Bay, and took one son with them.
The others, too, had to leave the school to attend to their fathers’ 
ll8
business in Aden.
Besides the Government School, commonly known as the Aden 
Residency School, there were in the Settlement in 1871 ten private 
schools for religious instruction, four Jewish attended by 70 boys, 
and six Arab attended by 107 boys and 13 girlsi^^There was also a 
Catholic seminary at which Galla boys were trained as missionaries 
to work in their own country. It was run by French priests, and the 
boys, thirteen in number, were taught Arithmetic, domestic subjects, 
Latin, French and Galla.
The nuns of the Order of the Good Shepherd, who were British, 
had a school with two classes, one for European girls, and the other
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for liberated slave-girls. The first class had ten boarders, six of
whom were orphans, and a number of day pupils# They were taught
English, Arithmetic, Geography, History, Needlework and Music* The
second class was limited to ten, and they received a plain education
120in the English language, Needlework and domestic subjects.
Finance
Military and official expenses were met by the Government* Honey
for the day-to-day running of the town and for carrying out minor
works came mainly from local taxes. At the time of Haines* departure
in 1854, the following taxes were in forcej-
Keeping for hires
Horse or donkey Rs. 1-J per month
Camel As, 4- " "
Boat ^21. ^ ”
Boat pass ^22 As# 4
Arms pass As* 4
Sweeping tax As* 4 per month
Watering tax As# 4 " "
Cost of summons ^ As. 10
Sale of water No price given
As has been mentioned, ground rent was not collected until 1855*
and then it and the other taxes were organised into a Municipal Fund#
127As years went by, more taxes were added and licences required.
The Municipal Fund was never large enough to allow Aden to 
develop as much as the Residents would have wished* and no amount 
of taxation would have given the Settlement financial independence.
The Bombay Government was not liberal towards the needs of the civil 
population, and therefore certain projects were carried out, sometimes 
partly by public suoscription* and sometimes wholly by private 
enterprise.
In Aden, the Resident levied taxes and granted licences without 
reference to any law. V.'hen he increased the rates or the scale of 
licence fees, he did so by simple notification. However* the opening 
of the Suez Canal brought more European businessmen to the Settlement 
and, unlike other people there, Europeans were not used to paying taxes 
without being satisfied as to their legality.
In 1871* Tremenheere complained that he was "in the very disagree­
able position" of being questioned as to the legal bacis of come taxes* 
Therefore, he recommended that an Act should be passed to define the
position of the Resident, and to give him the necessary authority for
129levying rates and taxes* Such an Act was not passed, and the
Resident*s powers continued absolute and undefined#
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The administration of Aden had no constitutional basis and the 
authority of the chief administrative officer, Political Agent or 
Resident, lacked the necessary legal definition. This fact, in the 
first fifteen years, was the basic cause of the civil-military 
conflict and the main reason for the wide discretionary powers which 
the British representative exercised in local matters* The Aden Act 
went some way towards placing the judicial system on a legal footing, 
but even it was not rigidly applied.
The British were wise to introduce their laws slowly. By first 
adopting the existing system they later found it easier to bring 
about the changes which they wanted.
The administration suffered from a shortage of money and staff 
as well as from the slow government machinery. The E.I.C., and later 
the Imperial Government, expected the best service possible for the 
least possible expense, and both worked their men very hard* The 
Residents did their best with the limited resources at their command. 
They and their Assistants showed groat initiative ani enterprise in 
running the Settlement• In general, the administration wa3 
enlightened and patriarchal.
l6o*
CHAPTER VI*
SULTAN KUHSIH.
The history of Aden in the period under study and beyond is 
essentially that of British relations with the neighbouring tribes, 
especially the *Abdalis and Fadlis* In fact, the chiefs of the 
former tribe played such an important role in the annals of the 
Settlement that their names have been used as titles for this and 
the following two chapters. British relations with the interior were 
generally unstable, and for a better understanding of their course, 
some background information about the tribes is necessary*
The *Abdalis. The *Abdali territory, or Lahj, had an area of 
?6b square miles (33 by 8) and lay immediately to the north-west of 
Aden* To the east lived the Fadlis, to the west the *Aqrabis and 
Subayhis, to the north the Hawshabis and to the south was Ghubbat Saylan 
(Saylan Bay). The capital was al-Hawtah, also known as Lahj. Al-Hawtah 
was 21 miles to the north of Aden, in a fertile plain watered by the 
two branches of the Riber Tiban, al-Uadi al-Kabir (the Great Valley) 
and al-l.’adi al-Uaghir (the Small Valley), The Tiban rose in the 
Hawshabi territory more than 40 miles north of Zaydah, a village on 
the *Abdali-IIawshabi border, where it bifurcated. Nearly half the 
population lived in the plain, in and around al-Hawtah. With the 
capture of Aden, the ’Abdalis lost their only port and were left with 
a shallow useless coastline, six miles long*
Four of the six main caravan routes leading to Aden traversed 
Lahj from north to south, and in the south they all converged at the 
village of Shaykh *Uthman. The village was six miles from the Barrier 
Gate, adjacent to both the *Aqrabi and Fadli districts, which meant 
that any one of the three tribes could prevent supplies from reaching 
Aden. Here water was sweet and plentiful. These factors explain why 
the British bought Shaykh *Uthman in 1882 and why Lahj, as a whole, 
was to be of vital importance to the new Settlement*
All sources are agreed that the *Abdalis were the most civilized 
and the least warlike among the tribes* In 1838, Haines gave their 
number as 10,000 and put their fighting strength at 400. Sixteen 
years later, the Rev. G*P. Badger, the Garrison Chaplain of whom 
further mention will be made, wrote that they could muster 2000, but 
he did not give their total number. W*F* Prideaux, Assistant-Resident, 
estimated the ’Abdalis in I87I at 8000 and their warriors at 800. Of
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all the chiefs in the interior, theirs was the only one who employed 
a regular force of mercenaries. The mercenaries were mainly Africans 
and formed a kind of palace guard. Their number in 1854 was 4-00.
The ’Aqrabis. The ’Aqrabi country was to the west of Aden. To 
the east the neighbours of the ,Aqrabis were the ’Abdalis, to the 
west and north the Subayhis, and to the south was the Arabian Sea.
Their coastline extended from al-Hiewah on the northern shore of 
Aden Harbour to Ras * Imran in the west. The tribe had only one large 
village called Sir Ahmad, about three miles inland and defended by a 
particularly strong fort, built of stone. Bir Ahmad had a bandar 
which gave it the advantages of a seaport* Caravans coming to Aden 
from the Subayhi territory had to pass through Bir Ahmad, and on this 
account the village assumed new importance after 1839* If they so 
desired, the 'Aqrabis could interrupt the flow of supplies into Aden.
The "Aqrabis were originally a sub-division of the ’Abdali tribe 
and did not break away until the middle of the 18th century* At that 
time, ’Abd al-Rabb, the Chief of Hujariyyah, a district between Mukha 
and Ta’iz, rebelled against the Imam of Ean’a, and 'Abd al-Karim, the 
Sultan of Lahj, espoused the Imam’s cause. The ’Aqrabi shaykh,
Mahdi Ibn ’Ali, seized the opportunity to revolt and joined with 
’Abd al-Rabb. In 1753, the allies occupied Lahj and besieged the 
Sultan in Aden for three months. The siege was lifted and 'Abd al-Rabb 
withdrew only after 'Abd al-Karim had paid him a large sum of money 
and ceded Bir Ahmad with its bandar to Mahdi. Mahdi now became 
independent and assumed the title of "Sultan". However, to ensure 
his continued independence, he agreed to pay the 'Abdali chief 0330 
per annum.
In 1838, the male population of the 'Aqrabi tribe numbered 600. 
Their fighting strength in 1854 was given as 200, and in l8?l as 300*
In 1339* their Sultan was Haydarah Ibn Mahdi.
The Fadlis. The Fadlis were to the east of Aden and had a sea­
board of 100 miles, from the ’Abdali border in the west to the ’Awlaqi 
in the east. To the north were the Yafi’is and Ilawshabis, and to
the south lay the sea. The Fadli district was divided into two parts, 
the inland mountains and the coastal plain or Abyan. Shuqrah, 60
miles to the east of Aden, was the port of the district and its capital*
The Yafi’is exported their coffee from Shuqrah when they were not at
war with the Fadlis.
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The Fadlis were the most warlike people in the vicinity of Aden.
In 1838, they were estimated at 15,000, 4000 of whom were warriors.
In 1871, Prideaux, without giving their total number, put their 
fighting force at 6700*
The Subayhis. The Subayhi territory lay to the west of Aden and 
extended from Ras 'Imran in the east to Bab al-Kandab in the west. To 
the east were the 'Abdalis and 'Aqrabis, and to the north the Hawshabis; 
to the west was Hujariyyah, and to the south the sea. The country 
was mainly desert and unlike the other tribes the Subayhis were nomads, 
living in tents. They were divided into many clans and had no para­
mount chief. Both in 1838 and 1854, they were estimated at 12,000.
The Ilawshabis. The Hawshabi country was to the north of Aden 
and had an area of 1000 square miles* To the east lay Yafi’, and to 
the west Hujariyyah; to the north were the 'Alawis and Amiris, and 
to the south the Subayhis, 'Abdalis and Fadlis. The chief village 
was al-Raha, and the Sultan in 1839 was Mani' Ibn Sallam.
The Yafi'is. The Yaifi'i district was to the north-east of Aden.
To the west lived the Amiris and Ilawshabis, to the east the 'Awdhalis 
and Fadlis, and the Fadlis were also to the south; to the north lay 
Hadramawt. The country was divided into two parts, upper and lower, 
and each had its own sultan. The Settlement had relations only with 
Lower Yafi*, the population of which was estimated at 20,000 both in 
I838 and 1854. Its capital was al-Qarah, and the Sultan in 1839 
was *Ali Ibn Ghalib*
The 'Awlaqis. The 'Awlaqi territory lay to the east of Aden.
The neighbours of the 'Awlaqis were the Nahidis to the east, and the 
Fadlis and 'Awdhalis to the west; to the north was Bayhan, and to the 
south the sea. Like Yafi', the 'Awlaqi country was divided into two 
parts, upper and lower, and again only the lower had relations with 
the British. The population of this part was estimated in l8?l at 
15,000. The capital was Ahwar, and the Sultan in 1839 was Munassar 
Ibn Bu Bakr.
The 'Alawis. The 'Alawi country, or Suhayb, lay to the north of 
Aden, and had an area of not more than 40 square miles. To the south 
and west of this district were the Hawshabis, to the east the Zarabaris, 
and to the north the Amiris, Prideaux in 1871 put the number of the 
tribe at 1500 and its fighting force at 500. The first figure must 
have referred to the males only because it is inconceivable that
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one third of the tribe was warriors, since the women did not fight*
The chief village was al-Qash'ah, also referred to as Suhayb, and the
Sultan in 1839 was Hilal Ibn Sayf*
The Amiris* Dali*, or the Amiri district (so-called after the
title of its ruler), lay to the north of the 'Alawi territory. It
was bounded on the east by Upper Yafi*, and on the north and west by
Imamic Yemen. In 1871* the population was given as 4-000. The Amir
1in 1839 was Mus'ad Ibn Kusayn*
The tribes could be distinguished by their accents, dreGS and 
the manner in which they carried weapons* The tribesman was so proud 
of his tribe that he considered it dishonourable to deny membership 
of it, even when expediency required it. However, to ascertain a 
tribesman's identity, questioning by a skilled interrogator was still 
necessary*
For weapons, the tribes had matchlocks, swords, spears and 
daggers. For their livelihood they were dependent, to a greater or 
lesser degree, on agriculture, stock-raising, fishing, transit dues 
and plunder. They also hired themselves out as soldiers; the 
'Awlaqis even took service with the Nizam of Hyderabad. The poorest 
tribes were the Subayhis, folloived by the 'Aqrabis and Fadlis. The 
others were prosperous; and after the occupation, Aden was almost 
entirely dependent on them, and especially on the 'Abdalis. Thi6
dependence was the primary reason for the relations between the
Settlement and the tribes.
The tribe was a social and political unit, composed of smaller
units or clans, held together by the belief that they were descended 
from a common ancestor. Every clan had its own chief, and all the 
clan chiefs acknowledged the supremacy of one paramount chief. The 
Subayhis were an exception to this rule. The chieftaincy was 
hereditary, but the paramount chief's authority was far from absolute. 
He was subject to the laws of Islam and the customs of his tribe*
If he acted contrary to then, his authority was challenged and his 
position threatened* In matters of importance, he had to consult the 
elders of the tribe, otherwise his decisions would not be supported*
If a tribesman killed a member of another tribe, his chief could 
not legitimately punish him, nor could the victim's chief demand 
justice* Such cases were considered private feuds and were left to be 
settled by the parties concerned. The next of kin could either
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retaliate or accept diyah (blood money) which was considered full 
compensation for the murdered relative. The amount of money was 
fixed by a man of standing, such as a shaykh or sayyid. Yet such 
was the bedouin*s love of vengeance that he rarely accepted diyah.
If he could not lay his hands on the murderer himself, he killed any 
member of his family or tribe.
A private feud often led to war between the two tribes, and the 
chief of the murderer was bound to protect him. Failure to do so 
would cause internal strife and a revolt against his authority by the 
partisans of the murderer. However, fear or self-interest did some­
times move a chief to arrest or liquidate a murderer, but this was 
done in great secrecy} for if such an action became known, it would 
cause division and bloodshed.
If a man committed murder and sought refuge with another tribe, 
the chief of that tribe was under a moral obligation to give him 
refuge. lie could not punish him, or deliver him up for punishment, 
but he could ask him to leave his territory.
A strong element in tribal politics was the sayyids. The sayyids 
played chiefly the roles of mediator and peacemaker. Few matters of 
importance were decided without their advice and consent. Their great 
influence was due to their superior learning and alleged descent from 
the Prophet. The sayyids had their own rules and customs and could 
be tried only by their peers*
It was with these tribes that the British had to cultivate good 
relations as speedily as they could. Aden was barren and could not 
exist without the hinterland. The hinterland was also necessary if 
the Settlement were to become a trading centre, as was hoped. The 
fortifications which were once impregnable were now in ruins and could 
afford no adequate protection. The force which stormed the peninsula, 
and now formed the garrison, was too small to withstand a combined 
attack by the tribes.
In addition, the British had no intention of using Aden as a base 
for aggression or expansion. Their desire was to live peacefully in 
their new possession. Therefore, Ilaines made friendly overtures to 
Sultan muhsin and other chiefs in the interior. The response was 
encouraging; before the end of February 1839, engagements of peace 
and friendship were entered into with many, including a reluctant 
Sultan Muhsin. These engagements were short and simple, expressing
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a desire for peace and uninterrupted traffic. However, bonds and 
treaties of a more definite nature were to follow*
Sultan Muhsin had paid from the port revenues specified sums 
of money besides grain and cloth to the tribes through whose 
territories the trade routes passed, and whose names will be given 
later. This he did to buy peace and to ensure the safe transit of 
merchandise, since the tribes in question were envious of his income 
from the port, small as it was, and could easily cause him trouble*
The loss of Aden to the British meant loss of income for Huhsin 
and the stoppage of stipends to the tribes. Ilaineo was not slow to 
realise what the consequences might be. The ’Abdalis might adopt 
towards the British the same attitude which their neighbours had 
towards then when Aden belonged to the Sultan. The ’Abdalis now, 
like the others, could harm Aden’s trade, and they could do so more 
effectively due to their geographical position. More important still, 
they could cut off essential supplies from their own country.
To avoid such consequences, Haines proposed that the British 
should not only assume the Sultan’s obligations to other tribes, but 
also assume new obligations towards the Sultan himself* Muhsin should 
have the commercial advantages referred to in the draft treaty of 
January 1838. Moreover, he should be given #3000 per annum and his 
heir-apparent (his eldest son Ahmad) #1200. As pensioners of the 
Government, father and son would not be tempted to break the peace.
Two other men whom Haines recommended for an annual pension 
were Shaykh Kajab al-’Uzaybi and Sayyid Muhsin Ways. Eajab was the 
son of the ’Uzaybi chief who fell during the storming of Aden, leaving 
behind him thirteen other children, six of whom were girls. The 
’Uzaybis were the strongest clan of the ’Abdali tribe, and their land 
separated the Fadlis from the British. By giving the young chief 
#800, Haines hoped to secure his friendship and keep open the road 
into the interior.
Muhsin Ways wa3 a master of intrigue, as Haines had learnt from 
bitter experience* Besides being the son-in-law of the ’Abdali sultan, 
he had two other wives from the Hawshabi and Yafi’i tribes. These 
marriages and his standing as a sayyid gave him considerable influence 
in the interior. Haines proposed to buy his friendship for #1200 
per annum, and to make him responsible for settling all demands 
previously made upon his ’Abdali father-in-law by the neighbouring
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chiefs* For this purpose, Haines considered that #2000 a year 
would suffice*
The proposed allowances totalled #8200, and Haines maintained 
that although this sum might seem great, it would not prove so* If 
there were peace inland, trade would flourish and customs revenue 
increase*
An additional, but occasional, expense which the Political Agent
thought necessary was presents to distinguished guests* When chiefs
went visiting, they always took gifts with them and expected others
in return* To smooth relations still further with the tribes, Haines
2
deemed it wise to follow this custom. Presents given to officials 
of the E.I.C* were sold by auction, and the proceeds credited to the 
Government*
James Farish, the Acting Governor of Bombay, supported the
policy of granting stipends to the various chiefs, but felt that in
no way should they exceed the sum offered by Ilaines under the proposed
treaty of September I838, i.e* #8000*":> The chiefs were to receive
their subsidies on iy on condition that they remained loyal to the
.British and gave a written undertaking to this effect. Farish
A
sanctioned the expense of presents, but urged economy. In a private
letter to Hobhouse, he defended the stipendiary policy as being
"material for the security of our position, and of the commercial
5
intercourse with the country;.*•"
G.W. Anderson, a member of the Board, does not seem to have 
informed himself about the new acquisition. He opposed the granting 
of allowances on the ground that "the chieftains” did not cede Aden 
peacefully, implying that all the neighbouring chiefs were to blame 
for its forcible occupation. The fact is that only one chief was 
to blame, the former ruler of Aden. The same mistake occurs in the 
Board’s letter to Haines of 22nd February quoted below.
Two other reasons for Anderson’s opposition were firstly, that 
the payment of stipends would be an admission of weakness. Secondly, 
there was no guarantee that the tribes would not attack if they felt 
that they could succeed, a fear which was before long justified. 
Anderson proposed that if the chiefs stopped trade with Aden, then, 
and only then, should the British negotiate with them and pay them a 
certain sum instead of "dues or customs".
Aden was a British possession, and therefore the British had no
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customs or dues to pay. V,:hen they finally paid the tribes, it was
only for the safe transit of trade as the Sultan had done before them.
Anderson agreed that suitable presents should be made to the chiefs,
but nothing that could be considered as a tribute*
J.A. Dunlop, another member of the Board, supported the
stipendiary policy, but agreed with Anderson that it should be made
clear to the chiefs that the payments they received were not to be
taken as a tribute. Ee thought that the ’Abdali stipends should be
7
reduced to make more money available for the others,'
The Board took no decision, but referred the question to 
Lord Auckland. To Haines they wrote, on 22nd February, that if “the 
chiefs1* asked for their stipends, they should be told that they had 
forfeited their right to such a consideration. However, if they
g
wished, their request would be forwarded to the Supreme Government*
As it happened, the chiefs had asked for their stipends before
the letter from Bombay arrived, and Haines reported, on 7th March,
that he had told them that he could not grant their request without
Government authority. They were not satisfied with this answer and
considered that the British had harmed them by taking Aden from
Sultan Muhsin* In the same letter, Haines expressed his fear that
it would be difficult to keep them from harassing Lahj or the Settle- 
9ment*
Sultan Muhsin himself visited Aden for the first time since its
capture on 9th March and was there until the 14th, The purpose of
his visit was ostensibly to ingratiate himself with the British* He
blamed what had happened on his tribe whom he said he could not
control, and again expressed his desire to be treated as an Indian
nawwab or rajah. By this he meant that the British should take his
country under their protection and give him a stipend. Haines replied
that it was not in his power to decide such important questions and
advised him to write direct to the Government* Muhsin did so on
13th March and ended his letter by repeating the old wish for an
offensive-defensive alliance.^*0
In Bombay, the Government directed the Persian Department, which
handled also Arabic correspondence, fco send the Sultan a polite, but
11non-committal, reply* Meanwhile, in April, the Supreme Government 
reached a decision on the question of granting stipends to Sultan Muhsin 
and others. Indeed, the decision may have taken longer had it not been
for disturbing news from Aden. Twice tribesmen crept up to the VJall
by night and fired at the sentries; a European who had unwisely
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ventured outside the fortifications was murdered; and marauders were
12malting the roads dangerous* Also the Government of Bombay reminded
the Governor-General of the chiefs* reaction to the occupation of
Aden as reported by Haines in his letter of 7th March and urged him
13to take a speedy decision on the subject of subsidies.
Auckland agreed to the payment of stipends and concurred with 
Farish that they should not exceed #8000 per annum* With reference 
to the events reported above, he instructed the Bombay Government that 
the stipendiary chiefs should be made answerable for the acts of
14their men, and damage should be made good from their allowances*
When Haines reported the firing at the sentries (4th March), he 
recommended that a body of cavalry be added to the garrison, a 
recommendation which was repeatedly made in connection with the defence 
of the Settlement* The horsemen would pursue attackers and keep safe 
the plain in front of the Wall* Auckland, instead, suggested that 
the chiefs who did not receive subsidies should be conciliated by 
employing some of their relations as horse patrols or in some other 
capacity. Thus they would be induced to identify themselves with
15the British in the preservation of order instead of being plunderers*
It happened that when the instructions of the Governor-General
reached Bombay, Haines was there on sick leave* He had fallen ill
on 15th March, sailed for the Presidency on 1st April and returned
to Aden on 20th May.
Back in Aden, Haines worked out a new scale of allowances in the
light of "further experience1** He fixed the stipend of the *Abdali
sultan at #6500 per annum, but gave no subsidy to hie heir-apparent,
since he felt that this would lead to quarrels among the sons who were
by different mothers.
When Haines was in Bombay, Muhsin Ways had stirred up trouble
between the *Abdalis and Ilawshabis which resulted in the death of 
16
thirteen men. Also the Governor-General had expressed his doubts
as to the desirability of putting too much power into the hands of 
17one man* Therefore, instead of giving Ways a lump sum of #2000 
to be distributed at his discretion among the other chiefs, Haines 
gave four of them the sums they had been accustomed to receive from 
3ultan Muhsin: the Fadli #364-?-, the Amiri #50, the Yafi*i #250 and
the Hawshabi #628. The *Alawi, who had previously been paid in kind 
only, was now to receive #60 as well* He and the Amiri do not seem
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to have signed treaties as required by the Government of chiefs
receiving stipends.
The treaties negotiated v/ith the other tribes, excluding the
•Abdalis, were identical in content. They all stipulated that the
chiefs should keep the peace and see that their followers committed
no depredations in Aden, Lahj or on the roads. Failure to comply
19with these terms meant stoppage of the stipends.
Sultan Muhsin visited Aden for the second time on 15th June, 1839*
to conclude the bond under which he was to get his stipend. The
Multan seems to have considered himself still entitled to the original
#8000, although he had lost Aden in a military encounter. He was
also reluctant to sign any bond which would make receipt of the money
subject to the good behaviour of himself and his tribe as stipulated
by the Government. When Haines made it clear that the payment would
bo made on no other terms, the Sultan asked for a promise that the
British would fight on his side if he were attacked by his neighbours.
In other words, he would now be content v/ith a defensive treaty.
Haines refused to give such a promise, but said that he would use
"strong persuasive arguments to prevent such a breach of faith on 
cl Qthoir part". The Sultan then signed the bond (l8th Juno), which 
inexplicably bound him with the British in what amounted to a defensive 
alliance#
Under this treaty:
1. The Sultan made himself answerable for outrages by his people 
on the roads*
2. He and his children pledged themselves not to offer any 
opposition to the British.
3# The interests of the contracting parties were to be **identical***
4. The .British undertook to pay the stipends formerly paid by
the Sultan to his neighbours.
5. The Sultan and his heirs in perpetuity were to receive from 
the British an annual stipend of #6500.
6* The British boundary was fixed at Khur Kaksar, as proposed 
in the draft treaty of 1838.
7m "In case of any attack upon Laheje or the Abdellee tribe or
upon Aden or the British troops, we (the Sultan) and the British shall
make a common cause.”
8. bhen in Aden, the Sultan’s people were to be subject to British
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lawsj and when in Lahj, British subjects were to submit to the 
Bultan's authority.
9# The Sultan and his family were to be exempt from customs
j 21dues.
The Government of Bombay, under the new Governor,
Sir James Rivett-Carnac, approved of this bond, but they deemed it
desirable to add the following clause? M... the engagement should
become null and void, in the event of the British Government ever
22seeing fit to relinquish the possession of Aden.*1 The addition may 
have been due to doubts about the long term value of the Settlement*
The bond was forwarded with the addendum on 14th September for 
the ratification of the Governor-General, and on 24th October it was 
ratified, but without the proposed addition* The Government of India 
gave no reason for ignoring the clause, and it is possible that it 
was an oversight. Bonds with other stipendiary chiefs were less formal 
and were only countersigned in Bombay*
The allowances to the chiefs totalled a little below the
08000 limit sot by the Government. They were to be paid in six-monthly 
instalments, in arrears, commencing from February 1839. The 'Abdali 
stipend was to be paid to the Sultan's agent, and the Fadli, to 
'Alawi, the eldest son of Sayyid Zayn al-'Aydarus. The other stipends 
wore to be paid through Muhsin Ways.
In addition to the stipends, Haines recommended salaries and 
life pensions, the purpose of which was, like other measures, to 
secure British interests and win the friendship of the people. The 
personal qualities of Muhsin Ways and hie tribal connections made 
Haines appoint him British agent for the protection of trade in the 
interior. For his duties, Ways was granted 060 a month. The distrib­
ution of grain and other minor articles Haines left in the hands of 
Sultan Muhsin's vizier, Hasan Ibn 'Abd Allah al-Khatib. For his
p-z
services, Haines paid him 0kO a month. Payment in kind was not
mentioned in any treaty with any tribe, and it seems to have been
discontinued after Hasan's death in 1840.
In February, Haines had recommended that Pajab al-*Uzaybi be
given j&800 per annum on humanitarian and political grounds* He now
recommended an annual pension of #360. The reason for this reduction
was that the clan had divided, and Rajab was the chief of only one 
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division. Haines now also proposed the rjensioning of two other
shaykhs who were disabled during the assault on Aden* One, aged 40,
25
was to receive #240 per annum, and the other, aged 24, #120*
The salaries and pensions amounted to #1920 per annum, but 
this sum was not paid regularly for any length of time. Hasan was 
killed in Kay 1840, and Muhsin Bays was dismissed in December 1841.
Kajab’s pension was stopped on account of his part in the first 
attack on Aden (11th November, l8j59)t hut it was resumed three years 
later. The stipends to the chiefs continued, with interruptions to 
some; and as years went by, some allowances were raised and more 
chiefs were added to the list* In the stipends lay the genesis of 
the later protectorate.
After Haines had settled the question of stipends, he engaged, 
as a camel patrol, twenty ’Abdalis under the Sultan’s son Ahmad at a 
monthly salary of #150. The employment of ’Abdalis for this task was 
contrary to the recommendation of the Governor-General, but it was a 
sensible decision* The ’Abdali territory bordered on the Settlement 
and controlled the approaches to it, and the ’Abdalis would not have 
permitted members of other tribes to patrol in their territory. The 
appointment of Ahmad as head of the mounted troop had the apparent 
safeguard that he v/as responsible to his father who was in turn 
responsible to the British. Besides, the arrangement v/as more
economical than importing cavalry from India, and more acceptable to
2 ^
the people inland*
Haines thought it unlikely that the Arabs would try to retake 
Aden* lie argued that if the ’Abdalis attacked on their own, they 
would certainly lose, and hatred among the tribes would prevent the 
formation of any coalition. Yet, even as early as 28th February, he 
recommended the strengthening of the Isthmus defences and of the 
garrison in order "to command respect and deter thoughts of recapture1*« 
Work had, in fact, already started on a line of temporary defences 
on the ruins of the old Turkish Wall, and in April, 314 troops were 
added to the garrison, bringing its strength up to 1050*
Another '•defence" which Haines built was an efficient spy system* 
;iany of the accountants and cashiers of the inland chiefs were Jews 
whose families lived in Aden* By virtue of their occupation, they 
had access to reliable information, and because their homes were in 
the Settlement, their interests were with the British. Moreover, they 
could write in Hebrew, a language which the Arabs did not read. All
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these fact® made the Jews Kaines* best spies*
Haines had Arab spies as well, but he did not place much
28
confidence in their reports as "they tend to exaggerate"* Excepted
from this generalisation in the first three crucial years of British
rule were Muhsin Ways and Ilasan al-Khatib. In addition, these men
were in a better position to supply secret information than even the
Jewish cashiers and accountants*
The Political Agent was careful that his agents should come and
go without attracting attention* For instance, he had a Jew who would
leave al-Hawtah and proceed as far as a wood which v/as a few miles to
the south* There he would hand his dispatches to another Jew who
would come to Aden by cea* Thus, the first would not arouse
suspicion by being absent one night from al-Hawtah, and the second by
29
being seen too often on the road. When Ilaines wanted to be 
absolutely certain about the truth of a rumour, he would have it
checked by several spies at different times, each acting without the
knowledge of the others*
Haines was prudent to take these precautions* The ’Abdalis could 
not easily reconcile themselves to the loss of Aden, and for years 
nourished the hope of retaking it. In fact, from the outset, their 
Sultan started to make plans to this end. The treaties which in 
Haines’ opinion may have reduced the likelihood of a tribal attack 
meant nothing to the ’Abdali and Fadli sultans. In August, after all 
the treaties had been signed and the first instalments of the stipends 
paid, Haines must have learnt with great disappointment that an attack 
was being planned by the Fadlis and ’Uzaybio, with the knowledge of 
Sultan Muhsin and his son. If the attack was not possible, they were 
determined to close the roads.
The Political Agent explained this hostility solely in terms of 
economics; the ’Abdali chief derived no benefit from the British 
presence in Aden, and the Fadli could forsee trade being attracted 
away from his bandar**^ In the author’s opinion, more important than 
economics v/as the fact that the new masters of Aden v/ere both foreigners 
and "infidels", a fact which was repeatedly to serve as a pious excuse 
for attacking the British Settlement and murdering British persons*
Acts of hostility were committed as early as March, but Haines 
nay have thought that they were isolated incidents which would cease 
once the chiefs were made pensioners of the British* Now, however,
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when the policy of reconciliation seemed to have failed and the
stipends to have no restraining effect, he advocated counter-measures.
Dates were (and still are) the staple food of the bedouin during the
hot season, and the tribes obtained their annual supply of this
commodity from the Persian Gulf during the cool or trading season*
If the tribes stopped communication i^ ith Aden, Haines proposed first
to warn them; and if his warning went unheeded, to retaliate by not
allowing dates to reach then from Aden, Sir Ahnad or Shuqrah#
For the measure to be fully effective, he recommended a blockade
of the *Aqrabi and Fadli ports# Furthermore, he proposed to keep the
Fadlis occupied by intriguing with their neighbours, the 'Awlaqis to
31the east and the Yafi'is to the north. The Government authorised
the blockade if the tribes carried out their plan, but their general
instruction was that Haines* measures should be T,purely of a defensive
32nature, but not aggressive"* The contemplated intrigues provoked 
no comment*
marly in September, murder and plunder were committed on the
roads# As a result, Haines threatened Gultan Fuhsin with the loss
of his stipend# He also decided to withhold the monthly pay of the
patrol under his son until the plundered property was restored and the
33culprits punished# This was done, and the patrol received their pay# 
Soon after, Ijuhsin and his son had a quarrel over relations with the 
jritish. The quarrel ended in the father*s withdrawing the patrol, 
leaving the roads open to plunderers*
Muhsin then appealed to all the neighbouring chiefs for assistance 
in retaking Aden* Haines counteracted by directing his two agents in 
the interior to frustrate his efforts, and this thoy did by bribery*
The Fadli chief, however, could not be bribed, and on 8th October, 
the two sultans met at al-Hawtah* The Fadli agreed to assist the 
•Abdali in recapturing Aden, and for his support he was given $1500 
and promised a similar sum when Aden fell*
Haines thought that Sultan Ahmad was not sincere in his intentions, 
but wanted only the money# His opinion was undoubtedly based on the 
traditional enmity between the two chiefs, but he forgot how volatile 
tribal jolitics could be# While he was still writing his report, he 
learnt that Ahmad had already mustered 600 men and was expecting 
reinforcements daily#
"Activity and firmness" were now needed, Haines wrote. Muhsin
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should be punished, and he suggested three ways of punishing him.
Firstly, by stopping his stipend; secondly, by securing two of his
sons as hostages for his good conduct; thirdly, by invading his
territory and capturing him with hie family, after v/hich the British
could dictate their own terms*
At the time Haines wrote this letter (October 1839), the mountain
passes were not yet scarped, and the Turkish Wall, which was far from
impregnable, was Aden*s only defence. The garrison had been reduced
by sickness and death* For carrying out the second punishment, Haines
recommended that the garrison be brought up to full strength, i.e. to
what it was in April, with the addition of 30 irregular cavalrymen 
34and their horses, now that the Arab patrol had been disbanded* The
best time for inflicting the third punishment would be v/hen a portion
of the garrison was relieved and the force thereby temporarily 
35increased.
The Government saw the need for reinforcing the garrison, but not 
for sending the cavalry: "... the less you have to do v;ith the
interior, the better." However, if Haines thought that the horse were 
extremely necessary, he should "trust to his own resources", but 
resources he had none*
Bombay ruled out the third alternative for punishing the Sultan.
"••• the only coercive measure which should be adopted in case of 
necessity ought to be by blockading the ports of the maritime disaffected 
chiefs, and this even should only be resorted to in the event of 
negotiation and remonstrance being found to be fruitless." The other 
two alternatives were authorised, but the second could only be effected 
by stratagem, since Haines was not allowed to make incursions inland.^ 
This prohibition, and the fact that the Sultan had no port to be 
blockaded, meant that ilaines could only stop his stipend#
Before the letter quoted above was received in Aden, indeed even 
before it was written, the *Abdalis and Fadlis had acted. At 4.30 a.m. 
on 11th November, a combined force, estimated by the Commandant at 
5000, attacked, but was beaten back with heavy losses* In the months 
since the occupation, the British had consolidated their position and 
with better weapons in their hands had no difficulty in repulsing the 
tribesmen. If the Arabs had made their attack immediately after the 
occupation they might well have succeeded#
Prior to the assault, Sultan Muhsin gave nominal charge of his
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people to his son Ahmad, probably in order to appear blameless and
37not to lose his stipend on the grounds of violating the June bond*
Haines was not deceived. The ’Abdali and Fadli stipends were stopped* 
Banning members of hostile tribes from Aden was considered, but was 
not found advisable; tho Settlement needed their produce, and Haines
70
needed information* In Bombay, the Government suspended the June 
treaty with the 'Abdalis, and on account of subsequent events it was 
never put into operation.
The defeated chiefs held, on let December, a council of war at 
which they decided to make another effort to recapture Aden a week 
later, after Ramadan was over* Each was to collect as large a force 
ac possible, in the simple belief that the greater t s number, the 
surer the victory, Sultan Euhsin once again applied to his other 
n-ighbours for support, but without success. The Fadli chief appealed 
to the Muslim population of Aden to join in the coming battle,
describing Haines as "the enemy of Mahomet, and of all Mahometans1’*
Ramadan ended, but the allies did not attack Aden, Instead, they 
intensified their efforts to prevent supplies from reaching it, with 
tho purpose of making life so difficult for the British that they 
would be forced to leave. The measure was not successful; some
39caravans fought thoir way through, and Haines did not remain inactive* 
lie retaliated by blockading Shuqrah on 17th December, and no t by
intriguing with the Yafi'is and 'Awlaqis as he had once proposed. The
blockade had a useful, but temporary, effect* The Fadlis withdrew to 
their country, the roads were re-opened, and Muhsin sent a deputation 
to sue for peace,
Haines made peace conditional on Muhsin's asking for pardon
4opersonally in Aden and giving two of his sons as hostages. Instead, 
on 5th January, 1840, the Sultan abdicated in favour of his son 
Ahmad, giving age and infirmity as reasons* The Fadli chief, meanwhile, 
wrote to him urging a second attack on Aden or else he would attack 
Lahj. Muhsin replied that the tribe was now in the hands of his son, 
whereupon the Fadli carried out his threat*
On becoming "Sultan”, Ahmad denounced his father's policy and 
declared that he intended to form an alliance with the British, To 
Haines he wrote that he was the servant of the Government and that he 
wanted peace and friendship, Haines was pleased with this letter, but 
insisted that peace could only be made on his own conditions, i*e, an
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ample apology and two brothers as hostages* By way of inducing the 
young chief to accept his terms, Haines, perhaps unwisely, held out 
to him the prospect of help against the Fadlis* ”••• the Foutheli 
insult you, and murder and plunder in your territory daily which 
could easily be prevented*”
It is difficult to guess how Haines could have checked the Fadlis* 
An expedition inland was out of the question; Shuqrah was already 
under blockade; and "strong persuasive arguments” could not have been 
more effective than the blockade. For his part, Ahmad understood from 
Haines1 letter that the Political Agent was prepared to use military 
force against the Fadlis, and he wrote to him that he would go to Aden 
to negotiate peace only after they had been put down* Haines insisted 
that peace should first bo made, and on his own terms. Ahraad, finding 
that there was nothing to be gained from Haines, came to terms with 
the Fadlis*
Ilaines himself reported that Ahmad did not want to be hostile to
the British, but he was forced into this position by his father, by
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the Fadli sultan and by Ibrahim Pasha* Haines' allegation regarding
the Egyptian Commander in the Yemen was based on two letters from the
British agent at Mukha, an Indian Muslim by the name of *Abd al-Hasul,
The first letter was to the effect that Muhammad *Ali had sent
an envoy to the Imam, with a promise of men, money and ammunition and
an offer to withdraw from his country if he undertook to drive the
British out of Aden* The Imam had answered that he was not strong
42enough to attack the British, nor did he wish to do so. The second
letter had spoken of messengers from Sultan Muhsin to Ibrahim Pasha,
requesting assistance against the British* Ibrahim had replied that
he could not grant it without the authority of Muhammad *Ali, but he
promised to write to his uncle and suggested that Muhsin should do the
same, an answer similar to that which Haines had more than once given
to tho 'Abdali chief* According to 'Abd al-Rasul, letters were sent
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to Egypt, but no reply had been received*
From this it is clear that the Egyptians in the Yemen did not
give any active support to the tribes, nor did they even promise them
help* Yet Haines accused them of constantly intriguing against Aden
and perpetually frustrating his efforts to reach a settlement with
his neighbours* He wrote that as long as the Arabs entertained hopes
44
of Egyptian assistance, they would not make terms with the British*
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As will bo seen, the Egyptians withdrew from the Yemen in April 1840,
but the 'Abdalis and Fadlis did not cease hostilities#
When Haines failed to make any headway with Ahmad, he recommended,
for the second time, that Lahj be captured and the old chief and his
family be taken to Aden as hostages# For administrative purposes,
the territory might be held at small expense if a fort were built and
guarded by British troops# Even this expense could be avoided by
giving the government to Muhsin Ways under guidance from the Political
Agent# However, the best plan was that Ahmad should be reinstated and
a new treaty concluded with him* "Our treaty should be offensive and
defensive, in fact his acts whether for peace, war or commerce should
depend upon the will of the British#" For the observance of the
proposed treaty the rest of the family should remain in Aden as
hostages, and the young chief should be guided by a native agent or
consul under direction from Aden# Haines' "offensive and defensive
treaty" was clearly one-sided, and the whole arrangement would have
amounted to a protectorate over Lahj#
For the capture of Lahj, Haines required two or three troops of
cavalry, horse artillery for four or six guns and 3000 infantry, half 
45
of them European* Haines' request for a large number of European
troops was made on the ground that the Arabs feared them on account of
tbeir muscular strength, while they looked down on the Indiana a:;
46inferiors# The expedition was to be financed partly from the Sultan's 
treasury and partly from the revenues of his territory, in half-yearly 
instalments#
Haines' justification for a show of strength was that the peaceful 
attitude of the British was interpreted by the tribes as weakness; 
they said that the British dared not venture beyond the Wall# Firm
47action was also necessary if Aden was to flourish as a trading post#
The Bombay Government responded by restating their policy of 
non-interference in even stronger terms* "••# you should confine 
yourself to the occupation of Aden; and, on no account to enter upon 
any offensive operations beyond that place, until otherwise directed ### 
if Aden cannot be made a valuable acquisition without entering into 
&& aggressive warfare with the Arab chiefs in the interior, the sooner
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the place is abandoned or surrendered for a consideration, the better#" 
The Supreme Government and the Secret Committee approved of 
Bombay's instructions, and the latter authority wrote direct to Haines*
l8o.
"While you resolutely resist every attack on you, we trust that you
will cautiously abstain from all aggression on any portion of the 
Z + o
Arab tribes." The Secret Committee was against the occupation of
Lahj, and showed understanding of the tribes1 attitude: "The hostility
of the Arab tribes is natural and might have been expected and we do
not think that our possession of Lahedge would reconcile them to our 
50dominion."
The Secret Committee doubted Carnaps wisdom in going so far as
51to suggest that it might be better to abandon Aden. Carnac himself 
had long thought that Aden would be "a troublesome and unprofitable
acquisition", and he expressed this opinion to Lord Palmerston before
52
he (Carnac) left for India, probably in Apri^ 1839* After the
November attack, in a private letter to Uobhouse, he described the
annexation of Aden as "a bad move", and predicted that the Settlement
would be "a constant source of expense and trouble", partly on account
of Muhammad *Ali who would not easily forgive the British their
seizure of Aden. Therefore he added: "I should be glad if you ordered
53us to give it up, making due arrangements for our steam purposes."
Hobhouse did not agree with Carnac, and Palmerston was confident 
thjt Aden "will prove . •» a most valuable possession, and ought to be 
defended at any cost". Palmerston was very surprised that Carnac did 
not appreciate Aden, and this made him doubt "whether he entirely
54deserves the high reputation for good judgment which he has acquired". 
Carnac, however, changed his opinion on Aden in the light of events in 
the Near East: "It will, I admit, be a possession of great value now
we find affairs so unsettled in Egypt, and it may become of considerable
55commercial importance; but it has cost us loads of money nevertheless."
In the mean time, Hobhouse also became convinced that Aden would be a
source of trouble, but he did not see how the British could withdraw
56from it before settling their differences with Muhammad •Ali.
Egypt’s unpopular rule in Syria encouraged Mahlud II to launch 
the attack which he had been entertaining since 1833 and from which he 
had been dissuaded by Palmerston. In April 1839, he sent a large force 
to reconquer Syria, but it was completely destroyed on 24th June near 
Busaybin on the Syrian frontier* Subsequently, news came that 
Admiral Ahmad Pasha had carried off the Ottoman fleet to Alexandria 
and surrendered it to Muhammad *Ali.
Sultan Mahmud died on 30th June and was succeeded by his son
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’Abd al~Hajid, a boy of sixteen* The young Sultan immediately 
started negotiations with Muhammad fAli who demanded the hereditary 
government of both Syria and Egypt# ’Abd al-Kajid was willing to 
agree, but Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria Bent him a collective 
note requiring the suspension of the negotiations, and this the Sultan 
gladly did*
Then in London, on 15th July, 1840, the Four Powers concluded with
the Porte a convention for the pacification of the Levant* Under it,
the Sultan agreed to confer upon Muhammad ’Ali the hereditary Pashalik
of Egypt, and for his life the administration of southern Syria# The
Pasha refused these terms and applied to France for protection*
Palmerston had already taken the precaution of ordering the
Mediterranean squadron to prevent communication between Egypt and
Syria* Then a force of British and Austrian marines defeated
Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammad ’Ali’e son, and the Egyptians lost Syria*
After that, the British fleet proceeded to Alexandria, but
Muhammad ’Ali yielded to tho will of the Powers and there were no
hostilities. In return for the Pashalik of Egypt, he agreed to
surrender the Ottoman fleet and to evacuate Syria, Arabia and Crete*
Muhammad ’Ali had in fact already withdrawn his forces from Arabia in
ax* tlcipation of an attack on Alexandria.
On 1st June, 1841, Sultan ’Abd al-Majid issued a firman confirming
Muhammad ’Ali in the government of Egypt with hereditary succession.
The Egyptian Question was now settled, and on 13th July, a second
treaty was concluded in London* This treaty confirmed the earlier one
and had the signature of France besides those of the other Four Powers.
57With this Muhammad ’Ali’s star set, and the British continued in 
possession of Aden#
rO
During the blockade of Shuqrah, a few skirmishes took place
between the British and the Fadlis. Lieut# R. Ethersey, com: anding
the "Euphrates", one of the two vessels which took part in the blockade,
could not ascertain what damage or casualties his cannonading had
inflicted, but he wrote to Captain R* Oliver, Superintendent of the
Indian Navy, that reports reaching Haines spoke of 80 killed or 
59wounded. The Government deplored the news and asked Haines for a 
60detailed report* Haines wrote that in fact only one camel and two
claves were killed# In addition, the sultan’s castle, the customs-house
6l
and some palm trees were destroyed* This explanation satisfied the
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Government, for it showed that "nothing occurred but what is
62inseparable from the evils of war'*# The Secret Committee, too,
were satisfied with the explanation, but did not see the necessity
63for the blockade in the first place*
Haines* 0wn comment on the blockade was that it brought respect
for the British, quietened the tribes and ended "the superstition that
64the Foutheli Sultan was invincible"* but this effect was not to
last long* L'rustrated in their attempt to dislodge the British, the
•Abdalis and Fadlis seem to have thought that if they got rid of
Kaines, Aden would become an easy prize# To this end, they twice
conspired to murder him, and tv/ice they failed* Then the *Abdali
sultan resumed the reins of government, and the two tribes decided
to make their long-postponed attack on the Settlement* Jihad was
65preached among the other tribes, but once again the ‘Abdalis and
Fadlis had to take the field alone*
About 2*00 a#m*, on 21st Ifey, a joint force, also put at 5000,
attacked* The force was repulsed within 90 minutes, but not before
plundering some army tents#^ After the retreat, the spoils were
exhibited to other tribes by way of inducing them to join in future
attacks* The Fadli sultan also displayed letters written to Haines
by Muhsin Mays and Hasan al-Khatib which had been intercepted by his
mounted guard, and it was decided that the two men should be executed*
Hasan was killed, but Muhsin saved his life by calling into his castle
67a guard of Hawshabis*
Carnac was now convinced by Haines* argument that the British 
should carry the war into the enemy’s territory, but practical 
considerations prevented him from authorising such action* If the 
British advanced into the interior, it would be impossible to know 
where to stop* Besides, an expedition should not be hazarded except 
with an overwhelming force which would be difficult and costly to 
equip* In l840, the Company’s forces were involved in Afghanistan,
China and Sind, a drain on the financial and human resources of British 
India, especially the Presidency of Bombay# The Governor, therefore, 
reluctantly adhered to the policy of defending Aden without leaving
so
the fortifications*
Auckland, too, thought it no longer wise to restrict the defence 
of Aden to the fortifications# This policy, he wrote, would encourage 
the tribes to persist in their hostility, motivated by "national 
feeling and tho hope of plunder"* However, he left it to his subordinate
183*
in Bombay to decide whether the capture of Lahj, as recommended by
69
Haines, could be carried out advantageously#
The day before Auckland wrote his letter, the *Abdalis and Fadlis
70made their third unsuccessful attack (5th July)# Prior to the July
attack, Sultan Muhsin ordered the confiscation of all property in
Lahj belonging to inhabitants of Aden and to the family of the late
Hasan al-Khatib# The result was that the merchants alone lost nearly
#15*000, and the Khatib family sixteen houses# The Jews bore the
brunt of the Sultan’s wrath because they spied for the British#
In deference to the opinion of the Governor-General, Carnac
considered the possibility of an expedition against Lahj, with the
71puriuose only of talcing revenge for the attacks on Aden# However, 
he found it impossible to equip a force of the strength and type
considered necessary and thought that the idea should be abandoned
72 73for the time being, an opinion with which Auckland readily concurred#'
74Earlier, he wrote to Hobhouse, "••• we have already enough to do#,#"
In October 1840, a qat vendor, a Sunni subject of the Imam
called Faqih Sa*id, claimed that he was a prophet and assumed the lofty
titles "al-Mahdi al-Muntazar”(the Guided and Expected One) and "Sultan
al-Barr wal-Bahr" (Lord of the Land and Sea)# He even had silver coins
of his own struck with these titles on either side# As his lieutenants,
he appointed three shaykhs each styled "Commander of the Faithful"*
Faqih declared that he intended to rekindle the religious fervour of
all believers and to recover the Yemen from the hands of "infidels
and sectaries", i#e# the British and the Shi*i Saydis#
The "prophet" promised his followers immunity against sword or
bullet and pledged that when the Yemen fell under his control, he
75would abolish all taxes* Soon many ignorant and superstitious people 
flocked to Faqih*s banner# V/ith them, he captured Ta’iz and several 
hill forts which he allowed them to destroy for their amusement#
This success, coupled with his own revengeful feelings towards 
the British, made Sultan Muhsin apply to the "Mahdi" for help, not 
knowing that he, too, wanted to expel the "infidels" from Aden* Faqih 
wrote to Muhsin and the other chiefs in the interior, commanding them 
to meet him with their followers at Eir Ahmad after *Id al-Fitr (late 
November) for the purpose of attacking the Settlement#^ Sultan Haydarah 
of the ’Aqrabis, who had until then been friendly to the British, now 
felt it his religious duty to turn against them; and on 24th November,
Haines received a letter from him saying- that he had been honoured
by a command from the Kahdi to Join hi;; force "for the extermination
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of Christians from the Land of the Faithful”*
Before taking Aden, Faqih wanted first to establish his rule 
in the Tihama# From his village of Danwah, near al~*Udayn, he wrote 
to Sharif Husayn (then at Sabid) and to his brother Ilamud (then 
governor of Hukha), ordering them, under penalty of death, to hand 
over control to him before the end of Ramadan# Sharif Husayn 
cunning iy answered that, as a Muslim, he could, not disobey and asked 
tho rhetorical question, "Would it not be more appropriate for *the 
Regenerator of the True Faith* first to recover Aden from the infidels?
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This question mado Faqih give immediate attention to Aden#
Haines thought that Faqih presented no danger# The chiefs were
disunited, and r.any of them would not take seriously "a character so
79lately sprung irf;o notice"* As it happened, Faqih never came near
the Settlement# Early in December, when he was about to march with
his army of 12,000, he found that he had to cope with a threat from
the rear# The Imam, who saw in him a danger to hie own position, had
collected a force of 20,COO and marched couth from San*a until he
readied Yarin where he encamped to prepare for an attack on Danwah#
However, before he was ready, Faqih, on 16th If- ’-ember, sent a
detachment of Bhu Muhammad ar.d Dhu Husayn tribesmen to attack his
outpost# Instead, when these Baydis reached Yarim, they renewed their
allegiance to the Imaip* They then returned to Danwah and engaged a
portion of Faqih*a troops, killing 150* Two other engagements followed
on 19th and 21st December, with equal success for the Imam*s men,
v.'hich encouraged the Ima i to advance on Danwah. There, on
2.5th December, a fierce battle took place in which several hundreds
of Faqih*s followers were slaughtered, but it is not known whether
80Faqih himself was among the dead or succeeded in escaping# As far 
as the British were concerned, the Mahdi*s defeat removed another 
threat to the Settlement and once again frustrated Sultan Iluhsin*s 
hopes for its recapture#
By April 184-1, the British had been in Aden for over two years, 
maintaining an expensive garrison. Every attack or tisturbance was 
followed by cessation of the land trade, and at night marauders would 
approach near enough to fire at the sentries# £uch a state of affairs 
not only made life difficult for the garrison and inhabitants, but also
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prevented merchants from settling in the town and made the British 
look very weak#
Auckland, therefore, thought that it was high time for the 
British to decide whether they should continue to occupy Aden as a 
beleagured town or take action against the marauders, thereby protect­
ing their subjects and giving such confidence to their friends ”as 
will render Aden the prosperous seaport which its position so well 
fits it to become”* To keep the neighbourhood clear of marauders, 
the Governor-General was willing to sanction the expense of a snail 
body of horse, if the Government of Bombay deemed it necessary* 
However, on no account were the Aden authorities to use the horse for
”any aggressive expedition” without permission from Bombay* The horse
should be regarded as mounted police, and not as a military force*
It would be possible to strike at al-Hawtah when the time for reliev­
ing part of the garrison cane, a suggestion made by Haines as early 
as October 1839. The strike, Auckland was confident, would change 
permanently, and for the better, the policy of Sultan Kuhsin and his 
ally, the Fadli chief#^
The same month Auckland wrote his letter, the ever hopeful Muhsin 
wanted to make another attack on Aden with the help of his Fadli
neighbour, but Ways persuaded him not to join* The Sultan then
imprisoned ”all Jews” in Lahj, and for their release demanded an 
unspecified sum of money which he stipulated should be equal to what 
he formerly received from the port of Aden# By arrangement with the 
•Aqrabi chief, he also stopped all caravans of coffee and other non- 
perishable articles proceeding into Aden, and channelled their export 
through Bir Ahmad# The perishable goods which he could not sell else­
where, he allowed to enter the Settlement, but levied on them at 
Shaykh *Uthman a duty which he designated ”the Aden tax”* This was 
in addition to the duty which he normally collected at al-Hawtah, and
Op
his receipts from it averaged two to three thousand rupees a month,
at least twice the amount of his stipend for the sane period#
The Political Agent despaired of ever making a permanent peace
with the *Abdali sultan and he thought that the British should not
negotiate with him except on the conditions formerly stipulated,
i#e# an apology and two sons as hostages*^ Meanwhile, Bir Ahmad
84should be blockaded in retaliation# Auckland approved on 19th July, 
1841, but repeated that such a measure should only be carried out ifOr
remonstrance failed*
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Before Haines received Auckland’s instructions, Ahmad ’Aydan,
the Interpreter at the Barrier Gate, had been assassinated (29th July)*
The Fadlis, who agreed not to join the ’Abdalia in another attack on
Aden, were nevertheless glad to join in annoying them* A body of
chieftains of the two tribes enticed ’Aydan to come out to them, a
distance of about 120 yards, and then they murdered him* Haines
thought that this murder could have been avoided if he had had the
cavalry for which he had continually been asking since March 1839.
”We are too confident in ourselves and we do not consider that we have
86subtle and daring enemies to cope with*”
The Interpreter’s murder moved Anderson, now Acting Governor of
87Bombay, to ask the Supreme Government for horsef but for various 
reasons the troop, which was recruited at Poona, did not reach Aden
until early January 1843* In the mean time, the ’Abdali, Fadli and
•Aqrabi chiefs decided to prevent all supplies, perishable and non- 
perishable, from reaching Aden* However, as before, the other tribes 
did not submit to their will and sometimes fought their way through,
Bven the ’Aqrabi and ’Abdali tribesmen did not apply the ’’economic
siege” strictly* In return for protection money, the ’Aarabis
88escorted caravans into the Settlement* At Shaykh ’Uthman, the
89’Abdali guards allowed supplies to go through for a substantial bribe*
Thus Aden survived, thanks to disunity among tho tribes*
Haines, however, thought that his three neighbours should be
punished* On 21st September, without reference to Bomb:.y, he again
ordered the blockade of Shuqrah, and again the Fadli chief left the
neighbourhood of Aden to protect his own territory* Haines also
ordered that the Fadli fishing boats be secured if possible* Their
crews had occasionally volunteered, for money, to 1:Ad saboteurs at
unfrequented spots, with the intention of committing murder or arson*
If capture seemed imminent, the saboteurs would mix with the labourers
90or hasten to their boats*
There is no evidence that the ’Aqrabi bandar was blockaded*
Perhaps no vessel of war could be spared for the purpose, and in any 
case the closeness of the bandar to Aden made it easy for the British 
to keep a check on it if they desired*
As for punishing Sultan Muhsin, there was nothing that Haines 
could do without Government authority* Therefore, he again recommended 
an attack on al-Hawtah, but the Government continued to oppose the idea*
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However, they now felt that an attack on a place nearer to Aden could
be made, and left it to Haines to decide whether it would check the
91Arabs or increase their hostility* Haines decided that it would check 
them, and ’’erase the opinion that they have formed that fear, or want 
of courage prevents us ever marching beyond the outworks of Aden to 
punish their audacity”*
What made Haines take his decision was the occasion of the annual 
relief of part of tho garrison* He chose not one, but two targets for 
his attack, Shaykh ’Uthman and Bir Hamid* At Shaykh ’Uthman, after the 
November attack of 1839, Sultan Muhsin had built a tower where he 
stationed the guard who stopped caravans and exacted taxes from them*
Bir Hamid was a village in the Fadli territory eight miles from Aden*
It was the site of Nawbat Shaykh Hahdi, the stronghold of Shaykh Kahdi, 
one of the fiercest of the Fadli chiefs* It had become the rendezvous 
and supply centre for the hostile tribes, and all attacks were planned 
there*
At 10*00 p*m* on 5th October, a force consisting of 500 infantry
and 80 artillery, with one gun, left Aden for Bir Hamid, arriving
there just before daybreak* The force blew up the stone fort and on
its way back destroyed the tower at Shaykh ’Uthman* Eoth buildings
were deserted, warning having been given of the British advance* The
only British casualties were five wounded from sporadic fire between
the two villages* The success of this operation made Haines more eager
92than ever to attack al-Hawtah, the ’’fountain’s head” of trouble*
The British attack on Nawbat Shaykh Kahdi, coupled with the
blockade of Shuqrah, forced the Fadlis into submission* Towards the
end of November, a relation of the Sultan came to Aden and offered
himself as a hostage until peace was made with his tribe* This was
accepted, the blockade of Shuqrah lifted, and caravans ceased to be 
93molested*
When Sultan Muhsin heard that the Fadli chief intended to visit 
Aden to make peace with the British, he asked him to postpone his visit 
until 9th December, that both might go together* Meanwhile, he went 
to Aden alone on the 2nd* On his arrival, the Fadli sultan heard a 
rumour intentionally spread by the ’Abdali party in Aden that their 
chief was bound in irons and that Captain Haines had sworn to murder 
every Fadli once within the walls* When Haines heard this, he sent 
Sayyid ’Alawi Ibn Zayn, now head of the ’Aydarus family, and others to
138.
assure the Fadli eultan that the rumour was false and invited some
of hie men to see the truth for themselves. The truth was that the
•Abdali sultan was not imprisoned as rumoured, but when the Fadli
visitors went to tell the news to their chief they found that he had
oh
retired to Shaykh •Uthman for the night. Sultan Ahmad did not go
back to Aden, nor was he ever to visit it.
Sultan Muhsin returned home on 14th December, v/ithout agreeing
to Haines* terms for peace, i.e. an apology, two eons as hostages and
the restoration of all property seized in 1840 from inhabitants of
95Aden, with special reference to the family of Kasan al-Khatib. The 
bill tan was under no immediate pressure to come to terms with the 
British* He did not feel the loss of his stipend, since he could 
repay himself twofold by the increased taxes on supplies entering 
Aden. Unlike the Fadli chief, he had no port to be blockaded, nor 
did he see any prospect of the British marching on hie capital.
The only outcome of the Sultan*s visit was Ilaines* discovery 
that Muhsin Mays wac open to bribery, a fact which should not have 
caused Haines much surprise. Ways had agreed to persuade llainea to 
drop his second demand for peace with the Sultan. In return, the 
Sultan had promised to give two of his daughters in marriage to two 
of the Cayyid*® sons, together with the first payment of his stipend 
after peace had been made. There was also the astounding accusation
by the Sultan that Ways had connived at Hasan al-Khatib*s murder. On
c.7
these grounds Haines dismissed Ways as British agent*''
Muhsin was still determined on revenge, but as us.,^1 he needed 
outside help. His heir was married to the sister of tho Hawshabi 
chief, and he thought that if he (Muhsin) abdicated in Ahnadfs favour, 
his eon might, as Sultan, prevail on the Hawshabis to join the *Abdalie 
in an attack on Aden. Accordingly, he ,TabdicatedM again in February
qo
I8*f2; but when the stratagem failed, he resumed government.
The same month, Haines recommended that the Fadli chief should 
have his stipend restored now that ho had made peace, although he had 
not visited Aden. Lord Ellenborough, Auckland*s successor, thought
99that more time should pass to allow the chief to prove his good faith. 
However, Sultan Ahmad grew impatient. In July, he sent agents to tell 
Haines that Muhsin had offered him 07000 if he renewed his hostilities 
against the British, and he threatened to accept.^^ Haines, in turn, 
threatened him with a third blockade of Shuqrah, which made him
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decline the offer Then Muhsin offered Ahmad 012,000 and an
3L02
annual allowance if he joined him, but Ahmad still refused* In 
November, the Bombay Government, under Lieut*-Gen# Sir G# Arthur, 
agreed to restore Ahmad*s stipend backdated to 1st December, 1841, 
when he sued for peace
By this time, the wars in China and Afghanistan had been 
concluded, and Haines was encouraged to repeat his request for British 
power to be demonstrated by tho capture of Lahj, no^v' that troops 
could be spared* lie also repeated his old demand for two of Muhsin*s
IQlf
sons as hostages* The Bombay Government wrote back that if the
demand for hostages was the only obstacle to peace, it should not be
insisted upon*^0^
fortunately for Aden, late in 1842 and early in 1843, a number of
factors combined to force Muhsin to sue for peace* His son Ahmad
was anxious to treat with the British that he might have their support
against his half-brother *Abd Allah should their old father die
suddenly* Beports of British victories in China and Afghanistan
reached the interior and, according to Haines, awakened in the tribes
106**a more lively sense of our merits*1* A blood feud had broken out
between the *Abdalis and the Fadlis, and the presence of the 50
107irregular horse had already made itself felt*
On 11th February, 1843, Muhsin and Haines signed a new treaty 
which superseded that of 1839# Clauses 1, 6 and 9 of the old bond 
were incorporated in the new, but significantly Clause 7 (the mutual 
defence clause) was omitted* The nev; articles were:
1* The Sultan agreed to restore to the family of Hasan al-Khatib 
the property confiscated from them in l840«
2* lie also agreed to make restitution to others with similar 
claims*
3. The rate of transit duty was to be fixed, a moderate export 
duty levied, and the Sultan was not to put obstacles in the way of 
trade*
4* British subjects were allowed to visit Lahj for commerce and 
their religious practices, with the exception of cremation, were to be 
tolerated*
5* British subjects committing an offence in Lahj should be sent 
to Aden for jjunishment, and vice-versa*
8* Subjects of the E*I*C# and those of the Sultan could hold
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tenure of land in either territory*
10* Kestoration of the Sultan*s stipend was to be left to the108
discretion of Haines and the Government*
The stipend was not restored until a year later, and in that time
the Sultan showed little regard for the treaty* He did not make
restitution to the Khatib family, nor did he return to Aden, for trial,
Hindu subjects of the E*I*C* who fled to Lahj and there changed their
109religion to Islam* Yet he seemed anxious that the treaty should
be upheld after his death* In July, when he fell sick and thought
that his hour had come, he invited Cruttenden to visit him, that the
treaty might be re-affirmed in front of his heir-apparent and other
children* During this visit, the first to be paid to Lahj by an
Assistant Political Agent, the Sultan insinuated that he wanted his
stipend back*^^
When he did not get it, he started intriguing with the Fadli
chief and others to annoy the 33ritish. However, nothing came of his
scheming} but Haines, afraid that something night eventually
materialise, suggested that his subsidy be restored, aa this would
"quiet hie mind and check further intrigue and also convince him that
peaceable and friendly measures with the British are far more prudent
and beneficial than the course he had hitherto adopted"*^"*’
The Government agreed} but before paying the Sultan his stipend,
Haines required him to sign a document pledging himself to adhere to
the 184-3 agreement* This the Sultan did on 20th February, 1844} and,
as earnest of his good faith, he paid the Khatib family 02000 and
112promised to restore all their property* He was then granted his 
stipend backdated to 11th February, 1843} and he was in future to be 
paid monthly, on the 11th of each month* Peace made with the British, 
the Sultan pledged not to attack any of his neighbours for a whole
113year.
As it happened, peace lasted not only for one year, but for two 
and a half, and what disturbed it was an outside element* In August 
1846, Sayyid Isiua'il, a zealot from Mecca claiming supernatural powers 
like" Faqih before him, arrived in the vicinity of Aden with the avowed 
intention of dislodging "the Feringhis from the stronghold of Moslems"* 
Bhe Sayyid had with him about 3000 men, and was confident that he could 
take Aden within half an hour *
Sultan Muhsin, who was still unable to reconcile himself to the
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British presence in Aden, thought that his moment had at la/„ come#
His excitnent at the arrival of the Sayyid was so great that he
abdicated in his favour and augmented the Sayyid*s force by 1000 men*
The other tribes were at first unwilling to join in the venture* They
did not forget the episode of Faqih and preferred to go on trading
with Aden* However* they were finally won over to "the holy cause"
by Sayyid Muhsin Ways, now the sworn enemy of the British, and showed
their enthusiasm by increasing Isma*il*s force* The Fadlis sent 5^0
men, the *Aqrabis 60, and the Hawshabis 300# Until then the Ilawshabis
had been faithful to the British and on more than one occasion had
not allowed men to pass through their territory to join in attacks
on the Settlement*
In Aden, belief in Isma*il*s superhuman powers and fear of the
cataclysm that was to come caused about 1400 people to flee* Tho
Sayyid made three attacks on Aden, on the l?th, 26th and 2?th August*
and three times was beaten back* Quarrels then broke out among his
followers who rapidly dispersed* The Sayyid himself was given refuge
by the Fadli chief***"^
Tho immediate result of the August hostilities was that the
stipends of the *Abdali, Fadli and Hawshabi chiefs were stopped; the
*Aqrabi chief received no subsidy* As a further punishment, Haines
once again suggested the blockade of the *Aqrabi and Fadli bandars
during the trading season, which was about to start, and the destruction
115of the chiefs* castles, which necessitated an expedition inland*
In a vain attempt to prove to the tribes that Aden did not need them,
116Haines asked the Government for supplies from Bombay*
As was only to be expected, the Board in I3ombay, now headed by 
Acting Governor L*E* Eeid, sent no supplies, but sanctioned the 
blockade on their own responsibility and agreed to the expedition
117inland, subject to tho approval of Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General*
Hardinge did not approve of the expedition, being afraid that any
defeat or indecisive conflict might endanger the Settlement* "The
success of raising the investment is not an advantage of so much value
118
as to be purchased by a severe loss of men*"
The blockade commenced on 5th October, and its immediate effect 
was that the Fadli chief withdrew to defend Shuqrah as he had done on 
former occasions* Two other results were that the ’Aqrabi chief sued 
for peace and the merchants in the interior sent all their exports
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through Aden. The customs duties paid more than offset the cost of 
119
the blockade*
The closure of Shuqrah was severely felt by Sultan Ahmadf and 
on 4th November, through the *Aydarus sayyids, he applied for a three 
months* truce and suspension of the blockade* Haines did not agree, 
but proposed a permanent peace on three conditions; an apology, non­
interruption of traffic to and from Aden, and the expulsion of
120Sayyid Isaa’il* Tho Fadli sultan complied, and Ilaines expressed
121his hope that Sultern Muhsin would follow suit*
Sultan Muhsin, instead, attacked a Fadli caravan on its way
122back from Aden, and some lives were lost* Then he tried to detach
the Fadli chief from the British by offering him a sum of money
123equivalent to his curtailed stipend, but nothing came of this 
offer*
The Hawshabi sultan withdrew to his country immediately the
fighting was over* He did not apologise for his part in the
hostilities, nor did he approach Haines for his stipend. However,
Haines was certain that he would ask for pardon as soon as he heard
that the Fadli chief had been forgiven* In such a case, Haines wrote,
it would be in the British interest to accept his apology* Four of
the principal caravan routes passed through his territory, much of
the grain consumed in Aden came from his fields, and the fewer enemies
the Settlement had, the better. Therefore, in February 184?, Haines
recommended the restoration of his stipend as well as that of the
Fadli chief.12Zf
The Government, now headed by Sir G*R* Clerk, agreed, and
payment was to be made from the date Haines received the chiefs*
125overtures for peace* The Fadli sultan had made overtures in 
November 1846, but the Hawshabi chief did not* To keep him quiet, 
Muhsin, and then his son Ahmad, paid him his stipend until the Govern- 
ment agreed to its restoration in April 1848 at Haines* request.
The country round Aden remained peaceful until 8th June, 1847, 
when a caravan was plundered by *Abd Allah Ibn Muhsin assisted by some 
•Aqrabis and Subayhis* Haines protested to the Sultan, but he replied 
that his people did not listen to him and that he had no salary from 
the Government, implying that it was not his responsibility to protect 
the roads* Ilaines repeated his protest, and this time the Sultan 
promised to do all he could, but he reminded Haines that he was poor
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and his people did not respect him*
Haines commented that the Sultan was not as poor as he would
wish others to believe, having more than a lakh of dollars; he was
only anxious to get his stipend back, and Haines recommended its
restoration* This he did on the old grounds that its payment would
ensure peace and quiet and enable the Sultan to maintain his authority
over the minor chiefs* besides, his knowledge that the allowance would
be stopped for any breach of good faith would act as a check upon his 
127conduct* Clearly, this argument was not born of experience, but
was dictated by expediency*
The Government thought that Muhsin deserved no consideration,
but found it convenient to agree with Haines* argument* However, they
stipulated that before his stipend was restored, he should go to Aden
and ask pardon for his offences* If because of age or infirmity he
was unable to go, then his son was to represent him* Muhsin was to
be left in no doubt that if he ever again acted against the British,
his stipend would be irrevocably forfeited* The agreement of 184-3
128was to be reneived, and Article 3 implemented* Before the Governor- 
General authorised the payment of the allowance (4th December), the 
Sultan had died (29th November), and with his death ended a difficult 
period for the British in Aden*
The two main aims of British policy after the occupation of 
Aden were retention of the new possession and a guaranteed flow of 
supplies* In pursuit of the first aim, the Settlement was refortified 
and a spy system established* In furtherance of the second, the 
British adopted a conciliatory policy towards their neighbours, and 
the stipends were its most significant expression*
The tribes which were not in the immediate vicinity of Aden 
simply changed paymasters, and their relations with the Settlement 
were purely commercial* The Kawshabis were the only tribe which 
departed from this rule, and that was only in 1846* The relations of 
the British with their nearest neighbours fluctuated between active 
hostility and reluctant peace* The stipends failed to win the friend­
ship of the *Abdali and Fadli chiefs; they made little difference 
to their income, and when in abeyance they served only as a source 
of trouble*
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Sultan Muhsin was not sincere when he offered to place his 
country under British protection, but it was not because of this that 
the British turned down his offer; it was because they were against 
territorial expansion in the interior* However, for geographical and 
economic reasons, they sought from the beginning a special relation­
ship with the ’Abdali tribe# The mutual defence clause in the treaty 
with Sultan Muhsin and the stipulation in the treaties with the other 
chiefs that they should not commit depredations in Lahj or in Aden 
were the clearest manifestations of this desire#
The British hoped to use the 'Abdalis as intermediaries with 
the other tribes, but this hope was frustrated by the enmity of 
Sultan Muhsin who could not reconcile himself to the loss of Aden*
The Fadli chief, for religious reasons, bitterly resented the presence 
of the British in the area and, with Muhsin, tried all in his power 
to evict them# Yet, in spite of this hostility, the British did not 
give up Aden because of its value to them#
British policy was mainly defensive, with caution as its guide* 
Sometimes the authorities had problems more important than Aden, and 
they were always restrained from advancing into the interior by 
financial considerations and by the fear of becoming too deeply 
involved with the tribes* Haines was allowed only one expedition, and 
that did not take him far from the Settlement* In contrast, blockade 
was sanctioned without hesitation because it could be carried out 
cheaply and did not bring the British into direct contact with the 
Arabs*
The British were jealous for their honour and were anxious that 
the tribes should respect them. This explains their persistent 
demand for a public apology before concluding peace and the constant 
advocacy of force by Haines and, on occasion, by his superiors* In 
fact, Ilaines criticised the higher authorities for their reluctance 
to use force, but his criticism fell on deaf ears* Unable to pursue 
his strong-arm policy, he resorted to diplomacy#
The Settlement’s dependence on the interior for its supplies and 
Ilaines* dependence on Bombay for instructions were great drawbacks# 
However, they were compensated for by British military strength and 
Arab weakness* The British retained Aden, and trade with it never 
ceased for any great length of time, thanks to disunity among the 
tribes*
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CHAPTER VII.
SULTAN * ALI»
Sultan Muhsin was succeeded by his son Ahmad, and what was 
formerly required of the father was now required of the son# Ahmad 
came to Aden on 29th February, 1348, and on 8th March concluded with 
Ilaines a treaty similar to that of 1843. The only two new articles 
were 7 and 8. Article 7 implemented Article 3 of the 1843 treaty,
By it, the transit duty on all goods passing through Lahj was fixed 
at 2a>, and no duty was payable on the produce of tho territory itself. 
Under Article 8, the Sultan promised to encourage the cultivation of 
European and local vegetables. Article 2 in the new treaty was a 
restatement of Article 4 in the former one, with the addition that 
British subjects could now visit Lahj for pleasure as well as for 
commerce.
After tho signing of the treaty, Ahmad asked that the following 
articles be added:
1. That he should have a house in Aden to symbolise his friend­
ship v;ith the British and give him prestige among his neighbours.
Baines approved and recommended that a house costing not more than 
Rs. 10,000 be built for him at the Government’s expense in consider­
ation of his having foregone a large part of his revenue under the 
new treaty.
2. That a surveyor be sent to al-Hawtah to plan and aupervise the 
walling in of the town and the construction of a small fort on which 
six guns were to be mounted; the Sultan was to meet all expenses. 
Haines favoured the project and argued that, connected as Lahj was 
with Aden, it was necessary to afford security to merchants* property
cl v al-IIawtah#
3# That the Government should give him six twelve-pounder guns 
with carriages and ammunition. Haines did not comment on this request.
4. That all stipends, excluding that of the Fadli chief with 
whom he preferred to have no dealings, be paid through him, as this 
would give him greater control over the roads. Ilaines saw in this 
suggestion a great convenience to the British representative who had 
been paying the stipends since the dismissal of Muhsin Ways at the 
-L.nd of 1841. Besides, acceptance of this responsibility by the Sultan 
would make him "solely and wholly answerable for the general tran­
quillity of the neighbourhood". For these reasons Haines recommended 
the suggestion*
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5. That he and his territory be placed "under the protection
and advice of the British Government"* If Lahj wae invaded, the
British should assist him in repelling the invasion, and in return,
he would help them "in every way”. Haines* opinion was that if the
Sultan walled in his capital and mounted a few guns on the fort which
he proposed to build, it would not be possible for his neighbours to
trouble him. The Imam of San*a would then be the only power that he
would have reason to fear* Tho request, Haines remarked, was
X
tantamount to an offensive-defensive alliance, and he could have 
added "not like the one I suggested in 1840", i.e. one-sided.
The Government of Bombay declined the third request without any
comment and turned down the first as inexpedient* The fourth they
acceded to, provided that the stipends were distributed as originally
intended and the Sultan had no power to withhold payment without
authorisation* They agreed to the second request without any provisos,
and the fifth they thought should be brought to the special attention
of the Home Authorities, "for our relations at Aden seem **« to depend
2
as much upon contingencies in Europe as in India"*
The Supreme Government were in complete agreement with that of 
Bombay. On the fifth article they commented, "••• while friendly 
terms with this neighbouring chief are desirable, all engagements 
which would involve the British Government in his quarrels or 
difficulties are most objectionable"*^ The Home Authorities took the 
same view.**
Ahmad lived only to express his great disappointment ai the 
reception of his proposals, for he died of smallpox on l8th January, 1849. 
His successor was his brother *Ali, aged 29* *Ali repeated the request 
for an offensive-defensive article to be added to die new treaty, on 
the ground that the treaty was "entirely in favour of the English".
This was refused, and after some days of negotiation Ilaines had his 
way; the treaty was signed in duplicate on 7th May, and was ratified 
by the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, on 30th October*
None of the articles proposed by Ahmad was included in the treaty, 
but the Sultan of Lahj was entrusted with the jinyment of stipend money 
to the other chiefs, with the exception of the Fadli who continued to 
e paid through Sayyid *Alawi* By this arrangement, the special 
relationship between Aden and Lahj was further emphasised, and the 
pre-eminence of the *Abdali sultan acknowledged* The British now began
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the practice of dealing with the other tribes through the Sultans 
of Lahj,
Relations between Aden and the neighbouring tribes remained
amicable until 29th May, 1850. In the evening of that day, a boat
belonging to the E*I,C*,s steam frigate "Auckland” crossed to the
northern shore of the harbour, and the unarmed crew of seven, very
unwisely, landed to pick up shells, A group of "Aqrabis, led by one
al-Baghi Ibn ’Abd Allah, fired on them, killing a seaman and wounding
a boy. The wounded boy and a companion escaped death by running along
the shore until they came to the Barrier Gate, while the others swam
5to a water-boat which was nearby. The abandoned boat was plundered, 
Gultan Haydarah approved of the murder and helped al-Baghi to 
escape to tie Subayhi territory. Moreover, he took the murderer’s 
dependants into his own castle for protection, Ilaines retaliated 
by declaring the ’Aqrabi bandar closed to shipping, and this declar­
ation had for over four years the effect of an actual blockade. In 
addition, Haines decided to ignore the independence of the ’Aqrabi 
sultan and from now on he referred to him merely as "Shaykh", The 
pretext for "demoting" him was that he paid "tribute” to the ’Abdali 
sultan. In fact, the money which Haydarah paid was not tribute. It 
was no different from what the ’Abdali sultan himself had formerly 
paid to the other chiefs or what the British were now paying him and 
others. In all these cases, payment of money did not constitute 
vassalage, but was meant to ensure peace,
Haines wanted to make Haydarah subject to ’Ali because for some 
time he had been hostile to the British, while ’Ali had been friendly, 
and naturally Ilaines wished to see the ’Aqrabi territory in friendly 
hands. When he reported the "Auckland" incident, the circumstances 
were favourable for the ’Abdalis to regain possession of Bir Ahmad,
The ’Aqrabis had for a few months past been dissatisfied with their 
Sultan’s conduct, and the chief’s sons themselves had been openly at 
enmity with their father.
Having decided that Haydarah was subject to the ’Abdali sultan, 
Haines demanded that ’Ali should remove him and appoint another in his 
place. The new shaykh should be "a man who will not only inculcate 
the resjject due to British subjects, but check and punish plunderers1'# 
Haines also required that ’Ali should arrest al-Baghi and hand hint 
over, 'Ali, who had no authority over Haydarah, was flattered at
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Ilaines' request that he should punish him, for he (and later his 
brother Fadl) saw in it recognition of 'Abdali sovereignty over the 
'Aqrabis.
The 'Abdali sultan went to Bir Ahmad with 800 men to seize 
al-Baghi, When he found that he had fled, he demanded and obtained 
hostages for his recapture, 'Ali made no attempt to dismiss Haydarah, 
and Haines excused him to the Government by stating that it was
g
difficult to find a successor,
Haydarah resented 'Ali's action and retaliated by closing the 
Hiswah wells, a source of 'Abdali income. Immediately 'Ali heard this, 
he proceeded with 900 men to the hamlet of Baylah, and from there 
sent twenty horsemen to Bir Ahmad, presumably to warn Haydarah, A 
skirmish followed in which Haydarah's brother-in-law and two others 
were killed* Haydarah himself narrowly escaped and took refuge in 
the castle,
'Ali knew that ho could not take the castle i</ith his o\m means,
7
and therefore he tried to secure Haydarah by bribery. When he failed,
he asked Ilaines for two guns and a few gunners to destroy the castle,
but Ilaines told him that for this the sanction of "superior authority" 
8was necessary. Then 'Ali asked the Kawshabis and Yafi'is for
assistance, while Haydarah called in the Subayhis,
After a series of daily attacks on Bir Ahmad, Haydarah offered
peace terms, but these were declined, and the roads to the village 
a
were blocked* Fadl, 'Ali's brother and successor, burnt a few huts
on the fringe of Bir Ahmad and the hamlet where al-Baghi had lived*
The inhabitants, who were suffering from a scarcity of food, sued for
peace on 24th August, but their offer was rejected until the murderer 
10was delivered up. The murderer was in the Subayhi country and
could not be delivered up.
'Ali was still determined to subdue the 'Aqrabis, and his belief
in the victory of numbers made him persuade the Fadlis to join his
already large army. On 4th January, 1851, nearly 3000 men in his pay
besieged Bir Ahmad, Tho following day, leading a force of more than
111000 'Abdalis with two old guns, he took up position three or four 
hundred yards from the castle, and firing started. The castle was 
partly damaged; and while tho force was preparing to storm it,
Haydarah and his men surrendered. The loss on 'All's side was four 
men, and on Haydarah's eight, including a brother* 'Ali exacted from
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the 'Aqrabis an indemnity of #1800 and made them supply his army 
with food for the time it was at Bir Ahmad (4th-9th January),
The 'Abdali sultan sought Ilaines* advice as to what he should do 
next, and Haines advised:
1, That he allow the unoffending inhabitants to return to their 
homes after they had sworn allegiance to him,
2, That he permit them to trade freely with Aden and all
neighbouring villages.
3, That he destroy the 'Aqrabi castle and not allow another to 
rise in its place.
4, That he take Haydarah and his nearest relations as prisoners 
to Lahj and keep them there until al-Baghi was surrendered.
5, That he build a tower at al-Hiswah and place guards in it,
The Sultan took back with him to al-Hawtah eight 'Aqrabi chiefs,
12but not Haydarah himself. He did not destroy the castle at
Bir Ahmad, but he built a fort at al-Hiswah in August 1852. When
13Cruttenden visited him early in March 1851, he discussed with him
the situation at the 'Aqrabi village. The Sultan told the Assistant
Political Agent that the 'Aqrabis were now reunited with the 'Abdalis 
and that Haydarah had been deposed in favour of his son Fadl, Signif­
icantly, however, the Sultan could not vouch for their continued 
submission.
Cruttenden was of the same opinion and intimated that the 'Aqrabis
were reconciled to their position only because Ilaydarah was "no longer
of sound mind" and his son was too young to bo an effective leader;
Fadl's age was not given. When Cruttenden asked 'Ali why he did not
destroy the castle, he replied that it was not an Arab custom to
14
destroy a fort once its garrison had surrendered.
From what 'Ali said and did it is clear that he was not willing 
(and for good reason) to go as far as the British would have wished in 
punishing the 'Aqrabis, The 'Abdalis were divided, and Haydarah's 
imprisonment might have created for the Sultan troubles with his own 
and other tribes. The writer, in fact, doubts that Haydarah was 
removed; 'Ali could not remove him even if he was one of his clan 
chiefs. In Arabia, it was easier to kill a chief than to remove him.
It is true that Ilaydarah was old, but there is no evidence that he 
suffered from senility or any other mental disorder. When the 
opportunity presented itself, he seized it and re-asserted his 
independence.
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The tribes* hatred of the Christians manifested itself again in 
1851* On 2nd March of that year, a party of officers from the garrison, 
which was in Lahj for a few days* hunting, retired to l/aht, a village 
inhabited entirely by sayyids, where the Sultan had put a house at 
their disposal* In the party was the Deputy Assistant Commissary, 
Captain G#J*B* Milne, and the house was near that of one Sayyid Ilusayn* 
The Sayyid was not at home when the officers arrived* When he 
came back in the evening, he felt insulted that "infidels" were given 
a house near his* At night, while the officers were asleep, after 
unwisely dismissing their guard, Husayn attacked them with hie dagger, 
killing Captain Milne and wounding two others*
Husayn fled to the Hawshabi country where Sultan Mani* imprisoned 
him, probably intending to return him to Sultan 9All. However, the 
Sayyid, who was not chained, escaped to the Fadli territory where 
Sultan Ahmad gave him asylum* This act of the Fadli chief ended four 
years of good relations with the British and started a period of 
hostility which was to last until 185%
As Sayyid Husayn was an inhabitant of Lahj, Haines asked 
Sultan *Ali to secure him and deliver him up for punishmentj if that 
could not be done, he was to arrest any member of hi; family* Accord­
ingly, the Sultan imprisoned four inhabitants of Waht, two of whom 
were distant relations of the S a y y i d , a n d  charged the rest with the 
responsibility of bringing back their kinsman* A delegation of twelve 
then went to the Fadli sultan and implored him to hand over the 
murderer to them, but he refused* *Ali did not execute the four 
prisoners as he had threatened* They, and the ‘Aqrabi hostages before 
them, were probably detained for a while and then set free* The 
Sultan knew well the dangers of becoming involved in a blood feud*
Haines, with the two murders in mind, asked permission to destroy 
the castle of Bir Ahmad and every building in Waht with the exception 
of the mosque "as a memento of our vengeance"* He asserted that 
"nothing else will suffice to instil the necessary dread into the minds 
of such a people as those bordering on Aden"* He argued that similar 
crimes might be committed if the Government persisted in "too lenient 
a policy towards men unable to comprehend other than brute courage and 
the force of arms, and it does, I respectfully point out appear to me 
wiser to offer a summary instance of our displeasure than subject 
ourselves to be termed cowards to their rising generation*
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The Political Agent had occasion "to offer a sumary instance of 
his displeasure’1 before March was over* Gultan Ahmad’s brother, Salah, 
and Gultan 'Ali’s half-brother, 'Abd Allah, and brother-in-law,
Sayyid Muhsin Ways, once British agent in Lahj, had conspired to kill 
Haines* To carry out their plan, they chose one Salim Ibn Sa’id*
Salim succeeded in smuggling his dagger into Aden; and on 26th March, 
he saw the Political Agent driving with his wife on the road from 
Tawahi to the town; but as Haines was armed, he did not attack* Then 
another officer, who was also armed, passed that way without being 
attacked*
The following morning Lieut* Delisser of the 7Sth Highlanders 
was riding unarmed from the town to Tawahi* Salim beckoned to him as 
if he had a message to convey* Immediately the officer stopped, Salim 
secured the reins of his horse and stabbed him in the back and arms* 
Delisser however dismounted, grappled with his assailant and killed 
him with his own weapon*
By 1846, most of the horses which were sent from India had died*
In 184-7, both the Political Agent and tho Commander of the Garrison 
gave it as their opinion that the cavalry troop could be safely with­
drawn, as they expected no further trouble. Now when Haines reported 
the attempt on Delisser*s life, he asked that a body of 30 or 50 
horse be sent to Aden for the same reasons which he had given in 
l84l after tho murder of the Interpreter* The Political Agent also 
informed the Government that as a warning to would-be assassins he
had hung Salim’s body in chains just inside the Barrier Gate, where
17it was seen by all people coming from the interior*
In Bombay, Willoughby condemned Haines* action as being against
18
"the spirit of the age"* The Governor, Falkland, and D*A* Blane,
too, did not agree with it, but recommended the Military Department
to consider Haines’ request for horse in the light of the reported 
19incident* Nothing came of this recommendation, and the question 
was not revived until the middle of 1855, as will be seen*
On the subject of destroying Bir Ahmad and Waht, Falkland did not 
share Haines' revengeful feelings; "Had the assassin been abetted and 
employed by the inhabitants of those places, there might be some colour 
for such an act of vengeance; but to visit a deed of one execrable 
wretch upon the heads of numbers who in this matter at least must be 
held to be perfectly innocent would not, I conceive, be defensible in
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20justice or sound policy.” The Governor considered the Sultan of
Lahj blameless, but since the Sayyid was his subject, Raines was to
demand that he should either deliver him up to British justice or
execute him himself. If the Sultan failed to co-operate, he was to
be treated as an enemy.^*
Dalhousie, too, was not for collective punishment. In anewer to
Haines* fear that the new generation of Arabs would grow up believing
that the British were cowards if such a policy was not adopted, he
wrote on 21st Aprils "To visit these people with fire and sword, under
such circumstances, would be unjust and savage. His Lordship does not
believe that even an Arab tribe would regard our abstinence from such
a proceeding as a proof of cowardice* But if they should do so, it
will be infinitely more for our honour and for the power of our name
that we should submit to be unjustly suspected of cowardice, than
that we should convict ourselves of injustice and cruelty.”
The Governor-General did not think that the Sultan was required
to hand Husayn over to the British, but he thought that •All himself
should execute him within a reasonable time to be fixed by the Governor
of Bombay, and with the knowledge of the Political Agent. If this
was not done, the Sultan’s stipend should be withdrawn, friendly
relations with him broken off, and he should be informed that the
Government would take whatever additional measures they might deem 
22necessary.
For the execution of Husayn, Falkland, on 3rd Kay, fixed a period
of two months, and ho left it to circumstances to determine whether
23the period should be extended. The *Abdali, Hawshabi and Fadli
stipends had been suspended by Haines immediately after the murder of
24Captain Milne| the ’Abdali, to hasten the capture of the murderer?
the Hawshabi, because Gultan Kani* had allowed the murderer to escape?
25and the Fadli, because Sultan Ahmad had given him shelter.
On receipt of India’s letter dated 21st April and Bombay’s dated
3rd Kay, Haines acquainted Sultan *Ali with their contents. ’Ali
replied that Husayn was in the Fadli territory, and there was nothing
he could do. Haines then wrote to the Fadli chief demanding the
surrender of Husayn to ’Ali. Ahmad, who by the middle of Kay was also
harbouring al-Baghi, answered that to deliver up a fugitive was against
26
Arab laws and customs, and this he could not possibly do.
In view of Ahmad’s refusal to comply with British demands, the
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Governor-General, now knowing that his stipend had already been 
stopped, ordered its suspension. If he retaliated by force, "British 
power must be put forth for his punishment. .... We have acted with 
justice and moderation in this matter? but having been compelled to 
resort to arms, we are now justified in using them in such a manner 
as shall be intelligible to barbarous tribes. ... His Lordship 
conceives that the Government should not be content with levelling 
a tower or tv/o near the coast; but that it should direct its officers 
to carry fire and sword into the lands of the Foutheli tribe, and to 
inflict upon them the utmost severity of punishment in their persons 
and property, which may not be inconsistent with the dictates of 
humanity."^
In the light of Balhousie’s opposition to violence and collective 
punishment in the case of V/aht, one may be tempted to think that the 
quotation above represented a change of attitude. The fact is that 
it was a reaction to a different situation. The people of V/aht were 
not involved in the murder and this Dalhousie recognised. In Ahmad’s 
refusal to surrender the murderer, he saw a defiance which he could 
not understand or tolerate.
Dalhousie left the details of the campaign to his subordinate in
Bombay and expressed his opinion that the interests of Sultan ’Ali
28would make him an ally. Falkland directed Haines to make on the 
Sultan the impossible demand that he should secure both murderers and 
surrender them to the British, or punish them himself in a manner 
fitting their crime. Without saying how, he instructed Haines to 
support ’Ali in his efforts if necessary and, at the sane time, to 
warn him that the Governs int "will not suffer him to remain neutral".
If ’Ali replied that he was willing, but unable, to comply with 
the request, the men being in the Fadli territory, Haines was to 
demand the same from the Fadli sultan, making it clear that the British 
were determined on revenge. If Ahmad showed that he would rather 
resort to violence than do what he was asked, it was Haines’ duty to 
weigh and consider, with the Garrison Commander, what the next step 
should be. Haines was to give the Commander all the information avail­
able on the fighting strength of the enemy, the points where he could 
best be attacked, the extent of the country to be traversed and its 
food resources. If it was thought that a detachment could be spared 
to make an expedition inland, it should be undertaken immediately*
20*+*
If that was not possible, Haines was to inform the Government what
he required for the expedition and when it could be made* If
reinforcements were necessary, they would be sent to Aden when the
29north-east monsoon set in (in October)*
Before Haines had time to carry out these instructions, two more 
European seamen were murdered* At sunset on 12th July, 1851, the 
’’Sons of Commerce”, a merchant vessel carrying coal from England, ran 
aground twelve miles to the east of Aden, in Fadli territory* In 
the morning, the crew of sixteen took to the boats and having rowed for 
three hours in the direction of Aden, beached them, presumably in 
'Abdali territory* The captain and four Een made their way to Aden 
on foot, leaving the chief officer and the rest of the crew to guard 
the stores* A band of ‘Uzaybis led by one Salah al-Sumali attacked 
them, killing the chief officer and a sick seaman{ the remainder 
fled to Aden*
Haines immediately reported the incident to Sultan *Ali and
demanded that he should secure the culprits and inflict upon them the
30punishment they deserved* *Ali secured tho ringleader, and on 
23rd July his agent came to Aden to tell Ilaines that Salah was under 
guard, but that his punishment would bring the Sultan into collision 
with his most powerful clans, the *Uzaybis and Sallamis, the prisoner 
being a man of consequence* Haines replied that the murderer*b 
importance was beside the point; he cared only to see justice done* 
i-hen the two months fixed for the surrender of Sayyid Husayn and 
al-Baghi expired, ilaines asked Sultan *Ali whether he was willing to 
comply with the Government*c demand or not* As expected, *Ali answered 
that he was, but tho men were in his enemy*s territory and he could not 
attack the Fadlis because he was not certain of the loyalty of some 
divisions of his own tribe* Ilaines again requested Sultan Ahmad to
31deliver the murderers to Sultan *Ali for trial, but again he refused* 
Subsequently, Haines suggested to *Ali that the *Abdalis should 
march with the British against the Fadlis, but *Ali did not agree; 
his tribe was disaffected, and the British could not tell friend from 
foe* Ilaines replied that a badge could be worn as a distinguishing 
mark but left the matter there, as he was not ready to negotiate 
further until he received from tho Sultan a signed document stating to 
what extent ho was prepared to assist in the punishment of the Fadlis* 
The Sultan wrote that he was prepared to supply the expedition
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with camels, bullocks and jowari - all at a fair price* He also
undertook to keep the roads safe and to send to Aden all Fadlis who
might flee to Lahj during the fighting* Haines did not answer because
he had heard, and believed, that Sayyid Husayn had recently spent two
days in Uaht, with the knowledge of the Sultan who had made no effort
to secure him*^
As for the expedition inland, in July Haines wrote a hurried
letter stating that he and the Commander of the Garrison, Brig* D* Forbes,
were agreed that it could not be mounted immediately* The country
to be traversed was sandy, the heat was intense and only a very small
portion of the garrison could be spared for immediate action due to
33poor health among the troops*
On 11th August, the Political Agent sent a detailed report on 
the subject# The earliest possible date for the attack would be the 
first week in November, by which time the weather v/ould be cool and 
reinforcements would have arrived*. The troops would be transported 
by sea to the Fadli country* Having punished the Fadlis, they would 
return to Aden for a brief rest and then march inland to al-Hawtah, if 
by then the Sultan had not fulfilled the British demand# In such a 
case, however, the Government must remember Mthat two thirds of our 
supplies are furnished by them (the *Abdalis) and that in desolating 
their country we are inflicting a heavy punishment on ourselves”*
The Government must also bear in mind that great care would be necessary 
to see that the punishment was felt as lightly as possible by the poor 
peasants, hundreds of whom were British subjects, having come originally 
from India as labourers, and then settled in Lahj as they were allowed 
to do under the treaties of 18^3 and l8*+9*
With regard to Vlaht, Haines now recommended only the destruction 
of Sayyid Husayn*s house and the one where Captain Fdlne was
34
murdered* The *Aqrabi castle, he thought, must be destroyed# The 
fighting strength of all the neighbouring tribes he estimated at 
116,000, a highly inflated estimate#^
In Bombay, the members of the Board wrote separate minutes on 
Ilaines* report and all expressed satisfaction that the Fadli chief 
had not committed any hostile act in spite of the stoppage of his 
stipend* Falkland did not think that Sultan Ahmad would resort to 
violence and hoped that he would deliver up the murderers to *Ali, and 
that *Ali would execute them# If this happened, the affair would be
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brought to a satisfactory conclusion and all cause of conflict 
removed*
The Governor was anxious for a peaceful settlement because he 
interpreted Jalhousie*s instructions as requiring him to send an 
expedition against the Fadlis, not only if they interrupted traffic 
v/ith Aden, but also if they refused to surrender the murderers* As 
for *Ali, Falkland thought that if he was playing the British false, 
a force similar to that of 1841 could be cent to al-Eawtah, and he 
agreed with Haines as to what this force should do* In the mean tine, 
the garrison should be permanently strengthened to deal with any
possible contingency, such as internal insurrection, external
36aggression or stoppage of supplies*
Lieut#-Gen# Gir John Grey, the Commander-in-Chiof, differed v/ith
Falkland in his interpretation of the Governor-General*s instructions#
He understood that force was to be used against the Fadlis only if
they interrupted the flow of supplies into Aden. In refusing to
deliver up the murderers who sought his protection, Sultan Ahmad was
simply following a time-honoured custom, and this did not justify
an attack on him. However, if he resorted to violence, he should be
punished, but not before all efforts of diplomacy had failed*
Grey gave a number of reasons why no attack should be rnade on the
Fadli; if it could be avoided. In Aden, the British were surrounded
by "ht..'if-savage tribes” able, according to Haines, to turn out 120,000 
37fighting men* In spite of their feuds, they would unite when "their 
national or fanatical prejudices" were roused, as they might be by an 
attack on the Fadlis. Haines did not think that the tribes would 
meet the British face to face in the plain, and it was out of the 
question to follow them into the hills* In the event of a confront­
ation, the Fadlis would have little to lose# The British could 
destroy their rude towers and miserable villages in the plain, but 
Cruttenden, whom Grey described as "an officer of great Arabian
•2p
experience", believed that this would have a negligible effect* The 
trouble which the tribes could cause in return might force the British 
to give up Aden as being too expensive*
Grey took Sultan Ahmad*s quietness as a proof that he did not 
intend hostilities, and insinuated that he could be won over by 
financial inducements* With regard to Sultan *Ali, his punishment 
presented no great problem# His district v/as near to Aden; and if
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it became necessary to march against him, no large force would be 
required. Unlike the Fadli chief, he had a wealthy town which he 
knew the British could destroy. This knowledge and the stoppage of 
his stipend might make him, out of consideration for his own interest, 
co-operate in bringing the murderers to justice*
The Commander-in-Chief did not agree with Falkland that the 
garrison should be increased. He quoted Haines as having no fear of 
an internal insurrection and argued that the arrival of reinforcements 
might arouse the suspicions of the tribes and provoke them into acts 
of hostility*^
The other two members of the Board, Blane and A. Bell, agreed
40
with Grey that no increase to the garrison was necessary# All
thought that there was no urgency in preparing for the expedition in
view of tho prevailing quiet# Their decision was that they should
wait for Ilaines* next report and further instructions from the
Governor-General.
The instructions were never issued, for soon letters arrived from
London putting an end to any thought of an expedition# The Secret
Committee, i.e. Mobhousa (now Lord Broughton), in a letter dated
6tli August, opposed any military action against tho Fadli sultan
except "under circumstances of extreme necessity" and considered the
41
stopping of his stipend sufficient punishment#
In private letters to both Dalhousie and Falkland, dated
7th August, 1851, Broughton repeated his official instructions and
gave reasons for the cancellation of the expedition. In his letter
to Dalhousie, he disclosed that he did not trust the Bombay Government
or Captain Haines with the operation, fearing that they would go too
far# Haines, he wrote, was "a respectable officer, but I should not
like to trust him with any service requiring great discretion, or to
allow him to command in chief during a little war in Arabia'*#
Like Grey, Broughton showed understanding of the Fadli chief*s
42
refusal to surrender the men who had sought refuge with him* He 
thought that in addition to stopping the chief’s stipend, members of 
his tribe should be banned Irom Aden. The "circumstances of extreme 
necessity" under which force could be used were defined in both letters* 
Force was to be used only if the Fadli chief committed aggression 
within British limits or against the Sultan of Lahj. In his letter 
to Falkland, Broughton was careful to point out that the Cabinet
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agreed with him as to the inexpediency of military operations against 
43the Fadlis*
The letters from London were a great disappointment to Dalhousie
who was eager to send a force against the Fadlis* Before he received
the Bombay minutes and the London letters, he repeated privately to
Falkland that the force "should do all the mischief they can, however*
consistent with humanity* With such gentry (the Arabs) you must deal
44
according to their notions rather than ours".
45Now Dalhousie wrote resignedly, ”*•• we must obey orders’*, and
46later he described these orders as "weak and unwise"* The stoppage
47of the chief’s stipend, he thought, would only increase hie hostility*
In September, Dalhousie wrote privately to Broughton that the 
Fadli chief had shown signs of submission, but he doubted that the
48policy of "quiescence" would succeed* In Uovember, Broughton 
answered that he did not consider the murder of Captain Kilne as 
sufficient reason for ”a costly scuffle with the ragamuffins in 
Arabia •*•« No great harm will t^ isue if the unavenged death of poor
Captain Kilne prevents officers indulging their fondness for field
49sports at the hazard of their lives*” Broughton suggested to
Dalhousie that he could not possibly have meant to wage a war against
tho Fadlis in order only to avenge M i n e ’s death, and added* "We
do not want another Kafir war - one is quite enough*
When it became known in Aden that the expedition had been
cancelled, Ilaines recommended, as the wisest policy, the continuation
of friendly relatione with the Sultan of Lahj, Thus the roads would
51remain open and prices stable* With respect to al-Baghi and Husayn, 
he continued to press for their execution or surrender, but to no 
avail* The men were in the Fadli territory, and the Fadli chief was 
not willing to execute them himself or hand them over to be executed 
by others*
By comparison, the case of Salah was simple* He was in the hands
of his own sultan; and reluctant as *Ali was to execute him for fear
52of the consequences, he finally did so (22nd October), under pressure 
from Haines and motivated by his own interests* ’Ali had Salah killed 
secretly after he had bribed some influential chiefs to overlook the 
deed, but Haines was told that the execution was public. The *Uzaybis, 
Salah*s clan, had no doubt why and by whom their kinsman was killed* 
Ffforts to convince them that he was not murdered by the Sultan were
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were in vain, and they retaliated by killing a man from al-Hawtah,
probably of ’Ali's clan, the Lallamie*
As was to be expected, the whole ’Abdali tribe was soon involved
in a great conflict which resulted in the loss of seventeen lives*
The Sultan himself was forced to spend a great amount of money to
strengthen his authority which had been weakened by his submission
to the demands of "infidels”* ^  The "infidels” themselves greatly
appreciated what ’Ali had done, and rewarded him by restoring his
stipend and giving him, as a present, a small three-pounder gun* At
the same time, payment of the Iiawshabi stipend was resumed*
Another murder attempt on British ground was made in June 1852*
A sepoy who happened to be outside the Barrier Gate was attacked and
wounded by a man of the ’Aqrabi tribe, Haines reported the incident 
54to ’Ali who enquired what help he could expect if he were to attack
55the ’Aqrabis and destroy their castle* Ilaines gave no answer, but 
referred the subject to the Government of Bombay who directed him to
find out what kind of help the Sultan needed without raising his
. 56hopes*
The Sultan asked for a gun, ammunition and a number of artillery­
men without specifying whether they should be British or Indian* 
However, Ilaines took it for granted that they should be British, and 
advised against their going into the interior because they could not 
be safe on account of their being Christian. Some tribesmen might
also like to avenge their relatives who were killed in the attacks 
57on Aden* The murder of Captain Milne must have been uppermost in 
Haines’ mind at the time*
’Ali’s desire to take extreme action against the ’Aqrabis was not 
prompted by the attempt on a sepoy’s life, but by Huydarah’s decision 
to stop paying him the annual sun of #330* The ’Aqrabi chief, who 
had been subdued for over a year, now rebelled with the assistance of 
Bultan Ahmad, Later it transpired that the Fadli chief had agreed 
to protect the ’Aqrabis in return for half tho revenue of their bandar 
when it was re-opened.
In 1853, the Gubayhis joined the ’Aqrabis and Fadlis in annoying 
the British and their allies the ’Abdalis, using Bir Ahmad as their 
headquarters* ’Ali begged Haines for help against them and reminded
him of the now established fact that "Aden and Lahedge are equally
58bound up in each other’s interests", Haines knew that, but was
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powerless to help# He thought that the whole matter could be settled
59If ’Ali gave Ahmad a sum of money# However, ’Ali refused to pay 
blackmail*
On 21st May, in conjunction with the ’Aqrabis, Ahmad attacked the
fort at al-Hiswah with a view to occupying it# His bombardment
breached it in three places, and its guard, whose supply of powder was 
nearly exhausted, were in a difficult position# They made a spirited 
defence in the hope that assistance from al-Hawtah was on its way to 
them, but no assistance arrived* There was treachery within the 
’Abdali tribe and the Sultan’s African guard refused to march with
him on the ground that they were supposed only to protect the capital#
The loss of al-Hiswah to the Fadlis would have been a great 
disgrace to ’Ali, and more significantly from the British point of 
view, it would have enabled Ahmad to cut off the water from the 
garrison and shipping in the harbour, a contingency which Haines feared 
and was determined to prevent# Fortunately for him, the schooner 
”Mahi” and the sloop of war ’’Elphinstone” happened to be at Aden# He 
sent the schooner and two boats from the sloop across the harbour to 
protect the watering place# The Fadlis shot at the vessels and the 
vessels returned the fire, driving the tribesmen back with the loss 
of six killed and fifteen wounded* Thus the ’Abdali guard were saved, 
in time, the humiliation of surrender, and the British averted a 
possible danger#
The Fadlis did not disperse after their repulse, but remained in 
the area, and the ’’Mahi" was detained as a precaution which proved 
necessary# On 2Ath ISay, they made another attack, but a few round- 
shots from the schooner sent them away# Meanwhile Sultan ’Ali 
approached his Yafi’i counterpart for assistance# The Yafi’i sultan, 
now Ahmad Ibn ’Ali Ibn Ghalib, sent him 600 men#
The Fadli sultan, realising that he could not take al-Hiswah, and 
fearing that the Yafi’is might take Ja’walah which he had wrested from 
them twenty years earlier, moved with the main body of his force to 
'Imad, on the ’Abdali border# From there he hoped to defend Ja’walah 
and at the same time to indulge in aggressive activities against Lahj# 
However, the Yafi’is reached the village and retook it on 27th May, 
v/hile he was still marching to ’Imad# When he heard this news,
Sultan Ahmad retreated in great anger# Then, at the instigation of 
the sayyids and moved by the spirit of Ramadan, the ’Abdalis and Fadlis
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concluded a month’s truce which took effect from the middle of June
__ 60
and was observed by the other tribes as well*
Hardly had the truce terminated when the Yafi’is made a foray 
into the Fadli territory, and the ’Awlaqis threatened to sweep through 
it in the direction of Lahj# ’Ali welcomed this threat; and to 
encourage the ’Awlaqis to maintain their hostile attitude, he paid 
them 01000# With the help of the two tribes he hoped to weaken the
Fadlis to such an extent that in the future the ’Abdalis could
chastise them on their own#^
In July, the Yafi’is strengthened their garrison at Ja’walah by 
150 men and dispatched a large force southward close to the Fadli 
border# The ’Awlaqis were congregating as if for action# The Fadli 
sultan was alarmed by these movements and decided to make peace with 
the ’Abdalis, For this purpose, he requested the sayyids of his 
tribe and Sayyid 'Alawi of Aden to meet him at ’Imad* When the news 
reached ’Ali, he called his sayyids for a conference at al-Hawtah#
The ’Aqrabis, apprehensive as to the outcome of the discussions
between the two big tribes, took the precaution of enlisting the
62support of the Subayhis#
Negotiations between the ’Abdalis and Fadlis were held at ’Imad 
from 2nd to 6th August, with Sayyid ’Alawi as mediator# Sultan Ahmad 
argued that if the ’Aqrabis were to be reunited with the ’Abdalis, 
as ’Ali and Haines had been demanding, he would lose a potential 
source of income. To forego it, he required that ’Ali should pay 
him a lump sum of 0700 and resume payment of his stipend# ’Ali did 
not agree to either demand# Nevertheless, the two tribes agreed on 
a truce of twelve months, three months being allowed for settling 
the Bir Ahmad question.^
At the end of September, the Fadli sultan again demanded his 
stipend from ’Ali# ’Ali sent his agent to ask Haines for advice, 
and Haines advised that he should keep his neighbour quiet by . 
procrastination until his tribe had gathered in their crop towards 
the end of December and then he could tell him what he pleased.
SkMeanwhile, he should prepare himself to protect his own villages#
Late in October Salah the Fadli arrived at Shaykh ’Uthman with 
100 men, and from there sent a messenger to Sultan ’Ali to remind him 
that the three months were nearly over and that his decision on the 
question of Bir Ahmad was awaited. The ’Abdali sultan immediately
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wrote to Sayyid ‘Alawi to negotiate with Salah on his behalf, which
he did. Sayyid ‘Alawi used dilatory tactics, the ‘Abdali sayyids
gave Salah a small present, and the question of Bir Ahmad was not 
65settled#
In November, the Fadli sultan made it known to 'Ali that he
intended to interrupt trade with Aden if his claims were not met#
The sayyids tried to make peace between the two sultans, but they
failed; 'Ali refused to pay# Haines, not for the first time since .
the Hiswah affair, urged him to come to terms with his enemy# The
Political Agent was certain that 'Ali could not win# His tribe i*as
disunited, and his African guard would not fight outside al-Hawtah#
If he were to hire soldiers from other tribes, ho would have to pay
them and feed them while in his service and give them presents on
their departure# The mercenaries would not be able to beat the Fadlis,
and thus ‘Ali would ultimately have to pay their chief# The fighting
would diminish 'Ali*s revenue by interrupting traffic, which must have
worried Haines more than anything else#
Notwithstanding, 'Ali was determined to ret.Lc;t; and to assist
him in case of a Fadli invasion, ho engaged a division of the Yafi'i
tribe#^ As it happened, in nid-lecember the Fadlis invaded the
'Abdali territory with the intention of cutting down the grain. A
combined force of 'Abdalis and Yafi'is challenged them and succeeded
in holding them at bay# Then news reached the Fadli sultan that the
'Awlaqis intended to make an inroad into his territory, and this news
changed the aspect of affairs# Sultan Ahmad with 150 men marched to
Bir Ahmad, and the rest, under his brother Salah, returned to protect
their country# Thus the 'Abdali crop was saved, and Haines*
predictions were proved wrong*
'Ali was encouraged and decided to press home his advantage# He
asked Haines for a steamer to take 500 of his men to Shuqrah, but
Ilaines told him that he could not grant him his request, that the
'Abdalis could gain nothing by vrar and that peace was the best policy#
In the mean time, Fadl, a brother of Sultan Ahmad, wrote to 'Ali
guaranteeing the safety of caravans going to Aden# 'Ali sent the
letter to Ilaines for his comments# The Political Agent thought that
it could be a good move towards a truce, and ‘Ali's advisers were of 
67the same opinion# (
A truce was agreed upon for eleven days, during which the sayyids
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were to arrange a more permanent peace# This they failed to do; and 
on 11th January, 185^ t after the truce was over, a meeting took place 
between Fadl Ibn Muhsin and Haines, at which the former made his 
brother's wishes known# Fadl said that as long as the castle of 
Bir Ahmad stood to shelter the Fadlis and Subayhis, there would be 
no peace# Therefore, his brother wanted the British to destroy it 
or to lend him a gun and the services of a few artillerymen for the 
purpose, a request which he had made in 1852# If the British did not 
help, 'Ali would be blameless if the roads were closed# Fadl reminded 
Haines that his brother had already spent 030,000 in his attempt to 
keep the roads safe and to bring the murderers to justice#
•All's excuse for not destroying the castle himself was very weak#
He said, "The Arabs ### would not march against walls or break stones;• 
All that the 'Abdalis could do to the 'Aqrabis was to burn their stores 
of wood or kirbl# "The Arabs" in 1851 did, under 'Ali's own leader­
ship, "march against walls" and were successful# In 185^, 'Ali's two 
big guns may not have been operational, and he may have been unwilling 
or unable to hire a large mercenary force as lie did in 1851# Besides, 
he now had the Fadlis to contend with as well as the 'Aqrabis#
Ilaines, not unexpectedly, told Fadl that British assistance for 
the destruction of Bir Ahmad required the sanction of "superior 
authority", and that he would forward his request to Bombay. He 
advised against burning wood and klrbi# as this would only harm the 
poor, increase feuds and interrupt traffic#
Viith Fadl's consent, the Political Agent sent for the 'Aqrabi 
chiefs in an attempt to persuade them to break their alliance with 
the Fadlis and submit to the 'Abdalis# A number of them, not includ­
ing Sultan Haydarah, arrived in Aden on 2^th January, I85A, and Haines 
conferred with them on the following two days# The chiefs expressed 
their readiness to reunite with tho 'Abdalis and to acknowledge 'Ali 
as their sultan* Their difficulty was, however, how to free themselves 
from the agreement which Haydarah had entered into with Sultan Ahmad 
in l852# Finally, it was decided that 'Abd al-Karim, Haydarah's
son-in-law, should visit the Fadli chief and obtain from him a document
68which would annul the agreement# It is not known whether *Abd al-Karim 
discussed the subject with the Fadli sultan, but it is known that the 
agreement was not annulled#
At this point, it is necessary to go back to the subject of the
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murderers, Sayyid Husayn and al-Baghi* In November 1852, Haines was
told that Husayn had been poisoned in the Fadli territoryf presumably
on orders from Sultan Ahmad. The Political Agent reported this to
the Government as fact; but as will be seen, the information was
false. In the middle of 1854 it came to light that the Sayyid was
still alive* Here it is enough to say that Haines believed, or for
convenience* sale© chose to believe, that Husayn was dead#
On 29th January, 185^, the Political Agent asked for permission
to restore Sultan Ahmad*s stipend if he delivered up al-Baghi and
renewed his promise of 1839 not to commit depredations in Lahj or on
70the roads leading to Aden. The Government, under Lord Elphinstone,
agreed in a letter dated 18th February, but stipulated that these
peace moves should be conducted with the knowledge and consent of
Sultan *Ali. They added that the Sultan had lately been at enmity
with the Fadli chief on account of the British, and that relations
71with Ahmad would not be renewed except on this understanding.
Before Haines could act on this letter, he had been recalled to
72Bombay to answer a charge of peculation* With aim went also his
Assistant Cruttenden and the rest of the civil administration* As
for Aden*s three immediate neighbours, they proclaimed, on 14th February,
two months' truce during which they were to consult and settle all
73their differences.
In Haines* place, the Government appointed, as Acting Political 
Agent, Col. A. Clarke of the Madras Army, the Commander of the 
Garrison since Hay 1853* Clarke assumed office on 9th March, vfhen' 
British relations with the 'Abdalis were at their best, and with the 
Fadlis and *Aqrabis at their worst# No sooner had Sultan Ahmad learnt 
of the new appointment than he wrote to Clarke, complaining of itfhat 
he saw as the favour shown by Haines to the 'Abdali sultan and 
begging for the re-opening of the 'Aqrabi bandar* closed since I85O, 
and the restoration of his own stipend, stopped since 1851* If his 
requests were not granted, he threatened that hostilities would be 
resumed at the end of March, two weeks before the expiration of the 
truce.
Ahmad's requests were not granted, and he did not attack* The 
truce made in February was allowed to run its full term; and after 
its expiry, uneasy peace continued until June, when, again thanks to 
Hamadan, the truce between the three tribes was officially renewed 
for six months.
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In the mean time, on 31st March, 1854, Clarke pleaded the Fadli 
cause to the Government. He v/rote that Sultan Ahmad had never been 
to Aden nor had an interview with Ilaines* ”... the excluded chief ... 
should have at least an opportunity ... of making his wishes or claims 
known in person, and further that he may be convinced that the door 
of justice and of right dealing is open to him, if he chooses to 
avail himself of it, as well as to others.” The Acting Political 
Agent added that there was a strong party in Aden adverse to 
Sultan Ahmad and favourable to Sultan 'Ali, and every decision regard­
ing the Fadli chief was influenced by it. Clarke was reluctant to 
act on the Government's letter of l8th February, but the Government's 
instructions were to be obeyed.
In refutation of Clarke's pro-Fadli arguments, it must be 
emphasised that there was no ban against Cultan Ahmad's coming to 
Aden and his meeting with the Political Agent. He himself had taken 
an oath never to set foot in the Settlement, and as will be seen 
in ediately, he remained faithful to his oath. Tho "door of justice” 
was as open or closed to him as to others. It is possible that many 
people in Aden were on the side of the 'Abdali sultan, but it is 
difficult to see what influence they could have exercised on his 
behalf.
To redress the balance, as he saw it, at the beginning of a new 
regime, Clarke invited both the 'Abdali and Fadli sultans for 
discussions. The Fadli declined to enter Aden, but expressed his 
willingness to meet Clarke anywhere else. Clarke, in turn, could not 
agree to a meeting outside the Settlement, and decided to hold no 
further communication with him until he surrendered al-Baghi, as the 
Government had instructed Haines#
The 'Abdali sultan evaded the invitation and sent his agent 
instead# The agent asked Clarke the significant question, ”Do you 
want the roads open or closed?” ”Open, naturally”, Clarke answered. 
Then the agent revealed that 'Ali had an agreement signed by Haines 
to the effect that if the 'Aqrabi chief did not break his alliance 
with the Fadli sultan and swear allegiance to him before the truce 
expired in mid-April, Haines would be prepared to destroy his castle. 
Now 'Ali wished to know whether Clarke was willing to fulfil this 
agreement*
Clarke answered that he must first see the document and expressed
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his desire to have a meeting with 'Ali. He said this because he 
thought that the document did not exist and that the lie was 
occasioned by his invitation to Ahmad to visit Aden. Therefore he 
asked the agent to assure 'Ali that no peace would be made with Ahmad 
without his knowledge and concurrence, as required by the Government.
The agent came back with the agreement and told Clarke that if 
he countersigned it, the Sultan's brother would visit him. Clarke 
found himself in a great dilemma. On the one hand, he was not willing 
to discredit his predecessor lest this would create an unfavourable 
impression on the mind of the friendly chief, and on the other, he 
could not possibly countersign an agreement which he considered unwise
74and unjustified by the existing state of affairs.
Clarke sent a translation of the agreement to Bombay where it was
shown to Haines for his comments* Haines denied any knowledge of it, 
but there are reasons for believing that in this he was not honest.
Firstly, he was most anxious to see the 'Aqrabis reunited with 
the 'Abdalis.
Secondly, Clarke recognised his signature and did not doubt ite 
authenticity#
Thirdly, the reason why no copy of the agreement could be found
in the Political Agent's office was that Ilaines "kept no English or
75native register of letters received or dispatched"; if he did, he
must have destroyed them when he knew that he was leaving, for Clarke
wrote that Haines handed him "only a very few miscellaneous letters"*^
From the beginning, Haines was secretive about his dealings} when he
went to Bombay on sick leave in April 1839* he took his files with
77him, and ovon when he left Aden for good, he had official papers 
with hia.^
Fourthly, Haines did not attack 'Ali or accuse him of forgery, 
as one night have expected} on the contrary, as v/ill be seen, he 
spoke of him in favourable terms.
Fifthly, Haines was already charged with a criminal offence, and 
understandably he did not want to incur political censure as well# 
Having denied that he made any agreement with 'Ali, Haines 
summarised his long experience with the Arabs and criticised Clarke's 
policy towards the chiefs. The Arabs were "... most difficult to 
control and manage .... Our European ideas of equity and politics 
will not be comprehended by the Arabs* .... they must be defeated
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with their own weapons, by quietly letting them know that you perceive 
their intentions, before they ere prepared to carry them out and let 
them feel that you are their superior in tact, intellect, judgment, 
and activity of purpose, that their secret thoughts are known to you, 
that your information is sure, secret and correct and that you are 
prepared to counteract their designs} this united with frankness, 
firmness, decision and consistency will secure an Englishman his 
point, and he will have moral power over them and be respected and 
feared, and they will afterwards give him little trouble. Good­
will, kindness and respect, will • •* do more than even the bayonet 
79can in Arabia*'"'
Haines' last remark cannot but strike one as strange in view of 
hie frequent advocacy of force. Ho often resorted to blockade which 
was authorised* If he had the authority and tho means, he would not 
have hesitated to make as many attacks inland as he felt necessary*
As it was, he often found himself forced to fall back on diplomacy#
Tho former Political Agent disagreed with Clarke's approach to 
the chiefs* By entering into correspondence with the Fadli, he had 
insulted the 'Abdali, and this might have serious consequences* The 
Fadli might be encouraged to dictate his own terms, "••• he is a 
snake in the grass^0 that will bite as opportunity offers, and his 
acquaintance is by no means desirable;•••" The 'Aqrabis, Haines 
thought, would not be peaceful until they were reunited with the 
'Abdalis#^*
The Government accepted Haines' denial of the agreement without
question and instructed Clarke to continue the policy of his predecessor
pending the arrival of the permanent Resident* For his guidance in
82the interim, they sent him a copy of Haines* letter quoted above*
Clarke himself, on 2?th April, wrote a second letter in favour of the 
Fadli sultan. In it he attacked Haines for interfering in the tribes' 
feuds, and he cited as an example the Hiswah affair on 21st May, 1853.
Clarke wrote that the loss of life on that day alienated the 
Fadlis more than the stoppage of their stipend, and the 'Aqrabis more 
than the closure of their bandar* The British should not care 
whether they received their supplies, including water, through the 
Fadlis or the 'Abdalis# The important thing was that they were 
supplied* Water was a profitable commodity, and the Fadli sultan 
would not have closed the Hiswah wells had they fallen into his hands,
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as Ilaines had feared. The tribes should be left to fight their own 
battles, and the Aden market should be open to free competition* Thus 
tribes who were lees wealthy and industrious than the 'Abdalis, such 
as the Fadlis and 'Aqrabis, might benefit from "the non-intervention 
system" by giving up their predatory habits and adopting a more 
productive and settled way of life*
As long as Sultan 'Ali felt that ho could get British aid when 
he needed it, he would use it to retaliate against any attack made 
by the 'Aqrabis and Fadlis on his territory or people on the roads*
He might even create occasions for claiming British help to show his 
enemies that he had influence with the British which they did not 
have*
It was "humiliating" that after fifteen years the British were 
still uncertain as to their supplies, the regularity of which 
depended on the hostility of "a predatory chieftain", not so much to 
the British* but to a tribe in alliance with them. To set matters 
right, Clarke asked for authority to carry out to the letter the
principle of non-interference by sea or land, as it was "politic and
8 ^
just"* J The Government did not comment on his letter, but again
84instructed him to continue his predecessor's policy*
Clarke's letter of 27th April, as well as that of 31st March, 
shows that he had not acquainted himself with the facts, and hence 
his assessment of the situation was not correct. The only occasion 
on which Haines did manifestly and imprudently interfere in the affairs 
of the tribes was in 1850, when he decided to end the independence of
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tho 'Aqrabis* When he defended al-Hiswah, it was because the avowed
intention of the Fadlis was to cut off the water v/ith which the naval 
and commercial vessels in the harbour were supplied* The Fadlis and
'Aqrabis were already in open hostility to the British, and their 
attack on al-Hiswah was the active expression of this enmity*
The British received their supplies from whomever was ready to 
supply, but it happened that Lahj was fertile, well-cultivated, 
abounded v/ith water and bordered on Aden - all good reasons for 
greater commercial activity between the 'Abdali tribe and the Settle­
ment* The Fadlis and 'Aqrabis could not possibly compote with the 
'Abdalis, not because of any interdiction against them, but because 
of their own circumstances* Their land was poor, and there were not 
many cultivators among then* The 'Aqrabis had the added disadvantage 
of a small population and a small territory*
Sultan 'Ali was entitled to great influence v/ith the British, a 
fact which the Government recognised* The Sultan was responsible 
for keeping the roads open, and the Settlement . ;;r greatly dependent 
on the produce of his country# For these reasons, it was good policy 
for the British to give him all the support they could, but in this 
they often failed*
Clarke greatly underestimated the enmity of the Fadli sultan 
towards tho British* If the wells at al-Hiswah had fallen into his 
hands in 1853, he would, in all probability, have cut off the water 
because money was not the object of the attack* It may have been 
"humiliating" for the British to be dependent for their supplies on 
the goodwill of the tribes, but it would have been dangerous if they 
had abandoned their ally who had exerted himself to ensure that 
supplies reached Aden and whose interest, with regard to the Hiswah 
affair, was identical with theirs*^
The man appointed to succeed Haines, Lieut*-Col* James Outran, 
took over on 23rd June, 185^* as Political Resident and Commandant* 
Prior to that, he was Resident at Baroda, and it was hoped that his 
appointment to Aden would be the answer to all its problems, current 
and anticipated* Outrarn felt that Sultan 'Ali was justified in not 
dealing with Clarke personally. Clarke's tenure of office was 
temporary, and he did not recognise the agreement allegedly signed by 
Haines* He had made friendly overtures to Aimad with whom 'Ali was 
at enmity on account of the British, and against whom JIaines made 
many threats, but could carry out none*
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In spite of this, Outrarn decided not to contact the Sultan,
believing that it was ’All’s duty to contact him first# ”•## for we
ought to impress the Arabs with an idea of our superiority which too
86
apparent an anxiety to conciliate is not calculated to do*" ’Ali 
did write first# His letter was received on 13th July, and he would 
have written even earlier had it not been for a rumour that, like 
Clarke, uutrau had sent a friendly letter to Ahmad, inviting him to 
Aden# ^
In a review of British relations with the tribes subsequent to 
the murder of the ’’Auckland” seaman in I lay 1850* Gutram made a strong 
attack on British policy. ”*.# a policy more just and energetic in 
principle and purpose, more vacillating and pusillanimous in its 
execution, and more futile and mischievous in its results, is ••• 
without a parallel in the whole cycle of our Indian history#”
The demands for the execution or surrender of the murderers were 
made in a way which took no account of Muslim law and Arab customs 
by which the tribes were guided# If the British were not ready to 
enforce their demands to the letter, they should not have threatened 
reprisals for non-compliance, for this led only to contempt of their 
power#
Outrarn, who was formerly Political Agent in Bind, compared the 
Arabs to the Baluchis, and his relation to the Sultan and Lahj and 
other chiefs in the interior he compared with his former relation to 
the Khan of Kalat# Then he went on to say that at his request the 
Khan always executed his own tribesmen for the murder of British 
subjects, but this he would not have done without the excuse to his 
people of foreign pressure upon him# If there had been no British 
army to protect him, the Khan would not have dared put anyone to 
death, nor would Gutram have expected him to do so#
The Resident praised Bultan ’Ali for having executed 
Salah al-Suiaali, especially since his action was an infringement of 
Muslim law and Arab customs on b :half of ’’infidels”# Outram also 
recognised the enmity which the Sultan invited from his tribe and 
others as a result, and urged the Government to give him in the 
future all the support that could ’’conveniently” be given#
kith regard to the immediate situation, the Resident recommended 
that strong measures should be taken against the ’Aqrabis and Fadlis# 
The castle of Bir Ahmad should be destroyed to deprive the Fadlis of
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of its use as a refuge in the heart of the ’Abdali territory and 
compel uhe ’Aqrabis to reunite with the ’Abdalis, a continuation of 
Kaines* policy* If the acts of the Fadli sultan in the future 
merited chastisement, he should be chastised, and if he attacked Lahj, 
as he was likely to do \*hen the current truce expired at the end of 
the year, the British should assist Sultan *Ali to the best of their 
ability as thoy were bound to do ”by treaty”, meaning that of 1839#
If the Fadlis and ’Aqrabis made advances, having as their object the 
restoration of their stipend and the re-opening of their bandar.
Outrarn would reject them on the basis that tho murderers had not been 
surrendered.
Then Outran proceeded to outline the policy which he would follow 
in the future# He would hold the chief of a place where a British 
subject was murdered responsible with, and not for his tribo, as 
Auckland had directed in 1839# The murderers of British subjects and 
the plunderers of British property would be speedily and amply 
punished. British intercourse with Arabia was limited to the coast; 
hence, any outrage would be committed on the co: t, and the villages
which would harbour the offenders would be within easy reach from the 
sea.
In the first place he would demand redress from the chief in 
whose territory the incident occurred. Then, with great secrecy 
and celerity, he would transport troops to the village at or before 
daybreak and surround it to prevent the escape of the inhabitants*
The villagers would bo called upon to give up the offender; and if 
the place were within the jurisdiction of a friendly chief, as in 
most cases it would be in that of the Sultan of Lahj, the chief would 
be suLmoned and asked to persuade his people not to resist. If the 
offender was not surrendered, a further period would be allowed to 
enable non-combatants to leave the village, after which it would be 
destroyed with its defenders*
In such circumstances, Gutram thought, resistance would be highly 
unlikely. The village elders would know that the surrender of the 
criminal was the only way to preserve the lives and property of their 
people, hence they would not regard the act as a dishonour. The chief, 
instead of resenting the measure as an infringement of his authority, 
would be grateful to the British for relieving him of the embarrassing 
duty of hinself enforcing the criminal’s surrender. To his people,
222.
he would appear as an intercessor, rather than an instrument in the 
hands of the foreigner.
If the Government deplored the loss of life, they would have 
the consolation that British lives and property would be more 
respected, and a repetition of the offences which called for the 
punishment less probable. If the British had reacted in this way to 
the first murder, the other murders would not have taken place, an 
echo of Ilaines. It was unlikely that the Arabs would avenge a 
murderer executed by the British or relatives slain in battle*
Execution by a foreign power and death in battle did not place on the 
kinsman the duty of taking revenge, as did the murder by an individual. 
However, even if the Resident were in danger of assassination in 
consequence, Gutram was convinced that a great pox^er should not be 
deterred from executing justice by any such consideration.
Similar measures could also be ado-ted to ensure safety on the 
roads and to protect the watering place, aims which would not be 
served by the non-interference system - approval of Ilaines* inter­
vention in tho Hiswah affair. let Gutram advised against any 
expedition inland, as it could not be undertaken without troops and 
equipment which could not bo provided from Aden and might involve the 
British in operations greater than originally contemplated. The 
Resident asked for discretionary power to act immediately if any new
occasion arose, and he assured the Government that he would use it
88to the best of his judgment and ability.
To his review, Outrarn appended a long report by tho Rev. G.P. Badger. 
This supported Outrarn*s conclusions and recommended the adoption of 
his policy.
Badger was Protestant Chaplain to the Aden garrison from 18^7 to 
1359. He studied Arabic in Beirut and lived in Iraq for many years.
Of the four books he wrote, two are worth mentioning here, ”An English-* 
Arabic Lexicon” and "Muhammad and Muhammadanisn”. Badger came to 
prominence after Haines’ departure, when his knowledge of Arabic and 
Islam were utilised. In fact, he acted as an unofficial adviser to 
Outrarn and Coghlan. Haines did not consult Badger because during his 
term of office the civil and military branches of administration were 
separate and often at variance# However, from Badger’s report, it is 
clear that the Chaplain had no high regard for the political Agent.
The policy which Gutram formulated and Badger supported was
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basically the same as that repeatedly advocated by ITaines, i.e. 
offences against the British should be punished swiftly and effect­
ively by the British themselves. At first glance, Gutram’e policy 
appears convincing, but in fact it was impracticable and would have 
had no chance of success* When one remembers how short the ’Abdali 
coastline was, it is obvious that only a small percentage of the 
incidents of plunder and murder could have taken place In the friendly 
’Abdali territory. Besides, there was no guarantee that the ’Abdali 
sultan would always be friendly*
The offender, regardless of the tribe to which he belonged, would 
not have gone back to his villago and waited for the British to come 
and take hirn, or for his people to hand him over* No natter how 
quickly the British arrived at the scene of the crime, they could not 
ensure the arrest of the offender. By the time the news of the offence 
reached Aden, and the British reached the spot, no matter how near it 
was, the culprit on his camel or horse could be miles away probably 
in the interior, and for good reason, Outran himself, like others 
before him, advised against advances into the interior. The chief 
would not have given up his offending subject gladly, oven if he knew 
where he was* Given the chance, an Arab would avenge a kinsman 
executed by a foreign power or slain in battle, and it was for this 
reason that Ilaines advised against loading Gultan ’M i  some European 
artillerymen in 1852*
Outran wrote confidently that if his policy had been adopted 
after the first murder, the other murders would not have taken place* 
However, he unwittingly destroyed his own assertion by stating that 
the Khan of Kalat always executed murderers of British subjects* From 
this one cannot but infer that the punishment for the first murder 
did not prevent the occurrence of others, despite the presence of a 
large British force in Baluchistan.
In Louth Arabia, there was no British force outside the Settle­
ment, and the Aden garrison, which rarely numbered more than 1800, 
had no freedom of movement beyond the walls. Besides, the ’Abdali 
sultan, as well as the other chiefs in the interior, was not the 
equivalent of the Khan of Kalat; the Arab chiefs were politically 
independent, and the Settlement was economically dependent on then*
In brief, the situation in Baluchistan was not comparable to that in 
Aden, and if Outrarn*s policy had been followed, the British would
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have succeeded only in destroying mud huts and killing unarmed or
poorly armed people, proceedings which would have merely served to
increase the hostility of the tribes.
Outrarn*s review was dated 10th August, 1854, and on the previous
day the Court of Directors in London wrote to the Government of
Bombay that the combination of civil and military authority in the
person of t-ic- new Resident should not lead to any change of policy
go
towards the tribes* Later, on 22nd August, Sir Charles Wood, the
new President of the India Board, wroto privately to Outrarn?
"Conciliate the Arabs if you can, for I do not wish to be involved in
90hostilities with them if we can avoid it."
Elphinstone was convinced by Outran*s analysis of the situation
and tho need for a change in policy as recommended by him. In a
private letter to Uood he praised the Resident fur his understanding
of "wild races" and added that if the British had treated the Arabs
from tho beginning as Outrarn proposed, relations with them would have
been different* To keep at peace with the tribes, the British
submitted "to great indignities"; they threatened, but did not carry
91out their threats.
In view of this enthusiasm for Outrarn*s policy, the Court’s
letter of 9th August was a great disappointment to Elphinstone and hie
colleagues. The Governor regretted that after fifteen years of
British presence in Aden, relations with the Arabs were "far from
satisfactory". No Englishman was safe outside the fortifications, and
enmity to the British still existed in spite of the benefits which
92t'neir presence in Aden conferred upon the tribes*
Pending instructions from the Governor-General, the Government
of Bombay wrote to Outrarn, conveying the Court’s directive, but giving
him authority to use his discretion in supporting ’Ali if Ahmad broke
the peace before the arrival of specific instructions* His support,
93however, was not to extend to the use of force, which rendered it
meaningless# With this official letter went a private one from
Elphinstone. In it, the Governor expressed his appreciation of
Cutram’s report and assured the Resident that had it not been for the
Court’s directive, the Government of Bombay would have authorised him
94to carry out his policy*
Dalhousie, too, approved of Outrarn*s policy and in a private
letter he assured the Resident of the unanimous supsort of the India 
95Council. Tho Governor-General blamed the Secret Committee for the
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failures which Outram*s report had exposed. He asserted that if
they ha allowed him to dispatch a force against the Fadlis in 1851,
British interests in Arabia would now be secure and British power 
96respected. Privately, he urged Wood to withdraw the prohibition 
of 1851.97
In an official letter to Bombay, Dalhousie expressed his hope
that when the Secret Committee read Outranks report, they would
rescind their orders and allow the authorities in India to do what
seemed right to them. In the mean time, and in defiance of standing
orders, he gave Outram wide discretionary powers which did not rule
out the use of iorce in defence of Lahj if proved necessary. This he
justified by invoking the mutual defence clause in the treaty of
1839 which, in hi3 opinion, "imposes obligations upon the Government
of India ••• higher and more authoritative than even the orders of
the Secret Committee”. Dalhousie was firmly convinced that "the
plighted faith of the British Government" made it imperative that
98they should help the Sultan in whatever way th^. could*
Who::, hood read Outran*s report, he wrote privately to
Blphinstone that he, too, was convinced of "the folly" of British
policy in the past and was inclined to think that the British should
act as Outram proposed. "But I hate the notion of engaging in
hostilities with these petty tribes out of which so little comes
99beyond irritation and reasons for future quarrels*1'
Before the Government of Bombay had time to transmit Dalhousie*e 
instructions to Adon, Outram had left and been replaced on 
26th October by Lieut.-Col* V/.M. Coghlan. Coghlan was an artilleryman* 
He had served in Afghanistan and Sind (1333-^3) anr* was present at 
the capture of Ivalat (November 1839). Outram described him as "one 
of my oldest and most intimate friends"*"^0 At the time of his 
appointment, Coghlan was in Belgaura, Mysore*
Cutram was appointed Acting Resident at the Court of Lucknow 
when the Resident, Col. Sleeman, was given sick leave for fifteen 
months. Coghlan, in turn, was sent as Acting Resident to Aden. Both 
men were confirmed in their posts after fifteen months when it became 
certain that Sleeman*8 health would not allow him to resume office* 
Cutram*s transfer to Lucknow came when he i/as considering a change 
due to ill health.**’^ ’
The choice of Outram’.s successor was a difficult one. The two 
officers who 2 Elphinstone considered most suitable were abroad on
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leave* Of the officers available, none combined political experience
with the rank necessary to command the garrison* Elphinstone first
offered the post to Col* Uaddington, Chief Engineer at Bombay and
formerly at Aden, but he declined it* Lord F* FitzClarence, the
Commander-in-Chief, proposed Lieut.-Col* J* Ilolland, the Quarter
Master General, but Elphinstone did not consider that his experience
qualified him for the duties at Aden* The choice was then between
Coghlan and Major John Jacob of the Sind Horse*
Elphinstone thought that in making the final decision, some
consideration should be given to the policy which the new Resident
was to carry out* If Outram*s recommendations were to be adopted,
Jacob would be the nan. However, if the old policy was to be
continued, then fla less brilliant officer would be a fitter instru- 
102
ment". Dalhousie chose Coghlan, on the grounds that his rank was 
higher than that of Jacob and that Jacob was needed where he was on 
the Sind Frontier*’*’0^
Coghlan was given the same discretionary powers as Outram and 
was instructed to destroy Bir Ahmad if it became once again the centre 
for operations against the Sultan of Lahj* The destruction of the 
village and its fort would be the best way for "permanently" 
strengthening the Sultan, for securing free access to the wells at
104
al-Hiswah and for increasing the safety of communication with Lahj*
As to how and when Coghlan was to destroy Bir Ahmad, Elphinstone left
it to him, although he suggested that the best time would be December,
105when the garrison would be relieved*
The Resident agreed with Elphinstone as to the time for the 
attack, but hoped that the Sultan would not ask for help* However, 
if he did, Coghlan assured the Governor that he was ready to help 
him and to deal with any situation that might arise. If al-IIiswah 
were attacked, or even threatened, it would be defended immediately*
If the attack were made from Bir Ahmad, the village could be razed 
without any difficulty. If the Fadli chief stopped traffic on the 
road from Lahj, the British could safely advance as far as Shaykh 
•Uthman, and with the help of steamers could bombard the Fadli coast. 
Yet, Coghlan advised against a march into the interior.
After discussing the subject with Badger, Coghlan revised his 
strategy. How he suggested that if the Fadli chief attacked, the best 
thing would be to bring the *Awlaqis on the side of *Ali or at least
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secure their neutrality* An alliance between the ’Awlaqis and
*Abdalis would save the British the necessity of interfering directly
in tribal quarrels. Instead of destroying Bir Ahmad, Coghlan now
recommended, as Haines had done before, that the British should take
it and give it to the Sultan of Lahj, the *Aqrabis being originally
107a sub-division of his tribe*
This course of action must have been warmly welcomed in Bombay, 
Calcutta and London. The instructions given to Coghlan had greatly 
alarmed the Secret Committee, and they wrote to him direct ordering 
their cancellation. The Committee explained that the British were not 
obliged to give military assistance to the Sultan of Lahj under the 
treaty of 1839 as had been erroneously supposed by Outram and Dalhousie* 
That treaty was "cancelled by subsequent events" and the British 
were now bound only by the treaty of 184-9 which "carefully avoided 
all stipulation for mutual defence* On the general question of the 
policy to be observed with regard to the Arab tribes in the neighbour­
hood of Aden, you will receive instructions from the Government of 
Bombay} and you will clearly understand that neither on the present, 
nor on any future occasion, are you to engage in any inland military
i a Q
operations without specific orders ••*"
The Secret Committee sent similar letters to Dalhousie and 
Elphinstone. Their letter to Dalhousie contained also "the policy to 
be observed with regard to the Arab tribes". This "policy" was 
nothing more than a set of in ctructions dealing only with the punish­
ment of outrages committed against British subjects on the coast, and
109it merely re-iterated Outram’s recommendations*
In private letters to Coghlan and Dalhousie, Elphinstone
regretted that the Home Authorities had not sanctioned the use of
110force against the Fadlis* In a further letter to Coghlan, he 
wondered how the treaty of 1839 could have been abrogated when there 
was no clause to this effect in the treaty of 184-9* He rightly 
concluded that the former treaty had been breached by "the Sultan", 
but added that he did not know of such a breach and asked Coghlan if 
he had any explanation*^^*
Coghlan answered that he had none. "The Sultan" did not violate 
the treaty of l839i and hence he could not understand what was meant 
by "subsequent events". Coghlan was certain that the mutual defence 
clause could not have been omitted without careful consideration, and
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that Dalhousie, who ratified the treaty of 1849, could not have done
112
so without reading the correspondence on the subject*
The "subsequent events" referred to by the Secret Committee were 
the attacks and hostile acts carried out by Sultan Muhsin in 1839 and 
1840. Coghlan and Elphinstone, like Outram before them, believed 
that the relations with the ’Abdalis had always been friendly, not 
knowing what happened when ’Ali’s father was chief of this tribe* 
Elphinstone took office in December 1853 and Coghlan in October 1854, 
while Sultan Muhsin died in November 184-7* If the authorities in 
Bombay and Aden had consulted the early records, they would have 
found no difficulty in understanding what the Secret Committee meant 
by "subsequent events". Furthermore, they would have discovered that 
the treaty of 1839 was not superseded by that of 184-9, but by that of 
1843 which also contained no mutual defence clause.
In contrast, Dalhousie, who ratified the 1849 treaty, knew the
early history of Aden, but chose to cling to the letter rather than
to the spirit of the law, since this suited his policy. He wrote
privately to Elphinstone: "I think the present Secret Cee., i.e.
Sir C. Wood, are as wrong-headed as the former Secret Cee., i.e.
Sir John Ilobhouse, about Aden. ... But of course they must be 
113obeyed." Accordingly, he transmitted the Committee's instructions 
in an official letter to Bombay, adding that he did not object to 
the re-opening of the 'Aqrabi bandar and the restoration of the Fadli 
chief’s stipend if this would bring peace and friendly co-operation.
The truce which was to expire at the end of 1854 was extended 
by three months, the occasion being the death of a brother-in-law of 
the Sultan of Lahj* However, before the end of January 1855, the 
Subayhis, at the instigation of the Fadli and ’Aqrabi chiefs, made 
raids into the ’Abdali territory. The aim of these raids was to 
divert traffic to Bir Ahraad and thus deprive Sultan *Ali of his 
revenue.
The Sultan enquired casually of Coghlan whether the British would 
compensate him for his financial loss* Coghlan answered that his 
treaty with them did not guarantee his revenue, and this he said with 
great reluctance for his sympathy was with ’All. "The Sultan has 
incurred much odium and suffered no inconsiderable pecuniary loss in 
consequence of his faithfulness to us, he has been stigmatized by his 
more fanatical neighbours as the friend and ally of ’infidels’..."
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In January 1855* Sultan Ahmad concluded a treaty for mutual
115assistance with the Upper ’Awlaqis who were estranged from the
other branch of tu~ tribe and at enmity with the ’Abdali sultan.
Coghlan feared that the treaty heralded an invasion of Lahj, and as
a precaution, he opened communication with the Lower 'Awlaqis. The
Lower ’Awlaqis were friends of Sultan 'Alij and in the event of a
Fadli attack on his territory, they could be of help by attacking
the Fadlie from the rear or by sending a force by sea to al-Hiswah
to join the ’Abdali army. Therefore, Coghlan asked them to settle
their differences with their brothers and detach them from thoir
alliance with the Fadlis, which was done*
Coghlan asked for permission to buy the assistance of the Lower
’Awlaqis for two or three thousand dollars# The Resident realised
that he might be setting a dangerous precedent, but he promised not
116to take this step except as a last resort. The Government
sanctioned the grant of money, but warned that it should not be
117construed as a precedent. f
In April, the cousin and heir-apparent of Sultan Munassar
visited Aden to discuss assistance to the ’Abdalis against the Fadlie,
and in May, Coghlan sent his Interpreter, Hormuzd Raesam, on a mission
to the Lower ’Awlaqis. When Rassan returned, he wrote a highly
favourable report about them and recommended an alliance with them.
Their sultan showed himself anxious to fight the Fadlis, but pleaded
poverty. If the British gave him money, lead and powder, he would
sign any bond which they might require. Coghlan sent lead and powder,
ll8but no money and made no reference to a treaty.
The Bombay Government were against an alliance with the Lower
’Awlaqis, but authorised the Resident to present their chief with
#2000 in recognition and appreciation of his readiness to co-operate 
119with the British. The Supreme Government thought that if a treaty
was to be signed with the ’Awlaqi chief, the Fadli stipend should be
transferred to him* The treaty should bind Munassar to act against
IPOthe Fadlis when the British required it, but not vice-versa*
Elphinstone Jiiade the transfer of the Fadli stipend to the ’Awlaqi
chief conditional on Munassar’s "punishing" Sultan Ahmad and keeping
121the roads open to Aden. In practice, this would have meant the 
occupation of all or part of the Fadli territory.
In the mean time, ’Ali sent a sayyid to the Fadli chief to
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negotiate a new truce# Ahmad refused and threatened that if his 
stipend was not restored, and the ’Aqrabi bandar re-opened, he would 
attack Lahj and close the roads to Aden* Shortly afterwards, he did 
attack an ’Abdali caravan on British ground, captured four camels 
and retreated*
To counteract, Coghlan gave Sultan 'Ali some ammunition and made
three proposals to the Government. Bir Ahmad had been nominally
blockaded; now he proposed to enforce the blockade by stationing
the "Elphinstone" off the northern shore of the harbour, which would
also protect al-Hiswah. The Fadli country produced only cattle,
reeds and other building materials. For grain and all other essential
supplies, including lead and gunpowder, the Fadlis were dependent on
the surrounding tribes and Aden. A blockade of Shuqrah, with the
help of the "Mahi", ivould cause them great hardship* Further,
Coghlan proposed to prohibit the Fadlis from entering Aden, a measure
entertained by Haines, but not put into effect* Surrounded by hostile
tribes, with their coast and that of their allies effectually blockaded,
and with the Aden market interdicted to them, they would be forced to 
122make peace.
Elphinstone approved of Coghlan*s measures and wrote privately
to Wood that if they failed, he would want official permission to
123destroy Bir Ahmad and Shuqrah. When he wrote this, he had good
reason for believing that such permission would be granted, for Wood
had written to him privately: "Do not commit yourselves to inland
operations. Burn or deliver over to him of Lahedge if you please
Bir Ahmad or any sea coast town, but do not involve yourselves in the
124quarrels and feuds of the Arab chiefs." However, before 
Elphinstone*s letter reached London, Wood had been replaced by 
R. Vernon Smith*
When the isolation of the Fadli sultan did not change his 
attitude towards Lahj and Aden, Coghlan put his measures into effect, 
and ’Ali sent his brother Fadl to ask the Resident what he should do* 
Coghlan showed Fadl that the time was opportune for crushing his 
enemy. The 'Abdalis should attack Bir Ahmad while the ’Awlaqis 
invaded the Fadli territory from the east. This move, coupled with 
the British blockade, would leave Sultan Ahmad with no choice but to 
accept any terms which might be dictated to him.
Fadl agreed with Coghlan's reasoning, but pointed out that the
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difference between Arab and British warfare was very great. The
British troops were disciplined and would go through fire if so
ordered, while his troops were "undisciplined rabble". With reference
to the castle at Bir Ahmad, Fadl told Coghlan, as he had told Haines,
that the Arabs would not attack walls, and urged him to capture it.
The Resident replied that he could not do so, and reminded him of
what he had already done to weaken the Fadlis,
To the Government Coghlan wrote that the return of Bir Ahmad to
the ’Abdalis seemed the only way to restore safety to the roads between
Aden and al-Hawtah. If 'Ali could not take it, the British should
125and then give it to him. Coghlan personally was convinced that 
circumstances could not be more favourable for 'Ali to take Bir Ahmad,
"... but he is a most provoking fellow, ... when everything is ready
126for him, he hesitates to strike.
In May, Sultan Ahmad said that he wanted peace, and Coghlan
agreed to a meeting with his representative, a sayyid. The day the
sayyid arrived, the Resident was too busy to receive him, and on the
following day, the Fadlis and 'Aqrabis attacked Shaykh ’Uthman. Thus
it became clear that the sayyid*s mission was a piece of deceit, and
Coghlan refused to see him.
As soon as Sultan ’Ali heard the news of the attack, he marched
on Shaykh 'Uthman. However, Sayyid 'Alawi persuaded Sultan Ahmad to
accept a two months’ truce, mainly on account of Ramadan, and
Sultan 'Ali, who had not been consulted, had reluctantly to agree.
Coghlan protested to the ’Abdali chief about what had happened, and
127he v/ould have intervened had it not been for the hot weather,
Elphinstone wrote to Vernon Smith that if, after the truce was 
over, the Fadli chief attacked Shaykh 'Uthman or al-Hiswah, he would 
order the destruction of Shuqrah and Bir Ahmad. He advised that the 
British should give the 'Awlaqi chief arms and ammunition and encourage 
him to invade the Fadli territory, but should not enter into a treaty 
with him.128
In July, at a meeting at al-Hiswah between Coghlan and 'Ali, 
it was agreed that if the 'Awlaqis invaded the Fadli territory from 
the east, the 'Abdalis would invade it from the west, Coghlan also 
promised to write to the Government for permission to capture Bir Ahmad 
and either annex it or give it to the Sultan of Lahj.129 The Govern­
ment of Bombay were sympathetic and suggested to the Governor-General
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that they should make it clear to the Fadli chief that if he did not
stop interrupting traffic and deliver up the murderers, the British
would enforce their demands. The Government also recommended that
130the assistance of the ’Awlaqis should be accepted.
After the truce was over, Sultan Ahmad resumed hostilities, His
attacks were centred on the junction of the three roads from the
Fadli, ’Aqrabi and ’Abdali districts near Shaykh 'Uthman, a mile or
two from British limits* The roads were closed, and supplies in
Aden became scarce, When none of his enemies was willing or able to
do anything about the situation, Coghlan lamented the fact that he
had no irregular horse at Aden, unlike every frontier station in India*
He recommended that he be sent 100 cavalry and argued that if he had
them, closure of the roads would be unknown. The horse would be more
131useful than all the alliances which the British could make, a
return to Haines' policy*
Coghlan stressed this point in a private letter to Elphinstone*
A British company, he wrote, could fight the whole Fadli tribe, but
the Fadlis would not meet the British face to face* As soon as the
British advanced, they, would "fly” on their camels and the infantry
"would find no enemy to engage except the sun and the sandhills". The
garrison was therefore helpless, and Sultan 'Ali, the ally of the
British, was of no help* This situation Coghlan described as
132"mortifying" to British pride* The Government of Bombay recommended
that a troop of cavalry be raised locally as this would be more
economical and would not go against the Secret Committee's prohibition
133to tako offensive action*
In urging the adoption of Coghlan*s proposals, Elphinstone wrote
to Smith that it was obvious that something should be done to keep
the roads to Aden clear, and he advocated the destruction of Shuqrah
and Bir Ahmad which could be attacked without a inarch inland*
Elphinstone warned Smith that he should not be "too sanguine about
Col* Coghlan's being able to prevent our coming to blows with some
134of hi s neighbours,*."
Dalhousie was still strongly in favour of more active measures 
against the Fadli sultan and declared that he entirely approved of 
Coghlan's proposals* However, under the Secret Committee's prohibition, 
he could not authorise them, but he had written to the Home Authorities 
urging that strong measures should be allowed*1^9 This appeal was
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reinforced by Elphinstone in a private letter to Smith, in which he
regretted the fact that action had not been taken five years earlier,
and once more asked that Coghlan be given permission to destroy
Bir Ak.'.d. and Shuqrah*1^8
Meanwhile, in August, the Fadli chief decided to make peace with 
•Ali and the British* His conditions were that the blockade of 
Shuqrah and Bir Ahmad be lifted, that his people be allowed communic­
ation with Aden, and that his stipend be restored. Coghlan was 
agreeable, and told Elphinstone that in return he would demand that 
the Fadli sultan should expel the murderers from hie territory and 
preserve peace for the future* The Resident, probably on Badger's
advice, did not insist on what was not possible for an Arab to do,
137to deliver up a guest* The demand for the expulsion of the
murderers, rather than their surrender or execution, was a compromise
on the part of the British and not incompatible with Arab ideas of
honour and hospitality*
In September, Sultan 'Ali and the Fadli sultan's brother, Salah,
held a peace conference at Shaykh 'Uthman under the chairmanship of
Sayyid 'Alawi* Before the Sayyid left for the conference, Coghlan
told him his terms for a settlement with Ahmad. Ahmad agreed to them
and cn 20th September he wrote to Coghlan that he had expelled the
murderers* The Resident then lifted the ban on the Fadlis' entering
Aden, ended the blockade of Shuqrah and Bir Ahmad, and recommended
the restoration of Sultan Ahmad's stipend with arrears*
The Government agreed to the restoration of the stipend from the
date the murderers were expelled, but not to the payment of arrears;
otherwise, British prestige i\rould be lowered in the Sultan's eyes and
in the eyes of the other chiefs* As regards the Fadlis* allies, the
'Aqrabis, the Government thought that if they submitted, Coghlan
could give them a "written assurance" of British protection during
139their good behaviour*
The news of the peace was welcomed in Bombay, but Elphinstone 
warned Smith in a private letter that the British should not be lulled
l4ointo security and postpone the formation of a small troop of cavalry* 
Smith, too, was pleased at the turn of events and described Coghlan 
as "a clever fellow", but expressed his fear that he and other agents 
might be "too active in mischievous interference in order to magnify
141
their own importance"* On a former occasion, he had expressed his
23^ .
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hope that Mlphinstone would keep Coghlan "quiet" at Aden*
Before Bombay’s letter authorising the restoration of the Fadli
stipend reached Aden, Coghlan had left on a visit to the Lower ’Awlaqis
and some tribes on the African coast with whom he concluded treaties
banning the slave trade# At Ahwar, Coghlan gave Sultan Munassar
Hs* 2500 and presents to the value of Rs* 1500, the total being the
02000 which the Government had authorised him to give to the Sultan*
The ’Awlaqis told Coghlan that they wanted to attack the Fadlis, but
143he advised against such action, and his advice was accepted* They 
also told him that the Fadli chief had not expelled the murderers* 
Coghlan believed them readily and suggested that he should vithhold 
his stipend and for the third time urged the Government to send the
144irregular horse, as he anticipated renewed hostilities*
The Bombay Government requested their Commander-in-Chief to send
145
the horse as soon as possible, and in a private letter to Smith,
Blphinstone wrote that in view of the urgency, he was sending
volunteers from Jacobs H o r s e I n  June 1856, only fourteen troopers 
arrived, but the rest never joined them# They went first to Bushehr 
where they took part in the Anglo-Fersian War of 1856-7, and then 
they were drafted back to India when the Mutiny broke out*
With regard to the ’Awlaqi rumour that the Fadli chief had not 
expelled the two murderers, the Bombay Government wrote to Coghlan 
that if the rumour was true, and the Fadli sultan resumed hostilities, 
he was to warn him that failure to expel the murderers within seven 
days would cause him the irrevocable loss of his stipend* If this 
warning had no effect, Coghlan was to transfer the Fadli stipend to
the * Awlaqi chief and to reiropose his punitive measures* If he saw
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fit, he could also blockade the Fadli port* Dalhousie, still
eager to take revenge on the Fadlis, again recommended a military 
148expedition#
In November 1855# *Ali, fearing a Fadli attack from Bir Ahmad,
signed with Sultan Munassar an agreement whereby he would pay him
#5000 for taking the ’Aqrabi castle and giving it to him# ’Ali was
to pay half the sum in advance and the balance after the fort had
been captured# If the ’Awlaqi chief failed, he was to refund the 
149
advance# Later, however, ’Ali broke the agreement, and Munassar 
decided to take Bir Ahmad himself and then give it to one of his 
tribesmen who was in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad* Coghlan 
supported Munassar*s decision, as he liked to see the fort in the
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hands of a capable man friendly to the British as Munassar was*
Elphinstone thought that this arrangement might lead to a coalition 
between the ’Abdalis and Fadlis, the results of which would be serious* 
The i.. .UiRh would be hemmed in by enemies, and Bir Ahmad would be 
only a detached outpost from which nothing could be hoped, not even 
the safety of the roads* However, he admitted that it was not possible 
for him to know as much about the matter as Coghlan who was on the
151
spot and had Badger and Rassam to advise him*
Fears of Fadli aggression proved groundless, and the country
continued peaceful* In December 1856, Coghlan was able to pay a four
day visit to al-Hawtah, accompanied by his two Assistants, eight
152officers and sixteen soldiers* The visit was of particular 
importance in that it was the first by the British representative at 
Aden to Lahj, and as such it could not but be taken as an index of 
the amicable relations between the ’Abdalis and the British*
By March 1857* the Fadli chief had been quiet for twenty months, 
but he did not ask for his stipend to which he was clearly entitled 
if he had expelled the murderers# Coghlan was, therefore, confirmed 
in his belief that he had not expelled them# In the mean time,
Sultan ’Ali’s half-brother, ’Abd Allah, and Shaykh ’Ali of the ’Uzaybis, 
approached the Fadli sultan and urged him to make peace with the 
British over their chief’s head# *Abd Allah was hostile to ’Ali as 
he was to Ahmad before him; the Shaykh had a personal grudge against 
him*
Sultan Ahmad responded and on 30th March he came to Bir Ahmad 
where he held a conference with the two men and tho ’Aqrabi chief, 
now ’Abd Allah Ibn Ilaydarah, the old man having recently abdicated*
The purpose of the conference was to work out how best to approach the 
British, and when it ended, on 5th April, Sayyid ’Alawi was summoned 
and given a long message for Coghlan# The murderers were not in the 
Fadli territory* Al-3aghi fled after he had killed a woman; and 
although a native of Eir Ahmad, he dared not go there; none knew 
where he was* With respect to Sayyid Ilusayn, the Fadli chief said 
that since he sought his protection, he could not execute him or 
deliver him up* When Coghlan demanded his expulsion in September 1855* 
the Sultan expelled him, and he took refuge on the border with the 
Yafi’i country*
The rest of the message was a poor attempt at explaining why the
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Fadli chief had not contacted the British in tho last twenty months, 
although he had complied with their demands to expel the murderers* 
Sultan Ahmad accused ’Ali of working against peace and said that he 
could not communicato with the British through a man whom he 
considered his inferior* He protested that he was misrepresented, 
complained that he had not been rewarded for his services to the 
British in 1838, and asserted that he was not so mad as to struggle 
with the English# Then he pledged himself to protect persons and 
property wrecked on his coast, and in token of his sincerity he sent 
his own horse as a present to Coghlan#
Coghlan was pleased at the turn of events and paid Ahmad his
153stipend backdated to September 1855* when Sayyid Husayn was expelled* ^
The ’Aqrabi chief submitted on 12th April, 1857, and a new treaty
bearing the same date was signed with him, thus recognising his
independence* The new treaty was not different from the one of 1839
154except that now the British could visit Bir Ahmad "for recreation"#
The peace which the British made with the Fadlis and ’Aqrabis 
without 'Ali*a consent greatly offended him# The measure was contrary 
to the Government’s instructions and had the effect of reducing his 
iiajjortance# The ’Abdali sultan retaliated by levying a tax of five 
annas on every camel load of water brought from Shaykh 'Uthman*
Coghlan protested that he could not legally do so, and warned that 
the British would not allow anyone to take advantage of their need 
for this vital commodity#^*
The Sultan answered by raising tho tax to six and a half annas 
which was nearly 2%o of the selling price in Aden# Coghlan demanded 
that the tax should not exceed one anna per camel load, and he was 
determined to enforce his demand. He had already entered into 
negotiations with the ’Uzaybis for support against their tribal chief# 
However, on 5th July, at a meeting between ’All and Rassam at 
Shaykh ’Uthman, the Sultan agreed to the demand, and this relieved the 
Resident greatly# He did not have enough troops to take Shaykh ’Uthman, 
and he was spared the need to employ one tribe against another which 
he described as "an expedient of the last resort"*^^
’Ali, however, continued to annoy the Fadlis and the British and 
in January I858, the uneasy peace which had prevailed for two and a 
half years was finally broken# Early that month, the Fadlis occupied 
part of Lahj, and the ’Abdalis retaliated by attacking their allies,
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157the *Aqrabist but were repulsed* 'Ali accused Coghlan of violating
the treaty of 1849 by supporting his enemies and acting unjustly 
towards him* He also threatened to prevent his people from trading
with Aden "until the Government shall come to its senses'1* Coghlan,
in turn, complained that 'Ali had detained a messenger from the Imam
on his way to Aden, that he had the murderer al-Baghi in his employ
at al-Hiswah, and that he had allowed Sayyid Husayn to return to his
native W’aht* Early in February, Ahmad lodged three complaints with
Coghlan against 'Ali concerning murder and plunder on the roads* Also,
♦Ali liu Bakr, an inhabitant of Aden and the water contractor at
Shaykh 'Uthman, protested that Sultan 'Ali had seized a conrignmont
158of coffee belonging to him, valued at Rs* 6000, on its way to Aden* 
Coghlan's hostility towards Ahmad was now transferred to '/.Li* 
Therefore, cementing relations with his enemies and detaching other 
tribes from him became the two objects of his policy* With these 
objects in mind, he wanted to visit Shuqrah and Ahwar, but his duties 
did not allow him* He therefore sent Rassam with a letter and a 
present to each of the two sultans{ the Interpreter left on 
25th January, accompanied by Sayyid 'Alawi. Rassam went first to 
Shuqrah, and then to Ahwar; but finding Sultan Kunassar absent on 
an expedition, he left him Coghlan's letter and present*
Luring the discussions at Shuqrah, Sultan Ahmad blamed the
recent troubles on 'Ali and complained that the British had not
checked him* The chief told Rassam what must have delighted Coghlan 
and made his scheming unnecessary* All the tribes were now against 
•Ali on account of his double dealing* The Hawshabis had made a treaty
v/ith the Fadlis to keep the roads open to Aden* The Lower 'Awlaqis
had quarrelled with the 'Abdalis because of 'All's attempt to sow 
discord among then, and the result was that they entered into an 
offensive-defensive alliance with the Fadlis, their former enemies*
The Upper 'Awlaqis were tho sworn enemies of the 'Abdalie*^^ Even 
the 'Uzaybis and Sallamis, the largest sub-divisions of the 'Abdali 
tribe, were dissatisfied with 'All's policy*
When Rassam returned early in February, he recommended an alliance 
with the Fadlis, describing it as "most desirable", and that on account 
of their exceptional prowess* In the eight months previous to his 
visit, they had successfully fought the 'Abdalis, the Yafi’is and 
even the Lower 'Awlaqis who were numerically stronger than themselves*
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Rassam regretted that dissensions among the tribes led to temporary 
or partial stoppage of supplies into Aden, and he thought that the 
situation would not improve as long as Sultan 'Ali could stir up 
trouble 'ith impunity*^^
Coghlan agreed, and in a private letter to Elphinstone he unjustly 
accused the Sultan of being responsible for all the troubles of the 
past seven years# He wrote that 'Ali had deceived him, as he had 
deceived both Iiaines and Outran# It was he who told tho murderers 
to take refuge v/ith the Fadlis and the 'Aqrabis, and then he charged 
these tribes with giving thorn shelter# Later he himself protected 
them, and they were still in his territory# While all other chiefs
l6l
were doing their best to keep the roads clear, 'Ali was plundering#
'Ali did not tell the murderers to take refuge v/ith any tribe* 
Sayyid Husayn fled, on the spur of the moment, first to the Hawehabi 
country and then to the Fadli# Al-Baghi fled first to the Subayhi 
territory and then he, too, sought refuge with the Fadli chief# No-one 
took refuge in the 'Aqrabi territory# Cayyid Husayn may have gone 
back to his village after wandering for some time, but there is no 
evidence that he did# Al-Baghi, as will be seen, was given asylum 
by 'Ali only after the British had mad© peace with his tribe, the 
'Aqrabis#
The 'Abdali sultan may not have been honest in all his dealingf,
but at the same time he was not responsible for all the troubles of
162the British, as Coghlan made out# Relations between him and the 
British deteriorated only after Coghlan had made peace with the Fadli 
chief without consulting him# The purpose of Coghlan's private letter 
was to prepare the Governor for any action which he might take against 
the Sultan#
Coghlan proposed to stop 'Ali's stipend; and if he broke off 
commercial relations with Aden, to occupy Shaykh 'Uthman and continue 
in its occupation until he had made reparation for his past hostility* 
The surrender or expulsion of tho murderers was to be part of the 
reparation# Coghlan was convinced that only force could make 'Ali 
submit to the will of the British# "Hitherto, diplomacy has been our 
only resort, and its best efforts have failed to remedy the evil of 
ever-occuring embarrassments with petty tribes, v/ho have grown over­
bearing by long immunity, and have learnt to regard our kindness and 
forbearance as proofs of inferiority and weakness•"
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The circumstances were favourable for an attack on Shaykh 'Uthman*
The Fadlis and 'Aqrabis were at feud with the 'Abdalis# According to
Coghlan, the Hawshabis and 'Awlaqis might even co-operate v/ith the
British if requested, but Coghlan would ask only for their neutrality#
However, the most important factor which would facilitate the attack
was that the 'Abdalis themselveo were disunited, and it was highly
unlikely that they would unite in support of their sultan#
If the Government agreed to his suggestion, Coghlan asked that
they should send him the troop of horse and bring the European part
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of the garrison up to its former strength of 300# In 1857* the
European members of the garrison were reduced; some were sent to
164Perim which the British re-occupied in January of that year# and
others to India during the Mutiny#
Coghlan stopped 'All's stipend as from the 1st March, 1858# The
Sultan retaliated by prohibiting the export of food supplies to Aden
and by directi ig his people to plunder on the roads# Consignments of
grain and coffee belonging to Aden merchants were confiscated after
transit duty had been paid# Tho other tribes' answer was to go to
Aden by a detour which added one day to their journey, but enabled
them to avoid the 'Abdali territory#
Coghlan was afraid that the Sultan might stop trade completely
with Aden by occupying Shaykh 'Uthman in force# If he did, the
Resident made it known that he would evict him from it# Shaykh 'Uthman,
with its commanding position, could be held by a detachment from the
Aden garrison until the arrival of tho troop of horse which would then
165effectually protect it and the roads leading to it#
What Coghlan had feared came to pass# The Sultan's brother,
Fadl, occupied Shaykh 'Uthman in force, and filled in all the wells 
except one which he kept for the use of his men* Furthermore, to stop 
traffic with Aden, 'Ali resorted to bribery where he could, and where 
bribery failed, to force# He eve. oent large parties to patrol outside 
the Br itish defences#
' he new situation made Coghlan elaborate on the necessity of 
capturing Ghaykh 'Uthman# As long as it was held by an enemy no 
supplies could come to Aden by land except under a strong escort from 
the other tribes who would have to force their way through, and this 
they might be reluctant to do unless heavily bribed, for they could 
justifiably say that the quarrel was not theirs# The hot weather would
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soon set in, the stock of water at Aden was rapidly diminishing, 
and the Sultan might close the Hiswah wells* The British reputation 
was also at stake* Coghlan again asked for the troop of cavalry,
affirming that if it had been at Aden, the Sultan would not have
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dared to defy the British in such a manner*
The Fadli chief offered to open the roads for a price which
immediately suggested to Coghlan that his neutrality or even
co-operation night easily be purchased by Sultan 'Ali, the only chief
then hostile to the British* To pr®vent a possible coalition between
the two, the Resident acted on his own responsibility.
Early in the norning of 18th March, ho proceeded to Shaykh 'Uthman
with a force of 500 infantry, 50 artillery with two guns, 40 seamen
and his small body of cavalry, now reduced to eleven* After an 
hour's fighting, three chieftains came forward and solicited, on the
part of the Gultan, that hostilities should cease and negotiat5.ons
begin* Coghlan agreed on condition that tho 'Abdalis abstained from
closing the roads and interrupting supplies in the future* The
chieftains pledged that the roads would be open the following day and
they showed willingness to visit Aden to settle all remaining
differences , which they eventually did#
The chiefs expressed their hope that tho British would withdraw,
and Coghlan agreed for two main reasons* Sultan 'Ali had been taught
a severe lesson* His belief that the British would never leavo their
fortifications had been shattered, and about 40 of his men had lost
their lives. This loss would create resentment among his clans who
considered that in his hostility to the British, he was motivated by
private interests rather than by the welfare of his people*
The more important reason was that a survey of the village
convinced Coghlan that it was not feasible to occupy it as an outpost
garrisoned by a small detachment of infantry with a couple of guns*
bhen the 'Abdalis felt like it, they could easily besiege the small
force, harrass it with continuous skirmishing and oblige the British
to go out to relieve it*
To effect the object which Coghlan had originally contemplated,
Ghaykh 'Uthman must be converted into a fortress with a strong
resident garrison and with half a troop of light cavalry, without
which even heavy artillery would not prevent its being surrounded and
perhaps cut off from all communication with Aden* The British,
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therefore* blew up the fort and returned to Aden the same day without
a single casualty*
Coghlan's proceedings were approved in Bombay* "The Rt. Hon*
the Governor in Council (Elphinstone) ••• was with reluctance about
to sanction the adoption of the measures of coercion suggested by
you; when the receipt of your subsequent letter (reporting the
success of the expedition) ••• has only rendered it necessary for
Government to record its full approval of your proceedings*" The
Government promised to strengthen the garrison and send the cavalry
as soon as possible* They agreed that there wms no need to establish
an outpost at Shaykh 'Uthman; the Sultan could be "kept in order"
168
by operations from Aden itself*
In London, when Ellenborough, Smith's successor, heard of the
preparations ttfhich Coghlan was making, he wrote to Elphinstonei
"Frig. Coghlan rather alarms me* I have no doubt you have written to
him and cautioned him, so I did not write at all*"^^ Two months
after the expedition, Elphinstone wrote to Ellenborough that he, too,
had been startled when he heard that Coghlan had in mind to occupy
the village os Shaykh 'Uthman and wrote to warn him against such a
step, but before his letter was received Coghlan's good sense had
made him abandon the project* Elphinstone assured Ellenborough that
Coghlan had acted for the best and that he (Ellenborough) need have
170no worries on his account*
After the attack, things went back to normal* The Sultan returned
the coffee to 'Ali Bu Bakr, but he did not explain why he detained
the Imam's messenger and harboured al-Baghi* Coghlan did not make an
issue of the messenger's detention, but insisted on the expulsion of
al-Baghi from Lahj* His remaining at large would neutralise the "good"
effects of the Shaykh 'Uthman campaign and would be "most derogatory
171to British honour and most detrimental to British interests."
Strangely enough, Coghlan made no reference to Sayyid Husayn*
'Ali blamed the hostilities on misunderstanding and misrepresent­
ation. He denied detaining any messenger from the Imam and described
172the report as "false". As for al-Baghi, he had assumed that 
Coghlan had forgiven him after making peace with his tribe; but since 
this was not the case, he promised to expel him* 'Ali seems to have 
vindicated himself to Coghlan's satisfaction, as Ahmad had done the 
year before, and his stipend was restored as from 19th March, 1858,
2^ -2.
$285 having been deducted as compensation for the plunder committed 
173by his people.
.Relations improved steadily, and on 1st July, 1858, the two men
met at al-Hiswah* *Ali expressed his regret for what had happened
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and vowed to be friendly in the future# In March of the following
year, Coghlan spent three days at al-Hawtah as guest of the Sultan;
and four months later, Rassam, now Second Assistant-Resident, acted
as mediator between *Ali and some members of his family#
The Government did not send the cavalry for which Coghlan had
asked, but instead, they decided to send camelraen from Lower Sind#
Yet, as it were to justify their action, they asked Coghlan whether,
in view of the peaceful relations with the tribes, there was any
175need for maintaining an ’’expensive” troop of horse# Coghlan
answered that there was no need now that British relations with the
tribes had materially changed, and there was reason to believe that
176peace would continue# The eleven horsetroopers were sent back 
to Bombay, and the five remaining horses were sold by auction* The 
Indian cameliaen, 6l in number, arrived on 9th December, 1859, but it 
was found that they were no match for the masters of the camel, and 
they were disbanded in September 1860#
In the previous April, Coghlan was sent to Masqat and Zanzibar 
on special duty# He took with him Rassam and Badger and left 
Playfair as Acting Resident* By the time he returned to Aden, in 
July 1861, he was due a furlough of fifteen months* In September he 
left for England with the intention of retiring at the end of hie 
holiday#
The Government of Bombay offered the Residency to Col# Kemball, 
the agent at Baghdad, but he declined it# They then apr>ointed as 
Acting Resident Col. G.H* Robertson of the 25th Regiment Native 
Light Infantry# Robertson took up office in November 1861, but died 
in January of the following year and was succeeded as Acting Resident 
by Maj*-Gen# R#VJ* Honner who arrived in Aden in April 1862* However, 
Playfair, who had been First Assistant-Resident since 185^ and who 
had had charge of the Residency for over a year, found it difficult 
to work under him* He expressed his wish to leave Aden, and the 
Government of Bombay appointed him Acting Political Agent at Zanzibar* 
Honner was appointed when Clerk was Governor of Bombay, but the 
new Governor, Sir H#B#E* Frere, did not consider him suitable* He
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wrote privately to Wood that Ilonner "is not a man I would ever have
placed in a position where any kind of diplomatic or administrative
ability is required”. Frere believed that the Resident should be a
man of political experience, and not only a good soldier as Honner
was. He admitted that it would not be easy to remove him, but
suggested, as the most amicable solution, that Coghlan should return
to Aden temporarily. This would give the Government time to chose a 
177new Resident# Coghlan returned on 3rd January, 1863, and Honner 
went back to Bombay. Sultan 'Ali died three months later, with peace 
still prevailing between the British and all the surrounding tribes#
After Muhsin's death, relations between the British and the 
'Abdalis took a dramatic turn for the better. The British acknowledged 
the pre-eminence of the 'Abdali sultan and made him their channel of 
communication with the other chiefs, thus putting into effect their 
original policy of working through Lahj. The 'Abdali sultan, in turn, 
pledged to keep the roads open and started to consult the Resident 
on all important matters*
Demands that murderers of British subjects should be tried and 
publicly executed brought about a collision between the European 
concept of justice and Arab customs and traditions. In consequence, 
the 'Abdali sultan found himself in the classic dilemma of the 
colonial intermediary, at the centre of a conflict of laws.
As a de facto British agent, he had to appear to co-operate with 
the British; but as an Arab ruler, he had to comply with tribal laws# 
The British would not give him active support in carrying out their 
wishes, but at the same time they could harm him if he did not act at 
their behest. In meeting British demands, 'Ali went as far as he 
safely could and in the case of Salah even further. On that occasion 
he almost destroyed himself# Under these circumstances, tho policy 
of working through Lahj had but a limited success, a fact which gave 
rise to criticism#
At first, the British wanted to impose their own morality, but 
ultimately they found that they had to compromise. They accepted the 
expulsion of the murderers from the territories of their protectors 
as a substitute for their execution# Continuing the practice of 
adapting themselves to Arab customs where possible, the British now 
made use of their local sayyid in negotiating with the tribes#
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A cavalry troop continued to be the Residents* answer to their 
troubles with the Arabs, but their wish was not granted. Official 
policy against expeditions inland and intervention in the affairs of 
the tribes remained constant} force was to be used only in defence 
of Aden. This restriction was severely criticised by the Residents 
and their superiors in India.
Deprived of the means of taking offensive action in the interior, 
the Residents often found themselves compelled to counsel peace or 
admit inability to act. On one occasion, Haines used the 'Abdalis to 
punish the 'Aqrabis, an action which proved to be a great political 
blunder. Coghlan believed in the principle of playing the tribes off 
against each other, but only as a last resort. More than once he 
prepared to put this principle into practice, but his schemes either 
failed or were rendered unnecessary.
Blockade and the stoppage of stipends continued to be employed 
with little effect. The new device of banning hostile tribes from 
Aden was not more successful. In their desire to achieve quick and 
concrete results, the Residents on rare occasions defied official 
policy and took direct action against the tribes. As they were 
successful, their action was approved.
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CHAPTER VIII.
SULTAN FADL.
'Ali should have been succeeded by his eldest son Fadl, a youth 
of twenty} but the responsibility of government daunted tho young 
man and he did not assume the leadership of his tribe* He did not 
draw his stipend nor did he pay tho subsidies to the shaykhs of his 
clans. More important, he did not meet a claim by the Fadli chief on 
his father.^ The chief therefore declared war on Lahj, and with the 
'Uzaybis committed plunder and murder on the roads*
In tho midst of this confusion, Major W.L. Herewether replaced 
Coghlan on 19th June* Herewether served under General Jacob of the
p
Sind Horse from 1844 to 1359, when he succeeded him as Comr.ander of 
the Sind Frontier Brigade, the largest of its kind in India* He
remained in that post for three years and in 1861-2 he acted as
Military Secretary to the Government of Bombay. Herewether
distinguished himself as a soldier in the Sind Mar of 1842-5 and the
Punjab ware of 1845-9. His remarkable qualities were officially 
recognised by Gir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind, and others.
In 1863, as in 1854, the Bombay Government suffered from a short­
age of available officers who united political experience v/ith high 
military rank. The Governor, Sir H.B.E. FJrere, valued the importance 
of tho two branches of administration at Aden very highly. The 
military responsibility he placed next only to that of tie Commander- 
in-Chief, and he thought that the political duties v^ ere too great to 
be left to an inferior man. His wish was that Aden should continue 
under an officer who was both Resident and Commandant, and in his 
opinion Herewether was "altogether the best officer at our disposal".^ 
W.L. Frere, the Governor's brother, and J.D. Inverarity, the other 
civilian members of the Board, agreed with him.
Unfortunately, in spite of his brilliant record, Herewether did
not have the necessary army rank to qualify him for the coramand of
the garrison. Frere, therefore, asked Sir William Mansfield, the
Commander-In-Chief, whether Herewether could be given local rank to
4enable him to bo Commandant as well as Resident. Mansfield answered 
that to give an officer local rank in time of peace was contrary to 
army practice, Besides, there were three lieutenant-colonelo already 
at Aden who would be offended if Merewether was promoted over them. 
Under these circumstances, Mansfield suggested that the command of
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the garrison could be given to Col* J«A*R* Raines of II*M* 95th Foot
which was due to go to Aden, and he did not foresee any trouble
5
between the two men*
Herewether was formally appointed Political Resident on 29th May, 
and an application for his promotion was made to Calcutta and London* 
In the mean time, Raines was sent to Aden as Brigadier-General and 
was asked to co-operate fully with Herewether* u*** Major Herewether, 
having the title of Resident, is, to all intents and purposes, a 
Governor, and must be treated as such *«• that is to hay, that his 
final decision must be law to you, pending a reference to superior 
authority*
The Supreme Government approved of the instructions given to 
Raines, but they and the India Office both agreed with Mansfield that 
there was no justification for bending army rules in Herewether*s 
favour* Herewether was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in January 1864 
as a matter of course* However, this promotion was not sufficient 
to givo him tho command of the garrison* Raines continued as 
Commandant, and there is no indication that relations betv/een him and 
Herewether were anything but amicable*
The first problem that faced Herewether as Resident was that of 
the* Abdali succession* In an attempt to settle the question, he
7
invited Fadl and his four uncles for discussions* Fadl and his uncle 
of the same name did not go, while the other three uncles accepted 
the invitation* After talks lasting nearly a month, the three offered
g
the turban to their brother Fadl*
Herewether had his first meeting with tho new Sultan at al-Hiswah
on 6th October, 186% Fadl asked the Resident for help in resolving,
by force, a quarrel between him and his troublesome half-brother,
*Abd Allah* Herewether pointed out to him that British policy was to
abstain from armed intervention in the affairs of the mainland*
Furthermore, British assistance at the outset of his reign would be
interpreted as a sign of weakness on his part* The majority of the
people were on his side and he should be able to punish his refractory 
q
brother himself*
In February 1864, Herewether paid a three day visit to al-Hawtah* 
His party included two European ladies, the first ever to be seen in 
the interior, a sign of the general peace then prevailing* A few 
months earlier, the Sultan had set aside a piece of ground for the
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growing of European vegetables# The seeds had been supplied by 
Herewether who was now delighted at the success of the experiment 
and greatly impressed by the cultivation of the plain surrounding 
al-Hawtah*^
A more tangible sign of friendship towards the British by the
•Abdalis and Fadlis was the protection afforded to ships which were
grounded on their coasts. On 10th December, 1863, the Peninsular &
Oriental Company’s steamer "Rangoon*1, which was coming from Calcutta,
ran aground four miles to the east of Aden on the ’Abdali coast* The
brother of Sultan Fadl and the nephew of Sultan Ahmad guarded the
11steamer until she was refloated two weeks lator* In January 1864,
the British ship "Statelie" on her way to Bombay ran aground 30 miles
to the east of Aden on the Fadli coast* She was protected, from
15th to 22nd January, by Sultan Ahmad himself, "acting in accordance
with the friendly feeling he has of late years evinced to any and
everything British". Herewether acknowledged this service by "a
12suitable present"*
The years 1863-65 were years of famine In the interior* Little 
rain fell, murrain afflicted the cattle and, in 1864, locusts visited 
the area* Late that year, most unexpectedly, the Fadli chief decided 
that he had been long enough at peace with the ’Abdalis and the 
British and it was high time that he fought them again* He urged 
the other tribes to join him, and reviled Fadl for allowing "infidels" 
to wander ^bout Lahj, meaning Herewether and his party* Herewether 
himself thought that the real reason for the Sultan’s change of heart 
was, as rumour had it, his belief that he was entitled to #40,000 
salvage for the "Statelie", instead of only a small present*
When Fadl heard that Ahmad intended to invade Lahj and destroy 
what the locusts had spared, he discussed the threat with Herewether 
at al-Hiswah on 3rd November, 1864. The Sultan proposed an alliance 
with the ’Awlaqis, and for this purpose, he requested a loan of 
#13,000 to be repaid out of his profits from the Shaykh ’Uthman project 
then under discussion* Herewether sanctioned the loan, believing 
that the Government would not object, having agreed to such a plan in 
1835, but he forgot that this was not meant to be a precedent*
In the Resident’s opinion, the best way of helping the ’Abdalis 
in their distress was to give them employment and put more money in 
their hands* To this end he recommended the early execution of the
Shaykh ’Uthman scheme; it would pay for itself a hundredfold by
benefiting the people apart from increasing the water supply to the
Settlement* This plan the Resident described as "sound policy as
13well as a humane procedure"*
Frere did not agree to the loan and instructed Herewether to
withdraw fro;: the arrangement* "It is not our business •*• to aid
one tribe in attacking another, especially when the tribe attacked
is nominally at peace with us*" The Government approved of the
■Shaykh ’Uthman project in principle, but added that thoy did not
14have tho means to carry it out# If the money had been paid, some
other means of repayment would have to be found, or the money could
be given as a gift to the Sultan for any service other than attacking 
15his neighbour*
Herewether conveniently answered that the arrangement v/ith the
’Awlaqis had been abandoned due to sickness and other unforeseen
circumstances* Re added that he had already given Fadl $5QQQ and
asked that this sum be considered as a gift in token of the Sultan’s
l6goodwill and friendship* The Bombay Government agreed, and so did
the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, but the latter warned that in future
the Resident should not give pecuniary assistance at his own discretion*
In December 1864, the Fadlis attacked a caravan near Shaykh
•Uthman, wounded six men and stole 40 camels laden with supplies#
Herewether complained to Sultan Ahmad and warned him that if the
18stolen property was not restored, his stipend would be stopped#
Sultan Ahmad answered by closing the road between al-Hawtah and Aden
for two days, and the closure would have lasted longer had it not
19been for Sultan Fadl*a move against him#
Ahmad did not restore the plundered property, and Herewether
20stopped his stipend and banned his tribe from entering Aden* The
chief then attacked Lahj, and for three days no supplies reached the
21Settlement from the interior* Off Shuqrah, his men plundered two
buggalows; the first, loaded with grain from Sind, put in for water;
and the second, from Berbers, ran aground during bad weather* To
punish Ahmad, Herewether suggested an attack on al-’Asala, four miles
from the sea* Many rich merchants lived there, and the Sultan
22depended on them for his money#
Like Coghlan and Haines before him when faced with disturbances 
on the roads, Herewether asked for a troop of 100 horse v/ith a small
2b 9.
23Arab levy attached to act as scouts and guides, on the nodel of the
Sind Horse with whom he had spent eighteen years* Lawrence, who was
against a forward frontier policy in India, opposed the sending of
cavalry to Aden, The cavalry would cost the Government Rs* 70,000
per annum and would likely embroil the British with the tribes, since
conflict with marauders would bring reprisals. Like Auckland before
him, Lawrence trusted that economics would be a sufficient inducement
to make the tribes act in a friendly way towards the British* "The
Arab tribes have a certain interest in maintaining friendly relations
v/ith the British Government owing to the good market which Aden affords
and we must trust to this motive exercising a proper influence over 
Zbtheir minds*"
In a private letter to Bir Charles Hood, the Secretary of State,
the Viceroy elaborated on his objection© to a cavalry troop at Aden*
A force of 100 men would be too small for the work expected of it*
Once the British started putting down plunderers, they would find
themselves in need of more and more men and would be forced to inter**
fere more and more in Arab affairs. Whatever good the force might
achieve, the cost would bo cut of proportion to it* Besides the
regular annual outlay for tho troop, barracks v/ould have to be built
25and other expenses met*
Kerewether was not satisfied with this answer and begged for a 
reconsideration of his request. He argued that the cavalry would not 
prove expensive, The cost of maintaining the garrison had been increas 
ing annually due to the steady rise of food prices, Ilore recently, 
the situation was made worse by famine and limited agricultural 
activity in Lahj on which the British were greatly dependent for their 
supplies* The 'Abdalis were afraid to cultivate the land to its full 
extent again lest the Fadlis would come and destroy the harvest. To 
remedy this situation, it was necessary that order and security should 
prevail in the immediate vicinity of Aden, The cavalry v/ould provide 
the peace desired, the land would be cultivated, and prices would come 
down*
The Resident went on to argue less convincingly that the cavalry 
would not involve the British with the tribes or bring reprisals upon 
them* The cavalry v/ould only be stepping in to stop disorders and put 
an end to tho reprisals which were going on among the tribes and which 
were causing much inconvenience to Aden* If, with the help of horse,
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Gen. Jacob could bring peace to Baluchistan where the tribes were
more powerful and predatory than the Arabs, the British could do the
26
same more easily in the vicinity of Aden v/here the "largest” tribe 
was "heart and soul on our side**. In short, Merewether believed that 
the cavalry would provide the economic and political answer to Aden*s 
difficulties, and to strengthen his case he quoted a personal letter 
from Coghlan in London, Coghlan wrote that the cavalry would preserve 
peace within a hundred-mile radius, and the Arabs could not oppose 
it.27
Merewether based his argument regarding the cavalry on his Sind
experience, but the situation in Aden was not the same as in Sind,
Sind was under British rule, and it was the duty of the British to
preserve law and order* Outside the peninsula of Aden the British
had no jurisdiction, and the cavalry could not possibly have acted as
a police force without involving the British with the tribes, as they
were to do on a future occasion#
The Government of Bombay were sympathetic to Merewether*s
proposals and asked the Supreme Government to reconsider them. However,
28the latter were not impressed and stood by their decision. Wood,
too, for the reasons given by Lawrence, was against sending cavalry
to Aden. In a private letter to Merewether he wrote that at Aden the
British had a natural boundary in the Isthmus beyond v/hich they did
not need to go except for the occasional punitive expedition which
circumstances might force them to carry out. However, it would be
better if they could avoid leaving their limits altogether# Wood
preferred the principle of "divide and rule" to direct intervention*
"... I infinitely prefer playing the chiefs off against each other,
... I should have thought that any of then, with the assistance v/hich
you can give in arms and money would be more than a match for his 
29neighbours," This was a private letter, and did not become official 
policy.
Meanwhile, the Fadlis continued to terrorise the vicinity of Aden*
In July 1865, they plundered and murdered two *Abdalis only two miles
from the Barrier Gate.^® In September, they plundered a caravan on
the British side of the Khur Maksar, about one and a half miles from
the Barrier Gate, Merewether repeated that if the cavalry had been
31at Aden, such an insult would not have been offered.
Then, liko his predecessors when they had trouble with one or
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more tribes, he vehemently attacked the British policy* of granting
stipends and what seemed to him appeasement. His attacks were
contained in letters to the Government of Bombay and the Secretary of
State for India* The following quotation from his letter to London
is a good summary of his criticism* The policy, he wrote, "*,. had
totally failed to do what was of most material importance to us, viz*
to improve the condition of the people of the country, so that we need
be in no fear of scarcity, at any time, of supplies, or to create
such wealth and contentment amongst them as would have made ou£
32continued presence her© their chief object*”
Since the Government of India did not sanction his proposal for
a body of horse, Merewether suggested that a force with the same
duties be provided by the ’Abdali tribe* Article 6 of the treaty of
1849 stipulated that the Sultan should protect the roads as far as it 
33lay in his p o w e r , b u t  his stipend did not enable him to carry out
his obligation* Therefore, r.erewcther proposed that a monthly sum
of Rs, 5500 be given him to maintain a patrol of 200 camelmen and
50 horsemen* If the Sultan failed to guarantee the safety of the
34roads, the money would be withheld*
In a letter dated 9th December, 1865, Lawrence showed himself 
favourably disposed towards this idea, but thought that the camel 
corps should be raised, trained and commanded by the British* The 
Arabs would be armed and equipped in the manner to which they were 
accustomed and would be operating among their own people* Having men 
of their own tribes in this corps, the chiefs would have a vested 
interest in maintaining peace and order, an argument reminiscent of 
Auckland^* A camel corps would be cheaper than a troop of horse 
sent from India, and no expense would be required on account of 
reliefs and furloughs* If the plan failed, the corps could simply be 
disbanded* An additional advantage was that in an emergency a camel 
could carry, besides its own rider, an English soldier or sepoy*
Before a final decision was taken on the subject, the Governor- 
General wanted to know whether reliable men could be found for the 
service and whether the scheme in general stood a chance of success*
In any case, he made it clear that the British should concern them­
selves only with the defence of the Settlement and its immediate 
approaches* "Under all circumstances, the principle of refraining 
from interference with the neighbouring tribes and abstaining from
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any concern with their internal quarrels, must be vigorously
maintained. The course of action, also, hitherto observed of
maintaining our relations beyond the walls of Aden, not by direct
operations on our part, but by operating through friendly chiefs,
35must still bo considered the paramount obligation,"
In a private letter to Wood, Lawrence explained why he wanted
the carnal corps to be under British, and not ♦Abdali, control# The
Sultan "will take all he can get, but I doubt his will, or his power
36to help ua effectively",
Merewether still wanted to punish the Fadli sultan, and for his
punishment he asked for a vessel of war to help in the capture of
al-’Asala* Its destruction or ransom would teach Ahmad a severe 
37lesson* Tho Viceroy answered, on 9th December, that for the time
being it was sufficient to blockade Shuqrah, and for this purpose he
authorised the sending of the vessel. The same vessel, he insinuated,
38might be used in an expedition.
Twelve days later, he wrote that if the blockade failed, an
expedition would be considered, and he asked Merewether for his
39plans* However, even before the first letter reached Aden,
Merewether had already made his expedition, Cn 13th December,
Muhammad, a brother of the *Abdali sultan, came to Aden to inform the 
President that the Fadlis were collecting a force with the intention 
of marching on Lahj and destroying the crops which were ready for 
harvest. The chief asked for help; and as Merewether was certain 
that the 'Abdalis would not be able to repulse the threatened attack, 
he ordered that a force be held in readiness to proceed into the
IlQ
interior as soon as it became known that the Fadlis were on the move.
News of their movement having reached Aden, an advance party of
200 left early in the morning of 21st December for Shayldh 1Uthnan to
strengthen the 300 *Abdalis who had been stationed there for the past
41year under Muhammad, The rest of the force followed on the 22nd,
The Fadlis, 1000 strong under Sultan Ahmad himself, had camped at 
Bir Sa’id, eight miles from Shaykh 'Uthxsan in 'Abdali territory, Tho 
British took them by surprise there and forced them to flee, In the 
engagement which lasted only 45 minutes many Fadlis were killed or 
wounded; the only British casualties wero seven injured*
A force under Sultan Fadl reached Bir Sa*id half an hour after 
tho fighting had ended; and although his horsemen killed a few
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fugitives, they did not penetrate deeply into enemy territory. For 
this reason, Merewether decided that the “Arabs" in the vicinity of 
Aden could not be relied on to form the camel corps originally
43proposed by him*
The troops returned to Shaykh ’Uthman where they spent three days 
and on 2?th December they left the village to attack the Fadli chief 
in his own country* On this occasion, the British force was 
augmented by 1500 ’Abdalis under Muhammad* At Ja'wala they captured 
seven guns, at al-’Amudiyyah and al-Kawr they destroyed the towers and 
at al-’Asala they demolished the houses* The Yafi’is returned to 
Ja’wala which thoy had abandoned to the Fadlis a short tine previously 
to avoid constant friction. The troops were back in Aden on 
5th January, 1866, having subdued the Fadli country, but not the 
Fadli chief*
The day before, Merewether wrote privately to Wood that the
Fadli spirit was completely broken and that the tribe would never
again constitute a serious threat to British communications. Snail
numbers might try to plunder, but this could be rrevonted if the
/|/t
Home Authorities authorised the sending of cavalry to Aden.
Merewether attacked the Fadlis without Government permission, but 
he justified his act by stating that the least delay would have been 
fatal. In a few days, the crops would have been destroyed throughout 
Lahj and the ’Abdalis, as x*ell as the people of Aden, would have had 
to face another famine* If the Fadlis had been allowed to remain at 
Bir Sa’id, the roads would have been closed and all vital supplies 
cut off. "It was now clear that further forbearance would be a crime
Lt5
- that a prompt and severe blow must be immediately administered*«•" 
The Government of Bombay approved of the car ;aign, and expressed their
confidence that it would have a beneficial effect on the future
L(L
conduct of the Fadlis and other tribes*
Wood, too, congratulated Merewether on the success of his
campaign, and expressed his hope that it would be a lasting lesson 
47to the Fadlis# However, the demands for cavalry did not cease. In
a private letter to Wood, Merewether wrote! "Ilad we had them, the
tribe would have been annihilated, instead of being able to escape
into the hills, and the old chief ... must have been captured or 
48
killed*" In other words, Merewether implied that there was still 
a need for cavalry* Frere was of the same opinion and wrote to
25*U
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Lawrence that without them the British might run great risks#
Lawrence, however, thought that Merewether#s success proved that
50there was no need for cavalry at Aden# Wood also had not changed
his opinion# f,I am rather afraid of giving a body of horse to the
Resident at Aden, he would I am afraid always be meddling with the
Arab tribes and we should be gradually led to assuming a protectorate
51and embroiling ourselves in Arab politics•,, This fear was realised, 
and the British ultimately assumed a protectorate over tho area# 
Contrary to expectations, the effects of the Fadli campaign 
were of very short duration# On 22nd February, a party of horsemen 
under Sultan Ahmad’s brother Fadl attacked, near Shaykh ’Uthman, a 
caravan bound for the interior, killed four men and carried off 25 
camels#^ The Sultan himself returned to Shuqrah with 800 or 900 
men after the British had withdrawn, and plundered a boat belonging 
to Mukalla which bad weather drove on shore#
Merewether felt that Sultan Ahmad needed another lesson, and 
accordingly a British force consisting of 351 officers and men left 
on the evening of 14th March on board the ‘'Victoria**. They took 
with them the ’Abdali sultan, his brother Muhammad, some of the elders 
and Sayyid ’Alawi. When they arrived at Shuqrah they found only 
twenty armed men, the Sultan and the rest of his force having left#
The British destroyed the village on l6th March, and were back in 
Aden on the 17th# ^
In May, Merewether went home on leave determined that Aden should 
have a cavalry troop# By then, Wood, who was against the idea, had 
been replaced as Secretary of State for India by Lord de Grey and 
Ripon (February 1866)# Merewether submitted his case to him; but 
before a decision could be taken, a change of government brought 
Viscount Cranborne (later Marquis of Salisbury) to the India Office 
in July#
Cranborne agreed that a troop of horse was most desirable, but 
thought that it should be raised locally# Horsemen from India would 
have to be relieved periodically and their efficiency would be 
reduced by being far away from home# In sanctioning the formation of 
a cavalry troop, the new Secretary of State was influenced by 
Sir Robert Napier, then Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, who 
supported the idea and to whose opinion, Cranborne wrote to Lawrence, 
"great weight may properly be attached**#^
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The Government of India gave orders for the formation of the new
troop in March 1867* However, the troop was not raised locally as
recommended by Cranborne, but was recruited from the Sind Horse,
presumably in the light of Merewether*s unfavourable testimony about
the "Arabs" following tho engagement with the Fadlis on
21st December, 1865*
The new troop was to act as a police force# It was to keep open
communications with the interior; to protect caravans coming to Aden;
to give security to the friends of the British; and to punish
plunderers# The same rules which Lawrance had formulated for the
camel corps were now applied to the cavalry troop#
Merewether returned to Aden in December 1865# In the previous
September, after a short period of hostility between the Fadlis and
the Yafi’is, the two sultans had concluded peace# The Yafi’i chief
also took on himself tho responsibility of making a two-year truce
between the Fadlis and the British# Sultan Ahmad seemed agreeable
and asked what terms would be acceptable# G*R# Goodfellow, Acting
Resident (8th l^ay-l4th December, 1866), answered that he or one of
55his sons should come to Aden and arrange matters# Instead,
Sultan Ahmad sent one of his sons to the Ottoman governor of Iludaydah
to complain against the British and to swear allegiance to the 
5oOttoman Sultan#
Nothing came of these overtures, and in May 1867 tho Fadli chief 
sent his eldost son Haydarah to surrender formally in his name and 
in that of his tribe* By then he was about 100 years old, crippled 
and blind but still mentally alert# He died on 3rd February, 1870, 
and was succeeded by Haydarah who had for some time acted on his 
behalf#
The Fadli surrender in 1867 was followed by a new treaty, bearing 
the date 27th May# The only article worthy of mention in this treaty 
is Article 4# It stipulated that a son, or another close relative 
of the reigning sultan "shall reside in Aden to be near the Resident 
and to transact business relating to the tribe".^ In other words, 
the British wanted a hostage, and the only hostage to reside in Aden 
was Yahya Ibn *Abd Allah, probably a brother of the old chief#
In January 1868, Maj.-Gen# Sir E#L# Russell succeeded Merewether 
as Resident and Raines as Commandant# Like Merewether, Russell served 
v/ith the Sind Horse, and During the Sind Campaign of 1842-3 he was
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Adjutant of the force# He, too, acted for one year as Military 
Secretary to the Government of Bombay, in 1856* Russell had no 
political experience#
When the Fadli hostage died, on 1st August, 1870, relations with 
the Fadli tribe were at their best, and Russell suggested that no 
replacement should be made "to mark our sense of the sincerity and 
goodwill shown to us by the present chief, Sultan Ilaidara #•#"
Perhaps more important, the Government would save the monthly sum of
58 59#100 paid for the maintenance of the hostage# The Government agreed#
Earlier, in October 1867, the good relations between the British and
the Fadlis had been marked by an increase to the Sultan’s stipend from
60
#364-J to #1200 per annum#
The peace which the British concluded with the Fadlis had its 
positive results# For the Aden Troop to operate successfully, the 
co-operation of the ’Abdalis and Fadlis was indispensible, and now 
obtainable# An Arab levy of 33 was raised and entered Government 
service on 1st July, 1867# The levy was made up of ’Abdali and Fadli 
tribesmen; the ’Abdali portion was stationed in its own territory at 
Shaykh ’Uthnan, and the Fadli in its own territory at ’Imad# Recruit­
ment from the Sind Horse started in 1867* The number of men required 
to form the Aden Troop was 100, and in April 1868 the first contingent 
of 55 arrived with their horses#
With the consent of the chiefs, the Aden Troop with members of 
the levy were soon patrolling in the ’Abdali and Fadli districts, and 
in 1872 they started patrolling in the Hawshabi and ’Alawi territories 
where no European had ever been before. Parties from the levy were 
continually on the move in their own territories# If thoy found men 
collecting for looting or such purposes, they reported them to the 
nearest patrol of the Aden Troop which proceeded immediately to the 
place in question and thwarted the plans of the marauders# Other 
parties from the levy accompanied the patrols as guides and interpreters* 
In short, the levy performed the same function as the Baluch Guides 
on the Sind Frontier, and the Aden Troop as the Sind Horse#^* The 
free movement of the Troop in the interior was a sign of the changing 
circumstances#
Peace with the Fadlis had another positive result# One of the 
reasons for the British occupation of Aden in 1839 was the fear that 
the French might take it and use it as a base for operations against
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India# Once in Adent the British made it their policy to prevent 
other nations from establishing themselves in their vicinity#
In 1862, the flench bought the port of Abokh on the Danakil coast 
for 010,000* The port was of some strategic importance, but of no 
commercial value# Therefore, the French then cast an eye on 
Jabal Ihsan, a peninsula in the ’Aqrabi territory with an area of 
fifteen square miles. The ’Aqrabi chief told Hornier that they had 
offered him # 30,000 for it#
Jabal Ihsan had an anchorage for three or four vessels, but as 
a harbour or military base it could not be compared with Aden# To 
the British it was of no use, but in the hands of an enemy it could 
have been dangerous. Materials for a siege could have been collected 
there, and a short easy march would have brought the enemy in front 
of the Isthmus defences#
The peninsula was of no great value to the ’Aqrabi chief either, 
but the temptation of celling it for a huge sun of money was too great, 
and Honner urged the Government to buy it to prevent its sale to the 
French, it being on the opposite shore of Aden Harbour# He was 
confident that he could get it for less than the reputed French 
offer.62
The Government of Bombay were against the French being so close 
to the British Settlement, but they were also against buying 
Jabal Ihsan at any price. Instead, they proposed that they should 
subsidise the chief of Bir Ahmad as they had other neighbouring chiefs# 
By this arrangement, they would not only gain influence over the 
•Aqrabie, but also prevent their chief from selling territory to the 
French or any other power#
fho idea of granting the ’Aqrabi chief a stipend originated with 
Sir William Mansfield, the Commander-in-Chief« In a minute dated 
7th December, 1862, Mansfield wrote that if the French established 
themselves at Jabal Ihsan, they would cause great inconvenience and 
even constitute a danger by stopping supplies from reaching the 
garrison# If war broke out, they would be well placed to lay siege 
to Aden, or arm the Arabs to attack it. The Arabs were not favourably 
disposed towards the British, and the French could win them over by 
money# JIansfield added that when he was in Aden on a tour of inspection 
in November 1862, he heard that the French had promised to help the 
•Aqrabi chief against his enemies if he sold them Jabal Ihsan, and this
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might make their offer more attractive. British policy, on the other
63
hand, was against embroilment with the Arab chiefs.
On 12th December, tho Government instructed Coghlan, who was on 
his way back from England, to subsidise the ’Aqrabi chief for the 
reasons given above. In their letter to London, which quoted 
extensively from I&nsfield’s minute, they pointed out that the 
occupation of Jabal Ihsan by the French would in no way add to the 
facilities which their ships had at Adenj it would only be harmful 
to British interests and a source of jealousy, dispute and conflict.
If the French had actually offered to buy Jabal Ihsan, the Home 
Authorities should remonstrate with the French Government against 
such a move.
.iith this official letter Frere sent a private one to Wood, in 
v/hich he strengthened his argument against buying Jabal Ihsan* An 
extension to British territory would weaken control over Aden itself 
and involve the British in interminable troubles with their neigh­
bours. The British would not only offend tho Ottoman Government, 
but also "all the great European powers". It would be cheaper to 
strengthen the defences of Aden than to enter the market against the 
ironch.^
The Secretary of State was for the purchase of Jabal Ihsan. V/hen
he received Bonner’o report he v/asted no tine and on 2^th December
wrote direct to Coghlan, who was on his way back to Aden, authorising
him to arrange for the cession of Jabal Ihsan to tho British Govern- 
66meat. Tho Foreign Office, too, thought that the purchase was 
"desirable"#^
Later, in a private letter to Frere, Uood reassured him that the
Government had no intention of occupying Jabal Ihsan, but at the same
68time they did not want anybody else to do so. To the Viceroy,
Lord Elgin, he wrote 1 "i/e have authorised buying Little Aden, to 
keep our friends, the French, out. ... We do not propose to settle 
it, or occupy it, but to be able to exclude inconvenient neighbours."
Coghlan arrived back in Aden on 3rd January, 1863, and found 
Bombay’s letter of 12th December waiting for him. Before he could 
arrange a meeting with the ’Aqrabi chief, he received London’s 
letter of 2*fth December. Coghlan wanted to buy Jabal Ihsan as 
instructed by the Secretary of State, but the chief now said that he 
would not sell his land to Britain or to any other power. However,
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to show his attachment to the British, h© expressed himself willing
to give a written promise not to alienate Jabal Ihsan without their
previous knowledge and consent# A bond to this effect was executed
with him on 23rd January, and in return he received an immediate
70payment of 03000 and a monthly stipend of 030m Thus, by force of
circumstance, Bombay*s proposal was carried out, and the •Aqrabi
chief became the seventh stipendiary of the British Government* Wood
regretted that an outright purchase had not been made, but approved
71of the transaction#
The French were not deterred by the bond signed with tho Britiehj
and fearing that the *Aqrabi chief might succumb to the temptation
of money, Coghlan made another attempt to purchase the peninsula out-
72right. This tine *Abd Allah was willing to sell, but the purchase
could not be effected and had to be deferred until 1869.
The Fadli sultan protested against the proposed transaction, which
made it impossible for the *Aqrabis to sell or for the British to buy.
His protest was based on the agreement of 1852, whereby he was
entitled to half the revenue of the *Aqrabi bandar# From lS6*f-67|
the Fadlis and the British were at war, and when peace returned,
Iierewether found himself occupied with the Abyssinian Campaign# He
loft Aden in January 1868, and it fell to his successor, Russell, to
carry out the deal#
In November of the same year, the Fadli sultan sent his son
Haydarah to renew his claim on Jabal Ihsan and to lay others against
73the *Abdali chief# Russell settled then all in March 1869 by a
/ 7 in­payment of 02000m Then, after ten days of haggling v/ith the *Aqrabi
chief, a deed of sale was signed on 2nd April# The British paid
#30*000 and agreed to add a further #10 to the original monthly stipend
as compensation for the dues which the ’Aqrabi chief received from
the bandar in Jabal Ihsan# In turn, *Abd Allah agreed not to sell any
portion of his territory (Ras ’Imran was mentioned in particular)
except to the British#*^
The Sultan of Lahj protested against the deal, on the pretext
that the ’Aqrabis were his subjects, and therefore, the sale was
illegal# Goodfellow, officiating for Russell, dismissed his clain7^
and the Sultan renounced it, but said that he wished to submit his
case in person to tho Governor of Bombay, Sir VJ# Fitzgerald* As will
be seen, his desire to visit India was not connected with Jabal Ihsan.
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Hero, however, it is enough to say that Russell welcomed the Sultan’s
idea of visiting Bombay and gave it his support# Ho stated that
since Fadl came to power, he had been a true friend of the Britishj
he liked them and was willing to learn their way of government# A
visit to Bombay would increase hie respect and friendship#
The same month Fadl went to Bombay (February 1870), Russell,
not knowing the real motive behind his visit, advised the Government
not to recognise his claim on Jabal Ihsan and to acknowledge the
♦Aqrabis as an independent tribe# He advanced tho false argument
that when, in 1850, Haines requested Fadl’3 brother to attack the
’Aqrabis, it was his duty as a friend of the British Government to
do so* All chiefs were expected to take action against plunder and
closure of the roads# Yet Russell recommended that the Sultan be
given 02300 in acknowledgment of his tribe’s co-operation on that 
77occasion#' Bombay referred the matter to the Supremo Government
wlio acted on Russell’s recommendation, emphasising the fact that
78Haines had committed a deliberate mistake in 1850# From that time 
on, the ’Abdali sultans could not claim sovereignty over the ’Aqrabis# 
When Sultan Fadl was in Bombay, he asked the Governor for an 
increase in his transit dues and for other concessions# If tho British 
did not agree, he suggested that they should take hi© territory in 
return for ”a sufficiency1* for himself and his dependants, an old 
’Abdali wish# The Bombay Government preferred the second alternative 
and set out their case in a memorandum dated 5th July, 1870#
By then, the Suez Canal had been opened; and as a result, the 
authorities in Bombay feared a challenge to Britain’s supremacy along 
the route from Suez to Bombay# They wrote that the nations of Europe 
would now try to acquire stations on the Red Sea coast, and they could 
have cited, as an example, the attempt of a French company to 
establish a coal depot on the bandar of Shaykh Sa’id, in the straits 
of Bab al-IIandab, not far from Perim# This attempt failed due to 
Turkish pressure#
The British had in Aden the best position along the Red Sea route, 
but according to the Government it had a number of disadvantages* It 
was difficult to obtain water and fresh provisions from the mainland# 
The excessive heat made necessary the relief of Indian troops every 
two years, and of European troops every year# The landward fortific­
ations were not £rong enough to withstand a European attack, and to
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strengthen them a large expenditure would be required* Tho troops 
were still, after 30 years, cooped up behind the walls in a position 
which encouraged insult and aggression. It was not safe for a 
soldier to leave the fortifications alone, and this state of affaire 
was not calculated to earn respect for the British.
By accepting the Sultan’s offor, the British could ensure a 
continuous supply of fresh provisions and build permanent water works. 
The greater part of the garrison could be quartered in the hills 
where the climate was cooler. The landward fortifications would not 
need to be strengthened, and British prestige would be enhanced in 
the eyes of the tribes inhabiting the Arabian and East African coasts.
Optimistically, the Government of Bombay went on to reassure the 
Viceroy, Lord Mayo, that far from creating complications for the 
British, the occupation of Lahj would extend British influence and 
bring peace to the tribes. The British would attach the tribes to 
their interests by employing their men as irregular troops and police. 
With the money the tribesmen earned they would improve their land.
This argument cannot fail to remind one of Auckland’s in 1839*
Tho tedious negotiations for Jabal Ihsan and the high price paid 
for it showed how difficult it was to purchase territory. The Govern­
ment argued that every year this difficulty would become greater as 
the competition of European nations to acquire stations on the Red 
Sea coast increased and taught the natives the value of their land#
"The province of Lahej nominally extends along the sea coast from the 
Straits of Bab el-ikuideb on the west to about 80 miles east of Aden”,
and it was unnecessary to elaborate on the advantages which the
79possession of such a territory would bring.
The Government of Bombay did not submit their memorandum to the 
Supreme Government immediately. They first called for comments from 
Merewether, now Chief Commissioner in Sind, and his former Assistant, 
Goodfellow, now in the Political Department of the Bombay Staff Corps, 
Poona. Strangely enough, they did not ask for the opinion of Russell, 
their man at Aden.
In a memorandum dated 23rd October, l8?0, Goodfellow, too, 
supported the idea of annexing Lahj, but thought that if the Government 
feared complications, they could give the scheme a trial# He himself 
believed that the Sultan, his elders /and people would welcome British 
occupation, as it would improve their condition and relieve them of
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many anxieties* The advantages he foresaw were the same as those 
envisaged by the Government, but he warned that they should not be 
expected immediately#
Goodfellow regretted that although the British had been in Aden 
for such a long time, they had little reliable information about the 
neighbouring country# Like the Government, ho was under the false 
impression that the Sultan had suzerainty over the Subayhis and other 
tribes between Jabal Ihsan and Bab al-Mandab# Therefore, he hoped 
that through Fadl, the British would be able to extend their influence 
in that area# Goodfellow "doubted" whether thero were hills near 
enough to the Settlement where the greater part of the Aden garrison 
could be quartered# However, he thought that a camp could be 
established on the mainland where the European troops could go during 
the cool season; in the hot season fever might be prevalent in the 
interior* This arrangement would benefit their health and test the 
reaction of the people to the presence of British troops#^
Merewether disclosed that Fadl had more than once made the same 
proposal to him, but he had not reported it because he thought that 
tho Government would not consider it# The former Resident had no 
doubt that the offer was genuine, and now set out his reasons for 
accepting it in a memorandum dated 24th November, 1870# The Sultan 
had financial difficulties and was tired of the cares of state# Hie 
stipend was divided between himself and his brothers, some of whom 
were proving troublesome. The transit dues, Fadl*a only other source 
of income, were small*
Lahj had rich soil, sufficient water and an abundance of wood. 
However, due to a lack of efficient government and proper utilisation 
of the natural resources, the land was not as productive as it could 
be. Under British rule these resources would be properly developed, 
and the population would increase through immigration* Abolition of 
the transit dues and good relations with the tribes further in the 
interior would result in greater trade with Aden. The demand for 
water was yearly becoming more pressing as the Settlement grew# With 
Lahj in British hands, the Shaykh ’Uthman aqueduct coild be extended 
northwards to the River Tiban at Zaydah* The extension would not 
only decrease Government expenditure on water, but the increased 
supply would enable the authorities to sell water at a cheaper rate, 
and thus ensure a steady revenue#
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Merewether agreed with the Government that the importance of Aden 
to Britain had increased v/ith the opening of the Suez Canal, and no 
foreign power should be allowed a foothold near it. Meanwhile, 
Merewether was careful to correct some false notions held by the 
Government. Since the expeditions against the Fadlis in 1865-6, the 
troops were not forced to remain behind the walls all the time*
However, they did not venture beyond them because they did not make 
the effort to acquaint themselves with the language and habits of the 
people* If Lahj came under British authority, communication between 
the soldiers and the inhabitants would be established and both would 
learn to understand each other better*
With regard to stationing the troops in the interior, Merewether 
stated that the greater part of the garrison must always remain at 
Aden. However, in the mistaken belief that there were hills in the 
north of Lahj, he wrote that the Government could build a camp there 
to give the troops a spell in a cooler climate, v/hich wo hid be of 
great benefit to their health*
The former Resident noted that the district of Lahj was not as 
large as the Government of Bombay supposed, and he gave a reasonably 
correct picture of its extent. Its boundaries, he added, could now 
be easily defined. The Aden Troop had been for some time patrolling
in Lahj, and its commander could make an exact map without arousing
4 4 8 1  any suspicion*
The Government of Bombay did not revise their memorandum in the 
light of those submitted by their officers, but forv/arded the three 
documents to Calcutta under a covering letter dated 13th March, 1871.
In the previous eight months certain developments had taken place and 
the Government used them to strengthen their case for the annexation 
of Lahj. Sultan Fadl arrived back from Bombay in May I87O, and in 
August, nev/s reached him that Naqib Qaid Ibn Husayn Abu Ras, the 
principal chief of the Dhu Muhammad tribe, was planning to invade 
Lahj* The Dhu Muhammads were a large and powerful tribe of the Zaydi 
sect who inhabited the greater part of western Yemen where much coffee 
grew*
The direct reason for the intended attack was the assistance given 
by the Sultan to a Dhu Muhammad clan which rebelled against Qaid, but 
more important were the transit dues levied in Lahj# The Naqib 
considered the levying of dues contrary to the tenets of his faith 
and a hindrance to his people’s trading with Aden# He himself,
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consistently enough, did not exact dues from caravans passing through
his territory, but at the same time he had no scruples about attacking
small tribes and exacting tribute from them.
In September, the Sultan visited Aden and asked Russell for some
shot and powder to help defend his country* Russell granted him his
request on condition that the ammunition would not be used "for
aggressive purposes"* In justification of this gift, he argued that
if Lahj were attacked, the hinterland would be disturbed and supplies
82to Aden interrupted. Both the Bombay Government and the Supreme 
Government were convinced by his argument and endorsed the small 
assistance* Another measure which I-iussell took was to order the Aden 
Troop to patrol in the vicinity of Lahj, but not to take part if 
fighting broke out* The Resident hoped that the presence of the Troop 
and the knowledge that Sultan Fadl was prepared to defend his country 
night deter the Dhu Muhannads. J
In November, Russell reported that the Naqib had arrived in the 
Subayhi country, immediately to the west of Lahj, and that he was 
collecting tribute from this tribe who had also assisted his
84rebellious clan. The Subayhis agreed not to oppose the Naqib in 
his attack on Lahj, provided that he did not pass through their 
territory for the purpose. The Hawshabi chief, who had lost the 
important frontier village of Zaydah to Fadl in 1868, as will be 
recounted, not only granted the Dhu Muhammads permission to pass
85through his territory, but also agreed to march with them on Lahj, 
However, for no obvious reason, the Naqib did not attack Lahj as was 
expected, but instead attacked the Athwaris, a small tribe to the 
north-v/est * ^
The Viceroy’s attitude towards the dreaded attack was that the
British should not interfere by force of arms, and the Resident was
advised to seise any opportunity for reconciling the ? for or. see
87between the two tribes by "friendly mediation". Russell had, on 
his own initiative, undertaken this task from the beginning. He urged 
Fadl to abolish the transit dues, but Fadl answered that they were the 
principal source of his income and moreover the British had agreed to 
them in the treaty of 1849.
Russell admitted the justice of the Sultan’s case and suggested 
two alternatives for settling the dispute. The first was that the 
Sultan should abolish the transit dues and that the British should
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compensate him for the loss of revenue, v/hich the Resident estimated
at Rs. 1100 a month. Russell proposed an addition of 0300 to his
monthly stipend. The second alternative was to recompense the Naqib
for the expense he had incurred in suppressing his clan, but Russell
did not explain how the sum was to be determined.
Of these two alternatives, the Resident strongly advocated the
first as being more beneficial and permanent. Yet, if the Government
did not agree to either, the Sultan should go on collecting duty, and
the Zaydis had no right to enforce their religious principles on other
people# If they were allowed to set such an example, others might
88follow and the result would be general chaos*
Raid’s son-in-law and representative visited Aden in December
and had an interview v/ith Captain Prideaux, the Assistant-Resident#
He told him that Qaid was determined "to make clear all roads to Aden",
i.e. to sweep away the transit dues. Russell commented that if the
Kaqib did not desist and attacked Lahj, the Government must send a
force to defend it. The political and economic circumstances made
89such a step indispensible. December was the month of harvest, a 
favourite time for raiding v/ith tho tribes. If tho Dhu Muharamads 
attacked Lahj in that month, the consequences for Aden would have been 
very serious.
At this point (mid-December), Russell left Aden to take command 
of the northern division of the Bombay Army* His successor was 
i-Iaj.-Gen. C.V7* Tremenheere. In 1847, Tremenheere was Assistant 
Executive Engineer at Aden, and when he was appointed Resident, he was 
Chief Engineer at Bombay. Tremenheere had no political experience.
Tho first communication the new Resident had from the Naqib was 
to the effect that he agreed not to attack Lahj for eight months, 
lremenheere thought that this breathing space should be used to 
settle the question of traffic through Lahj onco and for all, other­
wise the British would have to face the same danger again. He 
supported Russell’s suggestion that a fair compensation be given to 
the ’Abdali chief for the dues levied by him, v/hich he estimated at 
0800 a month. Abolition of the dues would bring more trade to the 
port, add to British prestige among tho tribes and reduce the price 
of some supplies for the garrison.^
c^ aid died on 9th January, 1871, and the Government thought that 
his son might carry out his threat and attack Lahj at the end of the
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eight months* In such a case, the policy of non-interference would
lead to general disturbance in the country, and such a state would
be most undesirable* The ground of the trouble with the Dhu Muharamads
was the transit dues which were "alike opposed to the general policy
and to the local interests of Government"* If the British did not
accept the cession of Lahj and themselves abolish the transit dues,
they would have to grant compensation to tho Sultan* The Government
had no doubt that the first alternative was better both economically
and politically* Here it is necessary to add that the feared attack
by the Dhu Muharamads did not materialise*
To strengthen their argument for the annexation of Lahj, the
Government of Bombay emphasised the role of the Suez Canal in the
transport of troops and cited as an example the force sent recently
to Hudaydah direct from Turkey to suppress an ’Asiri rebellion*
Previously, the Ottoman Sultan would have asked hie viceroy in Egypt
to put down a revolt in Arabia, but now 15,000 men were sent through
tho Canal v/ith five vessels of war* Tho presence of such a force
in the Yemen would be a serious challenge to Britain’s position as
the paramount power along the Red Sea coast* The annexation of Lahj
91was necessary to prevent its acquisition by any other nation#
At or about the same time the Bombay Government sent their letter 
with its enclosures to Calcutta, they received a letter from Aden 
which, if it had arrived earlier, might have made them hesitate before 
recommending the annexation of Lahj* The letter was dated 
23rd February and contained revelations which Sultan Fadl had made 
to the Resident* In 1869, anarchy seems to have broken out in the 
rich coffee-growing district between Ta’iz and Ibb in the Yemen* For 
no obvious reason, the local chiefs turned to Sultan Fadl as the only 
man able to restore law and order to their disturbed country* In 
return, they offered him the government of the district and as a sign 
of their good faith, they sent him hostages*
Fadl was attracted to this proposition and discussed it v/ith 
Russell# Russell advised him against it, but did not report it to 
the Government* The Sultan was not discouraged and started to plan 
his expedition* The necessary money had to be borrov/ed, and it 
happened that the Sultan had a wealthy ’Awlaqi friend in the service 
of the Nizam of Hyderabad* The ’Awlaqis in Hyderabad, of whom there 
was a large number, kept in close touch with events in South-West Arabia
267#
and tried to influence them. Fadl thought that hie friend,
Jemadar Muhsin, would be interested in the venture and lend him some 
money* When he was in India, he discussed his plan with him* Muhsin 
approved of it and agreed to lend Fadl two and a half lakhs of rupees, 
or #125,000, half the amount which he required* There and then the 
Jemadar advanced the Sultan #20,000, and the balance was to be sent 
later*
The balance arrived in January 1871, eight months after the 
Sultan’s return from Bombay* On 22nd February, Fadl had an interview 
with Tremenheere in which he revealed his plan and tried to interest 
the Resident in it. He spoke at length about the natural resources 
of tho Yemen and the importance of its being under strong rule* Ho 
argued that it would be to the advantage of the British if peace 
prevailed there, and he urged the Resident to take the necessary 
measures to bring this about# "If 500 British troops were marched 
into the interior the whole country v/ould willingly submit to the 
rule of the British Government and hail its establishment as an 
inestimable boon*" "The whole country" could only have meant the 
district in question, and in making such a proposal the Sultan could 
not have been serious, unless he hoped that the British would allow 
him to rule under their protection* At any rate, Tremenheere told 
him that the British could not give the slightest consideration to 
this idea.
Fadl then said that if the Government lent him Rs. 300,000 to 
be used in financing his proposed campaign, he would in return give 
them annually #50,000, half the revenue of the district. Tremenheere 
rejected this proposal also, and in any case, here again the Sultan 
could not have been serious v/hen he made it, for there was no reason 
why he should continue to pay this sum after three years when the 
debt would have been repaid*
Then Fadl enquired whether the Government would oppose his 
undertaking the occupation of that district on his own* He added 
that his arrangements for the expedition were fairly advanced when 
the Ottomans beat the ’Asiris at Iludaydah towards the end of 1870.
This Ottoman victory made him suspend his preparations, but he was 
ready to proceed with them immediately if Tremenheere could assure 
him that neither the Ottomans nor the French (at Shaykh Sa’id) would 
interfere* Tremenheere could give him no such assurance and tried
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to dissuade him from his "wild notions"* Instead of conquering new
territory, the Resident advised him to improve his own, but the Sultan
replied that his country was poor and his income was not enough to
meet his rising expenses*
Tremenheere was certain that the Sultan was bent on his venture
and predicted that no good would come out of it# His tribe was not
warlike, and the mercenaries whom he would be forced to hire might
turn against him once the country had been taken# In fact, Tremenheere
suspected the ’Awlaqi jemadar of having an ulterior motive in making
the loan, since the bulk of the mercenaries would probably come from
his tribe who, if the venture succeeded, would keep the larger part
of the district# The Resident urged the Government to send Fadl a
friendly letter to the effect that they would view with great
displeasure any attempt on his part to conquer new territory because
92this would disturb the peace prevailing in the area*
Tremenheere*s letter was forwarded to Calcutta, as was usual, 
and it may have arrived there at or about tho same time as the three 
memoranda enclosed with Bombay’s letter of 13th March* With all 
these documents before him, the Viceroy ttzrnod down the annexation 
proposal* The Sultan’s desire to acquire new territory made Lord Mayo 
doubt the sincerity of his offer* The writers of the three memoranda 
were not in agreement as to the geography of Lahj, and the Viceroy 
himself was naturally not better informed* Therefore it was under­
standable that he gave ignorance of the exact boundaries of the 
district as another reason for rejecting the Sultan’s offer* He argued 
that it was difficult to foresee what disputes the British might have 
with the surrounding tribes or with what Ottoman claims of sovereignty 
they might find themselves in conflict#^
In transmitting the relevant papers to London, the Viceroy simply
94signified his "entire disapproval" of the annexation proposal# The 
India Office, then headed by the Duke of Argyll, did not comment on 
the subject, being presumably in agreement with the Viceroy*
Lord Mayo believed that the objects sought might be secured by 
negotiation with the Sultan without any addition to British territory* 
If there was any portion of his country, the acquisition of which by 
a foreign power was undesirable, he might perhaps be induced to agree 
not to sell it without British consent, as the ’Aqrabi chief had done* 
At the same time the opportunity might be taken to reach an agreement
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v/ith him for the abandonment of the transit dues which were the main
95motive for the quarrel v/ith the Dhu Muhammad tribe*
The Viceroy asked the Resident to comment on the points raised 
in his letter* Tremenheere agreed that there was no need to add 
Lahj to Aden for the desired objects to b© achieved, and he, too, 
thought that the Sultan could not have been sincere in his offer* He 
then went on to correct mistake© made by the Bombay Government in 
their memorandum of 5th July, 1870* There was no lack of fresh 
provisions at Aden* However, prices could be reduced and traffic 
increased by the abolition of transit dues* The Sultan of Lahj and 
other chiefs would accept a monthly sum in lieu of dues which were 
unpopular and regarded by son© as contrary to their faith* The sources 
of water were in the immediate vicinity of Aden and might be considered 
secure unless the area was occupied by a European force* If more 
water works were decided on, matters could easily be arranged with 
the Sultan as in the case of the Shaykh *Uthman aqueduct*
There were no hills or highlands in Lahj which could provide
cooler quarters for the troops* The whole district lay in the plain
96and its climate was not better than that of Aden* If found 
desirable, troops could patrol in Lahj during the cool season, but 
this might be regarded by the distant tribes as an unusual display of 
force, and therefore it was not necessary to discuss the location of 
troop© in the Sultan*© territory*
Far from having an extensive coastline, the *Abdali© had a 
shallow shore only six miles long* Apart from the strip of land on 
the northern shore of Aden Harbour, from al-Hicwah to Khur Maksar, 
there was no spot which a foreign power could turn to advantage, and 
even this strip was useless since there was no access to it except 
through the harbour which was British* Therefore, there was no need 
to negotiate with the Sultan on this subject either, unless the British 
wanted to secure possession of that strip, thus obtaining access by 
land to Jabal Ihsan entirely through British territory* Tremenheere 
was confident that the Sultan would be willing to cede as much land 
as was needed for the purpose*^7
Nov/ that the annexation of Lahj was no longer a subject for 
discussion, the Bombay Government commented only on the transit dues* 
They considered their abolition in Lahj as most important since the 
territory was the closest to Aden and the dues were the main cause of
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the quarrel v/ith the Dhu Muhammads* However, they expressed their
fear that the abolition of dues by one tribe might only make other
tribes increase theirs* Nevertheless, they asked the Resident to
make enquiries and submit a report showing what payment would be
required for each tribe concerned to forgo its right to the collection
of transit dues and whether such payments might be met in part by a
98
moderate toll levied on the goods when they entered Aden*
No answer to the Government’s request can be found, and this 
may have been due to one of two reasons* The danger of an attack on 
Lahj by the Dhu Muhammads had passed, and the British authorities in 
Aden, as well as in India and England, were soon to have a more 
pressing problem caused by the intention of the Ottomans to annex the 
hinterland* Yet the policy of compensating tribes for the abolition 
of transit duties had already begun*
In May 1871, Tremenheere signed treaties to this effect with 
throe of the Subayhi clans (the Mansuris, the Makhdumis and the
Q Q
Ruja’is) for a total monthly sum of #95« The treaties resulted from 
am incident in March which had brought the Aden Troop into collision 
with the tribesmen* A party composed mainly of Mansuris seized two 
camels laden v/ith cat from unarmed boys on their way to Aden* 
(Tremenheere wanted to protest against this incident, but did not know 
to v/hom,^ 00 since the Subayhis had no paramount sultan* Finally, he 
asked the ’Abdali chief to use his influence v/ith them, but Fadl 
replied that they had harassed his own subjects, and that he could do 
nothing other than close his territory to traffic, a reply which did 
not satisfy the Resident*
The Mansuris, who were not punished for their offence , soon 
committed another* On 4th April a caravan of eleven camels passed 
through their territory, and was stopped three times along the route, 
each time paying transit dues# A sayyid who was travelling with it 
was beaten and his belongings were plundered* Tremenheere feared that 
if the Mansuris were allowed to go on with their acts of aggression, 
others might join them and trade would be interrupted* Since Fadl had 
admitted that he could exercise no influence over the Subayhis, the 
Resident decided to take direct action* He instructed Captain Stevens, 
the Commander of the Aden Troop, to make a sudden march into the 
Subay&i territory, take the Mansuris by surprise, seize their principal 
men and bring them prisoners to Aden*^^ The Troop came upon the
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Mansuris and called on them to surrender# They refused and fired
on the Troop* The Troop returned the fire, several Arabs were killed
102and others captured*
The Bombay Government described Tremenheere1s instructions to
103
Captain Stevens as "highly injudicious", while Lord Mayo condemned
the incident as being in violation of the Supreme Government’s
directions of 9th December, 1865* The Troop had penetrated 40 miles
into the interior and had not limited its duties to patrolling the
approaches to Aden* The Eritieh had taken direct action and had not
settled the matter through friendly chiefs as they were supposed to
do# Mayo considered this expedition as interference in the internal
affaire of the tribes and requested that the Resident "should be
strictly enjoined to abstain in future from such enterprises *•• and
to confine the employment of the Aden Troop to those patrol duties
104for which they were originally raised#"
Fadl was disappointed that Trenenheero had not consulted him 
before sending out the cavalry* In an interview on 2nd May, the 
Sultan told the Resident that if he had sought his advice, he would 
havo sent v/ith the Troop men to parley with tho Subayhis, and the 
affair would have been settled without bloodshed. Fadl then arranged 
for the Subayhi chiefs through whose territories trade passed to go 
to Aden for discussions with the Resident# The discussions led to the 
signing of the treaties abolishing transit dues*
The Sultan’s successful mediation convinced Trenenheero that Fadl 
had great influence with the Subayhis, but had refrained from using 
it when first approached# The Resident went on to accuse him of 
exercising hi© influence to bad effect# V/hen the roads through the 
Subayhi country were unsafe, they v/ere so at his instigation or v/ith 
his connivance* Like Coghlan before him, Tremenheere thought that 
conducting affairs through the ’Abdali sultans was "the most fertile 
source of our complications”, and added that it was with great 
reluctance that he had availed himself of Fadl’s services in dealing 
with the Subayhi chiefs#'*'^
The Mansuri affair showed that the British policy of working 
through Lahj still had its limitations# Fadl naturally wanted to 
avoid trouble with his neighbours, but if the Resident had warned him 
that he intended to send out the Troop, he would probably have made a 
special effort to settle the natter peacefully*
272.
More important than the abolition of dues in the Subayhi territory
was their abolition in the Fadli country. In Hay 1872, as a result
of a dispute between the Fadlis and the Yafi’is in which transit dues
loomed large, the Fadlis agreed to abolish them for an additional #80
106bo thoir monthly stipend* No quick decision could be taken on the 
•Abdali case because a large sum of money was involved.
In May 1868, after a dispute between the ’Abdali and Ilawshabi 
chiefs, the latter attacked Lahj* Fadl struck back and defeated 
•Ali Ibn Hard’* In July, the two came to terms. As reparation for 
the damage he had caused, the Ilawshabi sultan ceded Zaydah to the 
’Abdali in a formal deed signed by himself and his elders. Later ’Ali 
claimed that he had signed the bond under duress while a prisoner of 
Fadl, and wished to retake Zaydah. Zaydah was a border village with 
a never-failing stream of water, and from time to time the Hawshabis 
diverted this stream to the detriment of Lahj, but it is not known 
whether the quarrel in question was on this account.
•Ali again raided the ’Abdali territory, but again was repulsed*
Then he started to incite the hill tribes in the Yemen to join him#
Fadl asked Russell for advice, and the Resident told him that if
Zaydah v/as legitimately his, he should warn the Hawshabi chief not to
reoccupy it* Russell also wrote to Ibn Mani1, warning him that if he
persisted in his hostile attitude, he would incur the enmity of the
British* If his advice had no effect, and the hill tribes came to
the aid of the Hawshabis, Russell felt that the British could not
allow Lahj to be plundered* For their supplies of food and water they
v/ere dependent on it, and Sultan Fadl was a great friend of theirs*
If there was a real danger to Lahj, they would have to forgo their
107policy of non-interference* as they had done on former occasions 
when their supplies were threatened*
Fortunately for the British, their armed intervention v/as not 
necessary* ’Ali came to Aden on 22nd November, expressed his regret 
for what had happened, and promised to disperse his men on the under- 
standing that the Resident would reconcile him to Fadl* The two 
sultans met at Aden on 15th December and left seemingly reconciled, 
Zaydah still remaining in possession of Fadl* Russell himself was 
particularly glad at the apparent success of his efforts, because at 
the time the authorities were considering the extension of tho Shaykh 
•Uthraan aqueduct to Zaydah, and therefore It was necessary that all
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109righto to the village should bo established*
Lator it became known that the two sultans had only agreed not
to light for six months, but the question of aydah was not settled* 
„hcn the six months expired, ’All plundered two caravans and warned 
.ill travellers to keep clear of his territory* Goodfellow (then 
Acting resident) advised Fadl to ake concessions for the sake of 
peace, impressing u on him that it was up to him to make a 
reconciliation with *A11, for *Ali*s quarrel was with him, and not 
v/ith the British* At the same tine Goodfellow threatened * Ali that 
hi© stipend would be stopped if he did not restore the plundered 
property* Fadl did not heed Goodfellow*s adv oe, and *Ali did not 
reply to his letter, although he stopped plunder lag on the roads*^^
The peace in the neighbourhood of Aden was threatened in 1870, 
but was not disturbed until 1872, when the Ottomans decided to bring 
all the Yemen, as constituted in the 16th century, under their control* 
To this end they occupied San#a and the reet of the country under 
the Imam* Them, through the Imam, they sent letters to the different 
chiefs in the vicinity of Aden, ordering them to doclare their
allegiance to the Ottoman sultan* The Ilawshabi chief was the only
one who showed any readiness to comply, and that , r>a in the hope that 
the ottomans would help him recover Zaydah from the Suxtaa of Lahj* 
iowever, the Ottomans failed in their venture, #md  ’Ali*6 hope 
was frustrated* The events and the diplomatic activity which ended 
Ottoman proceedings in South-West Arabia are beyond the scope of this 
work* Here it is sufficient to eay that these proceedings led to the 
extension of tho stipendiary system and th establishment of the 
irotectorate*
The years covered by this chapter witnessed a great improvement 
in iritieh-*Abdali relations. Howev -r, as before, the Sultan waa 
cautious in acting at the Residents* behest, an; the Residents were 
critical of the policy which required thorn to wor through Lahj* They 
i-Iao criticised the principle of non-intervention and tho ban on 
military action in the interior* In fact, , erowether defied official 
policy wnen he carried war into the Fadli territory*
The higher authoriti a had always been avorse to giving the 
Resident a cavalry troop lest he would use it as a means of 'gression*
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When they finally agreed to give him the troop, they ade it clear 
that it should be used only in defence of the Settlement* Tremenheere, 
however, used it far beyond Aden, thus justifying the fears of the 
authorities. i general, the need for eac® and regular sup 'lies 
continued to guide ritish policy towards the hinterland, end the 
stipendiary system wae extended to meet this need.
When it beeaee known that the ranch nted to buy Jabal Ihsan, 
the British found it necessary to do art from their principle of no 
expansion beyond Aden* They bought the peninsula to deny a foothold 
in the area to any other power* The geopolitical facte created by 
the opening of the Sues Canal made the Bombay overnment also give 
serious consideration to Fadl’s offer of hie ter itory*
At the end of the -eriod under study, the British in Aden were 
accepted by all their noighboiir®• The Aden Troop moved freely in 
the interior and received co-operation from the two rain tribes* The 
iceident served as an arbiter in local disputes an assumed an almost 
patriarchal role* - hen the OtU ans threatened to annex the hinter­
land, all the chiefs,with tie exception of t awehabi, appealed to 
him for protection, and by so doing demonstrated their reference for 
the British*
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CONCLUSION*
This thesis falls into two main parts* The first (Chapters III-V) 
traces the development of Aden, and the second (Chapters VT-VIII) deals 
with its history* Most of the material in the first part has never 
been used before, and never before has anybody discussed in depth the 
factors and policies responsible for the Settlement^ progress or the 
problems which tho British faced*
The official material in the second part, and in Chapter II, is 
found in other works, but the private material is completely new* The 
latter source has been of great help in understanding the real reasons 
for some official decisions and in showing the kind of relationship 
which existed between the different people in authority*
It is regrettable that there are no primary sources in Arabic
on the early history of the Settlement of Aden* The little material
available in that language has been translated from English* The 
only book which deals at length with the whole period covered by this 
thesis is "Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, l800«l878H 
by Thomas E* Marston* This work, however, contains many inaccuracies 
and does not treat fully a number of important points* In general, 
it shows a lack of thorough research which, in some cases, has led to 
wrong conclusions*
"Sultans of Aden”, by Gordon Waterfield, is another book to which 
reference must be made* This volume covers Haines* term of office 
with special emphasis on the relations between the Political Agent 
and Sultan Muhsin, i*e* the first nine years of the period treated 
in this thesis* The book is, on the whole, well researched, but it 
is more a work of journalism than of history* Like Marston,
Waterfield makes no effort to understand the motives for the tribes* 
behaviour, and like him, he overpraises Haines*
The present writer has brought to light new material, has given 
a new interpretation to British-Arab relations and has shown that 
some accepted views are mistaken* The results of his research and 
thinking are summarised in the following pages*
Britain occupied Aden for several reasons* It was feared that
Muhammad *Ali or France might take it and turn it into a base of 
operations against India* A French re-occupation of Egypt after the 
Pasha's death presented itself as a distinct possibility, and the 
Bombay Government argued that in such an event the peninsula would be
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useful as an observation post or a forward position should the British 
decide to attack Egypt. The British hoped that possession of Aden 
would enable them to break the American domination of the coffee trade 
of the Yemen and re-establish the town as a great market. However, 
the strongest reason for the occupation was Aden's harbour and its 
location midway between Bombay and Suez, which made it an ideal place 
for a coal depot and communications centre.
Fears of a major attack proved groundless, and, perhaps fortun­
ately for the British, the permanent fortifications were not x>ut to 
the test* As a result of events in the Levant, the danger from 
Muhammad 'Ali was removed shortly after the occupation. France made 
no hostile move towards Aden or India, although the British continued 
to suspect her intentions*
The French did not re-occupy Egypt, and the Settlement was not 
used as a forward base against that country. However, it was used 
as such, to good effect, during the Abyssinian Campaign* Aden's value 
as an observation post was undoubtedly very great. From the Settlement, 
the Residents watched French activity in the Red Sea and provided the 
Government with information on current affairs in Arabia and 
East Africa.
During the first eight years of the occupation, the value of 
Aden's commerce was stressed by all concerned except Lord Ellenborough. 
Half-way through his term of office, Lord Hardinge began to think of 
the Settlement primarily as a military base, and his successor,
Lord Dalhousie, regarded it in the same light* Nevertheless, further 
measures were taken to encourage Aden's commerce, the most important 
being the opening of the port in 1830*
Between 1839 and 1833* the Bombay Government laid equal emphasis 
on the Settlement's value as a military base and as a commercial 
centre* Falkland's order in the latter year that Aden's military 
importance should come before its commercial development was given 
under pressure, and did not result in the decline of trade, as Jacob 
claims in his book "Kings of Arabia". Haines' successors continued 
to foster commerce, and the higher authorities did nothing to discourage 
their efforts* Elphinstone even refused to consider the re-imposition 
of customs dues, describing the step as commercially retrogressive*
While Falkland's decision had no adverse effect on the growth of 
trade, as is clear from the figures, neither did it result in an
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increase to the garrison or a strengthening of the defences. The 
appointment of army officers as Residents did not imply greater 
emphasis on the military aspect of Aden, as Marston suggests* From 
the beginning, the Government had intended to put the political and 
military duties at Aden in the hands of an army officer, but they later 
decided to leave Haines in charge of the political duties* The 
question of uniting the civil and military authority was discussed 
more than once prior to l8f&, and after Haines* dismissal in that 
year, the Government seized the opportunity to combine both branches 
of the administration*
An argument in favour of appointing a Resident was that he would 
not need to refer to Bombay as often as the Political Agent. In fact, 
the position did not change, and the Resident's recommendations carried 
no more weight than those of the Political Agent* Only in local affairs 
did the Resident exercise greater powers since he also commanded the 
garrison.
The appointment of Major-Generals Russell and Tremenheere, 
following the Abyssinian Campaign, was not an indication of Aden's 
growing military importance. Maj.-Gen* Honner had been Resident at 
Aden long before that Campaign, and Tremenheere was succeeded by a can 
of lower rank, Col* J.W. Schneider. The prime qualification of the 
Resident was that he should have sufficient military rank to command 
the garrison.
Although the British failed to monopolise the coffee trade, they 
succeeded in re-establishing Aden as the entrepot for South Arabia,
East Africa and India* This new market was important not only 
economically, but also politically; it played a great part in making 
the Arab tribes identify their interests i^ ith those of the Settlement*
In it they sold their produce at a good price, and from it they bought 
what they needed of foreign merchandise. As far as the Government was 
concerned, the Settlement's prosperity meant more business and 
increased revenue from customs dues at Indian ports. In contrast,
Aden had hardly any military role to play, and the garrison was a 
heavy financial burden* Contrary to vhat Marston aays, the Settlement's 
ultimate value was commercial rather than military*
Aden more than fulfilled the function for which it had primarily 
been occupied, namely that of a coaling station midway between Bombay 
and Suez* ThiB is shown by the number of steamship companies which 
made a base of the port and by the number of steamers which coaled 
there. These steamers did not only ply between Bombay and Suez, but
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touched at Aden en route to and from places as distant as Australia 
and Peru*
Being at the centre of this traffic, the Settlement naturally 
developed as a communications base, and the volume of mail handled 
by its post office illustrates the important role which it played in 
this respect. The opening of the Suez Canal and the establishment of 
the telegraph line between Suez and Bombay were to increase its 
communications value still further. Aden's usefulness to the British 
was never more clearly demonstrated than at tho time of the 
Abyssinian Campaign when all its services were called upon, and were 
not found wanting.
Before the occupation, the two-fold fear of complications with 
tho Ottomans and involvement with the tribes had made the Eritish 
adopt a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of South-west Arabia* 
In line with this policy, they had sought only commercial relations 
with the 'Abdalis and repeatedly turned down their proposals for 
offensive-defensive alliances# After the occupation, the British 
decided to maintain the principle of non-intervention and to adopt 
two new ones. The first banned territorial expansion and the second 
ruled out expeditions into the interior*
The British would have liked to adhere to these principles and 
to restrict their relations with the hinterland to commerce; but for 
geographical, economic and political reasons that was not possible*
The British were dependent on the interior for their food and water 
supplies, hence peace with the tribes and among the tribes themselves 
was of vital importance to the Settlement*
For the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the area, the 
British found it necessary to establish relations with the neigh­
bouring chiefs and to assume the responsibility of paying them 
stipends. Still, to avoid embroilment in the interior, they chose 
the 'Abdalis to L-? their intermediaries idlth the other tribes. However, 
-.uhsin could not forget the loss of Aden, and his hostility forced 
them to abandon temporarily the idea of working through Lahj*
The Residents strongly criticised the policy of non-intervention, 
describing it as too lenient and as detrimental to British interests* 
They wanted freedom to march inland whenever they felt it was necessary; 
hence their persistent demand for a troop of cavalry* The higher 
authorities, as a rule, were apprehensive of getting entangled with
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the tribes, and this explains their reluctance to provide the 
Residents with the horse which they thought would be used as a means 
of aggression. When they finally sanctioned the troop, they placed 
strict limitations on its use*
The principle of "divide and rule", which according to Jacob and 
liarston was successfully applied by Haines and others, had little or 
no effect on the course of events. In the first place, the tribes 
were not united, and in the second, the British did not want to rule 
the interior. What they wanted was peace among the tribes, an object 
which would not have been served by setting them against each other*
When the Residents' requests for action were not granted, they 
fell back on diplomacy or promoted tribal alliances which came to 
nothing* In cases of emergency, they made expeditions into the 
interior and also intervened in support of their allies when the 
Settlement's supplies of food and water were threatened#
The British continued to rule out expansion beyond their border 
until 1S62, when the French showed interest in buying Jabal Ihsan*
Jabal Ihsan was useless to the British, but its possession by a 
potential enemy was considered dangerous* To prevent such a contingency, 
they bought it themselves. For the same reason, the Bombay Government 
supported the annexation of Lahj* Thus the British departed from 
their three original principles, but this departure did not moan that 
they had abandoned them*
If the British failed to work through Lahj under Muhsin, they 
succeeded to a certain extent under his sons. 'Ali and Fadl 
co-operated v/ith them, but only as far as they safely could within 
the limits of tribal laws. The Residents, whose freedom of action 
was restricted by official policy, could not always give the 'Abdalis 
the support they needed. This situation caused ill-feeling on both 
sides and made the Residents criticise the policy of working through 
the 'Abdalis. They would have preferred to deal directly with the 
other tribes.
In the long run, British policy succeeded for several reasons*
The British did their best to be acceptable to the tribes, and where 
they could they adapted themselves to their customs* In spite of 
initial failure, the stipendiary policy achieved its aim, and the 
general prohibition against interference in the tribes' internal 
affairs must have saved the British many problems*
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Despite the advocacy by certain individuals of coercive methods, 
the British v/ere restrained in the use of force, which was wise. If 
the higher authorities had sanctioned every demand for military action, 
they would have found it necessary to occupy the whole hinterland 
and in the process would have alienated the tribes which were friendly 
or neutral. As it was, they-extended their influence by more peaceful 
means, and when they finally assumed direct responsibility for the 
area, after the Ottoman attempt to annex it, it was at the request 
of the tribes.
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Notea*
In references for all Bombay Proceedings, except the BSP* the 
first number is that of the Range, the second that of the Volume* 
and the third number or date is that of the Consultation* The early 
volumes of the BPP have no Consultations* BSP references have no 
Range number*
In APR references, the first number is that of the Volume and 
the second that of the Letter in the relevant Department*
In FO references, the first number is that of the series, the 
second that of the Volume and the third that of the Dispatch*
In all other official references, the first number is that of 
the Volume and the second that of the Letter or Document*
In the Broughton* Clerk* Balhousie and Lawrence Papers* the 
reference is the Volume number* In the Slphinstone Papers, first 
comes the Box number, and then the Folder number* In the Wood Papers* 
for outgoing letters the number is that of the Letter Book} for 
incoming letters the first number is that of the Correspondent and 
the second that of the Volume*
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34. Ilaines-Sultanf Pari# P. 40/35. This letter is dated 24th,
but should be 23rd January, 1838# The Sultan*s reply is
dated 23rd#
35. Sultan-Haines: 23 Jan# 18385 Pari# P# 40/37.
36# Haines-Sultan: 24 Jan# 1838: Pari# P* 40/38#
37# Haines-Malcolm: 3 Feb. 1838, ut supra#
58* Sultan-Haines: 26 Jan. 18385 Pari. P# 40/39.
59. Haines-Malcolm: 3 Feb# 1838, ut supra#
60# Haines-Ahmad: 28 Jan. 1 83 8: Pari# P# 4o/40#
61# Ahmad-Haines: 28 Jan* 1838: Pari. P# 4o/4l#
62# Haines-Ahmad: 28 Jan. 1838; Pari# P. 40/42#
63. Ahmad-IIaines: 29 Jan# 1838: Pari. P# 40/43.
64# Haines-Ahmad: 29 Jan. 18385 Pari# P. 40/45.
65. Haines-Sultan: 30 Jan# 18385 Pari# P# 40/46#
66# Haines-Malcolm: 3 Feb. 1838, ut supra#
67. Haines-Ibrahim Pasha: 6 Feb# 18385 BSP 95/8#
68# Grant-IIobhouse: 20 March 18385 Br# P. 841*
69. Min# by Grant subscribed to by Board: 26 March 18385 BSP 96/13.
70# Hobhouse-Grant1 10 May 18385 Br# P. 838*
71# This is clear from a letter sent from the Govt, of Bombay to
the Sec* Com#, dated 27 Aug* 1838; see Pari# P# 40/52*
72. Campbell-Palmerston: 27 March 1838, with encs.j FO 78/342A5.
73. Campbell-Palmerston: 27 March 1838, ut supra*
74. Campbell-Palmerston: 17 April 18385 FO 78/342/21#
75* Campbell-Palmerston: 7 July 18385 FO 78/343/45.
76# Muhammad *Ali-Boghos Bey: 28 March 1838, enc# in the above#
77* Palmerston-Campbell: 12 Kay 18385 FO 78/342/15.
78. Falmerston-Campbell: 14 May I8385 FO 78/372A3*
79* Marston, Britain*s Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area. I800-I878. 
p# 60#
80# Palmerston-Campbell: 24 May 18385 FO 78/342/17.
81# Palmerston-Campbell: 8 June 18385 FO 78/343/18*
82* Palmerston-Campbell: 25 July 18385 FO 78/384#
83. Campbell-Palmerston: 29 May 18385 FO 78/342/36#
84. Where the Wahhabis had recovered power in the 1820*s#
85. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 356-7#
86* Hobhouse-Auckland: 9 June 18385 Br# P# 838#
87. Kelly, op# cit., pp. 357-9.
88# Webster, op. cit#, Vol. II, pp* 608-10.
89. Campbell-Palmerston: 9 June 18385 FO 78/343/38*
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91.
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93* 
94. 
95* 
96. 
97*
98.
99.
100.
101.
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105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114*
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120. 
121. 
122.
123.
124.
125.
126. 
127. 
128.
129.
130. 
131.
132.
133.
Campbell-Palmerston: 7 July 18385 FO 78/343/45. 
Campbell-Palmerston: 1 Sept. 1838; FO 78/343/60.
Marston, op. cit.t p.59.
India-Bombay: 2 July 18385 Pari. P. 40/51.
Bombay-Sec. Com.: 27 Aug. 18385 Pari. P. 40/52.
Min. by Farish subscribed to by Board: 1 Sept. 18385 BSP 99/37. 
Bombay-Sec. Com*: 7 Sept. 13385 Pari. P. 40/59.
Pari. P. 40/56♦
They did pay it after the occupation.
The question of the f,Darya Dawlat" was in fact settled before 
the subject of the transfer was raised.
Min. by Farish; 1 Sept. 1838, ut supra. Most of these 
instructions were suggested by Iiaines himself in his letters 
to Malcolm dated 3 Feb. and 22 Aug* 1838 (Pari. P. 40/27 and 54). 
Ilaines-Sultan: 24 Oct. 18385 Pari. P. 40/63#
Sultan-Haines: nd; Pari. P. 40/65.
Ahmad-Haines: nd; Pari. P. 40/68*
After deducting 0700 from the sum instead of adding to it* as 
Farish had instructed.
Pari. P. 40/69.
Pari. P. 40A05.
Pari. P. 40/71.
BSP 101/49.
Pari. P. 40/77.
6 Nov. 1838, ut supra.
Pari. P. 40/91.
Pari. P. 40/100.
Pari. P. 40/101.
Pari. P. 40/103.
Pari. P. 40/106.
Sultan-Haines: nd, rec'd 24 Dec. 1833; Pari. P. 40/111.
Min. by Farish subscribed to by Board: 29 Nov. 18385 BSP 101/49. 
Farish-Sultan: 1 Dec. 1838} ibid.
Pari. P. 40/82.
Pari. P. 40/85.
Pari. P. 40/112 enc. 113*
Pari. P. 40/114.
Pari. P. 40/115.
Pari. P. 40/105*
Pari. P. 40/121*
Haines-Ahmad; 31 Oct. 1838; 
Haines-Bombay: 9 Jan* 1839} 
Haines-Ahmad: 4 Nov. 18385 
Haines-Bombay: 6 Nov. 18385 
Haines-Bombay: 7 Nov. 18385 
Haines-Bombay:
Haines-Denton: 20 Nov. I8385 
Haines-Bombay: 13 Dec. 18385 
Haines-Bombay: 13 Bea* 18385 
Haines-Sultan: 14 Dec. 1838; 
Sultan-Haines: 16 Dec. 18385
Bombay-Haines: 2 Dec. 18385 
Bombay-Haines1 21 Dec. 1 8 3 8}
Haines-Sultan: 24 Dec* 18385
Sultan-Haines: 24 Dec. 18385
Haines-Sultan: 25 Dec. 18385
Haines-Bombay: 9 Jan. 1839}
Sultan-Haines: 7 Jan. 1839}
Haines-1Aydarus; 8 Jan* 1839; Pari. P. 40/122.
Haines-Bombay; 10 Jan. 1839* Pari. P. 40/123.
"A Descriptive and Historical Notice of Aden, lately captured 
by the British”, United Service Journal* 1840, Part II, p. 9* 
Haines-Sultan: 16 Jan. 1839; Pari. P. 40/129.
Sultan-Haines; 16 Jan. 1839} Pari. P. 40/130.
Haines-Bombay; 25 Jan. 1839} Pari. P. 40/128. For an account
of the battle and the events leading to it, see "Officer in
the Queen's Army", Historical and Statistical Sketches of 
Aden..., pp. 54-7. or Low. History of the Indian Navy 1613-1863* 
Vol. II, pp 118-125.
India-Bombay: 21 Jan. 1839; Pari. P. 40A24.
Hansard, 46, 11 March 1839.
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Chapter III*
1* Haines* Memoir, Bombay Karine iroceedings, 4-12/65# and 
ivellsted, Travels in Arabia. Vol# II, pp# 388-9#
2# See article on ”*Adan” in Encyclopaedia of Islam# Ed# 1960#
3# The Travels of Marco Polo# Everyman’s Edition, Introduction
p# viii and pp# **01-2#
4# Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354. Translated
and selected by H.A#R. Gibb, p#109#
5# Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs##*, pp# 8-9#
6# ibid#, p# 8#
7# Wellsted, op* cit#, Vol# II, pp# 393-^#
8# Hunter, An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in 
Arabia, p# 2o#
9* Wellsted, op* cit#, Vol# II, pp# 393-5#
10# Haines* Memoir, ut supra#
11# ”A Descriptive and Historical Notice of Aden, lately captured 
by the British”, United Service Journal, 1840, Part II, p# 11#
12# Western-Bailie : 25 and 2# Jan# 1839; BSP 108/8#
13# Bombay-Haines: 2 March 1839? BSP 108/9#
14. Bombay-Hainesi 24 Feb* 1839? BSP 108/8.
15# Foster-Bombay: 30 March 1839? BSP 111/15#
16# Govt.-Foster (now in Bombay): 15 April 1839? ibid*
17# Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan# 1839? BSP 108/8#
18* Govt.-Foster: 15 April 1839? ut supra#
19# India-Bombay: 20 May 1839? BSP 114/24#
20# Memo# by Political Secretary, Bombay: 14 Jan# 1340, quoting 
letter from Sec# Com# dd 7 Sept. 1839? BSP 129/6*
21. Foster-Govt.: 15 May 1839? BSP 119/33*
22# "Sometimes” would have been more accurate#
23* Foster had in mind Socotra for which, it was rumoured, "some 
foreign power” was bargaining#
24# Foster-Govt#: 23 Aug. 1839? BSP 119/33#
25. Curtis-Bombay: 3 Nov* 1840? BMP 361/45/27 Jan* 1841.
26# Unless specifically mentioned, the figures given for the 
population do not include the military#
27# Haines-Bombay: 5 March 1839? BSP 110/12#
28# Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, pp. 13-14#
29* Hunter, op# cit#, p# 2o#
30. Haines-Bombay: 13 Sept. 1839? BSP 121/37*
31# Rep# by Mil# Com# (Aden): 29 Aug. 1840? BMP 361/45/27 Jan# 1841#
32. Haines-Hallam: 26 Aug. 1840? BMP 361/38/23 Sept* 1840*
33# Haines-Bombay: 29 Aug# 1840? ibid#
34. Min# by Carnac: 25 Oct. 1840; BMP 361/45/27 Jan. 1841#
35. Memo# by Mci!ahon: 13 Nov* 1840; ibid#
36# Haines-Bombay: 31 March 1840? BSP 134/19#
37# Haines-Bombay: 15 Oct. 1842; BSP 196/49#
38. Min. by Carnac subscribed to by Board: 15 April 1840; BSP 134/19#
39# Haines-Bombay: 19 April 1842? ARR 25/34 (Sec#)#
40* Haines-Bombay: 13 May 1842; ARR 25/5 (Sec#)#
41. Haines-Bombay: 24 Nov# 1842? BSP 197/45.
42# Haines-Bombay: 19 April 1842; ARR 25/34 (Sec*)#
43# Haines-Bombay: 13 May 1842; ARR 25/5 (Sec#)
44. Curtis-IIaines: 27 Oct# l84l? BSP 184/13#
45# In Aden, the word ”sidi” (from Arabic "sayyid”, "lord" or
"master”) was jocularly applied to non-Somali Africans, most 
of whom were former slaves#
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46. The term "borah" or "bohora" ("trader” in Gujerati) records 
the occupation of the first Hindu converts to Islam, but not 
all Borahs were Muslims* The Muslim Borahs were either Shi’i 
or Sunni. The Shi’i Borahs were Isma’ilis and were by far the 
larger group. They were townspeople essentially devoted to 
trading and money-lending* They lived mainly in Surat,
Burhanpur, Ujain, etc* The Sunni Borahs were traditionally 
peasants who lived chiefly in the Northern Konkan and Gujerat.
The Eorahs who went to Aden must have been mostly Shi’i.
47* Haines-Bombay* 24 Nov* 1842* BSP 197/5**.
48* Mignon, "A Short Camp Residence in the Valley of Aden#..", 
pp. 10, 15 and 12.
49. Memo, by Bombay Govt.s 25 Kov.,1842; BMP 362/10/2 Dec. 1842.
50. Rep. by Special Com.* 23 Sept. 1843? BSP 214/48.
51. Haines-Special Com.* 12 Dec. 1842; Appendix to Special Com^s
Rep. of 23rd Sept. 1843, ut supra.
52. Rep. by Special Com.* 23 Sept. 1843; ut supra.
53# India-Bombay* 28 Dec. 1843; BSP 217/5#
54* India-Bombay* 9 April 1843; BSP 204/19.
55. In 1843, the French had occupied one of these islands, Mayotte*
56. Memo, by Hardinge* 7 July 1844; BMP 362/39/7 Aug* 1844.
57. These reductions were not put into effect. The garrison was
rarely less than 1696; and when the Settlement had horse, it
was never less than 50#
58. Special Com.-Mil. Board* 26 Sept. 1844; EMP 362/42/23 Oct. 1844.
59* India-Bombay* 14 March 1845; BSP 234/13.
60* India-Bombay* 13 May enc. Memo, by Hardinge: 10 May 1845;
BSP 236/20.
61* India-Bombay* 21 Sept. 1846; BSP 246/32.
62. See Ch. VI, p. 191.
63# India-Bombay* 14 Oct. enc. Memo by Hardinge* 30 Sept. 1846;
BSP 247/35.
64. Haines-Bombay* 19 June and Min. by Governor subscribed to by
Board* 12 July 1843; BSP 209/29.
65# Rep. by Hardinge (written off Qusayr): 10 Feb* 1848;
EMP 363/46/29 March 1848*
66* Bombay-Haines* 24 April 1845, referring to letter from Haines
dd 5 March 1845; ARR 44/2009 (Pol.).
67. Lieut.-Col. J. Holland, Q.M.G., Poona (for FitzClarence) to 
Bombay* 17 Aug. 1853; ARR 117.
68. Govt.-Holland* 14 Sept. 1853; ibid.
69. Holland-Govt.* 27 Sept. 1853; ibid#
70# Bombay-Haines* 26 Oct. 1853? BPP 394/50/24; cf, Jacob, Kings
of Arabia# pp. 64-6*
71. Rep. by Mil. Com.* 21 Nov. 1853? BMP 364/64/15 April 1854.
72. Haines-Bombay* 25 Nov. 1853? ibid.
73# Rep. by Mil. Com.* 2 Dec. 1853; ibid.
74. Govt.-Mil. Board* 8 Sept. 1854; BMP 364/70A3 Sept. 1854.
75# Coghlan-Elphinstone* 27 Feb. 1855; Elph. P. 6DAl«
76. Res. by Govt.: 1 Dec. 1855? BMP 365A5/12 Dec. 1355.
77. The letter, dated 23 Oct. 1847, was quoted in a report by
VJaddington* 7 Aug. 1857; BSP 315A7*
78. Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix# p. 13.
79# cf# Playfair, op* cit#, p. 13, and Hunter, op. cit., pp. 142-3.
80. For the Abyssinian Campaign, see Marston, Britain’s Imperial 
Role in the Red Sea Area. 1800-1878* Chs. XVI-XX.
81. Napier-1.0.: 2 May 1868; ARR 473#
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82. Russell-Bombay* 5 April 1869? ARR 4-92/102 (Mil.)*
83. Jacob, op. cit., p. 63#
84. Frero-Wood: 22 Oct* 1862; W.P. 88/4.
85. Haines-Bombay* 1 Jan. 1843; ARR 31/1 (Sec.).
86* Haines-Bombay* 6 May 1845; ARR 50/27 (Pol. ).
87* Haines-Bombay* 8 May 1846; ARR 58/25 (Fol.).
88. Haines-Bombay* 15 June 1846; ARR 58/35 (Sec.).
89. Troops used for police duties without being fully trained for
them.
90* Outram-Bombay* 13 Sept* enc. Outram-Sec* Com*; 9 Sept. l85*M
BSP 292/30.
91. Outran-Eombay* 27 Sept* 185^1 ARR 130/137 (Jud*).
92* Coghlan-Bonbay* 24 Aug. 1856; BSP 301/16.
93* Coghlan-Bombayt 21 Jan. enc. Playfair-Coghlan: 20 Jan* 1857?
ARR 197/9 1 (Jud.)*
94. Tremenheere-Eombay* 27 June, enc. Admin. Rep. for 1871-2;
31 May 1872; ARR 572A27 (Pol*).
95- Coghlan-Bombay* 30 April and 1 Kay 1859; LAZ 37#
96* Playfair-Fuller (Ex. Eng.)* 27 Oct. i860; ARR 282 (Ft/), and
Playfair-Bombay* 1 Nov. i860; ARR 287/I67 (Pol.).
97* Bombay-Merewethert 12 Aug. 1864; ARR 39^/1480 (PI/)*
98. Merewether-Bombay* 24 Nov. 1864; ARR 394/113 (PV/).
99* Conservancy Rep. for 1864, Merewether-Bombay* 14 Feb. 1865, 
enc* Goodfellow-Merewethert 13 Jan. 1865; ARR 4l8*
100. Frideaux-Tremenheere* 22 April 1871; ARR 561 (Part I)/72 (Gen.). 
101* Haines-Bombay* 12 Nov. 1845; ARR 50/20 (Pol.)*
102. Merewether-Bombay* 14 Feb., enc. Conservancy P.ep* for 1864s
13 Jan* 1865; ARR 418/25 (Gen.).
103. Frideaux-Tremenheeres 22 April 1871; ARR 561 (Part D/72 (Gen).
104. Reps, on Public Works by Ex. Eng. for 1859*60 and 1860-61*
1 and 13 lay respectively; ARR 306.
105. Goodfellow-Russells 28 Jan. 1869; ARR 495.
106. Hunter, op. cit., pp* 7-9.
107* Bombay-India* 12 Jan* 1847; BSP 249/2.
108• Bombay-Haines* 13 March 1847; BSP 249/12*
109. Haines-Bombay* 15 April 1847; BSP 251/21.
110* Min* by Governor concurred in by Commander-in-Chief Sir W. Cotton 
and L.R* Reid* 5 May 1847; BSP 251/21.
111. Bombay-Haines* 17 March 1852; ARR 105/1212 (Pol.).
112* No epidemic was reported that year, and Outram himself did not 
elaborate.
113. Outram-3ombay* 26 Sept. 1854; BSP 292/32.
114. See Ch. VII, p. 201*
115# Haines-Bombay* 6 April 1351, enc* Emergency Regulations;
BSP 272/9.
116. Outram-Sultan* 21 Ses^ t. and Outram-Bombay* 26 Sept* 1854;
BSP 292/32.
117. Merewether-Bombay* 15 July 1865; ARR 418/99 (Jud.)*
118* Coghlan-Bombay* 21 April enc. Playfair-Coghlan* 1 April 1855;
ARR 151/56 (Jud.).
119* Aden Port Regulations, Unconnected with Customs Laws, Bombay*
6 March 1856; ARR 173*
120. Coghlan-Bombay* 17 Jan. 1863, enc. Judicial and Conservancy 
Rep. for 1862; ARR 370/6 (Jud.).
121* Merewother-Bombay* 8 July 1863; ARR 370/51(Jud*).
122. Merewether-Bombay* 14 Oct. 1865; ARR 4l8A52 (Jud.)*
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123* Russell-Bombay: 20 April 1869} ARR 4-95/122 (Jud#)*
124* Bombay-Haines: 25 Nov* 1847} ARR 61/4511 (Pol*)*
125. Coghlan-Bombayi 2 Nov* 1858} ARR 232/151 (Sec*)*
126# Playfair-Bombayi 27 Sept# 1861; ARR 318/159 (Pol*)*
127* Coghlan-Bombayi 2 Nov# 1858, ut supra*
128# Goodfellow (in charge of Residency) to London: 13 July 1869}
LA 44*
129. Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, pp* 13-14*
130* Hunter, op* cit#, pp# 26-7*
131* Plural of "Khadim”, "servant” in Arabic#
132# For additional information on the Akhdara, see Arnaud, ”Le3
Akhdam de 1*Yemen”, Journal Asiatique, Vol# XV, pp* 376-86, 
and Von Kaltzan, Keise nach SUdarabien .**, pp* 182-92#
133* Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, pp# 14— 16, and Hunter,
op* cit*, pp# 27-36 and 79-86• See also Von Kaltzan, op* cit*,
PP* 159-181*
134* Mil. Board Bombay-Q#M.G., Poona: 12 July 1853, quoting letter 
from Haines; ARR 117/3052 (Mil.)*
135* Outram-Bombay: 9 Oct. enc. Rep* by Com. on Wells; 30 Sept. 1854;
ARR 134/143 (Pol.).
136# ibid.
137* Coghlan-Bombay; 11 March 1856; BMP 365/20/10 May 1856.
133# Eorabay-Coghlan: 28 April 1856; ibid.
159* Res. by Governor subscribed to by Kalet: 7 Aug. 1856, quoting 
letter from Adam; BFv/P 352/66/21 Aug* 1856*
140. Outran-Bombay: 9 Oct. enc. Rep. by Com. on Wells: 30 Sept. 1854,
ut supra#
141. Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs «... p. 7*
142. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 July 1855} API? 153/93 '("Mil.)
143. Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs.... p. 11. cf.
"Reminiscences”, Chambers Journal. 6th Series. Vol. II, No* 56, 
Dec. 24, I898, p. 50.
144. Res. by Governor subscribed to by lialet: 7 Aug. I856; BFWP
352/66/21 Aug. 1856, quoting letter from Adam. This letter is
given as "anonymous” in Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient 
Reservoirs.... p. 18, and in Norris and Penhey, An Archaeological 
and Historical Survey of the Aden Tanks, pp* 13-14.
145* ,lphinotone-Coghlan: 3 Oct. 1&56; Elph. P* 9A/4#
146. Playfair, A Memoir on the Ancient Reservoirs.*., p. 8*
147• Playfair-Bombay; 15 July 186I5 ARR I34/II6 (Pol•)•
148. Boiabay-Playfair: 17 Aug. 1861; ARR 134/4349 (PW)
149* Coghlan-Bombay: 17 Feb* 1863; ARR 369/16 (FW).
150. ARR 369.
151. Hunter, op* cit#, p* 12.
152. Rop. by Captain Vi.M. Ducat, Ex# Eng.: 18 lay 1872; ARR 573#
Also Hunter, op* cit., p. 15*
153# Pym-Merewether: 28 Aug. 1863; ARR 369/505 (FW).
154. Merewether-Bombay: 15 Sept. 1863; ARR 369*
155* One would have expected Merewethcr to suggest a lower price for 
the Shaykh fUthman water because he had expressed sympathy with 
the poor and because the water was of inferior quality# However, 
he m a y  have felt that such a price would induce the Government 
to spo isor the project*
156. Merewether-Bombay: 14 May 1864; ARR 394/38 (FW).
157. Morewether-Pym: 23 Oct. 1863; ARR 369/417 (FW).
158. Merewether-Bombay: 2 Nov. 1863; LA 4o.
159* Merewether-Bombay: 1 April 1864; ARR 394/23 (FW).
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l6o# Merewether-Bombay: 18 Feb* 1867; ARR 456/26 (PW).
161. Merewether-Bombay: 16 March 1867; ARR 456/37 (Pol*)*
162* Russell-Bombay: 18 Dec* 1868; LA 44*
163* Prideaux-Ex. Eng., Aden: 13 Oct. 1870; ARR 534/1066 (Mil.)*
164. Ducat’s Rep., ut supra.
165* Prideaux-Sx. Eng.: 15 Oct., 1870, ut supra.
166. Tremenheere-Bombay: 11 April 1872; ARR 614/72 (FW).
167* Hunter, op. cit., p. 10.
168. It is not known how he arrived at this figure.
169* Bombay-India: 9 July 1869} ARR 534/Hi.372-Mtf.1682. The
opinions of lander and Russell were reported by the Government. 
170. India-Bombay: 6 Oct. 1869; ARR 534/1050 (FW)*
171* Res. by Govt.: 3 Sept. 1873} ARR 614/338—MW.2022*
172. Hunter, op. cit., p. 17*
Chapter IV.
1. Haines* Memoir, Bombay Marine Proceedings, 412/65.
2. Wellsted, Travels in Arabia, Vol. II, p. 397*
3. ibid., p.
k. Haines' Kenoir, ut supra.
5. See Appendices 2 and 3*
6. Haines-Malcolm, Superintendent, Z*N»: 3 Feb. 1838; Pari. P. 40/27* 
7* Haines’ Memoir, ut supra*
8. Wellsted, op cit., Vol. II, p. 397*
5. Bombay-Haines: 24 Feb* 1839; BSP 108/8.
10. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; BSP 115/26.
11. Bombay-Haines; 10 Aug. 1839; BSP 113/30.
12* See Appendix 4. The official year ran from 1st May to
30th April until 1866-7, when it was changed to run from
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13* See Ch. V, p. 136.
14. Haines-Bombay: 28 May 1842; ARR 25/3 (TDR).
15. Trade Rep. 1842-3, Haines-Bombay: 4 July 1843: BRP 
374/22/27 Sept. 1843.
16. Trade Rep. 1863-4, Merewether-Bombay: 9 June 1864; ARR 
398/47 (Rev.).
17* Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1839; BSP 108/8*
18* Certificates by which the merchant was exempted from export 
duty at any port in the Bombay Presidency.
19# Bombay-Haines: 24 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8.
20. India-Bombay: 20 March 1839} BSP 111/15*
21. India-Bombay: 25 March 1839; ibid*
22. ibid.
23. Bailie-Bombay 1 4 April 1839; BSP 112A8*
24. See Appendix 3*
25. Bailie-Bombay: 4 April 1839, ut supra.
26. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839} ut supra.
27* Haines-Bombay: 12 March 1848; enc* treaty; BSP 255/14.
23. Haines-Bombay: 14 June 1853; BSP 284/18.
29. Trade Rep. 1845-6, Haines-Bombay: 10 Sept. 1846; BRP 
375/38/28 April 1847*
30. Trade Rep. 1870-71, Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 June 1871} ARR 
561 (Part I)A29 (Pol.).
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3^# Ilaines-Bombay: 21 March 1847? BSP 250/14#
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36# See Appendix 5A*
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stimulant#
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377/9/11 Sept# 1850, and Trade Pep# l8:,J-51» Haines-Bombay2 
13 Aug# 1851; BRP 377/47A5 Oct, 1851#
40# Haines-Bombay: 11 Jan. 1854; ESP 289/6#
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43# Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839? BSP 115/26#
44# Bombay-Haines: 10 Aug, 1839? BSP 118/30.
45* See Appendix 6*
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•7I cf
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49* Haines-Bombay: 24 Jan. 1843? ARR 31/2 (THE)#
50. India Act VI, 1848? India Acts, Vol. 3.
51. Haines-Bombay: 24 Aug# 1848? ARR ?4/25 (IDE)*
52. Haines-Bombay: 13 Oct* 1845? ARR 50/9 (TDFin)*
53* Bee Appendix 4#
54# Trade Rep* 1846-7, Raines-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1847? BRP
375/50/15 Sept. 1847#
55* Bombay-Haines: 10 Feb# 1848, enc# Eombay-India: 3 Bee. 1847;
ARR 70/381 (TOR).
56# India-Bombay: 15 Jan. 1848, enc. in the above#
57# Hardinge (off Qusayr) to Clerk: 13 Feb. 1848; Clerk Papers 3B#
58# Bombay-Haines: 17 Oct* 1848, enc. India-Bombay: 30 Sept. 1848;
ARE 70/6254 (TDR).
59* Haines-Bombay: 24 Aug# 1848; ARR 74/25 (TDR).
60. Court-Eombay: 30 May 1849? Rev. Letters to Bombay 790/11#
61. India Acts, Vol. 3*
62. Outram-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1854, enc. Postscript to Part 2 of 
Appendix by Badger, dd 21 July 1854; ESP 291/28. See also 
Ch. VII, pp. 197-233*
63# Min* by Governor: 6 Sept. 1854; BSP 291/28#
64# Haines-Bombay: 29 May 1852; ARR 110/31 (Pol#)#
65. In the first fourteen years coupled with Bremen#
66# Haines-Bombay: 9 Feb# 1847? BSP 249/12#
67# Trade Rep. 1845-6, ut supra#
68# Merewether-Bombay: 5 May 1366; ARR 433/65 (Pol#)*
69# For the growth and distribution of the sea trade, see
Appendix 7A, where the period has been divided into four seven-
year blocks for purposes of comparison. Note especially the 
seven years before and after the opening of the port#
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70# Trade Rep* 1843-4, Haines-Bombay* 24 June 1844; BRP
374/39/28 Aug. 1844.
71. Trade Rep. 1847-3, Haines-Bombay* 2k July 1848; BRP
376/14/6 Dept. 1848, and Trade Rep* 1848-9* Haines-Bombayt 
4 Aug. 1849? BRP 376/50/26 Sept. 1849*
72* Trade Rep* 1858-9* Coghlan-Bombay* 18 May 1859? ARR
254/62 (TDR)*
73* Trade Rep. 1845-6* ut supra*
74* Trade Rep. 1859-60, Playfair-Bombay* 24 May i860; ARR
284/78 CRev.)*
75* See Appendix 7E*
76* The partial report for 1842-3 and the full report for 1843-4*
77. Bombay-Haines1 27 Aug. 1844; ARR 37/2837 (TDR).
78* Trade Rep* 1847-8, ut supra*
79* Trade Rep. 1848-9, ut supra.
30* Trade Rep. 1861-2, Honner-Bombay* 17 May 1862? ARR 342/83 (Rev*)*
81* For coal imports and "exports", see Appendix 7C*
82. According to Playfair* The Trade Report for 1854-5 gives no
figure for land imports. See Appendix 5A*
83* See Appendix 7R*
84. Trade Report 1350-51* ut supra*
85* Bombay Customs Dept, to Bombay Govt*S 22 Dec. 1855* ARR 
137/1910 (TDR).
86* Hunter, An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in 
Arabia, p. 90.
87* See Appendix 8d*
88* Tremcnheere-Bonbay* 27 June 1872, enc. Admin. Rep. for 1871-2;
ARR 572/129 (Pol.)*
Chapter V.
1* Bombay-Haines* 24 Feb* 1839? BSP 108/8*
2. Min. by Board* 9 Sept. 1839? BSP 119/33*
3* Min. by Board* 19 Nov. 1839? BSP 123/43*
4* For the differences between Haines and Bailie, see
BSP Vols. 119 and 122.
5* Min* by Carnac subscribed to by Board* 16 March 1840?
BSP 131/13.
6* Haines-Bombay* 18 Feb* 1840? ibid*
7. Haines-Bombay* 22 Feb* l840? BSP 132/14.
8* Bombay-Haines* 28 Feb* 1840; BSP 131A1*
9* It is surprising that Carnac did not make the point that Kharg 
was occupied as a temporary measure only, to force the Shah
to withdraw from Herat* Aden, on the other hand, was occupied
as a permanent possession.
10. Min. by Carnac* 16 March 1840, ut supra*
11* Sec. Com.-Bombay* 20 May 1840? Board’s Drafts of Secret Letters
to India, 12/609*
12. Haines-Bombay* 31 March l34o, with encs.j BSP 134/19*
13* Nor did Haines have "an establishment of writers"* At the
end of 1840 he had only one permanent writer*
14. Capon-Bombay: 31 March 1840? BSP 135/22.
15. Min. by Governor subscribed to by Board* 15 Aoril 1840?
BSP 134/19*
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16* Aden was never officially declared a British possession, 
although it was internationally regarded as such#
17# Kin. by Governor: 10 July 184-7; BSP 252/30*
18. Kin. by Reid: 20 July 184?; ibid#
19# The head of administration at Singapore was a military officer 
having the title of Lieutenant-Governor and responsible to 
the Governor-General# He commanded the garrison and had 
undivided authority over every branch of the public service#
20# Kin. by VJilloughby 1 22 July 184-7; ibid#
21# Kin# by Governor subscribed to by Board: 23 July 18471 ibid#
Jacob writes that in I838 Grant offered Bagnold the command 
of the expedition sent to capture Aden, but he declined due 
to poor health. (Kings of Arabia, p* 29)
22# India-Bombay! 26 Aug. 1&47; BPP"392/56/24-.
23# Court-Eombayi 19 Jan# 1848; Political Letters to Bombay, 4-80/1#
24-# Outram had been Political Agent at Kahi Kanta and in Lower and
Upper Sind. He had also been on a number of diplomatic missions 
and had distinguished himself in fighting against Indian and 
Afghan tribes# In Elphinstone*s opinion there was no difference 
between these tribes and the Arabs in the vicinity of Aden#
25# Kin. by Governor: 17 April 1854; subscribed to by L’arden and
Lunsden in separate minutes; BSP 290/17. Outram had formerly 
been Resident at Earoda, the highest position under the 
Bombay Government until it came under the Government of India 
in 1854*
26# India-Bombayl 25 I'arch 1839? BSP 111/15#
27# Bombay-India: 24 Feb. 1839; BSP 108/8*
28. Bombay-Haines: 28 Nov# 1839* BSP 124/44#
29# Haines-Bombay: 23 Dec. 1840; BSP 153/4.
30# Haines-Bombay: 1 June, enc. Cruttenden-Haines: 30 Kay 184-1;
BSP 165/30.
31# Kin. by Anderson, nd; ibid*
32. Bombay-Baine©: 14 July l84l; ibid*
33# Haines-Bombay: 19 Aug. 1841; BSP 169/41#
34. Naval and passenger vessels also took and brought mail#
35» Bombay-Haines: 23 Sept# 1841; BSP 169/41*
36# Kin. by Governor: 17 April 1854, ut supra.
37# tee Appendix 10#
33# Haines-Bombay: 8 March and Bombay-Haines: 9 April 1839;
BSP 111/14.
39# Haines-Bombay: 13 Oct. 1843, with encs.; ESP 216A3#
40. Bombay-Haines: 17 Feb* 1844; ibid.
4l« Badger*s Rep#, Appendix B to Outram-Bombay: 10 Aug# 1854;
BSP 291/28.
42. Outram-aombay: 20 July 1854; BPP 395/24A1#
43. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; ESP 115/26#
44# Appendix A to Haines* letter of 9 June 1839, ut supra#
45. Bombay-Haines: 10 Aug. 1839; BSP 118/30.
46# Bombay-Haines: 24 Feb* 1839; BSP 108/8#
47# ibid.
48. Bombay-Haines: 14 Aug. 1841; BSP 165/30.
49. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839; BSP 115/26#
50. Haines-Bombay: 2 Aug. 183?; BSP 119/32#
51. Ilaines-Bombay: 18 April l84l; BSP 161/24.
2$ 7.
52* Bombay-Haines: 20 May 1841$ ibid#
55* Frideaux-Tremenheere? 21 May 1872$ ARR 572/100 (Jud*)#
54. See Appendix 11#
55* Huntert An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in
Arabia^ p# 151#
56# Haines-Bombay? 9 June 1839* ut supra*
57* Ponbay-Haines* 10 Aug. 1839I BSP 118/30*
58# India-Bombay? 12 Aug# 1839$ BSP 119/33*
59* Haines-Bombay? 27 Oct* 1840; BSP 148/49#
60* Bombay-Haines: 30 Nov* 1840; ibid'*
61* Haines-Bombay: 20 May and Bombay-Haines? 16 June l84l$ BSP 
161/26*
62* On the death of Sa*id Ibn Sultan* the ruler of Masqat and
Zanzibar in October 1856, a dynastic dispute arose regarding 
the position of Zanzibar* The British decided to intervene 
and settle the quarrel# In March i860* Coghlan was commissioned 
to inquire into and report on the matter* He left Aden on the 
19th April* accompanied by Rassam and Badger, visiting first 
Masqat and then Zanzibar# In December, Coghlan submitted his 
report to the Government of Bombay, and it was on the basis of 
this report that a settlement was concluded in April 1861*
Coghlan returned to Aden on 28th July, 1861* See Coupland,
The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890, PP* 14-37*
63* Playfair-i3ombay? 9 Jan* and 4 April 1861} ARR 319/7 and 61 (Jud#)#
64. Coghlan-Bombay? 12 Feb* and Res. by Govt#: >0 June 1363?
ARK 370A6 and 1761 (Jud#)#
65# Russell-Bombay: 24 Sept* and Res. by Govt.: 28 Hov* 1868$
ARR 476/119 and 3913 (Jud.)#
66* Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 June 1871* enc. Admin. Rep# for 1870-71$
ARR 561 (Part I)/129 (Pol.)#
67. India Act II, 1864$ India Acts, Vol* 9*
68* For the establishment of Courts of Small Causes beyond the
local limits of th? jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts of
Judicature established by Royal Charter# See Appendix 12#
69* Frideaux-Tremenheere? 21 May l872j ARR 572A O O  (Jud*)*
70* ibid*
71# Playfair-Bombay? 4 April l86l$ ARR 313/61 (Jud.)#
72* cf. Hunter, op# cit., p* 130.
73* It is not indicated how many members were to be on the jury,
nor is it mentioned how the number was to be made up#
74# Haines-Bombay? 9 June 1839$ BSP 115/26#
75* Superintendent of Police, Bombay, to Govt.: 30 March 1840$
b s p 132 A 4 .
76. Haines-Bombay: 27 July and Min. by Governor? 23 Aug# l84lj
BDr lo 7/D 0 #
77* Haines-Bombay: 17 Kay 1845$ APR 5Q/2 (Gen.)*
78# Bombay-Haines? 13 March 1847$ BSP 249/12#
79* Merewether-Bombay: 14 Feb. 1865$ ARR 4l8.
80* Hunter-Tremenheere: 29 May 1872$ ARR 572/104 (Gen.)#
81* Former Assistant-Residents gave nearly the sano assessment of
the three races.
82# Pridesux-Tremenheere? 22 April 1871$ ARR 561 (Part I)/7l (Jud#)#
83. Haines-Bombay: 27 March 1841$ BSP 159A3*
34. Govt, of Bombay to Mil. Dept.? 13 Dec. 1853$ ARR 114/5169 (Jud.)#
85* Coghlan-Bombay? 21 April 1855$ ARR 151/56 (Jud*)#
86. Res. by Govt.: 18 July 1863$ ARR 369A378 (FW)#
87* See Hunter, op* cit., p. 131#
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88* Coghlan-Bombay: 21 April enc* Playfair-Coghlan: 1 April 1855*
ARR 151/56 (Jud.).
89. ibid*
90. Haines-Bombay: 30 March 1852 (Crime Rep. for 1851-2)} ARR 
110/7 (Jud*).
91. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 Jan. enc. Playfair-Coghlan; 20 Jan. 1857}
ARR 197/9 (Jud.).
92* Coghlan-Bombay: 21 April enc* Playfair-Coghlan: 1 April 1855* 
ut supra.
93* Russ ell-Bombay I 8 Jan. 1869} ARR 4-95/18 (Jud*).
94. See Hunter, op. cit*, p. 131*
95* Haines-Bombay: 24 May 1847} BPP 392/24/29*
96* Coghlan-Bombay: 21 Jan. enc. Playfair-Coghlan: 20 Jan* 1857*
ut supra*
97* Playfair-Bombay: 1 Oct. i860} ARR 283/144 (Jud.).
98. Playfair-Bombay: 1 June 1861* Admin. Rep* for 1860-61}
ARR 306*
99* Whereby troops were transported between England and India via 
Suez, and not via the Cape of Good Hope.
100. Leighton (Officiating Postmaster-General, Bombay) to Coghlan:
25 Feb. and 19 Aug. 1859} ARR 260/406 and 1521.
101* Waller (Postmaster, Aden) to Playfair: 11 March and Coghlan-
Bombay: 16 March 1859} ARR 260/16 and 164 (Gen.).
102* Postmaster to Abbott (in charge of Residency): 1 April 1868}
ARR 475*
103* Mignon, "A Short Camp Residence in the Valley of Aden...1’, 
pp. 18-19*
104* Haines-Bombay: 15 and 31 May 1846, with encs. from Civil Surgeon}
ESP 245/17} and Haines-Bombay: 15 June 1846; BSP 245/18.
105* Bombay-Haines: 13 March 1847} BSP 249/12*
106. Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 March 1872; ARR 576(Parti)/49 (Marine).
107* Playfair-Bombay: 31 Aug. enc. Civil Surgeon to Playfair:
31 Aug. i860; ARR 2&0/12? (Pol.).
108. See Playfair’s letter above and Hunter, op* cit., p. 145#
109# Rep* from Medical Superintendent to Coghlan: 28 April 1856;
ARR 170.
110* Coghlan-Bombay: 26 Sept* 18565 BSP 302/18.
Ill* Coghlan-Bombay: 1 Aug. 1861; LA 39*
112. Moore, Sir Charles Wood’s Indian Policy. 1855-66* p* 108.
113* Bombay-Coghlan: 17 Kay 1855} ARR 149/circular 1732 (Gen.).
114* Coghlan-Bombay: 25 Dec. 1856} BSP 306/2.
115* Admin. Rep. 1859-60, prepared by Playfair: 1 June i860; ARR 306.
116. Coghlan-Bombay: 14 Jan. enc. Badger-Coghl&nl 12 Jan* i860;
BEP 352/44.
117. First a Ejtropean, and then a Par si.
118* Admin* Rep. 1866-7* Merewether-Bombay: 5 June 1867} ARR 457*
See also McKnight (Headmaster) to Sir A. Grant (Director of 
Public Instruction, Bombay): 1 April 1868} ARR 475* and 
Sorabji Peetonji (Headmaster) to Hancock (First Assistant- 
Resident): 14 April 1871} ARR 561 (Part 1).
119* Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 June 1871, enc. Admin Rep. for 1870-71}
ARR 561 (Part l)A29 (Pol.).
120* Alphonsus (Catholic Chaplain at Aden) to Tremenheere:
19 May 1871} ibid.
121* To permit country craft to leave their ordinary grounds and
proceed to sea*
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122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
123.
129.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16. 
17.
Persons entering Aden with arras had to leave them at the 
Barrier Gate, i/hen they collected them, they had to pay 
four annas, and a further six annas were charged towards the 
cost of hiring a donkey for a police escort to see them safely 
out of the town. This tax was abolished in 1854.
Paid by shopkeepers*
Paid by shopkeepers in certain parts of the town where the 
streets were watered.
The police received four annas for serving summonses. This 
was also abolished in 1854*
Outram-Bombayi 20 July, enc. Dansey (Acting Assistant Political 
Agent) to Clarke (Acting Political Agent): 22 March 1854j 
BPP 395/24Al.
See Hunter, op. cit., pp. 132-5.
At the end of the year, the Municipal Fund was either in debt 
or had only a small balance in hand, as shown by the table 
belows-
1865-6 1866-7 1867-8 1868-9
Receipts Rs.36,446 33,647 4g ,926 44,646
Expenditure Ra.55.640 37.742 42.777 41,576
Balance: Ra* 80& 905 DR 1,651 3.070
Tremenheere-Eorabay: 25 April 1871; ARR 570/89 (Gen.).
Chapter VI.
For information about the tribes see:
a) Haines* Memoir, 1838 (Bombay Marine Proceedings 412/65).
b) Badger*s report on the tribes and their relations with 
the Settlement, 1850-54 (Appendix B tc Outram*s letter 
dd 10 Aug, 1854; BSP 291/28)*
c) Prideaux*s report on the tribes, 10 Jan* 1872 (Enc. in 
Tremenheere-Bombay: 21 Jan* 1872; Official Publications, 
Aden Admin. Reports, Vol. 1).
Haines-Bombay: 5 Feb. 1839? BSP 108/8*
Rot #8700 as stated by V’aterfield in Sultans of Aden, p. 94* 
Min. by Farish: 18 Feb. 1839? BSP loWfc 
Farish-Hobhouse: nd, probably April 1839? Br. P* 84l*
Min. by Anderson: nd? BSP 108/8.
Min. by Dunlop: 19 Feb. 1839? ibid*
Bombay-Haines: 22 Feb, 1839? ibid*
Haines-Bombay: 7 March 1839} BSP 110/13*
Haines-Bombay: 15 March 1839, enc. Sultan*s letter which 
wrongly appears under date 16 March 1839? BSP 111A5*
Res. by Board: 12 April 1339? ibid.
Haines-Bombay: 4, 6 and 8 March 1839? BSP 110/12*
Min. by Farish and Anderson, dd 10 March 1839. This date 
must be incorrect because letters from Aden normally required 
a fortnight to reach Bombay. The date of the consultation is 
3 April 1839. Ibid.
India-Bombay: 11 April 1839? BSP 112/18.
India-Bombay: 18 April 1839? ibid.
Haines-Bombay: 11 June 1839} BSP 115/29*
India-Bombay: 11 April 1839, ut supra*
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18• Haines-Bombay: 3 Feb* 1839 (Appendix)? BSP 108/8, and
Haines-Bombayi 11 July 1839? BSP 118/31# See also Aitchisonf 
A Collection of Treaties* Engagements and Sunnuds relating to 
India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. VII, pp* 121-63.
19# Aitchisonf op* cit#, Vol* VII, pp# 121-63#
20* By the 15th June, 1839* the Yafi’i and Hawshabi chiefs had
already bound themselves by treaty not to attack Lahj, and
Mullein*a great enemy, the Fadli chief, was to do the same on 
8th July*
21* Haines-Bombayj 11 July 1839* ut supra, and Aitchison, op* cit*, 
Vol* VII, pp* 137-8*
22* Bombay-India I 14 Sept* 1839? BSP 120/34*
23# Haines-Bombay: 11 July 1839* supra*
24# Haines-Bombay: 11 June 1839* ut supra*
25# Ilaines-Bombay: 2 Aug* 1839? BSP 119/32*
26* Haines-Bombayt 11 June 1839? BSP 115/29* and Haines-Bombay:
11 July 1839? BSP 118/31.
27. Haines-Bombay: 28 Feb. 1839? BSP 110A2.
23* Haines-Bombay: 28 April 184-5? BSP 236/19#
29# Haines-Bombay: 2 March 1840? BSP 132/14*
30. Haines-Bombay: 23 Aug. 1839? BSP 119/33#
31. ibid*
32* Bombay-Haines: 11 Sept* 1839* ibid*
33. Haines-Bombay: 13 Sept. 1839? BSP 121/37*
34* The horses in the vicinity of Aden were too small to carry a
fully armoured man#
35. Haines-Bombay: 20 Oct. 1839? BSP 123/43.
36# Bombay-Haines: 21 Nov. 1839? ibid.
37# Haines-Bombay: 12 Nov* 1839? BSP 123/43.
38. Haines-Bombay: 15 Dec. 1839? BSP 123/5.
39. ibid.
40. Haines-Bombay: 30 Dec* 1839? ibid*
41. Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb# 1840? BSP 130/10/47QA. The last number 
is that of the letter, and it is necessary to add it since three 
otl;er letters, which have also been used, appear under the
sai3 date in the same consultation# See below,
42* Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb# 1840? enc. letter from *Abd al-Rasul?
ESP 130 AO/740.
43. Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb. 1840, enc. letter from ’Abd al-Rasul?
BSP 130A0/743*
44. Haines-Sec. Com.: 7 Feb. 1840? BSP 132A 4 *
45. Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb. 1840? BSP 130/10/737*
46# Ilaines-Bombay: 22 May l84l; BSP 161/26#
47# Haines-Bombay: 1 Feb* 1840? BSP 130/10/737 *
48* Bombay-Haines: 26 Feb# 1840; BSP 130A0*
49. Sec, Com.-Haines: 30 April 1840? Board’s Drafts of Secret 
Letters to India, 12/609*
50. Sec. Com.-Bombay: 27 March l84o? ibid, 12/589#
51* Sec. Com.-Bombay: 30 April 1840? ibid, 12/608*
52. Carnac-Hobhouse: 31 Jan. 1840? Br* P. 842*
53. Carnac-IIbbhouse: 26 Nov# 1839? ibid, 841*
54. Palmerston-Hobhouse: 14 Dec# 1839? ibid, 839*
55* Carnac-IIobhouse: 27 April 1840? ibid, 842.
56. Hobhouse-Carnac: 4 April 1840? ibid, 839*
301*
57* Marriott, The Eastern Question, An Historical Study in
European Diplomacy, pp, 233-45* See also Anderson, The Eastern 
Question. 177^-1923* PP* 95-106#
53# Which started in December 1839# and may not have been lifted
until the south-west monsoon set in at the end of April, when 
the bandar became unserviceable#
59* Sthersey—Oliver: 1 Feb* 1840; BSP 131/11*
60* Min* by Farish and Carnaci 24 Feb# 1840; ibid#
61# Haines-Bombays 25 Mar# 1840; BSP 133/17*
62* Min* by Farishj 11 April and Min* by Governor subscribed to
by Boardi 13 April 1840; ibid*
63* Sec* Com.-Bombay 1 2 July 1840; Board*s Drafts of Secret Letters 
to India, 13/631*
64* Haines-Bombay: 25 March 1840, ut supra#
65* Ilaines-Bombay8 31 March 1840; BSP 134/19#
66# Haines-Bombay8 21 and 25 May 1840; BSP 137/23*
67* Haines-Bombay8 2 June 1840; BSP 137/26*
68# Min* by Carnac subscribed to by Boards 24 June 1840; ibid*
69* India-Bombays 6 July 1840; BSP 141/32*
70* Haines-Bombay: 9 July 1840} BSP 142/34#
71# Min* by Carnac subscribed to by Parish: 1 Aug* l840j BSP 141/33#
72* Min# by Carnac subscribed to by Board: 10 Oct# 1340; BSP 145/42*
73* Inuia-Bombayi 9 Nov* 1840; BSP 148/49#
74. Aucklcnd-Hobhouse1 18 Sept. 1840; Br# P* 842*
75* Haines-Bombay: 28 Nov* 1840; BSP 149/32*
76. Haines-Bombay: 9 Nov# 1840; BSP 148/49*
77* Haines-Bombay: 28 Nov. 1840, ut supra*
78# Haines-Bombay: 28 Nov. l840j BSP 149/52, and Haines-Bombay:
28 Nov# enc# Cruttenden-Haines: 23 Nov# lC40; BSP 149/53# 
Cruttenden obtained his information while on a visit to Mukha#
79* Haines-Bombay: 9 Nov. 1840; BSP 148/49*
80* Haines-Bombay: 29 Dec. 1840; BSP 153/3*
81* India-Bombay: 12 April l84l; BSP 160/22#
82* Haines-Bombay: 30 April l84l; BSP 161/24*
83* Ilaines-Bombay: 18 May 1841; BSP 163/28#
84* Haines-Bombay: 28 May l84l; BSP 161/24.
85* India-Bombay: 19 July 1841; BSP 167/35*
86* Haines-Bombay: 2 Aug* 1841; BSP 167/35#
87* Min* by Andersonf 24 Aug. l84lj ibid*
88* Haines-Bombay: 29 Aug* 1841; BSP 168/39#
89* Haines-Bombay: 25 Sept# 1841; BSP 172/48#
90. Haihes-Bombay: 2 Oct* 1841; BSP 171/46.
91* Pes# by Governor subscribed to by Eoardr 18 Sept. l84l;
BSP 169/40*
92* Haines-Bombay: 10 Oct# 1841, with enca#; BSP 171/45*
93. Ilaines-Bombay: 2 Dec. 1841; BSP 174/51.
94. Ilaines-Sec. Com*: 10 Dec. l84lj BSP 180/4.
95* Haines-Bombay: 4 Jan* 1842; ibid.
96. Haines-Bombay: 31 May 1842; BSP 189/26.
97* Haines-Bombay: 4 Jan* 1842, ut supra.
98* Haines-Bombay: 4 March 1842; BSP 183/21*
99* India-Bombay: 28 April 1842; BSP 186/19*
100. Haines-Bombay: 29 July 1842; BSP 191/35#
101* Ilaines-Sec# Com*: 10 Aug* 1842 and Ilaines-Bombay: 29 Aug. 1842;
BSP 192/3.
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102* 
103 •
104.
105. 
io6« 
107. 
103.
109.
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114*
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
rr < -
3.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Haines-Sec* Com.: 9 Sept. 1842; BSP 194/44.
Bombay-Hainesi 21 Nov. 1842; BSP 196/49.
Haines-Sec. Com.: 11 Nov. 1842; BSP 197/50.
Kin. by Governor and Boards 14 Dec. 1842; BSP 197/53. 
Haines-Sec. Com.: 11 Nov. 1842, ut supra.
Haines-Bombays 3 Feb, 1843; BSP 201/9.
Haines-Bombayj 28 Feb. 1843; BSP 202/14, and Aitchison, 
op. cit.| Vol. VII, pp. 138-40.
Once a convert had declared his Islam, under no circumstances 
was he returned to be tried by ’’infidels”.
Haines-Bombay: 29 July 1843; BSP 210/34,
Haines-Bombayt 1 Jan. 1844; BSP 217/3.
Haines-Bombay: 2 March 1844; BSP 219/13.
Haines-Bombay: 30 March 1844; BSP 220/17.
Haines-Bombay: 15 Aug. 1846; BSP 245/25. and Haines-Bombay:
17, 26 and 30 Aug. 1846; BSP 246/28. For a detailed account 
of Sayyid Israa’il’s attacks, see ’’Officer in the Queen’s Army”, 
Historical and Statistical Sketches of Aden.... pp. 63-*70*
The Fadli sultan had recently built a new castle eleven miles 
from the beach out of range of gunfire from the sea. 
Haines-Bombay: 30 Aug, 1846; BSP 246/28.
Kin, by Peid subscribed to by Board: 9 Sept. 1846; ibid, 
Xndia-Bombay: 21 Sept. 1846; BSP 246/32.
Haines-Bombay: 16 and 30 Oct. 1846; BSP 247/34.
In March 1847, Sayyid Isma’il left for Hadhramawt and was 
killed in a brawl two years later*
Haines-Bombay: 16 Nov, 1846; BSP 247/36*
Haines-Bombay: 25 Nov. 1846; ibid,
Ilaines-Bombay: 2 Dec. 1846; BSP 247/37.
Haines-Bombay: 16 Feb. 1847; BSP 249/12.
Bombay-Haines: 15 March 1847; ibid.
Haines-Bombay: March 1848 and Bombay-Haines: 15 April 1848;
BPP 392/45/14,
Haines-Bombay: 16 June 1847; BSP 252/27.
Min. by Willoughby and Board: 27 Sept. 1847; BSP 253/38.
Chapter VII*
Haines-Bombay: 12 March 1848; BSP 255/14,
Min. by Willoughby, concurred in by Governor: 7 April 1848; 
ibid.
India-Bombay: 6 May 1848; BSP 256/23.
Bombay-Hainee: 14 Aug. enc. extract from dispatch by Sec. Com* 
dd 2 June 1848; BSP 256/24.
Playfair, A History of Arabia Felix, p. 169.
Haines-Bombay: 12 June 1850; BSP 266/11.
Haines-Bombay: 27 June 1850; ibid.
Ilaines-Bombay: 14 July 1850; BSP 267/13*
Haines-Bombay: 14 Aug. 1850; BSP 267/14*
Haines-Bombay: 27 Aug. 1850; ibid*
Presented to his father by the Bombay Government in 1828; when 
he failed to get ordnance from Haines, they were overhauled 
and carriages were built for them*
Haines-Bombay: 14 Jan. 1851; BSP 271/3.
The visit was at the request of the Sultan who was sick and 
wished to settle tho question of succession in case of his 
death.
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14. Haines-Bombay: 10 March, enc* Cruttenden-Haines: 5 March 1851$ 
BSP 271/6*
15. Haines imprisoned another kinsman in Aden.
16* Haines-Bombay* 10 and 13 March 1831? BSP 271/6.
17* Haines-Bombays 27 March 1851$ BSP 271/7* and Haines-Bombay*
6 April 1851J BSP 272/9#
18# Min. by Willoughby* 14 April l851| BSP 271/7#
19# Min. by Falkland and Blane* 11 April 1851$ ibid*
20* Min. by Falkland* 30 March 1851$ BSP 271/6*
21* Bombay-Haines* 3 April 1851| ibid*
22* India-Bombay* 21 April 1851$ BSP 272/9*
23# Bombay-Haines$ 3 May 1851$ ibid*
24* Haines-Bombay* 17 April 1851$ BSP 271/7.
25* Haines-Bombay* 9 May 1851$ BSP 272/12.
26* Haines-Bombay* 24 May 1851$ BSP 272A3#
27* India-Bombay* 10 June 1851$ BSP 272A3*
28* ibid.
29* Bombay-Haines* 28 June 1851$ ibid.
30* Haines-Bombay* 13 July 1851$ BSP 27Z/lBs, and Haines-Bombay*
19 July 1851$ BSP 272A9#
31* Haines-Bombay* 24 July 1851$ BSP 272A9#
32* Haines-Bombay* 11 Aug. 1851$ BSP 272/23*
33# Haines-Bombay* 25 July 1851$ BSP 272A8*
34. Haines-Bombay: 11 Aug. 1851, ut supra.
35* This figure was given by Haines to Forbes and appears in
Forbes* letter to the 13 Aug, 1851* BSP 272/23*
36. Min. by Falkland* 26 Aug. 1851$ BSP 272/23*
37* Haines* estimate was ll6f000#
38. In April 1851, Cruttenden was on leave in Bombay and wrote
a memorandum on the subject of the murders. BSP 271/6*
39* Min. by Grey* 27 Aug. 1851$ BSP 272/23*
40. Mins, by Blane and Bell: 27 Aug* 1851$ ibid*
4l* Sec, Com.-Bombay* 6 Aug. 1851$ BSP 272/24.
42* Broughton-Dalhousie* 7 Aug. 1851$ Br. P* 860*
43* Broughton-Falkland: 7 Aug. 1851$ ibid,
44. Bnlhousie-Falkland* 3 Sept. 1851$ Bal. P, 81*
45* Dalhousie-Falkland* 18 Sept. 1851$ ibid.
46. Dalhousie-Falkland* 23 Oct. 1851$ ibid.
47. India-Bombay* 20 Sept. 1851$ BSP 273/27#
48. Dalhousie-Eroughton* 24 Sept. 1851$ Br. P. 857*
49# Broughton-Dalhousie* 8 Nov. 1851$ Br. P. 860*
50. Broughton-Dalhousie* 6 Oct. 1851$ ibid.
51# Haines-Bombay* 15 Oct. 1851$ BSP 273/31#
52* Ilaines-Bombay* 27 Oct. 1851$ BSP 273/32*
53* Badger’s Rep., enc. in Outran-Bombay* 10 Aug. 1854$ BSP 291/28*
54. Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1852$ BSP 2?9A&. Hunter dates this
incident 1851, and he copied from Playfair.
55• Haines-Bombay* 11 July 1852, enc. *Ali-Haines$ nd$ BSP 279/24* 
56* Bombay-Haines * 12 Aug* 1852$ ibid*
57* Haines-Bombay* 23 Sept. 1852$ BSP 279/32#
58. Haines-Bombay* 17 April, enc. ’Ali-Haines, rec’d 15 April 1853$
BSP 284A 6.
59* Haines-Bombay* 26 April 1853$ ibid.
60. Haines-Bombay* 24 and 28 May 1853; BSP 284/17, and
Ilaines-Bombay* 14 June 1853$ BSP 284A 8.
61. Haines-Bombay* 26 July 1853$ BSP 284/21.
62.
63.
64.
65. 
66 •
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77. 
73.
79.
80. 
81. 
82, 
83.
34.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97. 
98 * 
99.
100.
101*
102*
103.
104.
105. 
106*
107.
108. 
109. 
n o .
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Ilaines-Bombay: 22 July 1853? ibid,
Haines-Bombay: 13 Aug. 1853* BSP 285/22.
Haines-Bombay: 12 Oct. 1853? BSP 286/26.
Haines-Bombay: 30 Oct. and 12 Nov. 1853? ibid.
Haines-Bombay: 10 Dec. 1853? BSP 287/30,
Haines-Bombay: 27 Dec. 1853* BSP 289/3*
Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1854? BSP 289/8.
Haines-Bombay: 14 Nov. 1352? BSP 280/37.
Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1854, ut supra*
Bombay-Haines: 18 Feb. 1854? BSP 289/8,
The reasons for Haines1 recall and his subsequent humiliation 
and death in Bombay are beyond the scope of this work, but if 
tho reader is interested, he is referred to Uaterfield,
Sultans of Aden, Chs, 21-25*
Haines-Bombay: 28 Feb. 1854? BSP 289/12.
Clarke-Bombay: 31 March 1854? BSP 290/16,
Madras-Bombay: 17 Feb. enc. Clarke-Madras Govt.: 23 Jan* 1855?
BSP 294/2. 
ibid.
Bombay-Haines: 13 April 1839? ESP 111/15,
Uaterfield, op. cit., pp. 216-7*
Haines (in Bombay) to Govt.: 13 April 1854? BSP 290/18.
The Arabs gave Haines the same description fifteen years earlier. 
Haines-Govt.? 13 April 1854, ut supra.
Bombay-Clarke: 28 April 1854? BSP 290/18.
Clarke-Bombay: 2? April 1854? BSP 290/19, In this letter, 
al-Hiswah is incorrectly referred to as Bir Ahmad,
Bombay-Clarke: 9 May 1854; ibid.
cf. Outran-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1854, Appendix A to letter?
BSP 291/23.
Outram-Bombay: 12 July 1854? BSP 291/25.
Badgerfs Pep*, ut supra.
Outram-Bombay: 10 Aug. 1854? BSP 291/28,
Court-Bombay: 9 Aug. 1854? APR 146/21 (Pol.).
Wood-Outram: 22 Aug. 1854? W.P., L.3.VI.
El hinstone-llood: 30 Aug* 1854? El ph. P. 8B/1,
I In. by Elphinstone: 6 Sept. 1854; BSP 291/28,
Bombay-Outram: 11 Sept. 1854? ibid.
Elphinstone-Outram: 11 Sept. 1854? Elph* P. 9A/1. 
Balhousie-^utram: 4 Oct. 1854; Dal. P. 86,
Min. by Dalhousie: 30 Sept* 1854; ibid, 38.
Dalhousie-Wood: 4 Oct. 1854? ibid, 63,
India-Bombay: 17 Oct, 1854? BSP 292/33.
Wood-Elphinstone: 25 Oct* 1854; Elph. P. 3A/2* 
Outram-Elphinstone: 25 Oct. 1854; Elph. P. 6b/7,
Outram-Elphinstone: 11 Sept. 1354? ibid.
Elphinstone-Dalhousie: 15 Sept. 1854; Elph* P. 8d/1. 
Balhousie-Elphinstone: 27 Sept. 1854? Dal* P. 117.
Bombay-Coghlan: 4 Nov. 1854; BSP 292/33.
Elphinstone-Coghlan: 29 Oct. 185^? Elph. P. 9A/1. 
Coghlan-Elphinstone: 27 Nov* 1854? Elph. P. 6D/11,
Coghlan-Bombay: 4 Dec. 1854? BSP 294/d.
Sec. Com.-Coghlan; 9 Dec. 1854? BSP 294/1.
Sec. Com.-India; 9 Dec. 1854; Vi.P., 38.
Elphinstone-Coghlan: 10 Jan. and Elphin stone-Dalhousie:
II Jan. 1855? Elph. P. 9A/2 and 8d/1 respectively.
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111. Elphinstone-Coghlan: 17 Jan. 1855? Elph. P. 9A/2,
112* Coghlan-Elphinstone: 11 Feb. 1855? Elph* P. 6D/11*
113. Dalhousie-Elishinstone: 30 Jan. 1855? Dal. P. 117*
114. Igdia-Bombay; 8 Feb. 1855? BSP 294/2.
115. Coghlan-Bombay; 27 Jan. 1855? BSP 294/1.
116. Coghlan-Bombay; 12 Feb. 1855? ibid.
117. Bombay-Coghlan: 27 Feb. 1855? ibid.
118* Coghlan-Bombayt 12 May, enc. Rassam-Coghlan: 10 May 1855?
BSP 295AO*
119. Bombay-Coghlan; 10 Sept. 1855? BSP 296A6*
120* India-Bombay: 24 Oct. 1855? BSP 297/20.
121* Elphinstone-Smith: 16 Nov* 1855? Elph. P. 8B/2.
122. Coghlan-Bombay; 27 Feb. 1855? BSP 294/2.
123* Elphinotone-Wood: 19 March 1855? Elph. P. 8B/2.
124. Wood-Elphinstone; 9 Feb. 1855? Elph. P. 8A/2*
125. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 April 1855? BSP 295AO.
126. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 27 March 1855? Elph. P. 6DA1*
127. Coghlan-BorabayI 27 May 1855? BSP 295A0.
128. Elphinstone-Smith; 25 June 1855? Elph. P. 8B/2*
129* Coghlan-Bombay: 10 July 1855? BSP 296A3*
130. Bombay-India: 28 July 1855? ibid*
131. Coghlan-Eombay: 24 July 1855? BSP 296A4.
132. Coghlan-Elphinstone; 27 July 1855? Elph. P. 6dA 1 *
133* Min. by Governor and Board: 16 Aug. 1855? BSP 296/14*
134. Elphinstone-Smith: 12 Aug. 1855? Elph. Papers 8B/2.
135* Dalhousie-Elphinstone: 7 Aug. 1855? Dal. P. 117.
136. Elphinstone-Smith: 29 Aug. 1855? Elph. P. 8B/2.
137. Coghlan-Elphinstone: 24 Aug. 1855? Elph. P. 6D/11.
138. Coghlan-Bombay: 21 Sept, 1§55, with encs.; BSP 297A 8.
139. Bombay-Coghlan: 12 Oct. 1853? ibid*
140. Elphinstone-Smith: 17 Oct. 1855? Elph. P. 8B/2.
141. Smith-Elphinstone: 22 Nov* 1855? Elph* P. 8A/3.
142. Smith-Elphinstone: 7 Sept. 1855? ibid*
143. Coghlan-Bombay: 8 Nov, 1855? BSP 297/22.
144. Coghlan-Bombay: 28 Oct. 1855? BSP 297/20*
145. Pes, by Board: 14 Nov. 1855? ibid*
146. Elphinstone-Smith; 16 Nov. 1855? Elph* P. 8B/2.
147. Bombay-Coghlan: 15 and 16 Nov. 1855? BSP 297/20.
148. India-Bombay; 31 Dec. 1855? BSP 299/2.
149. Coghlan-Bombay: 23 Nov. 1855? BSP 297/23.
150. Coghlan-Bombay; 26 Feb. I856? BSP 300/6*
151. Elphinstone-Coghlan: 19 March 1856? Elph. P. 9A/3.
152. Coghlan-Bombay: 25 Dec. 1856? BSP 306/2*
153. Coghlan-Bombay: 10 April 1857? BSP 309/8.
154. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 April 1857? ibid, and Aitchison, A Collection
of Treaties* Engagements and Sunnuds relating to India and 
Neighbouring Countries, Vol. VII, p. 150.
155. Coghlan-Bombay: 25 May 1857? BSP 310A2.
156. Coghlan-Bombay: 9 July 1857? BSP 313A5.
157. Coghlan-Bombay: 12 Jan. 1858? LA 36.
158. Coghlan-Bombay: 24 Feb* 1858? ibid.
159. In January 1858, Coghlan received a friendly letter from the
chief, Sultan *Awad.
160. Coghlan-Bombay: 16 Feb* enc. Rassam-Coghlanr 4 Feb. 1858; LA 36.
161. Coghlan-Elphinstone; 16 Feb. 1858? Elph. P. 6dA1.
162. See also Playfair, op. cit., pp. 172-3*
163.
164.
165. 
166 • 
167.
168 •
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174. 
173.
176.
177.
1.
2*
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14. 
13. 
16.
17.
18.
19.
20. 
21. 
22.
23.
24. 
25.
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Coghlan-Bombay* 24 Feb, 1858, ut supra.
There they built a lighthouse to aid steamers passing through
Bab al-Man dab, and garrisoned the island with a detachment of
50 men,
Coghlan-Bombay* 6 and 7 March I858J LA 36,
Coghlan-Bombayt 16 March I8585 ibid,
Coghlan-Bombay: 18 March 18585 ibid,
Bombay-Coghlan* 7 April 1858 (two letters appear under this 
date)| ESLB 133/43*
Ellenborough-Elphinstone* 1 April 18585 Elph. P, 8A/5, 
Elphinstone-Ellenborough* 19 May 18585 Elph, P, 8B/5* 
Coghlan-Eombayt 3 April 18585 LA 36*
A messenger from the Imam arrived in January 1859* 
Coghlan-Bombay* 30 April, enc, lAli-Coghlan| nd, rec*d 
29 April 18585 LA 36,
Coghlan-Bombay* 4 July 18585 ibid*
Bombay-Coghlan* 15 Oct. 18591 APR 258/4361 (Pol.), 
Coghlan-Bombay* 4 Nov, l859| ARP 258/I38 (Pol,),
Frere-Uood* 22 Oct. 1862} W.P. 88/4,
Chapter VIII.
The claim was never specified, but in all probability it was 
some kind of protection money.
In 1839* Lieut, (later General) John Jacob raised what came to 
be known as the Sind or Jacobs Horse to subdue the hill tribes 
of the Upper Sind frontier. By 1852 this force numbered loCO. 
Frere-Viood: 25 April 1863} W.P. 88/6.
Min. by Governors 8 April 18635 Encs. to 
Bombay, 1945/64,
IUn. by Mansfield* 10 April 18631 ibid.
Adj. Gen.to Raines* 4 Aug. 1863} Encc. to 
Bombay, 1945/79.
Merewether-Bombay:
Me r e: r e t h er- Bomb ay *
Merewa ther-Bombay}
Merewether-Bombay:
Merewether-Bombay1 18 Dec 
1 Jan. 1864} LAMS 41.
Merewether-Bombay2 18 Jan. and 2 Feb. 1864;
Merewether-Bombays 17 Nov. 1864} LAMZ 4l.
For the Shaykh •Uthman project, see Ch. Ill, pp. 102-3* 
Bombay-Merewether* 5 Jan. 1865} APJR 413/30 (Pol.), 
Merewether-Bombay* 28 Jan. 1865} APR 413/14 (Pol.), 
India-Bombay* 5 May 1865} ARR 413,
Merewether-Bombay1 3 Jan. 1865} LAM 42.
17 Jan. 1865
2 July 1863}
1 Aug. 1863}
17 Oct. 1863;
18 Feb. 1864} 
18635
ilitary Letters from
Military Letters from
LA 40. 
ibid. 
ibid.
LAMZ 41.
LA 40, and Eerewether-Bombay:
LAMZ 41.
Merewether-Bombay* 
Merewether-Bombay* 18 Feb. I865 
Merewether-Bombay*
Merewet her-Bombay * 
Merewether-Bombay* 28 Jan. 1865 
India-Bombay* 5 May 1865} ibid 
Lawrence-V/ood* 21 Dec. 1865; W
2 April 1865 
17 June 1865
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid,
ibid.
P. 133/9.
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26# Implying the *Abdali, which was not#
27* Merewether-Bombayt 24 June 1865} LAM 42#
28# India-Bombays 31 Aug# 1865? APR 413#
29* Wood-Herewether: 9 Oct# 1865? VJ#P#, L#B»22#
30# Merewether-Bombayi 1 Aug# 1865? LAM 42*
31# Merewether-Bombay: 18 Dept* 1865? ibid#
32# Merewether-London1 30 Oct# 1865? ARR 432*
33# Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties# Engagements and Sunnuda
relating to India and neighbouring Countries# Vol# VII, pp* 141-4* 
34# Merewether-Bombay: 17 Oct* 1865? LAM 42#
35* India-Bombay: 9 Bee# 1865? ARR 432#
36# Lawrence-Wood: 21 Dec# I865? W*P# 133/9*
37* Merewether-Bombay: 18 Sept# 1865? LAM 42#
38# India-Bombay: 9 Dec# 1865, ut supra#
39* India-Bombay: 21 Dec# 1865? ARR 432*
40. Merewether-Bombay: 18 Dec# I865? LAM 42#
41# The total force, under Col* J#D* Woollcombe, was composed of
58 artillery (26 European with 2 guns and 32 native with 2
howitzers), 203 native infantry and 302 Grenadier Guards#
42# Merewether-Bombay: 21 and 23 Dec# 1865? LAM 42#
43* Merewether-Bombay: 16 Jan# 1866; LAZ 43.
44# Merewether-Wood: 8 Jan# 1866? l/#P# 74#
45* Her ewe t her-Bombay: 16 Jan# 1866; LAE 43#
46# Res# by Board: 13 Feb# 1866; ARR 432#
47* Wood—Merewethen 3 Feb# 1866; W*P#, L.B#22#
48# Herewether-Uood: 31 Jan# 1866; W#P# 74#
49* Frere-Lawrence: 12 Feb* 1866; Law# P# 45*
50# Lawrence-Frere: 12 Feb# l866f Law* P# 47*
51* Wood-Frere: 19 Feb. 1866; W#P#, L.B.22.
52# Merewether-Bombay: 5 Mar# i860; LAZ 43#
53* Merewether-Bombay: 17 liar# 1866; ibid#
54# Cranborne-India: 31 Oct# 1866; ARR 432 (I .rt 31
55* Goodfellow-Bombay: 17 Sept# 1866; LAZ 43#
56# Goodfellow-Bombay: 2 Oct# 1866; ibid*
57* Merewether-Bombay: 28 Hay lS67| LA 44, and Aitchison, op. cit#,
Vol. VII, p. 148#
58. Russ-11-Bombay: 17 Aug* 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)A55 (Pol*)#
59* Res* by Govt#: 15 Sept# 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2).
60* Russell-Bombay: 6 May 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/84 (Pol#)#
61* Russell-Bombays 26 Feb* IS69, enc# Lieut# Heyers (Commanding
Aden Troop) to Goodfellow: 23 Feb. 1869* ARR 490 (Part l)/64 (Pol) 
62# Honner-Bombay: 23 May and 18 Nov# 1862; LA 39*
63* Kin# by Mansfield: 7 Dec# 1862; EDLB 146#
64. Bombay-London: 12 Dec. 1362; Deeret Letters from Bombay, 36#
65* Frere-Wood: 10 Dec# 1862; W#P* 88/4#
66# London-Aden: 24 Dec# 1862; Letters to India, etc#, Vol# 1#
67# Wood-Ftfere: 31 Dec. 1862; U#P*, L#B*11#
63. Wood-Frere: 18 Jan* 1863? VJ#P#, L*B#12*
69* Wood-Elgin: 9 Jan. 1863; W*P*, L.B.12#
70# Coghlan-Bombay: 23 Jan# 1863; LA 40 and Aitchison, op* cit#.
Vol. VII, p. 151.
71* London-Aden: 26 Feb# 1863? Letters to India, etc#, Vol# 1#
72. Coghlan-Bombay: 18 Kay 1863; LA 40.
73* Russell-Lombay: 19 Nov* 1868; LA 44#
74. Russell-Bombay: 3 March I869? ibid#
75* Russell-Bombay: 5 April 1869; ibid, and Aitchison, op* cit#,
Vol. VII, p. 152.
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76* Goodfellow-Bombayt 25 Aug* 1869} LA 44*
77* Russell-Bombay: 22 Bee* 186 9{ LA 44, and Russell-Bombay;
16 Feb* 1870} LA 45.
78* Res. by Board: 51 Oct. 1871, enc. India-Bombay: 30 Sept. 1871} 
ARR 560/5287 (Pol.).
79. Memo, by Wedderburn, Political Secretary to Govt.: 5 July 1870; 
ARR 560.
80. Memo by Goodfellow: 23 Oct. 1870; ibid.
81. Memo, by Merewether: 24 Nov. I87O5 ibid.
82. Russell-Bombay: 30 Sept. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 1)/192 (Pol.).
83. Russell-Bombay: 1 Oct. 1870} ARR 532 (Fart 1)A93 (Pol.).
84. Russell-Bombay: 11 Nov. 1870} ARR 532 (Part 2)/223 (Pol.).
85. Russell-Bombay: 12 Nov. 1870} Aim 532 (Part 2)/236 (Pol.).
86. Russell-Bombay: 18 Nov. 1370; ARR 532 (Part 2)/239 (Pol.).
87. India-Bombay: 29 Leo. I87O} ARR 532 (part 2).
88. Russell-Bombay: 2 Dec* 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/251 (Pol.).
89* Russell-Bombay: 10 Dec. 1870} ARR 532 (Part 2)/257 (Pol.)*
90. Tremenheere-Bombay: 31 Dec. 1870; ARR 532 (Part 2)/284 (Pol.).
91. Bombay-India: 13 Inarch 1871} ARR 560.
92. Tremenheere-Bombay; 23 Feb, 1871; ARR 560/40 (Pol.).
93* India-Bombay: 2 June 1871$ APR 560.
94. India-London: 9 Juno I87IJ Foreign Letters from Government
of India, 15/95*
95* India-Bombay; 2 June 1871$ ut supra.
96. In actual fact, Lahj was cooler than Aden. Although situated
in the plain, it had water and vegetation. Besides, there 
were no rocks to absorb the heat of the sun during the day 
and givo it out at night.
97. 'Tremenheere-Bombay: 25 Aug. 1871} ARR 560/187 (Pol.).
98. Res. by Govt.: 25 Oct. 1871; ARR 560/5124 (Pol.).
99*. Tremenheere-Bombay: 18 May 1871} ARR 560/109 (Pol.), and
Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 153-9.
100. Tremenheere-Bombay: 24 March 1871$ ARR 560/66 (Pol.).
101. Tremenheere-Bombay; 7 April, enc* Tremenhoere-Gtevens:
5 April 1871} ARR 560/73 (Pol.).
102. Trjmenheere-Bombay; 14 April 1871; ARR 560/79 (Pol,).
103. Res. by Govt.: 19 May 1871} ARR 560.
104. India-Bombay: 4 July 1871; ARR 560.
105. Tremefrheere-Bombay: 4 May 1871} ARR 560/103 (Pol*),
106. Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 May 1872; LA 46, and Aitchison, op, cit.,
Vol, VII, pp. 148-9.
107. Russell-Bombay: 19 Nov. 1868} LA 44.
108. Russell-Bombay: 22 Nov. 1868; ibid.
109* Russell-Bombay: 18 Dec. 1868; ibid.
110. Goodfellow-Bombay: 18 Nov* 1869} ibid*
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APPENDIX 1.
Coins, YJeights and Measures.
Coins.
Before the occupation, the two main coins in circulation in 
South Arabia were the dollar and the mansuri* The dollar was the 
Maria Theresa thaler, referred to also as the German crown or real*
Its value depended on the silver content} and until 1831, it was 
at par with the American dollar (Marston, Britain*s Imperial Bole in 
the Red Sea Area, 1800-18^8. p. viii). In 187*7, Hunter quotes ^100 
as being equal to Rs. 212; , which puts the dollar at a little over 
4/- Sterling (An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia, 
p. 76). Hoskins puts the value of the dollar in 183& at 15/- Sterling 
(British Routes to India, p. 200), which is clearly incorrect* Perhaps 
the figure 15/- is misprint for 5/-*
The mansuri may have been named after one of the imams of the 
Yemen, and its value in 1839 was given by Haines as equivalent to 
As. 44. In 1839, Coghlan described this coin as "a thin, shapeless 
piece of copper, without any impression and its intrinsic is much 
less than its current value.” (Coghlan-Bombay: 7 Jan. 1839; ARE?
230/7 (iol.).)
After the occupation, the Indian currency was introduced into 
Aden. The standard coin of the Anglo-Indian monetary system was 
the rupee which was equivalent to 2/- Sterling. Its divisions were 
the anna, l/16th; the pice, ^ of an anna; and the pie, l/l2th of 
an anna. Es. 100,000 made a lakh.
The rate of exchange in 1839 was as follows
100 - Rs. 217.406
1 — Rs • 2*3
1 - 140 pice
1 - 160 mansuris
- 64 pice
- 73 mansuris
- 4 pico
mansuris
- 12 pies
(Haines-Bombay: 9 June 1839? BSP 115/26)
German Crowns 
n 11
tf 11
if 11
Re. 1
Re. 1 
Anna 1 
” 1 
" 1
311*
Weights and Measures.
a) Farsalah* An Arabian weight equal to 30 ratls.
b) Hatl* An Arabian weight equal to 17 053.
e) Ilaylah. An Arabian weight which differed according to the article 
measured. A kaylah of grain was roughly 16 lbs.
d) Kandi* A weight which differed from one part of India to another* 
In Aden, it varied according to the article measured; for example, 
a kandi of ghee v/as about 33 lbs*, while a kandi of firewood was 
about 6CO lbs.
©) Maund. The weight of the maund also differed from one part of 
India to another. The maund used in Aden was the Bombay one, 
which was equal to 28 lbs* There were 40 seers in the Bombay 
maund.
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APPENDIX 2.
A Statement of Customs Duties Levied at Aden 
Under Sultan Huhsin.
Imports*
Dates (first quality) - & J per bag.
Dates (common) - # 1/8 per bag*
Fuwah (madder) - As. 12 per 20 lbs*
Rice - & -J Pei* baS*
Iron and all other 
article© whatsoever -
Besides the import duty, there was levied at the Outer or Northern 
Gate a charge of 0 % on every camel load (or 600 lbs) of Indian 
goods, and only 1 mansuri on Arabian goods, which the *Aqrabi tribe 
received*
Exports*
Jowari and coffee — On every camel load (or
600 lb©.), As. 12 paid at 
the Customs House, and 
1 mansuri levied by the 
*Aqrabis at the Northern 
Gate*
(Haines-Bombay: 29 Jan. 1839; BSP 108/8.)
A Comparison between the Aden Rates under Sultan Huhsin, 
and the Bombay Rates fixed by Act I. 1838.
Note
The comparison is limited to rates on articles which appear in both 
the Act and the statement provided by Haines*
Article
Imports*
Act I, 1838
Cloves
Pepper
Tobacco
Coffee
British
Vessels
10/
10S
Foreign
Vessels
20/
20/
Under Sultan
5/* plus handling 
charge of 44/*
Ditto
Re* 1 As* 8 per maund
(Same rates for British Ditto
and foreign vessels)
Cotton and Silk Piece Goods, 
Cotton Twist and Yarn, the 
proauce of the U.K. or of 
any British possession
Do., the produce of any other 
place
Grains & Pulse
Livestock
/Petals, wrought or mrwrought, 
the produce of the U.K* or 
any British possession
Metals, do*, excepting tin, 
the produce or manufacture 
of any other place*
Tin, the produce of any other 
place than the U*K. or any 
British possession*
2  2 '°
3B
O /a
10D
Free
Free
15/ 12 farsalahs - /l*
7/
14/
12/
20/
Cotton - 3/, plus 24/ 
paid by the customer*
Silk - 5/ plus 
handling charge of 4-JZ
Jowari - 52 pic© per 
camel load of 12 
farsalahs*
Pace (Bengal) - 0 4 
per bag*
Rice (Ilalabar) *• 20 
pice per bag*
Wheat - 5/, plus 
handling charge of 
4 pice per farsalah*
Horses - #1 each 
Sheep - 5/
Bullocks St Asses - 3%
Metals - 5/ plus 
handling charge of
Bp;
Article
Aloes
Coffee
Cotton
Currants
Dyes
Ghee
Gum
Jowari
Exports#
Act I. 
British 
Vessels 
3^
1838
Foreign
Vessels
6/j
Under Sultan
7%$
5}vo, plus handling 
charge of 2-J reals 
per cent#
In husk, 0  5/8 per bag 
of 10 farsalahs#
05% per ^ bales of 
about 33 cwts#
Free
5%
25 pice per kandi#
3?^
5%
APPENDIX 4.
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Customs Revenue, 1839-1850*
Year Imports Exports Total
1339-40 Rs. 4,500
1840-41 12,314
184-1-42 15,196
1842-43 Rs. 12,927 Rs. 2,110 15,037
1843-44 17,705 1,092 18,797
1844-45 19,440 1,93s 21,376
1845-46 20,806 1,657 22,463
1846-47 28,287 2,087 30,374
1847-48 21,083 2,495 23,578
1848-49 29,468 3,869 33,337
1849-50 27,510 4,263 31,773
Note
The figures for the first three years are given in the first trade 
report, 1842-43* For this, and other trade reports see Appendix
Year
1845-4-6
1846-47
1847-48
1848-49
1849-50
1850-51
1851-52
1852-55
1853-54
1854-55
1855-56 
18^6^7
1857-58
1858-59
1859-60 
1860-61 
1861-62
1862-63
1863-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70
1870-71
Year
1845-46
1846-47
1847-48
1848-49
1849-50
1850-51
1851-52
1852-53
1853-54
1854-55
1855-56
1856-57
1857-58
1858-59
1859-60 
l86x>-6l
1861-62
1862-63
1863-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70
1870-71
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APPENDIX 5+
Land Trade,
A* Annual Totals*
Imports Exports
*CL 82,162 -----------
81,775 -----------
94,868 Rs. 56,902
99,955 124,136
n n  n?n108,018 110,020
104,395 153,090
- --------- 301,888
113,213 246,321
210,515
  182,320
87,910 78,115fO | JmL?
132,191
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  214,743
52,783 25^,664
Bs. 1,206,532 477,429
1,083,223 1,333,416
1,635,755 1,320,252
1,621,914 2,021,320
1,654,903 3,166,893
1,597,782 3,942,985
1,348,098 4,399,107
1,253,772 3,941,798
1,361,322 4,463,091
973,333 1,013,282
1,253,581 8^4,591
1,352,598 838,736
B. The Main Articles of Import.
Coffee Jowari Wheat
"CL 421 CL 2,164 CL 1,205
389 3,752 1,052
388 8,203 2,379
393 11,365 2,375
482 9,669 2,070
2,184 7,664 3,061
4,016 4,675 2,308
4,633 
rs. 557,100 
364,500 
479,860 
658,170 
677,160
615,330
716,490
600,660
521,460
197,200
342,780
323,300
6,920 2,457
Rs. 101,264 Rs. 71,340
179,776 70,680
115,776 67,710
136,976 135,090
209,888 136,350
169,952 219,840
98,128 59,160
135,424 61,200
109,296 39,870
44,320 21,945
115,476 36,180
188,760 8^,881
317.
C. The Main Articles of Export.
Year Raw Cotton Piece Goods
1847-48 Rs. 26,217 Rs. 6 35
1848-49 83,700 4,490
1849-50 48,465 3,906
1850-51 52,650 20,000
1851-52 110,664 66,940
1852-53 101,652 41,335
1853-54 120,384 39,563
1854-55 102,996 40,660
1855-56 44,256 13,999
1856-57 54,596 42,769
1857-58 144,008 23,202
1858-59 93,656 45,480
1859-60 230,850 41,742
1860-61 877,885 53,713
1861-62 550,684 69,396
1862-63 636,597 87,910
1863-64 1,031,652 86,526
1864-65 920,340 99,001
1865-66 751,005 95,705
1866-67 692,290 88,602
1867-68 909,043 100,086
1868-69 122,742 96,426
1869-70 128,352 82,715
1870-71 2,731 381,795
Tobacco & Snuff
Rs. 12,733 
19,720  
35,750 
35,960 
51,429 
35,738 
14,397 
15,239 
8,140 
11,853 
17,174 
67,764 
71,120  
269,704 
485,037 
907,695 
608,227 
2,335,276 
2,881,539 
2,515,745 
2,729,008 
223,224 
131,115 
147,003
*CL 2 Camel loads.
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APPENDIX 6,
A Comparison between Customs Duties at Arabian Ports, 
and those proposed for Aden*
A* Customs Duties at Arabian Ports#
The customs duties at Kukha and Hudaydah were as followss
Persian Tobacco - iz:i
Cloth - 8%
Coffee - 8%
Fine Rice - H i
Other grains 8 fa
Surat goods and
8:%other articles
Bullion - 1%
At Mukalla, the customs duty on all articles was 5%t and at Jaddah 
10^.
B# Customs Duties Proposed for Aden#
Imports
3% - Cardamoms* cinnamon, cloth, cloves, coconuts , cotton, cumblies 
(blanket, usually worn as a cloak by Indians), fuwah, ginger, 
metals, musk, myrrh, pepper, kishmish (raisins), saffron, 
sandlewood, sandlewood oil, silk, sugar, tobacco, wheat#
3/j - Coffee, frankincense, building wood#
- Gum#
Dates - 10, 20 or 30 mansuris per bag, depending on quality#
Dates, dry - 4-0 mansuris per bag#
Ghee - 12 mansuris per kandi.
Jowari - 4-0 mansuris per camel load.
Livestock - No duty#
Pice - 12 to 24- mansuris per bag, depending on quality.
Exports
5% - Fuwah, gums and resins, jowari, sabr (aloes), wars (safflower)*
3% - Coffee
Cotton cloth - # £ per 4 bales weighing about 338 lbs.
Ghee - 12 mansuris per kandi.
(Haines-Bombay; 20 Nov. 1839{ BSP 129/8. See also Appendix B to 
Haines* letter of 9 June 1839 (3SP 115/26), where he had made 
proposals on the same subject.)
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APPENDIX 7* 
Sea Trade■
A# Growth and Distribution.
Country Imports Country Imports
l843/44-l#t9/50 1850/51-1856/
Bombay Rs. 3,909,545 Bombay Rs. 4,482,964
Africa, ex. ports Africa, ex. ports on
on Red Sea 1,160,446 Red Sea 2,537,773
Bengal 344,418 Ports on Red Sea 1,774,761
Ports in the Red Sea 323,897 Kutch, Veraval &
1,481,993Malabar 170,258 Porbandar
Arabia, ex. ports on U.S.A. 1,267,859
Red Sea 155,344 Arabia, ex. ports on
763,259Kutch, Veraval & Red Sea
Porbandar 139,500 Bengal 310,396
Persian Gulf 138,237 Persian Gulf 319,462
U.S.A. 110,125 Malabar 205,974
United Kingdom 73.130 United Kingdom 190,994
Singapore 9,425 Singapore 137,470
France 2,100 France 20,858
Hamburg & Bremen 1,624 Madras 19,360
Mauritius 1,264 Spain 16,398
Holland
Hamburg
Mauritius
Seychelles
8,362
6,233
6,012
1,450
Rs. 6,539,403 Rs. 13,856,580
Country Exports
l843/44-l849/50
Africa, ex. ports
on Red Sea Rs. 766,522
Bombay 753,114
Ports on Red Sea 279,335
U.S.A. 163,126
Arabia, ex. ports on
Red Sea 72,598
United Kingdom 19,933
Kutch, Veraval &
Porbandar l4,44o
Bengal 8,832
Persian Gulf 6,528
Malabar 2,225
Hamburg & Bremen 1,502
Mauritius 1,050
Country Exports
1850/51-185^/57
Ports on Red Sea Rs. 2,618,696
Africa, ex. above 2,001,727
Bombay 1,455,631
Arabia, ex. ports on
Red Sea 1,037,321
France 767,099
U.S.A. 645,745
Persian Gulf 335,217
Kutch, Veraval 8c
Porbandar 215,302
Hamburg 123,046
Belgium 68,500
United Kingdom 54,039
Bengal 26,651
Malabar 6,087
Singapore 5,741
Madras 2,4o8
Seychelles 1,306
Holland 748
Mauritius 423
ES. 2,039,195 Es. 9,365,687
320.
Country Imports
l857/5§-l563/64
Bombay Rs 
Arabian Gulf &
. 8,064,933
Red Sea 4,637,600
Africa, Coast of 3,249,146
Kutch 2,447,843
Bengal 1,021,042
U.S.A. 742,106
Persian Gulf 469,400
Malabar 350,994
United Kingdom 301,486
Mauritius 59,889
France 52,695
Singapore 49,434
China 48,300
Suez 43,095
Madras 3,665
Rs. 21,541,628
Country 
Arabian Gulf 2c Red
Exports
1857/5§-i15^/64
Country
Bombay Rs
Arabian Gulf & Red 
Africa, Coast of 
United Kingdom 
U.S.A.
Calcutta 
Persian Gulf 
Kutch 
Malabar 
Suez
Singapore
France
Australia & China
Mauritius
Trieste
Madras
Italy
Sea
Bombay
Africa, Coast of
France
U.S.A.
Persian Gulf
United Kingdom
Kutch
Suez
Genoa
Mauritius
Australia
Bengal
Singapore
China
Madras
Malabar
Rs. 5,698,186
4,407,453 
2,577,654 
1,384,137 
1,034,818 
370,549 
303,438 
273,002 
210,294 
195,000 
147,145 
58,966 
46,556 
21,609 
14,990 
2,185 
500
Rs. 16,746,482
Inporta
I864/65-I670/7I
16,958,952 
Sea 8,016,750 
5,163,202 
2,104,364 
1,847,860 
1,642,709 
1,422,876 
1,087,266 
309,364 
254,417 
242,591 
219,458 
170,662 
126,522 
53,634 
10,514 
6,458
Rs. 39,637,599
Country
Arabian Gulf 2c Red 
Sea Rs.
Bombay
Africa, Coast of 
United Kingdom 
U.S.A.
Suez
France
Kutch
Persian Gulf 
Calcutta
Australia & China
Singapore
Mauritius
Trieste
Malabar
Italy
Madras
Exports
1864/65-1870/71
17,248,414 
4,738,981 
3 ,8 7 1 , 6 2 2  
1,256,197 
1,072,190 
941,866 
659,962 
389,484 
360,410 
194,704 
102,805 
79,190 
44,544 
19,282 
14,013 
13,075 
9,330
Rs. 31,016,069
321.
Year
1843-44
1844-45
1845-46
1846-47
1847-48
1848-49
1849-50
1850-51
1851-52
1852-53
1853-54
1854-55
1855-56
1856-57
1857-58
1858-59
1859-60 
1860-61 
1861-62
1862-63
1863-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70
1870-71
B* Annual Value
Import
Rs. 6o6f407
986,638 
1,107,409
898,845 
853,179
1,098,485 
1,198,687 
1,293,689 
1,830,675 
2,071,117 
1,668,713
1.903.910 
2,248,558
2,848,243 
3,353,098
2.614.910 
2,862,493 
2,946,768 
2,975,191
2,911,904 
3,879,267 
3,489,310 
4,926,032 
4,970,976
6,370,619 
6,717,092 
5,659,383 
7,504,187
Export
Rs. 117,511 
227,926 
322,950 
329,648 
261,607
m i ,153
M l ,  299
698,176 
1,034,213 
1,462,094 
1,332,694 
1,451,487
1,453,208 
1,920,490 
2,836,374 
1,710,925 
1,969,127 
1,815,641 
2,174,273 
2,592,813
3,645,324 
2,996,416 
3,474,303 
4,104,876 
4,855,669 
5,653,048 
4,250,882 
5,680,865
322,
C * Coal
The figures in this Appendix represent the value of coal imported from 
the United Kingdom only* After the French were allowed to have their 
own coal depot in 1845, coal for the use of the Meseageries Maritimes 
Imperiales was brought from France, but these imports are not recorded*
Year
1843-44
1844-45
1845-46
1846-4?
1847-48
1848-49
1849-50
1850-51
1851-32
1852-53
1853-54
1854-55
1855-56
1856-57
1857-58
1858-59
1859-60 
1860-61 
1861-62
1862-63
1863-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70 
1870-71
Imports
Rs. 261,787 
276,408 
358,785 
532,500
444,613 
280,048 
300,696 
269,148 
416,220 
623,246 
1,234,100 
1,077,955 
1,064,524 
1,402,228 
1,425,579 
1,570,323 
2,987,909 
2,847,795 
754,136 
1,348,900 
2,863,126 
1,470,582 
2,523,314 
2,168,730 
2,995,504 
5,337,590 
2,091,449 
2,097,152
Exports
Rs. 234,146 
264,195 
407,655 
436,050 
468,027
2,500
2,500
1,960
45
3,150
6,310
323.
Year
1843-44
1844-45
1845-46 
1846*47
1847-48
1848-49
1849-50
1850-51
1851-52
1852-53
1853-54
1854-55
1855-56
1856-57
1857-58
1858-59
1859-60
1860-61
1861-62 
1862-65 
1865-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70 
1070-71
D# Treasure#
Imports
Rs# 569*618
210,297 
91,341 
125,617 
251*780 
285,125 
550,000 
462*182 
1,059,860 
1,100,665 
1,107*908 
1,525,248 
992,054 
1,656,150 
2,241,798
1,761,125 
1,065,397 
1,374,466 
1,238,978 
1,157,359 
1,399,726 
1,712,592
2,107,905 
1,557,603 
7,528,147 
1,897,940 
1,731,113 
1,561,577
Exports
20,000
9,000
124,280
98,045
99,000
194,182
688,760
614,275
827,586
1,005,930
855,135
1,017,714
1,598,674
1,411,763
953,950
1,010,275
1,116,978
906,289
1,043,766
1,646,999
1,836,694
1,469,747
5,881,529
1,678,046
1,810,194
1,419,513
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E* The Five Ilain Articles of
(Value in Rupees)
Sea Trade*
Imports*
Year
X843-44
1844-45
1845-46
1846-47
1847-48
1848-49
1849-50
1850-51
1851-53
1852-53
1853-54
1854-55
1855-56
1856-57
1857-58
1858-59
1859-^0
1860-61
1861-62
1862-63
1863-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70
1870-71
Coffee Cotton Grain
32,526 
59*868 
14,808 
17*944 
5,031 
57,463 
44,886 
39,867 
93,029 
182,742 
149,965
161,176 
136,072 
451,276 
613,929 
118,621 
142,682 
250,613
364,138 
281,706
135,770 
14,528 
115,257
361,609
297,056
296,485
104,423
631,502
33,746
39,970
53,830
44,244
51,543
109,653
76,932
31,259
119,674
123,834
113,1^5
109,845
80,208
70,297
159,905
162,571
254,212
208,163
133,243
194,355
165,786
141,574
87,058
102,396
203,667
43,135
96,930
179,326
78,915
118,786
130,467
99,609
83,320
127,346
122,726
73,712
134,166
158,075
152,139
89,469
180,450
227,639
234,291
191,485
39^,618
296,394
269,324
232,941
184,811
423,159
686,145
262,699
253,505
634,214
406,579
304,274
Ivory Piece Goods
488 114,338
7,322 128,699
9,584 284,823
15,507 315,673
3,666 244,545
734 317,890
16,724 346,037
11,597 375,069
24,838 578,105
13,803 847,020
49,442 511,522
29,268 773,472
13,642 1,005,301
111,430 1,185,500
339,535 971,789
123,050 1,188,810
152,125 922,589
112,619 955,978
131,580 1,048,865
127,281 853,192
76,367 C 1,802,262 5 50,
217,717 1,220,450 82,
210,992 2,082,173 29,
146,985 2,435,623 48,
233,437 3,128,881 73,
517,770 2,890,401 43,
341,056 2,342,420 84,
430,551 3,430,659 138,
C a Cotton 
S = Silk
325*
168
185
961
592
371
111
517
795
326
Exports
Year
1843-44
184-4-45
1845-46
1846-47
1847-48
1848-49
1849-50
1850-51
1851-52
1852-53
1853-54
1854-55
1855-56
1856-57
1857-58
1858-59
1859-60
1860-61
1861-62 
1862-63
1865-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70
1870-71
Coffee Cotton
74,430
66,042
23,432
29,824
17,900
63,890
51,961
118,007
272,545
385,005
423,261
369,595
404,330
636,131
1067,905
538,771
453,448
438,028
857,337
799,312
844,998
308,289
501,740
640,322
551,396
474,679
426,926
909,660
1,771
4,630
7,272
4,745
18,810
12,672
2,686
16,368
9,171
30,113
15,888
7,808
3,697
1,900
101,445
92,670
30,065
203,090
135,526
26,595
23,690
47,044
88,751
20,273
10,980
36,725
Grain Ivory Piece Goode
4,2X4  ----- 29,946
10,208 7,247 45,603
13,502 64 111,822
15,757 150 152,149
13,971 4,672 118,257
44,246 887 168,654
33,581 14,623 151,563
32,719 10,227 230,477
32,592 25,254 352,423
38,065 11,505 602,868
44,000 55,922 395,161
36,274 20,854 626,125
32,010 20,043 604,929
90,456 108,115 700,964
58,561 368,675 794,301
46,678 187,975 553,742
71,288 218,648 562,463
45,172 278,070 501,316
43,198 236,267 571,358
64,333 199,425 715,280
44,224 220,434 C 1,477,265 S 5,150
174,729 310,810 1,174,397 12,230
224,644 148,374 1,548,485 10,680
114,762 151,085 2,170,071 18,245
222,239 269,910 2,107,179 12,100
591,467 400,820 2,800,676 12,900
288,159 367,422 1,727,192 12,165
273,793 460,273 2,442,732 28,580
cs
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APPENDIX 8 , 
Shipping
A* Country Craft
Year No» Tonnage
1844-45 383 7,880
1845-46 643 15,065
1846-4? 577 14,388
1847-48 814 20,310
1848-49 679 22,358
1849-50 726 23,436
1850-51 763 23,919
1851-52 - — — — —
1852-55 895 28,836
1853-54 932 18,206
1854-55 992 20,084
1855-56 1,013 26,450
1856-57 1,074 26,706
1857-58 1,120 24,841
1858-59 1,069 31,035
1859-60 941 37,578
1860-61 970 111,232
1861-62 950 37,857
1862-63 929 35,237
1863-64 804 30,210
1864-65 745 27,014
1865-66 819 28,395
1866-67 674 22,160
1867-68 1,043 44,630
1868-69 1,697 72,706
1869-70 1,688 64,402
1870-71 906 33,206
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C* Square-rigged Ships 
from 1863-64 to 1870-71*
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Year British
No* Tonnage
1863-64 61 47,637
1864-65 55 48,207
1865-66 85 70,729
1866-67 61 58,559
1867-68 86 66,751
1868-69 136 107,697
1869-70 70 60,912
1870-71 64 58,866
Year Dutch
No. Tonnage
1863-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67 « .  - . . .  —
1867-68 1 764
1868-69 1 1,146
1869-70 -  - . . . . . . .
1870-71
Year Portuguese
No* Tonnage
1863-64
1864-65 1 89
1865«*66 3 1,380
1866-67 • » mm mm mm m
1867-68 2 349
1868-69 2 151
1869-70 «•» mm -  .  •  _
No*
18
3
4 
6
16
19
4
6
U,S*A*
 ^Tonnage
15,602 
2,001 
3,644 
4,120 
10,911 
16,103 
2,420 
3,893
Arab 
No* Tonnage
1 575
1 220
5 2,473
1 350
683
650
1,213
Austrian
French Hamburg Swedish
No* Tonnage No* Tonnage No* Tonnage
1 516 1 1,021 ----
3 5 1 9 ............  -
1 5 1 6 ---------------- ---------
5 2,197 -------- -------------
3 1,342 ---------- -------------
5 1,146 ---------- -------------
1 5 4 3 -------------  2 1,453
3 1,24? -- ------- -------------
Russian 
Ho* Tonnage
Bremen Norwegian
No* Tonnage No* Tonnage
1 7 6 3 -------------
844
mm
1,449
543
897
673 602
Belgian Italian German
No, Tonnage No» Tonnage No * Tonnage No * Tonnage
620
1870-71 132
8 9 8 ...........
-  -  2 1,866
Year
1863-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70
1870-71
TOTALS 
No» Tonnage
“S3 Tst'iiV 
63 51,036 
99 79,362 
74 66,070 
108 80,117 
171 130,548 
81 68,387 
78 66,248
333.
D* SteainerB from 1863-64 to 1870-71
Year British French Arab
No* Tonnage No* Tonnage Mo. Tonnage No*
1863-64 124 128,675 25 36,260 »  - mm mm mm wm -
1864-65 127 142,643 38 47,103 -  - -  *»  -  - •  -
1865-66 160 157,422 48 50,977 -  - -  -  -  • - -
1866-67 148 154,131 41 43,829 -  - -  -
1867-68 158 165,351 44 49,399 -  - • •  -
1868-69 172 212,433 46 53,820 mm mm . . . . -  -
1869-70 226 273,553 50 58,941 1 1,168 2
1870-71 348 403,734 59 71,730 6 5,7^2 U
Austrian
Year
1863-64
1864-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68
1868-69
1869-70
1870-71
Italian 
No* Tonnage
13 10,027
Russian 
No* Tonnage
Dutch
No* Tonnage
2,859 164
Turkish 
No* Tonnage
2 1,076
Year
1863-64
1364-65
1865-66
1866-67
1867-68 
1868-69
1869-70
1870-71
"Foreign” 
No* Tonnage
4 1,785
TOTALS 
No* Tonnage
149
165
210
189
202
218
283
440
164,935
189,746
209,475
197,960
214,750
266,253
336,970
502,073
334.
APPENDIX 9.
Sources for Annual Trade Reports, including Shipping.
1842-43: Haines-Bombay: 4 July 18435 ERP 374/22/27 Sept* 1843#
1843-44: Haines-Bombay: 24 June 1844; BRP 374/39/28 Aug* 1844*
1844-43: Haines-Bombayj 20 Aug# 1843? BRP 373/9/2 Oct* 1845.
1845-46: Haines-Bombay: 10 Sept# 1846; BRP 375/38/28 April 1847#
1846-47: Haines-Bombay: 10 Aug# 1847; BSP 375/50/15 Sept. 1847*
1847-48: Haines-Bombay: 24 July 1848; BRP 376/14/6 Sept# 1848*
1848-49: Haines-Bombay: 4 Aug. 1849; BRP 376/50/26 Sept* 1849*
1849-50: Haines-Bombay: 20 Aug. 1850; BRP 377/9/H Sept. 1850.
1850-51: Haines-Bombay: 13 Aug. 1851} BRP 3 77A7A5 Oct. 1851.
1851-52: Haines-Bombay: 26 July 1852; ARR 110/11 (TDR).
1852-53: Haines-Bombay: 24 June 1853; Board’s Collections,
No. 171*660, Vol. 2647* 1855-56.
1853-54: Clarke-Bombay: 8 June 1854; ibid*
1854-55: Coghlan-Bombay: 4 July 1855; ibid*
1855-56: Coghlan-Bombay: 17 May I856; ARR 173/71 (TDR).
18^571 Coghlan-Bombay: 13 May 1857; BRP 379/33/22 July 1857.
1857-58l Coghlan-Bombay: 15 Nay 1858; Collections to Revenue 
Dispatches from Bombay, 11/23.
1858-59: Coghlan-Bombay: 18 May 1859; AFi? 254/62 (TDR).
1859-60: Playfair-Bombay: 24 Kay i860; ARR 284/78 (Rev.).
1860-61: Playfair-Bombay: 17 Kay 1861; ARR 323/83 (Rev.)*
1861-62: Honner-Bombay: 17 May 1862; ARR 342/54 (Rev.).
1862-63t Coghlan-Bombay: 20 May 1863; ARR 371/35 (Rev.).
1863-64: Merewether-Bombay: 9 June 1864; ARR 398/47 (Rev*)*
1864-65: Merewether-Bombay: 26 May 1865 ; Collections to Revenue
Dispatches to Bombay,845/8.
1865-66: Merewether-Bombay: 5 Kay 1866; ARR 433/62 (Rev.).
1866-67; Merewether-Bombay: 5 June 1867; Collections to Revenue
Dispatches to Bombay, 849/6.
1867-70: Aden Trade Reports (published separately* and found in 
both the British Museum and the India Office Library).
1870-71: Tremenheere-Bombay: 8 June 1871} ARR 56I (Part 1)/129 (Pol).
The returns form part of the Adninistration Report for 
that year.
Note
The reports for the years 1851-52 and 1856-57 have no schedules 
attached to them* The figures for these years have been obtaihed 
from the comparative statements for the years following*
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APPENDIX 10.
Hassam.
Hormuzd Rassam was born in 1826 of a Chaldean Christian family 
in Mosul, Iraq. In 184-5, he became assistant to A.H* Layard who 
was then excavating at Kuyunjik which he identified as the site of 
ancient Nineveh. Two years later, Rassam accompanied Layard to 
England where he studied at Oxford until 1849* Meanwhile, Layard 
had gone to Istanbul, and from there back to Kuyunjik. In 1849, 
the British Museum sent Rassam to assist him in his work; and when 
Layard returned to England to enter Parliament in 1852, Rassam took 
over from him* The excavation continued until 1854, when Rassam 
returned to London to join the British Museum.
When Outram was appointed Resident at Aden, he felt the need 
for an efficient and able interpreter at the Residency. He asked 
the Court of Directors whether he could have Rassam whom he had met 
in London. The Court was agreeable, and the British Museum raised 
no objections. Rassam arrived at Aden on 29th December, 1854, two 
months after Outram had left.
It was not long, however, before Coghlan, Outram’s successor, 
perceived that Rassam’s abilities were not those of an ordinary 
interpreter. "Ilis intimate knowledge of Arab character and manner 
is of great advantage to me in all my communications with these tribee 
( in the vicinity of Aden) whether personally or by letter, and I find 
him, not a mere interpreter and master of ceremonies, but a man of 
excellent judgment and untiring zeal, while his personal character and 
demeanour,are calculated to demand the respect and esteem of all 
classes.” ^Acoghlan-Bombay* 1 May lS55j BSP 295/9* J
From 1855 to 1857, Rassam performed gratuitously the functions 
of postmaster and magistrate in addition to his other duties. In one 
year, he tried no less than 1100 recorded civil suits. Impressed by 
his ability, Coghlan proposed in 1858 that he should be made 
Assistant-Resident, and the Government agreed.
When Playfair left in January I863, Rassam became First Assistant, 
and for some time he was Acting Resident. Rassam was sent on a number 
of diplomatic missions to various Arab chiefs, but his most important 
mission was to King Theodore of Abyssinia in 1864* He was in 
Abyssinia for four years, the last two of which he spent in prison.
On his release, in April 1868, he returned to Aden, and after a short 
time there he left for England.
From 1876 to 1882, Rassam was in Iraq, carrying on archaeological 
work. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the Foreign Office sent 
him to look into the affairs of the Christian communities in Asia Minor, 
Armenia and Kurdestan. Rassam died at Hove in 1910.
APPENDIX 11.
Section 273 of India Act VIII, 1839*
"An Act for simplifying the Procedure of the Courts of 
Civil Judicature not established by Royal Charter."
"Any person arrested under a warrant in execution of a decree 
for money, may, on being brought before the Court* apply for his 
discharge on the grounds that he has no present means of paying the 
debt, either wholly or in part; or, if possessed of any property, 
that he is willing to place whatever property he possesses at the 
disposal of the Court. The application shall contain a full account 
of all property of whatever nature belonging to the applicant, whether 
in expectancy or in possession, and whether held exclusively by 
himself or jointly with others or by others in trust for him (except 
the necessary wearing apparel of himself and his family, and the 
necessary implements of his trade) and of the places respectively 
where such property is to be found, or shall state that, with the 
exceptions above mentioned, the applicant is not possessed of any 
property, and the application shall be subscribed and verified by 
the applicant in the manner hereinbefore prescribed for subscribing 
and verifying plaints*11
^India Acts, Vol.
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APPENDIX 12.
Suits Cognizable by Courts of Small Causes.
The following were the suits cognizable by Courts of Small 
Causes:
"... claims for money due on bond or other contract, or for rent, 
or for personal property, or for the value of such property, or for 
damages, when the debt, damage or demand does not exceed in amount or 
value the sum of five hundred rupees. Provided that no action shall 
lie in any such Court on a balance of partnership account, unless the 
balance shall have been struck by the parties or their agents; or 
for a share or part of a share under an intestacy, or for a legacy or 
part of a legacy under a will; or for any claim for the rent of land, 
or any other claim for which a suit may be brought before a Revenue 
officer; or for the recovery of damages on account of an alleged 
personal injury, unless actual pecuniary damage shall have resulted 
from the injury." /**Act XLII, i860; India Acts, Vol. 7
This Act was replaced by Act XI of 186% The suite cognisable 
by Courts of Small Causes remained the same. However, under the new 
Act, the local government could extend the jurisdiction of a Court of 
Small Causes to suits involving sums not exceeding Rs. 1000. The 
local government could also invest the Registrar of a Court of Small 
Causes with power to try suits not exceeding Rs. 20, and he was to 
exercise this power under the general control of the Judge.
^/"india Act XI, 1863? India Acts, Vol. 10.J7
Heads of Administration
Political Residents, Aden*
Captain S.B. Haines, I.N.
(Political Agent) 
Col* A* Clarke (Acting Political
Agent)
Lieut.-Col. James Cutram 
Lieut*-Col* W.M. Coghlan
(first time)
Col* G*H* Robertson (Acting) 
Maj.-Gen. R.W. Honner (Acting) 
Lieut.-Col. W*M* Coghlan
(second time) 
Lieut*-Col. VI*L. Merewether 
Kaj.-Gen* Sir E*L* Russell 
Kaj.-Gen. C*W* Tremenheere
19 Jan. 1339 -
9 March 1834 -
23 June 1854 - 
26 Oct. 1834 -
November 1861 - 
April 1862 -
January I863 •
19 June 1863 - 
11 Jan. 1868 -
December 1870 -
9 March 1854
23 June 1854
26 Oct. 1854 
September 1861
January 1862 
January I863 
19 June I863
11 Jan. 1868 
December l8?0 
17 July 1872
Governors
Sir Robert Grant 
James Parish (Acting)
Sir Janies Rivett-Carnac 
G.W. Anderson (Acting)
Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Arthur 
L.R. Roid (Acting)
Sir G.R. Clerk (first time)
Lord Falkland
Lord Elphinstone
Sir G.R. Clerk (second time)
Sir H.B.E, Frere
Sir W.R.S.V. Fitzgerald
Sir P.E. liodehouce
of Bombay.
17 March 1833 9 July 1838
11 July 1838 «» 31 May 1839
31 May 1839 - 27 April 1841
29 April 1841 - 9 June 1842
9 June 1842 - 3 Aug. 1846
6 Aug. 1846 - 23 Jan. 1847
23 Jan. 1847 - 1 May 1848
1 May 1848 - 26 Dec. 1853
26 Dec. 1833 - 11 May i860
11 May i860 - 24 April 1862
24 April 1862 6 March I867
6 March 1867 - 6 May 1872
6 May 1372 - 30 April 1877
Governore-General of India.
Lord Auckland 4 March 1836 m 27 Feb. 1842
Lord Bllenborough 28 Feb. 1842 22 July 1844
Lord Kardinge 23 July 1844 - 11 Jan. 1848
Lord Dalhousie 12 Jan. 1848 • 28 Feb. 1836
Lord Canning 29 Feb. 1836 - 31 Oct. 1858
Govern or s-General and Viceroys.
Lord Canning 1 Nov. 1858 11 March 1862
Lord Elgin 12 March 1862 - 20 Nov. 1863
Kaj.-•Gen. Sir Robert Napier 21 Nov. 1863 1 Dec. 1863
(Officiating)
Col. Sir W.T. Dennison (Officiating) 2 Dec. 1863 11 Jan. 1864
Sir John Lawrence 12 Jan. 1364 11 Jan. 1869
Lord Kayo 12 Jan. I869 — 8 Feb. 1872
John Strachey (Officiating) 9 Feb. 1872 • 22 Feb. 1872
Lord Napier of Kerchistoun 23 Feb. 1372 2 May 1872
(Officiating)
Lord Northbrook 3 May 1872 O P 11 April 1876
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Presidents of the Board of Control*
Sir John Ilobhouse (first tine) 29 May 1835
Lord Ellonborough (third tine) September 1841-
Lord Fitzgerald & Vesey 28 Oct* 1841 -
Earl of Ripon 17 Nay 1843
Sir John Hobhouse (later Lord Broughton;
second time) July 1846
John Charle3 Herries 28 Feb* 1852 «
Sir Charles Vfood (first time) 30 Dec* 1852 •
R. Vernon Smith February 1855 ■
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